Source: Kenya Atlas, 1959 (Kenya National Archives). The lack of educational facilities in Maasailand in comparison with other surrounding areas is glaring.
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The Kamba trade in wood carvings has for many decades been done on a global scale. As early as the 1950‟s, the Kamba were organising trade in carvings to distant places like Britain and the United States. Commenting on the fame of Kamba wood carvings in East Africa, Adamson (1967: 237) noted that “they are also exported, and I have found them in curio shops in London, Stockholm, and New York.” She also took note of the group‟s skill in stone and iron crafts.
One might ask, where the subtitle „selling Maasai‟ was derived. It was midday in July 2000 when, seated outside a filling station in Kiboko, a Kamba wood carver and a curio shop owner dashed from his shop just opposite the station heading towards a Pollman‟s vehicle carrying nine tourists en route to Mombasa. He was shouting “buy Masai, buy Masai.” He made one or two sales. I invited him to have a soft drink and then sought some clarifications. I asked him why he invoked the name “Masai” when marketing his products and he told me: “You see, I don‟t know why...but wazungu (Whites) like Masai. Anyway, they have maintained their culture. I admire them too although I feel they should change...they are being left behind by the rest of the country.” Well, at least Muli (his name) knew that “Masai culture” was good for his business.
Muli told me how he deployed the services of a Maasai at one time to sell the products on his behalf. All of a sudden, he noted, the sales went up. And this is the same strategy adopted by some Kamba traders off University Way in Nairobi, where you find „Maasai‟ selling typically Kamba carvings. Let me expound why the Maasai are contracted to act as „middlemen‟?242 There are a number of reasons; one, the Kamba, like many other Kenyan groups, know that the Maasai „can get away‟ with a number of things including the sale of bows, arrows and swords,243 and two, many foreign tourists are attracted to carvings or curios being sold by
„traditional‟ groups. Muli put it this way, “the Masai and the wares match.” This „matching‟ is not just from the cultural aspect but also the fact that buying the products from Maasai in their traditional regalia makes the buyers feel they are engaging in some „fair trade‟ where the money goes „directly‟ to the „producer.‟ Tourists appeared to consider wares sold by the Maasai as more authentic, and „coming from the right source.‟ Amid laughter, noted Muli:
“Asungu244 keep on asking whether we are Masai, sometimes we just lie and tell them ja!”
Although these „joint‟ partnerships still favour the „contractors,‟ most of the Maasai I talked to tended to focus on the „positive‟ side of the trade saying that the Kamba were “assisting”
242 The Maasai do have their own wares too which they market directly. These include; ornaments, bangles, decorated belts and key holders, the Maasai sword, hide whips, clubs and walking sticks.
243 The law might prohibit the hawking of „weapons‟ but the practice is that the Maasai freely sell them in towns without any police intervention. Others doing the same but not looking „Maasai‟ risk arrest.
244 Asungu in Kikamba and Wazungu in Swahili, mean “Whites”.
This chapter sought to present the Kamba and the Maasai as groups that engage in mutual interaction and exchange. The chapter shows how interethnic coexistence is nurtured. It is an outline of the preconditions for coexistence. One of the most critical aspects that emerges is that coexistence is a complementary process. I shall expound on this by looking at the ecological, economic and social aspects. For ecological reasons and specialisation in different modes of subsistence, the Kamba and the Maasai have strong networks of exchange through which the Maasai provide cattle and their products while the Kamba provide agricultural products like maize, beans and peas. In ecological theory, it is noted that coexistence is enhanced when two species differ in the exploitation of resources (Pontin, 1982; see also Barth, 1969). Although the idea here is that this improves stability since the species in question reduce the frequency of “meetings”, specialising in different modes also acts as a basis for mutual exchange. Closely related to the ecological factor is vulnerability. Because both groups inhabit a semi-arid zone, drought enhances interdependence as the Maasai move their cattle to Ukambani in search of pastures while the Kamba go to Maasailand to hire farms (those near springs) or to haul wood for charcoal and firewood.
Economically, relations of interdependence revolve around Kamba businesspersons and Maasai customers. This is a relationship that has developed through regional variations in the integration to the market economy. Ukambani having had an early start in comparison to Maasailand, the Kamba have over the years exploited the business opportunities among the Maasai. This appropriation of the Maasai has extended to the tourism industry where the Kamba use the Maasai image to market their wood carvings. But as I have pointed out, the Maasai have their stake in business too, particularly in cattle trade or constructing buildings which they lease to the Kamba retailers. Moreover, the commoditisation of Maasai milk has
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shaped Kamba-Maasai relations by promoting closer ties and a rare form of exchange between the Maasai suppliers and the Kamba clients.
Socially, the Kamba and the Maasai exchanges take various forms. On the one hand, the shortage of schools in Maasailand has created a situation where Maasai pupils seek schooling opportunities in Ukambani. In addition, many Kamba teachers are deployed to work in schools in Maasailand. Besides, the interdependence created through education, there has also been adoption of “Kamba houses” among the Maasai as well as the deployment of Kamba labour in herding cattle and in farms among Maasai who practice crop farming.
I would like to mention something about common territory. The kinds of exchanges discussed in this chapter take place within a given physical space. And this is perhaps what differentiates „coexistence‟ from „relations‟. Coexistence seems to exemplify a relationship with intensity of exchanges and proximity, aspects that may not be prerequisites among groups that simply „relate‟. With regard to the Kamba and the Maasai, it is important to note that although they have independent territories, the boundaries have remained porous, making exchanges possible. But the most important aspect about their co-residence and interdependence are the distinctions and diversity they exhibit, since, common territory can also translate into assimilation, imitations and sameness, making exchange and coexistence difficult to discern. On the other hand, similarities between two ethnic groups can undermine coexistence as this may weaken the basis for exchange and heighten competition for similar resources. However, the aspect of distinctiveness should not be overemphasised, since groups can be very flexible. Although strangers and enemies can also engage in mutual transactions, there is usually some basis for understanding or commonality among groups that depend on each other.
Finally, I would like to comment about the relationship between „complementarity‟ and
„interdependence‟. From the discussion in this chapter, I would conclude that complementarity (a system of mutual exchange) is a milder form of „interdependence‟ (having to rely on others to survive). In other words, while „complementing‟ each other may be at a superficial level, „interdependence‟ signifies intensity of exchange and indispensability. I would also like to note that complementarity, interdependence and competition go hand in hand but the latter is discussed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER SIX: ETHNIC CONFLICT AS PART OF COEXISTENCE
Having looked at complementarity and interdependence between the Kamba and the Maasai in chapter five, I will examine another pertinent dimension of their relationship in this chapter.
From an empirical standpoint, the Kamba-Maasai discussion would be incomplete without looking at what the two groups are mainly stereotyped for: Hatred and conflict. Conflict is associated with struggles, strife, collision or the use of incompatible means to a certain goal (Horowitz, 1985: 95). There has been a discourse that looks at ethnic conflicts, particularly overt struggles, as falling outside of what is defined as interethnic coexistence (see Kriesberg, 1998). Others have also seen incompatibilities as “failure of coexistence” (Korbel, 1959), while some argue that coexistence has “limits” (e.g. Torstrick, 2000). The kind of approach I adopt here looks at antagonism, ethnic tensions and conflict as integral parts of the coexistence process. The functionalist and structural approach to conflict become fairly relevant here (see Kuper, 1993).
However, I am not suggesting that interethnic coexistence cannot “fail”, but these would be exceptional cases of extreme social turmoil and disorder, leading to a total breakdown of existing forms of exchange and sharing.245 My argument here is that among ethnic groups that share territory and resources, antagonism becomes part of everyday experience as they compete for the said resources, territorial boundaries and for ethnic supremacy. The competition for resources therefore takes the centre stage, adopting an approach that does not see ethnic conflict as primordial or essentialist. However, although group members can hold multiple and cross-cutting identities and interests, it will also be evident that cultural differences, particularly through politicisation, come into play as groups compete for resources.
This chapter takes the reader through the issues around which the Kamba-Maasai conflict revolve. But, as a way of introduction, I begin by briefly examining the Kenyan scene in general, and then proceed to look at Kamba-Maasai ethnic tensions and conflicts. In this regard, I will examine territorial boundaries and coveted resources like farmland, grazing areas, water, cattle and trading centres. The complexity of interethnic coexistence is exemplified by the fact that the resources that shape the groups‟ interdependence and harmony (as indicated in chapter five), are more or less the same ones that the groups fight over.
Besides discussing how ethnic conflict comes about, I will also discuss how the conflicts are resolved as well as legitimised.
245 An example would be the ethnic tensions and mistrust following the genocide in Rwanda and Burundi.
Torstrick (2000) also uses the Israeli-Palestinian case to argue that coexistence has “limits”.
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Not infrequently, ethnic conflicts in Kenya involve other groups outside of Kenya. These include the Karamojong of Uganda, the Ethiopian Boorana or Somali groups from Somalia who launch attacks in Kenya or get attacked for livestock. Most of these transnational conflicts usually involve more than two groups, going contrary to the supposition that most ethnic conflicts are dichotomous (Horowitz, 1985: 182). Moreover, the cross-border raids, particularly in the northern parts of Kenya, often pass as „normal‟ daily experiences, to the extent that even after reports that Kenyan groups have lost hundreds of livestock and several villagers have been killed, sometimes there is no state intervention.
It would be important to note here that historical ethnic conflicts over cattle, territorial boundaries, grazing and watering areas have been significantly shaped by the market economy and the political elite. When the Pokot raid the Marakwet for cattle, it is not what their forefathers used to do; now they use modern weaponry (guns), the raiders are often organised gangs, the clashes are bloodier, and the cattle stolen disappear through sophisticated delivery systems. Besides, the police may not pursue the raiders making it plausible not to rule out a political hand. Access to guns became easier during the long years of chaos in Uganda, during and after Mariam‟s military regime in Ethiopia and particularly after the collapse of Siad Barre‟s government and the consequent disintegration of Somalia in the early 1990‟s. The flow of sophisticated guns into Kenya has undermined Kenya government‟s strategy of arming “home guards” who are expected to protect their groups or villagers in case of external attack.
Conflicts that have destabilised the state
Apart from the isolated interethnic raids and conflicts discussed above, there have been others that have threatened the persistence of the state. Most notable here was the so-called Shifta War of the mid 1960‟s, where militant groups in the northern parts of Kenya fought for regional autonomy and subsequent secession to join Somalia. Although the Kenyan government won this war, much of this region has remained quite volatile, with sporadic incidences of banditry. After this protracted war, the only other real test to the stability of the state was witnessed in the beginning of the 1990‟s. Fearing that the clamour for multiparty
season of 2001, the death toll had reached 80. Reminiscent of the argument that where you marry is where you wage war (cf. Schlee: 1997), Angima notes that “ironically, intermarriage seems to aggravate the problem.
Maasai men now do marry Kisii women, which never happened until about two decades ago”. Actually, a closer analysis shows that because of the practice of female circumcision among the Kisii, Maasai men have always married Kisii women. Angima argues that ideally, intermarriage should bring the two groups closer by bridging the “cultural gap”. But, he writes: “Sons born to the Maasai from such marriages usually go to the Kisii side to see their relatives. But some of them use the opportunity to spy on the Kisii and facilitate cattle theft”.
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democracy would threaten the ruling party‟s hold on power, cabinet ministers and other political elite allied to President Moi organised the so-called majimbo rallies in 1991.249 During these rallies, these political leaders250 threatened to evict migrant groups residing in the Rift Valley (e.g. the Kikuyu, Luo and Luhya groups), and seen to be sympathetic to the multiparty crusade. Within no time, members of these groups were being attacked, killed and their homesteads burnt down. By 1993, when the orgy of violence abated, it was estimated that 1,500 people had been killed and 300,000 displaced (ICJ report 2000, citing Africa Watch, 1993).251 Surprisingly, even after KANU won the 1992 elections that were marred with violence, the ethnic clashes continued in some areas. In 1993, members of the Kikuyu were violently evicted by armed Maasai from Enoosupukia in Narok district. Apart from destruction of their property, about 17 of them were killed and 30,000 displaced.252 Between 1995 and 1996, the ethnic clashes subsided. However, just before the 1997 elections, they erupted again; this time in the Coast province where residents of upcountry origin (e.g. the Kamba and the Luo), assumed to be allied to opposition parties, were systematically attacked and evicted. After the elections, which KANU again won, clashes flared up in the multiethnic Laikipia district and Njoro areas of Nakuru district with the Kikuyu as the main targets. From 1998, some semblance of calmness reigned in most parts of the country. However, as I have already noted, episodes of bloody clashes were witnessed between the Maasai and the Kipsigis along the Trans Mara-Bomet districts‟ border and again between the Maasai and the Kisii on the Trans Mara-Gucha border. Nevertheless, contrary to expectations, the 2002 national elections were not marred with ethnic violence, a clear departure from the two previous ones.
Looking back however, the “ethnic clashes” of the 19990‟s, branded “land clashes” to mask the politicisation of ethnicity, almost plunged Kenya into a civil war. In fact, it must have been a surprise to the Moi government that these conflicts were confined to the margins.
Groups that had lived harmoniously together were being incited to take up arms and fight each other over imaginary grievances. The reason why the conflicts did not spread as envisaged by the agitators is because in some cases253, the groups ignored these external manipulations. Nevertheless, the clashes not only destabilised the livelihoods of those directly
249 Majimbo is Swahili word for “federal”. The KANU politicians touted majimboism as the solution to the clamour for multipartysm. They wanted Kenya to remain a one-party state or go federal, in which jimbos (federal states) would be exclusive ethnic enclaves.
250 Mainly led by Kalenjin politicians.
251 While some reports concur that those killed numbered about 1,500, they put the number of those forcefully displaced to 350,000 (see Young, 1999: 26).
252 ICJ report (2000: 30).
253 For instance, between the Kamba and the Maasai.
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affected but also contributed to Kenya‟s economic decline.254 Attempts made by church organisations, civil society, opposition parties and some Kalenjin politicians255 to have evicted groups return to their farms have hardly yielded any success, thanks to the Moi government‟s ambivalence in the facilitation of the process. Many of those evicted therefore are still displaced, residing in make-shift dwellings in church compounds and slum areas. The whole scenario is a showcase of how coexisting groups can be drawn into conflict and animosity through instrumentalisation of ethnicity. The new government ushered into office in 2002 is expected to revisit this problem and facilitate a reconciliation process.
6.1.1 Kamba-Maasai conflicts
“Muukamba kwata uta ulumye nundu nimakila, makwete matumo...” Translation: “You Kamba, hold your bow firmly because they (Maasai) have crossed the border, they are holding spears…” (Song by Kamba singer, Joseph Mutaiti). Composed and recorded in the 1980‟s, it sounded more like a war song although there was no ongoing conflict. The song however recollects some shared consciousness about past and present fears that the Kamba have about the Maasai. As already pointed out, the issue of territorial boundaries is common talk among both groups, at least metaphorically, for Ukambani-Maasailand border, though arguably one of the most clearly marked, has been one of the most porous. The song reinforces some Maasai claims that much of the Kamba-Maasai battles were fought on Kamba soil.
Apart from their astonishing history, elegance and resilience, the Maasai are widely reputed for their military prowess, at least before and during colonial rule. It has been noted that if it were not for the Rinderpest outbreak in 1880, among other cattle diseases, and a Small Pox attack in 1892, which dealt a severe blow to the group, they would have dominated many of their neighbouring groups (Adamson, 1967: 220; Lamphear, 1993: 98-9). Expounding on this point, a Maasai historian, Kantai, notes in Sankan‟s book that these “...natural disasters, disease and intra-tribal conflict decimated herds, and considerably reduced the population in some sections of the Maasai, thus making it possible for certain tribes to start attacking the Maasai with impunity. Thus the Kamba, the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin tribes all made incursions into territory that was previously effectively controlled by the Maasai...” (1971:
xxi).
254 The violence at the coast, for instance, disrupted tourism.
255 In 1995, in a bid to lure the Kikuyu back to KANU, the so-called KAMATUSA groups led by the then powerful cabinet minister Nicholas Biwott started negotiations with the Kikuyu politicians led by Njenga Karume. These negotiations yielded little, and totally collapsed after the Kikuyu overwhelmingly voted the opposition in the 1997 elections.
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6.1.1.1 Cattle raids
Their long history of sharing borders is dotted with episodes of raids and war. Most Kamba-Maasai conflicts have been fought over cattle. In other words, conflicts have not been necessarily influenced by their ethnic „difference‟ or clash in the modes of subsistence but rather „sameness‟, the fact that both groups keep cattle. And the keeping of cattle, which enhanced rivalry and competition, partly explains why the Maasai related with the Kikuyu, who did not keep herds worth Maasai raid, quite differently from the Kamba. Ndolo (1989:
67-72) notes that by the 1880‟s and the 1890‟s, the “Kamba-Maasai warfare had reached a new level of intensity.” During the Rinderpest epidemic that ravaged both Kamba and Maasai herds in 1882-83 and 1890-92, both tried to restock their herds by raiding each other. The
“southern Maasai” (e.g. Kaputiei), raided the Kamba in Nzaui (now part of Makueni district) in 1893 unleashing a lot of terror and havoc in the area as they took off with large herds of cattle.256 The Maasai attacks on the Kamba at this particular time are said to have worried the British colonial powers who considered the Maasai as aggressors. This concern led to the establishment of a special militia to protect the Kamba who were major suppliers of food and labour to the local garrison of the Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAco).
At around 1895, the Maasai were themselves engulfed in internal strife as two brothers, Olonana (Lenana) and Senteu (Sendeyo) fought over the ascension to the coveted position of Laibon257 or „leader‟ left vacant after the death of Mbatiany. Although the Kamba and the Maasai had their traditional differences, Ndolo‟s vivid account shows how the British used divide and rule tactics to foment hatred and rivalry. After the Kamba became hostile to Ainsworth after his attempts to curtail raids for cattle and women, in December 1895, a contingent of Maasai with the full support of the British attacked parts of Ukambani and collected a booty of 556 cattle and 1,300 goats which was shared among the Maasai and the British.258 Although the colonial administration was later to „abolish‟ cattle raids, their evident complicity in the exercise might explain why it proved difficult to stamp out. From this early pre-colonial period to the present, one thing that has remained is the portrayal of the Maasai as ultimate aggressors and the Kamba as „victims,‟ and yet, it is evident that warfare had significant cultural values among the Kamba. Apart from the animal wealth that was and still is highly valued, military prowess was one sure way that a young man gained recognition among his peers and elders in the society. In comparison however, cattle raids remained more
256 Ndolo, (1989: 67) citing Jackson F. (1936: 167).
257 The laibon was more of a spiritual leader but could also exercise political authority.
258 Ndolo (1989: 73) citing Ainsworth‟s report to Sir A. Hardinge, 3rd December 1895.