1. R ESEARCH AGENDA
1.4. Contribution of the papers and organization of the thesis
The first paper establishes the foundation of the thesis by reviewing the experimental literature in Ecological Economics. The paper develops a link between existing empirical work and the various definitions of institutions and theories of institutional change. It shows that three types of experimental practice can be distinguished in a structure–agency framework. These practices are mirrored in (1) a structural, (2) an agent-centered, and (3) an evolutionary viewpoint on institutions. The paper sets the frame for the thesis and contributes to the first and third guiding question by defining which concepts of institutions can underlie an empirical project and by asking questions about what we have to consider if we are interested in studying institutional change by means of economic experiments.
The second paper demonstrates the structural viewpoint as defined in the first paper and contributes to answering the second question. In a coordination game where subjects can choose between the bus or the car (i.e., a framed field experiment that focuses on mode choice), traffic policy is exogenously varied to study its impact on the behavior of participants.
In a similar approach, the third paper alters the sequence of play by introducing “leading by example.” In one treatment of a voluntary contribution mechanism public good game, subjects play in parallel; in another treatment, one participant moves first, and then, the other players decide, being aware of the first person’s contribution. It extends the approach of the second paper by altering an important variable of the group context layer: the
distribution of wealth. Participants also receive information on the distribution of wealth.
The paper also contributes to answering the third question. Specifically, it demonstrates that in the absence of a behavioral rule in one context, rules and norms known from other contexts can substantially alter behavior.
The fourth paper is based on a natural field experiment. Participants do not know they are part of an experiment and decide in their natural environment (cf. Harrison & List, 2004).
The study explores the role of what is perceived to be the status quo decision in a specific context. In particular, it demonstrates that if subjects are forced to decide either for or against a “no junk mail” sticker, their choices differ from a situation in which the status quo is not to use a sticker. The paper contributes to answering the second and third questions by exploring how higher level rules and norms affect decision-making.
The fifth paper takes a normative viewpoint by asking whether economic experiments could be used as a tool for achieving pro-social behavioral change. Specifically, it investigates how the experience of play in a social dilemma game affects subsequent pro-social behavior as measured by a donation. The paper contributes to answering the second question by investigating how experience in one context transfers to another context. Table 1 displays a summary of the empirical papers, distinguishing between the layers of information players assess.
Table 1: Main topics of empirical papers by information layers
Paper Number
Material Payoffs Game Layer
Group-Context Layer Identity Layer
II Coordination problem; no dominant strategy; class) or bus user (lower middle class)
III Social dilemma with dominant strategy but possibility to set a positive example in the leadership
IV Individual benefits depend on the interest in receiving ads and the benefits from saving paper
Perception of what is the social norm
Self-image with respect to environmental behavior
V Main interest in altruism (other-regarding
preferences) by means of a dictator game
Perception of what is the social norm
Self-image with respect to environmental behavior; learning and experience
Source: own design
The dissertation culminates in a concluding part. Here, the work is summarized, and the lessons learned for institutional analysis are synthesized. A major outcome of this synthesis is a research framework for the study of evolutionary institutional change as defined in the first paper. The empirical papers contribute to the development of this framework by suggesting specific aspects that could be potentially important in the study of institutional change.
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