The concept of institutions

observance (Agrawal and Yadama, 1997:459), as well as forest ownership. In principle, the communities enjoy usufruct rights; that is, rights to collect fruits, leaves and seeds. The government of Cameroon owns the right to the trees, timber and minerals. This tenure niche overlap (common pool resource and a national park) and the ineffective state control has led to continuous use on a furtive or open basis. Little is known of communities because academics and parks protection agencies have long ignored and downplayed their role in protecting biodiversity (Ostrom, 1999a). Consequently, local governance is truly the road less traveled. It has been recently argued that the political influence of forest communities could be strengthened by secure land tenure and well defined property rights and opportunities to use their resources (CIFOR, 2007:24). This leads to the main argument of this chapter that in the wake of state failures, the relocation policy is to blame for the conservation vacuum that currently exists in the Korup national park. Hence, if state is not effective on the ground, there is a need to revitalize and empower institutions created and enforced by user communities, because they have a higher chance of being respected.

strategies that organize shared concepts used by humans in repetitive situations. To her, rules mean shared prescriptions like “must”, “must not” or “may” that are mutually understood and predictably enforced by those responsible for monitoring and sanctioning in any particular situation. Also, norms are shared prescriptions that are enforced by participants themselves through internally and externally imposed costs and inducements.

Strategies, Elinor Ostrom argues, are regularized plans that individuals make within the incentive structures (Ostrom, 1999b:39). These plans could be rational or irrational.

For this chapter, institutions are not only rules or organizations but also both. The argument here is that a rule without an enforcement body is like assessing a software program while ignoring the hardware that runs it. So, it is not academically sensible to treat rules in isolation to their enforcement bodies because in most cases, they are part of the culture and history of a people. Institutions are therefore part; village associations, cultural sites and processes [effective regulations put in place] by groups with a strong identity and leadership. These groups survive on common pool resources through patterned behaviours that directly or indirectly control and regulate resource use. These behaviour control mechanisms (institutions) are “embedded in the traditions” and transmitted to other generations through the indigenous knowledge exchange process (Knudsen, 2008:40).

Traditional norms and values (customs for acceptable patterns) of resource extraction, set the rules of the game of social interaction and fashion how individual behaviour meet group expectations of forest use, and the long term security of resources. In this way, institutions could be seen as a way of life or the culture of a social unit. They always come into contact with other institutions, but could be highly resilient to changing circumstances even though they undergo change to some extent (Eguavoen, 2008:9). This change could influence conservation attitudes. Poteete and Ostrom, (2004:6) argue that if institutions, as they usually do, evolve as unwritten norms or rules, they would be difficult for outsiders to observe or get recognized. These assumptions are tested in the Korup context with the help of the institutional analysis and development framework (IAD) of Elinor Ostrom.

Elinor Ostrom’s institutional analysis and development framework (Figure 11) incorporates analysis on three levels. One level comprises the physical attributes of the forest, attributes

of the community, and the rules in use. The action arena includes; the action situation and the actors. The last, patterns of interactions produce outcomes, also constitute evaluative criteria (Ostrom, 1999b:42). The material attribute could be proximity to the resource, which is not completely degraded. The attributes of a community include: the values or generally accepted behaviour, level of common understanding by participants about the structure of action arenas, the extent of homogeneity in the preferences of community members, the size and composition of the community, and the extent of inequality of basic assets among those affected (Ostrom, 2004:35). The rules-in-use could be regulations, instructions, precepts, and principles (Ostrom, 2005:16). A rule is regulation when it is the rule being announced, put into effect, enforced (strictly, laxly, invariably, etc.), disobeyed, broken, rescinded, changed, revoked or reinstated. Elinor Ostrom argues that a rule is a precept when it is used as a maxim for prudential or moral behaviour that puts charity ahead of justice (Ostrom, 2004:20). Rules could also be a set of instructions for creating an action situation in a particular environment. Rules could be principles when they are a moral belief and mostly enforced by the individuals concerned.

Figure 11: A framework for Institutional Analysis (Ostrom, 1999:42; 2005:15)

The action arena is the social space where individuals interact, exchange goods and services, solve problems, dominate one another or fight (Ostrom, 1999b:42). Actors are either acting as individuals or as a group. Such an idea of grouping actors is used in discussing the Korup case. Action situations include: the set of participants; specific positions filled by participants; allowable actions and their linkage to outcomes; potential outcomes linked to individual sequences of action; level of control each participant has

Actors Physical/Material

Conditions

Attributes of Community

Rules-in-use

Action Arena Action Situations

Outcomes Patterns of Interactions

Evaluative Criteria

over choice; information available to participants about the structure of the action situation;

and the incentives and deterrents assigned to actions and outcomes (Ostrom, 2005:16).

Actors’ interactions produce outcomes. When participants share common values and interact in a multi-complex set of arrangements within a small community, the probabilities of them developing adequate rules and norms to govern repetitive relationships are much greater. Reputation for keeping one’s word is important in such small communities meanwhile the cost of developing monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms is relatively low. Heterogeneity in terms of culture and distrust substantially increase the task of devising and sustaining effective rules. However, in a well-ordered human enterprise, some behaviour is rarely observed because individuals following rules do not normally engage in that activity in the given setting (Ostrom, 2004:23). This means a common understanding and respect of the rules in use or enforced is pivotal. The IAD framework is hailed by Elinor Ostrom as relevant for analyzing common pool resources institutions, and could be applied in the analysis of sacred groves (1999b:44). The framework is also suitable for this chapter in that it examines the origin of rules or how they change in a particular context.

7.3 History of forest governance⁸⁰

The documented history of forest governance in Cameroon dates as far as the colonial era.

Since 1916, the British and French colonial policies outlived that of the Germans. The common denominator of the policies of these powers was that communities were granted usufruct rights, while the colonial authority owned the trusteeship over the forest. That is jurisdiction over forests was with the forestry service while rural communities could only gather non-timber forest products for domestic use (Amanor, 2004:8). A major difference was that the French tèrres vacants et sans mâitre and the Germanherrenlos land policies did not recognize and preserve the native rights of communities like British policy did (Egbe, 1997:9). They faced local resistance. For instance, the 1935 French forest code introduced a license-to-log system that granted commercial rights over forest products.

Only French citizens and expatriates enjoyed this privilege. However, the British colonial rule was responsible for the Korup forests area (British Cameroons) and so its policies are

80This historical timeline of forest governance is based on discussions with the SDO for Ndian in June 2006.

discussed. Its rule vested forests governance in the hands of the British Crown whose headquarters was in southern Nigeria. Local chiefs controlled at the ground level but were answerable to the British Crown. This indirect rule system stymied protests by placing land under the authority of loyal chiefs. Although the colonial authority ratified the by-laws introduced by chiefs, they intervened whenever chiefs deviated from official policy. Under this system, paramount chiefs were responsible for creating forest reserves; meanwhile the Forestry Department had legal rights to demarcate forest reserves if the chiefs failed to act (Amanor, 2004:9). This policy expected communities to participate in the implementation of development projects although they did not have any voice in their design. In this way, the colonial regime in Nigeria adopted a multi-layer management approach that recognized the conservation authority of indigenous institutions to some observable extent.

The postwar and independence years saw the emergence of a bureaucracy, which mimicked the colonial forest policies. British colonial Order No. 25 of 14 October 1937 originally established the forest as the Korup Native Administration Forest Reserve (KNAFR). Its provisions retained the right of enclaves to hunt, fish, collect; snails, tortoises, land crabs, honey, kola, wild fruits, nuts and so on. The boundaries of the reserve were regularly demarcated from thence until the mid-1960s and this marked the official commencement of post-colonial state ownership and control (Malleson, 1999; 2000; 2001). Ordinance No.

74/357 of 17 August 1974 that mirrors the national integration and development agenda of the independent state, which was aimed at using law to pursue its hegemonic project, defines the first forestry legislation. It was abrogated in the 1980s and replaced by Ordinance No 83/969 of 12 April 1983 because it was out-dated. Decree No. 83/170 of 1983 established the laws binding national parks in Cameroon. It banned hunting, gathering, fishing and logging in national parks and forest reserves. Relocation was originally announced in 1981 but after a 1983 assessment, people in the park enclaves were instructed not to build new houses, plant trees, cash crops or open new farmland since resettlement was imminent. Three years later, presidential decree No. 86/1283 of October 30^th 1986 created the Korup National Park and withdrew the extraction rights of all enclaves in the “national park”. The 1983 law was later found to be inadequate in solving forestry issues of the times and so was promulgated and replaced by Law No 94/01 of 20

January 1994. Its decree of application came in August 1995 that called for participatory forestry management and the concept of community forestry was adopted. A National Forestry Action Plan and National Environmental Management Plan were drawn up in 1996. Table 16 outlines the relevant laws and decrees to the Korup National Park case.

Table 16: Relevant forestry legislation (Korup Management Plan, 2002:40)

Year Decrees, Laws and Orders

14.10.1937 30.10.1986 20.01.1994 19.04.1994 20.07.1995 18.12.1995 1996

10.04.1996 05.08.1996 21.12.1998

•Order No. 25 established the Korup Native Administration Forest Reserve

•Decree No.86-1283 established Korup National Park (KNP)

•Law No.94-01 established forestry, wildlife and fisheries regulations in Cameroon

•Order No 037-CAB-PM classified KNP as Category One PA with priority protection

•Decree No 95-466-PM established conditions for implementation of wildlife regulations

•Decree No 95-678-PM establish indicative framework for land use in the southern forest

•National Forestry Action Plan and National Environmental Management Plan

•Decree No 96-237-PM defined the conditions for the functioning of Special Fund provided in the Law 1994 related to forestry, wildlife and fisheries

•Framework Law No. 96/12 on the Environment

•Decree No 98-345 of organized Ministry of Environment and Forest

Generally, the subsequent forestry decrees have still made local extraction inside the park illegal even though communities had long inhabited it before the introduction of the nation-building concept. It has been noted that there was no prior consultation with locals before enacting laws to ban their activities inside their “God-given or ancestral property” (Egbe, 1997:12). So, state management generally ignored and de-motivated locals whose energies needed to be mobilized in the forest management efforts (Ibid). The major explanation is that the over-seer forestry departments perceived of local or customary rules as ‘weak’.

Since 1988, eco guards; the para-military surveillance and enforcement unit of the Korup National Park Service, employed by the government of Cameroon, have been trained to guard the national park. They are supposed to patrol its boundaries and station at game guard posts, all of which are located on the Cameroonian side of the park when in effect, most bush meat is smuggled into Nigeria through footpaths across the national park. The

first ever Management Plan of the park, which expired in 2007, recommends the building of two game posts in strategic villages along the Cameroon-Nigeria border. One year to its expiration there was still no funding. Originally, three fully integrated and 23 contracted eco guards are to police the 126,900 hectares of closed canopy Korup forest.

Looking into the provisions of the decrees, laws and orders on Table 16, one could find inherent contradictions in their details. In such a cloudy circumstance, when state authorities undertake certain actions, they refer to different legislations for justification. As such, one is not certain which law is actually abrogated and which is the currently applicable one. One relevant contradiction is that although Korup National Park is one of the first ICDPs in 1986, eight years later, Order No. 037-CAB-PM classified it as a first category protected area with a high priority and protection status. There is a contradiction of certain objectives of the national forestry policy as defined by the 1996 Environmental Management Plan. The objective: to increase the participation of local populations in forest conservation and management in order to contribute to raising their living standards is also contradicted by Prime Ministerial decree No.96-237-PM of April 10^th 1996 which creates a Special Fund for the Management and Equipment of Wildlife Conservation and Protected Areas as provided for in Law No.94-01 of January 20^th, 1994. This Fund receives 30% of all revenue generated from hunting permits, licenses, trophy, capture and traders’

fees. 40% of the proceeds from transactions, fines and various sales of wildlife products are also paid to the fund. This decree provides that of the other wildlife related revenues, 55%

should go to the public treasury, and 45% to this special fund. There is no official stipulation that benefits derived from conservation activities be shared with locals. “Local people are not entitled to any cash but if a road is built in any part of the country, these people would benefit by using it whenever they come to that area”⁸¹. This reveals official ignorance to the loopholes of the stipulations of the 1996 Prime Ministerial decree.

Most of the contradictions affect the functioning of state agencies that oversee forest management on the ground. According to article 7 of Ordinance 74-2 of 1974, bona fide owners and occupants who hold rights over public property of the state prior to 1974, may

81Acting Conservator of Korup; personal communication, 23.07.06

not be dispossessed thereof unless the public interest so requires and subject to compensation calculated as in the case of expropriation. Consequently, until there is convincing proof that their restricted livelihood activities are against the public interest, relocation of inhabitants from a park, is unjustified. Also, the 1983 law requires people to request permits to own a firearm (locally made and imported) at the same time it bans all types of hunting with firearms. This contradiction makes the work of eco guards a daunting task as indigenes cannot understand why “a licensed hunting gun” should be seized. Since permit requests are costly, most Dane gun owners now resort to bribery and corruption when caught by the gendarmes or eco guards and later hunt to recover the money.

The extended colonial policy of community participation through chiefs or headmen reproduces the conceptions that communities are best represented through leaders (Amanor, 2004:10). In this light, community participation is uniquely used in official documents. Instead of rallying the entire community of resource users, appointed

“government Chiefs” are employed to work at the Korup Park Service office. These people have all but migrated with their entire nuclear families from their villages of origin to settle in Mundemba Town and are out of touch with the people they are supposed to represent.

However, the current view of many in the administration of Korup National Park is that the difficulties in stating for most wild species, what quantity of harvest is sustainable, is the main justification of state laws to completely ban all extraction activities inside the park.

For instance, Chapter 1, article 3 of decree No. 83/170 of the law binding national parks in Cameroon stipulates that livelihood activities like hunting, fishing, industrial activities, extraction of materials, pollution of waters, agriculture, pastoral activities and grazing of domestic animals are prohibited (Malleson, 2000:250). Interestingly, there is not a clear-cut clause in state law that does prohibit human settlement in national parks. It is hard to think of a scenario in which people who legally reside in parks would not carry out livelihood activities in them. However, such laws are the outcome of the fact that donors and ministries that make them are far away from the eco guards who have to implement what they did not participate in drafting. This also explains why the contradictory policy environment further complicates law enforcements on the ground especially by eco guards.