Actors’ interests, conservation linkages and networks

6.1.1.4 Locals or micro level actors

Micro level actors consist of village organizations like households, council of elders, chiefs, hunters, women and youth groups, and reluctantly, government appointed chiefs.

They constitute micro social units, which apply their customary rights to protect their lands from encroachments, although not officially recognized. An infant indigenous non-governmental organization; Korup Rainforest Ecotourism Organisation / Korup Guides Association (KREO/KOGAN), stands to be a platform for advancing the course of the locals. It is hard to include western researchers as actors with a committed stake in the conservation of the Korup National Park because it is officially acknowledged that current research is driven by external interests and contributes little to Korup National Park (Korup Management Plan, 2002:79). Scientists do not feel the obligation to leave copies of their works with the Korup Park Service library and so up-to-date knowledge is lacking. Also, western tourists may have an interest in admiring nature but have not directly contributed to the current conservation discourse in the area. Local universities have not done scientific research on the park except individual professors could work for partner universities on a project but the reports are not open to the public. Hence, for now it is fair not to include;

KREO/KOGAN, local universities western researchers and tourists as actors.

2. Habitat functions: Forests provide refuge and reproduction habitat to wild species, thus contributing to conservation of biological and genetic diversity and evolutionary processes.

3. Production functions: Photosynthesis and nutrient uptake by autotrophs converts energy, carbon dioxide, water and nutrients into a wide variety of carbohydrate structures which are then used by secondary producers to create an even larger variety of living biomass.

Humans consume, ranging from food and raw materials to energy and genetic resources.

4. Information functions: Forest ecosystems provide an essential ‘reference function’ and contribute to the maintenance of human health by providing opportunities for reflection, spiritual enrichment, cognitive development, and recreation and aesthetic experiences.

The interests of state and international actors are locally reflected in the goals and objectives of the Korup National Park (Chapter 3). Three key words describe them; poverty alleviation, conservation and development. The idea of relocation so that development could come easily to the people is a key goal. However, international forest partnerships since the 1990s have been built on a platter of politics of carbon sequestration especially as Cameroon’s forest have a capacity of 6.6 gigatones. It is high enough to attract international support for forest protection. However, this seems to favour rich western scientists and tourists, which visit the park for research and leisure. Hence, this international interest led to the official goal of limiting human activities inside protected areas only to research, tourism and recreation. Cameroon government shares this interest and has enacted national park laws that eco guards must enforce. As a poor natural resource steward, the government is in dire need of external technical and financial support (Ascher, 2000). Foreign exchange through green aid is another interest of the government of Cameroon in pursuing the national park strategy in the Korup forest area (Ibid).

Consequently, to maintain its political standing in the global conservation community, the government of Cameroon has to undertake actions that construe with the goal number 7 of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs); that focuses on reversing the loss of environmental resources (FAO, 2006:196). Consequently, the forestry laws dictate how environmental threats could be wiped. Eco guards; trained paramilitaries are employed

to patrol the Park and provide law enforcement and surveillance as a means of safeguarding the interests of their employers. As actors, their interests are defined by state orders and not necessarily a reflection of the interests of the local communities. However, management approaches have been dictated through funding agreements. For instance, a financial agreement signed in the early 1990s between the government of Cameroon and the European Commission clearly dictates the management priorities of the Korup National Park. Two of the seven terms of reference urges Korup National Park authorities to:

o Build and implement a development programme directed towards the rural areas surrounding the Korup Park in order to help local people to find sustainable economic alternatives to the present hunting, trapping, gathering and deforesting practices. This programme will be based on the development of appropriate, sustainable farming and extractive systems, the improvement of community social infrastructure and the development of small-scale economic activity.

o Develop an environmental education and awareness programme that would assist the local people to take part in the decision making process, manage their own resources and address issues of poverty, population, health, environment and sustainable development (Financial Agreement 1992:1 - 2).

Such outside dictation of policies is somehow justified given that environmental concerns had not been a priority to the government of Cameroon prior to the 1970s when the country enjoyed real economic boom. In the early 1980s and 1990s, state interest in the environment grew, partly in response to the international concern over biodiversity conservation (Malleson, 2000:249). Against this background, the non-legally binding authoritative statement of principles on forests adopted in 1992 put the primary task of conserving or sustainable management of forests in the hands of host governments and its peoples. In a smart anticipation of the availability of donor funds, the government passed Decree No. 81-13 in 1981 calling for the total protection to 20% of the country’s forest through the establishment of national parks and forest reserves (Ibid). In principle, national park laws ban all forms of human livelihoods inside them. The strategy of macro level actors is to exclude resident communities from national park despite the fact that the same national park law does not explicitly call for human displacements from national parks.

The community members are interested in forest resources for their livelihoods. The KREO/KOGAN is interested in the beauty and diverse nature of Korup rainforest, which

attracts many people to visit it. It asserts that communities inside the park have not been involved at all in developing its current limited tourist potentials. So, it advocates a participatory local management approach to address issues of unsustainable resource use.

Hence, the Korup case represents an interface that is characterized by competing interests revolving on a shared goal. Manifest cases of contestations in the 1980s were reported in by members of Erat village but Esukutan and Ikondo Kondo I have not officially laid a complain. Elites of Erat wrote a series of protest letters to the government of Cameroon and hired the services of a Nigerian Lawyer to fight their cause. They were ignored. Also, when buffalos destroyed their crops they wrote letters to the local commander asking him to send some gendarmes to kill these animals but their calls were again ignored (Röschenthaler, 2000:36). This then forced locals to hire expert hunters from outside to kill these animals.

Box 6: Actors and their interests (Adapted from: Schmidt-Soltau, 2003:6)

The money and technical advice serve as the driving engines for national actors to meet their international obligations. Added to this macro level network are academics⁶⁷that have provided the knowledge base on which dominant conservation discourses are framed. Eco guards are embedded at the lowest level of the macro level conservation network. While governmental departments and ministries make laws and decisions, the eco guards enforce them on the field (park surveillance and law enforcement). The incentive structures for eco guards are mostly the salary and expected bonuses they get as endowments.

Successful conservation is said to be through a supportive network of actors through claims, orders and goods are channeled and which defend respective interests (Long,

67See chapter two for the views of the romantics and conservation biologists.

Korup National Park Forest Reduction of hunting and

gathering as overall conservation goal; legitimized by international commitments like CBD

Make and enforce national park laws as sign of ownership; heeding to international calls for hasty green forestry regulations

Source of livelihood and development; own customary entitlements

Cameroon government/ ecoguards

Households & entire communities International Conservation Agencies

Common Interest:

sustainability of the resources inside the korup national park

Conflict: conservation discourses and strategies, knowledge and power

1992:4, Mahanty, 2002). A network of the national government and international donors (broken arrow in Box 6) is in charge of administrative issues. International fora and treaties on protected areas legitimize this network. Actors are linked by development finance partnerships initiated by conventions and treaties. Cameroon is a signatory to many treaties including a conservation treaty in 1999, but which has so far made little progress on the ground due to lack of financial backing from Western donors and credit organisations. In June of 2002, it participated in the planning meeting of the Africa Forest Law Enforcement and Governance (AFLEG) process in Brazzaville that involved more than 73 participants from 27 countries representing governments, international organizations, NGOs, and the private sector. It hosted a Ministerial Conference in Yaounde, from 13-16 October 2003 and signed the declaration that urges governmental commitment and will for action and partnerships. This ‘Yaoundé Accord’ is a trans-border conservation initiative aimed at protecting more than 3.5 million hectares of forest in the Congo basin.

Table 15: Cameroon’s international treaties

Name of treaty Place Year

The Convention on Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources Algers 1968 The Convention on the Protection of Cultural and Natural Heritage Paris 1972 Convention on International Trade of Threatened Flora and Fauna Species Washington 1973 Joint regulation of flora and fauna in the Lake Tchad Basin Enugu 1977 Accord for Co-operation among Central African States on wildlife conservation Libreville 1983

The Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer Vienna 1985

The Convention on Climate Change Rio de Janerio 1992

The Convention on the Conservation of Biological Diversity Rio de Janerio 1992

The Convention on Desertification Paris 1994

The Conservation of Central African Forest Ecosystems Yaounde 1999

Africa Forest Law Enforcement and Governance Brazzaville 2002

COMIFAC (Commission of Ministers in charge of Forests in Central Africa) TRIDOM (Tri-national Dja-Odzala-Minkebe) forest landscape programme

Brazzaville Brazzaville

2004 2005

(Source: Korup Management Plan, 2002:15)

Global networks like the the International Union for the Conservation of Nature give rise to multi-actor and multi-level governance in which authority is increasingly shared. It consists of ‘like-minded’ nested members sharing a common socio-biological identity, which has intrinsically superseded the confines of and are much more powerful than nation states.

Contracts, treaties and agreements oblige network actors. The nodes or ties are strong although donor commitments often characterize short cycles of four to eight years.

Through conservation networks, formal and documented knowledge on nature protection as well as “green aid” flow from rich to cash-trapped members (UN, 2007:28). At the village level, networks consist of households, families and village associations through which knowledge and information are shared among members. These networks are based on verbal contracts, loyalty, trust, kin relationships and obligation whereby individuals are nested within face-to-face relations with other persons (weak ties). Micro level actors do not constitute an organized structure and do not have access to global networks and so one would hardly see them as negotiating from a position of power. Consequently, ethical sensibilities are the arenas for the less powerful actors. In January of 2005 an emerging indigenous NGO initiated a Memorandum of Understanding that is signed by 22 Chiefs and representatives of villages in the park and its peripheral zones. This document states “the indigenous people have decided to take a step in collaboration with the NGO to conserve the Korup National Park forest and the animals” (MoU, 2005:1).

This means that access to this emerging network opens local actors to its constraints and opportunities (structural positions). Power is attached to positions in structures of social relations. The indigenous network could be likened to a lined network where locals do not have many ties. There are no cliques, groups or sub groups in this network. Should the KREO/KOGAN get access to a global conservation network, then there is a possibility to have more ties which also means more power to extract better bargains in exchanges, as well as be a focus for deference and attention from those in less favored positions.

However, a list of “anticipated benefits / opportunities” for the villagers as well as its 8 goals portray the KREO/KOGAN as a platform for advancing the interest of the locals, promising benefits and obligations for the villagers if they ban hunting and snaring.