Levi’s discussion of “Greek Wisdom” and his attempt to disassociate it from science and philosophy reflects a defensive posture against the charges brought against the philosophers in his period on the part of the more staunch traditionalists. At the same time he expresses a strongly critical attitude of these traditionalists as well as of other social and intellectual trends that characterize his social environment.
Levi’s entire literary enterprise, as we have seen, is based on the Aris-totelian notion that human perfection lies in the perfection of the intellect, which in turn consists of knowledge of the sciences. More-over, human immortality, according to him, results from the attainment of this perfection.112 Thus all actions and learning must be gauged from the perspective of how they contribute to or detract from it—a point that serves as the foundation of Maimonides’ philosophy.113 With this in mind, it is interesting to note what beliefs and practices Levi singles out in his own period as detrimental to achieving the goal of human perfection.
One of Levi’s criticisms echoes the age-old lament of all social educators and reformers against the pursuit of wealth for its own sake.
Maimonides indicates clearly that the situation is no different in his own time and that the most defective of human goals “to which the people of the earth spend their lives is the perfection of possessions.”114 He also describes the great lengths people go and the tremendous dangers to which they expose themselves to increase their wealth.115 In a similar vein, Levi notes that most of the people love their wealth more than their body. He points out that one of the Hebrew terms for the value of an object is damim, which is similar to the term blood, dam, alluding to the great devotion people have to their possessions. He also posits a relationship between damim and the word for imagination,
112 For a discussion of this point in Levi’s thought, see my introduction to Livyat Ḥen:
The Secrets of the Faith and the Gate of the Haggadah, xlvi-lv.
113 See, for example, Eight Chapters, 5; Mishneh Torah, Laws of Character Traits 3.2;
Treatise on Logic, 14.
114 Guide 3.54: 634.
115 Guide 3.12.
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dimayon, to indicate that these things have only imaginary value.116 So prevalent is the goal of pursuing wealth, Levi maintains, that “even the wise are afflicted with this illness.”117 Levi’s personal situation, in which he was dependent upon the support of others and had to eke out a living by tutoring, adds a further dimension to appreciating his remarks on this matter:
It is appropriate to learn from the ways of God, who watches over and benefits those who are good. For this reason it is stated: and in her left hand are riches and honor [Proverbs 3:16]. In this generation and this land, however, there are few who help the wise befriend them and honor them.118
In addition to the pursuit of wealth, Levi’s discussion of ethics in the opening to the pillar “Boaz” singles out a number of other evil traits—
jealousy, domination, and grief. He may have focused upon these traits in particular precisely because of his feeling of their pervasiveness in his period, even among the wise.
Superstitious beliefs and practices are also seen by Levi as highly detrimental to the individual’s wellbeing, and he attempts to negate a number of them. This position may seem more than a little strange to the modern reader, given many of Levi’s own views. One must remember, however, that many of today’s superstitions belonged to yesterday’s science. Levi distinguishes between astrology, the special properties of certain objects, and the ability of certain souls to affect what is outside the body by the superior power of their imagination—which he treats as true insofar as they are supported by empirical observation and can be explained scientifically119—and certain beliefs and practices that he regarded as having no foundation whatsoever. As indicated above, he denies the existence of demons, hence the efficacy of all practices associ-ated with them, such as spells and amulets.120 He regards the belief in
116 Livyat Ḥen: The Quality of Prophecy and the Secrets of the Torah, 4.
117 Ibid., 27.
118 Ibid., 9.
119 See above, note 91.
120 Compare Maimonides’ critique of the writers of charms in Guide 1.61, though his discussion there focuses on the belief in the power of the secret sacred names of
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them, and more so, the belief in having seen them, as a result of feeble-mindedness and an overactive imagination. While Levi’s imme-diate concern in his discussion of demons is to explain Talmudic tales that seem to accept their existence and the efficacy of certain practices to gain control over them or protect oneself from them, implicit in his remarks is a critique of many of his contemporaries who continue to believe in them. He expresses a similar critical attitude toward the belief in the ability of certain individuals to make miraculous long jour-neys in almost no time, despite the traditional sources that appear to confirm such ability.121 Levi concludes his discussion by arguing that
“one should only believe in what is sensed, or known by the intellect or received from our prophets and Sages. The perfect individual should not be tempted to believe anything outside these three.”122 Ironically, Levi borrows this argument from Maimonides, who brings it in his letter to Montpellier rejecting astrology.123 On this issue, Levi parts company with the Great Eagle, and views astrology as included in, rather than outside, the matters that should be believed.
Yet Levi’s indebtedness to astrology is not without reservation. He considers it an inferior area of knowledge, not worthy of devoting much time to it. The words of the Torah and the other sciences, such as astronomy, natural science, and metaphysics, should be the main object of one’s studies, for through them the soul attains its perfection. Similar to Maimonides, he also argues that the good and evil that befall a human being are in accordance with his acts, not in accordance with his constellation. While Levi clearly feels that the stars influence a person’s acts, they do not determine them. The laws of the Torah serve to
God. For a study of this issue, see Aviezer Ravitzky, “Maimonides and his Disci-ples on Linguistic Magic and ‘the Vain Imaginings of the Writers of Charms,’” in Jewish Culture in the Eye of the Storm: Jubilee Volume in Honor of Yosef Aḥituv, ed.
Avi Sagi and Naḥem Ilan (‘Ein Tsurim: HaKibbutz HaMe’uḥad, 2002), 431-458 (Heb.). For an extensive discussion of the controversy in medieval Jewish thought regarding the efficacy of amulets, see Dov Schwartz, Amulets, Properties and Rationalism in Medieval Jewish Thought (Bar-Ilan University Press: Ramat-Gan, 2004) (Heb.).
121 See Livyat Ḥen: The Quality of Prophecy and the Secrets of the Torah, 764-770.
122 Ibid., 770.
123 See Iggerot HaRambam, 479.
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counter their incidental evil influence, hence “Israel is not governed by the constellation” (BT Shabbat 156a).124
Levi’s Aristotelian view that the soul does not remain when the person dies leads him at times to attack contrary beliefs. He mentions Naḥmanides and alludes to his esoteric view that the reason for Levi-rate marriage is to enable the soul of the dead brother to transmigLevi-rate to the infant born of this union. Levi labels this opinion “corrupt.”125 He also reports having heard an “Ashkenazi rabbi” explain the Talmudic statement in BT Shabbat 152b that the soul ascends and descends for twelve months while the body still exists, and when the body no longer exists the soul just ascends, as referring to the wicked, in whose case the descent of the soul imparts feeling to the decaying body, thereby resulting in its experience of suffering. Only after this period, when the body is completely corrupted, does the soul ascend to the Garden of Eden. Levi considers this opinion too as clearly false. With the death of the individual, he argues, the body begins to return to matter and is no longer fit to retain a soul, while the soul is no longer capable of movement or of maintaining any feeling or imaginative knowledge.126 Levi also rejects the notion that “hell” (gehinnom) refers to an actual place, and he sees it as an allusion to the extinction of the soul, or its being “cut off” (karet), with the death of the body.127 Levi’s critique of certain views held by his contemporaries extends to the Kabbalists.
They appear to have continued to flourish in Provence in this period, with some of them incorporating philosophic ideas into their system.128
124 See Livyat Ḥen: The Secrets of the Faith and the Gate of the Haggadah, 189.
125 Ibid., 240; cf. Naḥmanides, Commentary on Genesis 38:8. See also Bahya ben Asher, Commentary on Numbers 25:9.
126 Livyat Ḥen: The Secrets of the Faith and the Gate of the Haggadah, 279-280. This opinion may have been influenced by R. Saadiah’s approach in Book of Beliefs and Opinions 9.5.
127 Livyat Ḥen: The Secrets of the Faith and the Gate of the Haggadah, 161. Maimonides alludes to this view in his Introduction to Pereq Ḥeleq, but does not make this point explicit. It should be noted that Levi, like Maimonides, is careful to defend the belief in bodily resurrection, though it is not completely clear whether this is his true opinion on the issue; see my introduction to Livyat Ḥen: The Secrets of the Faith and the Gate of the Haggadah, lvi-lviii.
128 For the Kabbalistic circles that continued to exist in Provence in the second half of the thirteenth century, see Ram Ben-Shalom, “Kabbalistic Circles Active in the
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Levi scathingly attacks them for positing a level of existence between that of God and the Separate Intellects.129 The critique against Naḥma-nides, the Ashkenazi rabbi, and the Kabbalists shows that different alternatives to Aristotelian philosophic thought regarding such central issues as the soul and the structure of the higher world continued to find a home in Provence in the second half of the thirteenth century, and that Provence remained subject to ideological influences from both the South (Spain) and the North (Northern France and Germany).
As the controversy that erupted in Provence a few years after Levi completed his composition reveals, the main alternative to the philo-sophic enterprise continued to come from the direction of those committed to traditional study, particularly of the Talmud. Levi not only defends the study of philosophy against the more tradition-al-minded antagonists, but offers a scathing criticism of them as well:
Since our nation was the most perfect of nations, they did not have to engage in the interpretation of the commandments, rules of conduct, actions pertaining to the laws and matters requiring adjudi-cation. Maimonides revealed his opinion on this issue in the opening to Mishneh Torah. This was how it was in the days of the prophets and the members of the Great Assembly, till the controversies in Israel grew more numerous.130 For this reason, the perfect of mind were able to engage in other sciences, until one became perfect and a person in truth. It is not good that a person devotes his study solely to the Talmud, and that he engages only in these matters. They [the contemporary scholars], however, do not think so. They think it is only right to engage solely in matters of [Talmudic] controversies and dialectics, in order to cry out and boast and be called “master,” in
South of France (Provence) in the Thirteenth Century,” Tarbiz 82 (2014):
569-605 (Heb.).
129 See Livyat Ḥen: The Work of the Chariot, 189-190. For a further discussion of Levi’s critique, see below, chapter 7, 257-260.
130 The reference should be to Maimonides’ introduction to his Commentary on the Mishnah. For a discussion of the relevant passage, see below, chapter 8, 286-287.
Levi interprets Maimonides as maintaining that due to the power of their intel-lects, the earlier Sages were able to see immediately how the problems that arose should be decided, and moreover, they were in complete agreement with one another. Hence they did not require lengthy deliberations resulting in many controversies.
Levi Ben Avraham 151 their choosing imaginary domination.131 Many of them do not wish to know the final decisions that arise [from the legal controversies], but to engage more in their feeble reading. They do not aim at perfection and the eternal life of the soul, but flee from it. For what arises from the words of the Talmud is knowledge of the command-ments and their fulfillment, and the final decision is what is intended in practical matters, and “everything follows from the ending” (BT Berakhot 12a).132
Levi essentially echoes the criticism voiced earlier by Jacob Anatoli against this traditionalist group, when he writes in his introduction to Malmad ha-Talmidim:
The Sages explained that the Work of the Chariot is a “great matter,”
and all wisdoms are directed to it and are like preparations for it. . . . Regarding the controversies of Abaye and Rabba, they said that they were a “small matter.”133 This is because the teachings of the Mishnah and the rest of the decided laws suffice for those seeking wisdom.
This is the opinion of our Sages, may their memory be blessed. But the “great matter” in the eyes of our scholars today, the masters of the tradition (gemara), is dealing with the issues of the Talmud—
not the clarification of the final decision but dealing with the problems raised there and the resolution of them. The “small matter”
is in their eyes the Work of the Chariot, which is the divine science.
In their eyes it is not even a “small matter” from among the good matters, but something bad and very bitter.
Jacob Anatoli too gives voice to the rejection of philosophic study on the part of many of his coreligionists who refuse to see the cardinal importance of this study. For both Levi and Anatoli, the main reason for Talmud study is to determine laws. Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah clearly alleviates the need for this endeavor, allowing the wise to devote more time to philosophic study. In his introduction to Mishneh Torah, Maimonides himself appears to hint that this treatise makes the study
131 Levi also levels the charge that many of the contemporary scholars are motivated by a desire for domination rather than a quest for knowledge and truth in Livyat Ḥen: The Quality of Prophecy and the Secrets of the Torah, 31.
132 Livyat Ḥen: The Secrets of the Faith and the Gate of the Haggadah, 140. Levi changes the meaning of the Talmudic dictum, which speaks of the conclusion of benedic-tions, to indicate that only the final decision is of importance.
133 See BT Sukah 28a.
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of the Talmud by and large superfluous. While he vociferously denied this point in a letter to Pinḥas Ha-Dayyan—indicating there that he wrote his composition for those not capable of entering into the depths of the Talmud134—his letter to his student Joseph ben Judah appears to confirm it:
I already admonished you that you should not be negligent in the effort to attain the entire treatise [Mishneh Torah], and make it your book, teaching it everywhere in order to spread its usefulness. For the end intended by what was composed in the Talmud and other compositions finds its completion in it [Mishneh Torah]. The end of [contemporary] scholars [however] is to waste time dealing with the proceedings in the Talmud, as though the intent and the end is to attain expertise in arguing and not anything else. This was not the [Talmud’s] first intent; rather the proceedings and arguments happened incidentally. When a statement was indecisive and one interpreted it in a certain way and another in the contrary manner—
each had to show proof in order that his interpretation should prevail. The first intent, however, was to know what was to be performed or avoided. This is clear to one such as you . . . .135
By equating the Work of the Chariot and Work of Creation with Aris-totelian metaphysics and natural science in the first four chapters of Mishneh Torah, the Laws of the Principles of the Torah, and seeing in the knowledge of these subjects the fulfillment of the most fundamental commandments of Judaism, Maimonides clearly indicates to what studies the intellectual elite should devote most of their efforts.136 Levi, following Anatoli, essentially continues Maimonides’ battle against the staunch traditionalists, who see in the study of the legal arguments of the Talmud the highest vocation in its own right.
In a sense, Levi is more radical than his predecessors. He not only chastises his coreligionists for their total devotion to the study of Talmud, even accusing them of both misguidance and poor morals as their motivation, but he is critical of the Babylonian Talmud itself for
134 See Iggerot HaRambam, 439.
135 Ibid., 257-258.
136 See also Mishneh Torah: Laws of the Study of Torah 1.12, where Maimonides incor-porates these subjects into the study of Talmud.
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including so many of these legal arguments. The relative brevity of the Palestinian Talmud is not a shortcoming in his view, but an advantage.
It reflects the advantage of the Land of Israel and its scholars, the creators of the philosophic homilies, over Babylonia and its scholars.137 The Babylonian Talmud is even considered by him to be one of the reasons for the loss of knowledge of the sciences among the Jews:
The loss of knowledge in Israel is due to the severity of our Exile, and the paucity of lovers of knowledge and their helpers among us, and the length of the Babylonian Talmud that preoccupies us. Since the lifetime of a human is short, one should examine each area of knowledge succinctly, all the more so in the case of practical knowl-edge in which it is sufficient for one [to know] how the matters are decided, and all the more so in the case of our nation than the others, which possess codices of all their laws that contain no differences of opinion. Every erudite person should have been content with the books of the Mishneh [Torah] composed by Maimonides, which is in truth a complete composition that clarifies the entire tradition thor-oughly, or Sefer Miẓvot by Rabbi Moses of Coucy, were it not for the jealousy that engulfs our nation.138
The only justification that Levi could find for the length of the Babylo-nian Talmud is that the Sages intended that it occupy the time of all those who were not prepared for the study of philosophy. They realized that if those who were not capable engaged in the study of theoretical knowledge, they would be harmed by it139—a clear jibe at the detractors
The only justification that Levi could find for the length of the Babylo-nian Talmud is that the Sages intended that it occupy the time of all those who were not prepared for the study of philosophy. They realized that if those who were not capable engaged in the study of theoretical knowledge, they would be harmed by it139—a clear jibe at the detractors