Maimonides’ influence on Levi’s philosophic approach is evident throughout his encyclopedia. While Levi favors the naturalistic approach to understanding God’s relation to the world, he is far from being a radical esotericist in his understanding of Maimonides’ thought, or a complete Aristotelian in developing his own. He accepts Maimonides’
proof of creation as valid and presents it as his own position, not appearing to allude to any esoteric view on this subject.32 Yet at the same time, as in the case of Maimonides, he interprets the creation story as referring to the natural process of generation of all that exists on earth.33 For this reason, Levi does not think that the days of creation each consisted of twenty-four hours. He inclines to the view that each
31 Maimonides does not explicitly mention this point when he discusses in the intro-duction to the Mishneh Torah, as well as elsewhere, the reasons for writing his code, yet there is reason to posit that this indeed is one of the reasons. For a discussion of these reasons, see Isadore Twersky, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), 20-47. For a view of the moderate philosophic camp, personified by Menaḥem HaMeiri, who devoted much of his efforts specifi-cally to the realm of Jewish law, see in particular Moses Halbertal, Between Torah and Wisdom (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2000) (Heb.).
32 Levi deals with the issue of creation in chapter nine of the section “The Secrets of the Faith”; see Livyat Ḥen: The Secrets of the Faith and the Gate of the Haggadah, 65-79. For a discussion of this issue, see my introduction to this volume, xxxii-xxxiv.
33 For an in-depth study of Maimonides’ interpretation, see Sara Klein-Braslavy, Maimonides’ Interpretation of the Story of Creation (Jerusalem: Reuben Mass, 1987) (Heb.). Levi interprets the creation story in Livyat Ḥen: The Work of Creation, chapters 10-12.
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lasted a thousand years, based on Psalms 90:4. Hence there was enough time for each stage in the natural process to be completed.34 Levi also agrees with Maimonides that the world will never come to an end and there will be no permanent changes in nature.35 He devotes much of his effort as a commentator to provide naturalistic explanations for most of the seemingly supernatural phenomena found in the Bible. The one major issue on which Levi breaks with Maimonides regards the status of astrology. While Maimonides completely rejected the truth of astrology and regarded it as inherently tied to idolatry and the belief in determinism,36 Levi, like Abraham Ibn Ezra, viewed it as a practical science, and made much use of it in his philosophic interpretation of the Bible.37 In the following chapters I will explore in some detail Levi’s approach to the Work of the Chariot, prophecy, Mosaic prophecy, miracles, the reasons for the commandments, and prayer. In this chapter I would like to explore a number of other areas relating to his biblical exegesis.
34 See Livyat Ḥen: The Work of Creation, 229-231. Levi derives this interpretation from Moznei ha-‘Iyyunim, which, following Moses Ibn Tibbon, he ascribes to Aver-roes. For more on this treatise, see below, chapter 8, 304-305. Levi brings support for his view that the day of creation must refer to a much longer period of time from the midrash in BT Sanhedrin 38b, which details what happened every hour on the sixth day. For example, in the sixth hour Adam gave names to all the animals, in the ninth hour he was commanded not to eat of the tree of knowledge, in the tenth hour he disobeyed, in the eleventh hour he was judged and in the twelfth he was expelled from the garden. Levi argues that each of these events clearly took place over a period longer than an hour. Hence the Sages had in mind a “day” that lasted a thousand years.
35 See Livyat Ḥen: The Secrets of the Faith and the Gate of the Haggadah, 86-92; cf.
Guide 2.27-29.
36 On Maimonides’ approach to astrology, see Y. Tzvi Langermann, “Maimonides’
Repudiation of Astrology,” Maimonidean Studies 2 (1991): 123-158.
37 On Ibn Ezra’s astrological interpretations, see Shlomo Sela, Astrology and Biblical Exegesis in Abraham Ibn Ezra’s Thought (Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 1999) (Heb.); see also Y. Tzvi Langermann, “Some Astrological Themes in the Thought of Abraham Ibn Ezra,” in Rabbi Abraham Ibn Ezra: Studies in the Writings of a Twelfth-Century Jewish Polymath, ed. Isadore Twersky and Jay Harris (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 28-85.
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A good place to start is with the examples brought by the Rashba in his condemnation of allegorical preaching,38 all of which appear in Levi’s treatise:
They said about Abraham and Sarah that they are matter and form, and the twelve tribes of Israel are the twelve constellations. . . . They also said that the holy vessels, the urim and tumim, are an astrolabe.
. . . The four kings that fought against the five are the four elements and five senses.39
Rashba goes on to condemn some of the preachers for treating all the stories up to the Giving of the Torah as parables, and also for viewing many of the commandments in this manner in order to lessen their burden. Furthermore, he censures them for their complete devotion to
“Greek Wisdom,” particularly the philosophy of Aristotle, and in their claiming that without this wisdom, the Torah could not be understood properly, and those lacking this wisdom are like animals. Finally, he charges them with not believing in creation and denying the possibility of any change in nature.40 In a later letter, he adds another example, this time clearly alluding to Levi: “Their master [of the allegorical preachers] wrote in regard to their [the Sages’] saying: ‘Mem and samekh in the tablets stood in place by a miracle’ (BT Shabbat 104a),41 that this is not possible. Since they have mass they would not be able to stand in place except by some subterfuge—there was something inside [the tablets] that held them up.”42
38 For a study of this issue, see Gregg Stern, “Philosophic Allegory in Medieval Jewish Culture: The Crisis in Languedoc (1304-1306),” in Interpretation and Allegory, ed.
Jon Whitman (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 189-209. It should be noted that Rashba’s ire was in no small measure due not only to the interpretations themselves, but the fact that they were taught publicly to a general audience.
39 Minḥat Qena’ot, 726-727. These examples appear in Livyat Ḥen: The Quality of Prophecy and the Secrets of the Torah, 613-616, 620, 659-661, 664-665, 878, 880, 885, 890-891.
40 Minḥat Qena’ot, 727-728.
41 Since the letters of the tablets were engraved straight through so they could be seen on both sides, and these letters were round, they must have stood in place by a miracle.
42 Minḥat Qena’ot, 735; cf. Livyat Ḥen: The Quality of Prophecy and the Secrets of the Torah, 254, 819.
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In essence, Rashba brings the following charges based on these examples: 1) early biblical history is treated as a parable, with the impli-cation that the historicity of these stories is denied; 2) miracles as supernatural acts of God are rejected and naturalistic explanations are offered instead, such as the momentous decisions on what course of action the Israelites should take being made on the basis of astrology, rather than by a miraculous device by means of which God communi-cated with the High Priest, or that certain apparent miracles were accomplished by subterfuge. In these examples, it should be noted, the miracles are not treated as parables, but God’s direct involvement is denied. The more general charges brought by Rashba involve the treat-ment of commandtreat-ments as parables in order not to have to fulfill them and the regarding of philosophy as the highest truth to which one must completely dedicate oneself. Even the Torah, in this view, must be understood accordingly. In short, God exercises no acts of volition, but His activity is confined to the fixed eternal order of nature.
There is a grain of truth in some of these charges when applied to Levi, while others are the product of a misunderstanding. Since Rashba based his condemnation on the reports that reached him, he was not able to see these views in their proper context.43 Yedaiah Bedershi correctly points out to Rashba in his Letter of Apology that the identifi-cation of Sarah with matter and Abraham with form was not meant as an interpretation of the Bible itself, but of a rabbinic tale, and there certainly was no intent to deny their historicity.44 In the case of the
43 Some of these examples appear in a letter to the Rashba from Don Crescas Vidal;
see Minḥat Qena’ot, 369-370. It should be added that Levi himself responded to the charges against him, but his letter is lost. What remains is Rashba’s response to Levi’s defense; see Minḥat Qena’ot, 390-395. Rashba speaks of seeing Levi’s booklet (quntres), which apparently refers to Levi’s letter. This letter clearly made little impression on the Rashba, judging from his very critical response, in which he repeats many of the same charges against Levi and the allegorical preachers.
44 See Yedaiah Bedershi, Ketav Hitnaẓlut, in She’elot u-Teshuvot ha-Rashba (Jeru-salem, 1976), no. 418, 212. For a study of this work, see Abraham S. Halkin,
“Yedaiah Bedershi’s ‘Apology,’” in Jewish Medieval and Renaissance Studies, ed.
Alexander Altmann (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), 165-184.
Yedaiah ascribes this interpretation to “one of our precious ones who is one of the important sages (ḥaverim) of that land and against whom there is the grievance”—a clear reference to Levi, whom he may have known personally when they both lived
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identity of the twelve tribes with the twelve constellations, too, it is clear from Livyat Ḥen that Levi did not deny the existence of the tribes, and that he simply maintains that each of them fell under the dominion of a different constellation.45 Nevertheless, the issue of the historicity of the early stories of the Bible was a real one for the Jewish philoso-phers. It is not always clear when the allegorical understanding of a story that they advance comes to replace the literal meaning, or when it comes to supplement it and reveal the story’s more profound meaning.
With this in mind, let us turn to the problem of Levi’s view of the historicity of the early stories in the Torah, beginning with the story of the Garden of Eden.
Maimonides appears to reject the literal meaning of the story when he alludes to its allegorical meaning in the Guide,46 though in his Intro-duction to Pereq Ḥeleq he accepts the view that such a garden exists and will one day be rediscovered.47 As we have seen in the previous chapter, Moses Ibn Tibbon regards much of the story, though certainly not all of it, as essentially true, in addition to having an esoteric meaning.48 Levi accepts the view that “every parable is made up primarily of things that exist.”49 Like Moses Ibn Tibbon and Maimonides, he is convinced that the garden is a real place. Furthermore, he follows Ibn Tibbon in locating it in the vicinity of Mount Kilimanjaro, from where, in their view, flow the sources of the Nile.50 What all these thinkers have in common is the refusal to accept an alternative (mythic) reality in which the nature of the world as we know it is completely different. They all agree that serpents do not talk, the fruit of trees do not impart
in Perpignan. The tale in question is the one in BT Baba Batra 58a concerning R.
Bana’ah, which Levi deals with in Livyat Ḥen: The Secrets of the Faith and the Gate of the Haggadah, 305-308, and will be explored below. Yedaiah continues his work by dealing with the other problematic views mentioned by Rashba.
45 See Livyat Ḥen: The Quality of Prophecy and the Secrets of the Torah, 620, 880.
46 For a discussion of this issue, see Sara Klein-Braslavy, Maimonides’ Interpretation of the Adam Stories in Genesis (Jerusalem: Reuben Mass, 1986), 299-305 (Heb.).
47 See Isaac Shailat (ed. and Heb. trans.), Iggerot HaRambam (Jerusalem: Ma‘aliyot, 1987), 137.
48 See above, chapter 4, 112-114.
49 See Livyat Ḥen: The Work of Creation, 39.
50 Ibid., 39-41; see above, chapter 4, 112.
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knowledge or grant eternal life, and angels with swords that stand as guards do not exist. To the degree that they thought that they could interpret the details of the story in a way that was in conformity with nature, they were prepared to accede to their literal truth in addition to their allegorical meaning.
Yet it is the allegorical meaning that is of greater concern to Levi, even when the literal meaning is seen to be true. While there is a real garden in a region called Eden, the philosophical truths they represent are far more important. As in the case of parables in general, Levi sees no reason to limit them to a single interpretation. He brings two different meanings to the garden and to Eden and the river that flows from it: 1) the garden is the sublunar world, Eden is the world of the spheres, and the river represents the forces emanating from the spheres;
2) the garden is the sublunar world, Eden is the Active Intellect, and the river represents the forms emanating from the Active Intellect. In addition, the garden may be seen as representing the body, or following a different line of interpretation, it represents the areas of wisdom that the human intellect is capable of attaining.51 Levi, like his philosophic predecessors, also shows how the Sages picked up on some of these meanings and expanded upon them, or understood the biblical parable in still other ways—a point that will be explored in more detail below.
In a similar manner, Levi approaches the four rivers. They are real rivers that he attempts to identify, and at the same them they represent different scientific notions, such as the four elements and the qualities each one possesses.52
The children of Adam and Eve also illustrate this point. Levi is certainly far more interested in the allegorical meaning of their names and the events surrounding them than in the literal meaning of the
51 Ibid., 47, 49-50.
52 Ibid., 39-46. Some of Levi’s allegorical explanations of other details of this story have been analyzed by Sara Klein-Braslavy, “R. Levi ben Avraham of Villefranche’s Interpretation of ‘Adam and Eve’ in the Story of the Garden of Eden,” in Tribute to Michael: Studies in Jewish and Muslim Thought Presented to Professor Michael Schwarz, ed. Sara-Klein Braslavy, Benjamin Abrahamov, and Joseph Sadan (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University Press, 2009), 105-139 (Heb.).
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stories.53 He leaves little doubt, however, that he sees in them actual historical individuals. While the great number of years lived by the ancients would appear to belie the fact that they were real individuals, or alternately, that nature does not change, Levi nonetheless accepts their historicity. He brings a number of explanations to show that their longevity is possible in nature due to geographical, astrological, dietary, behavioral, and hereditary factors.54
The actual occurrence of the flood is also not doubted by Levi, and he traces it to astrological reasons. The structure of the ark as specified in the Torah would indeed have enabled it to float on the water in his view. Yet Levi does not accept the literal truth of all the details of the story. The flood did not encompass the entire world, as already indi-cated by the Sages who excluded the Land of Israel,55 nor could the ark
53 Ibid., 152-160. Levi interprets the three children—Cain, Abel, and Seth—as refer-ring to the three faculties of the intellect: the practical intellect that knows the crafts, the deliberative faculty that is responsible for governance, and the theoret-ical intellect that knows the sciences.
54 Ibid., 318-326. Levi also cites Moses Ibn Tibbon’s explanation that these individ-uals were leaders who laid down legislations, and the number of years each one lived refers to the period that his legislation was in effect. Levi adds a similar expla-nation in his own name—each individual was the head of a family, and all of his descendants continued to be called by his name for the number of years stated. Ibn Tibbon’s explanation as cited by Levi was subsequently adopted by Nissim of Marseilles; see below, chapter 6, 201-202.
55 See BT Zevaḥim 113a; Genesis Rabbah 33.6. As mentioned above, Levi accepts the view that the world will continue to exist eternally and nature will never change.
He follows Averroes in rejecting the idea advanced by Avicenna that even if a species becomes completely extinct, it can reappear when matter is again prepared to receive the form of that species, and this is true of the human species as well.
According to Averroes, human beings can only be generated from members of the species. Samuel Ibn Tibbon mentions this controversy, while leaning toward Avicenna’s view in this matter—a view that allows for a continuous corruption and regeneration of the world; see Ma’amar Yiqqavu ha-Mayyim, ed. Mordechai Bisli-ches (Pressburg: Anton Edlen v. Schmid, 1837), chap. 3, 8. For a study of this issue see Gad Freudenthal, “Samuel Ibn Tibbon’s Avicennian Theory of an Eternal World,” Aleph 8 (2008): 41-129. While Levi denies the possibility of the corruption and regeneration of species, he agrees that the earth may still undergo widespread, though not total, destruction due to the strengthening of the element of fire leading to global warming, or the element of water leading to widespread flooding, as in Noah’s time; see Livyat Ḥen: The Secrets of the Faith and the Gate of the Haggadah, 89-90.
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contain so many animals. Hence the story should be interpreted as alluding to an esoteric level. The flood hints to the corruption of the human being—who is a micro-cosmos—due to his succumbing to the evil inclination and overly engaging in sexual activity. The ark represents the improvement of one’s morals, in order not to drown in one’s sins.
Levi goes on to interpret many of the other details of the story along similar lines.56
The interplay between the exoteric and esoteric levels of the story, and the interpretation of the homilies of the Sages as expanding upon the esoteric level, characterize Levi’s treatment of the stories of Genesis in general. The Tower of Babel, for example, is a real tower at the same time that it represents the belief in God as the spirit of the sphere.57 The city both is a real city and represents the religion of the inhabi-tants. The “one language” they shared literally refers to a single language they all spoke, at the same time that it represents a single religion. The goal of the inhabitants according to the literal meaning of the story was to build a tower in order to attract all the inhabitant of
The interplay between the exoteric and esoteric levels of the story, and the interpretation of the homilies of the Sages as expanding upon the esoteric level, characterize Levi’s treatment of the stories of Genesis in general. The Tower of Babel, for example, is a real tower at the same time that it represents the belief in God as the spirit of the sphere.57 The city both is a real city and represents the religion of the inhabi-tants. The “one language” they shared literally refers to a single language they all spoke, at the same time that it represents a single religion. The goal of the inhabitants according to the literal meaning of the story was to build a tower in order to attract all the inhabitant of