Levi presents innumerable philosophic interpretations of rabbinic texts throughout the second part of his encyclopedia, and chooses to conclude his encyclopedia with an extensive discussion devoted exclu-sively to this subject, thereby highlighting its significance in his view.
He opens the Gate of the Haggadah with a discussion of “Greek Wisdom,” which is prohibited in the Talmud.94 The continuous contro-versies in Provence concerning the permissibility of learning philosophy, which its opponents equated with “Greek Wisdom,” if not outright heresy, undoubtedly looms in the background of his deci-sion to begin with this topic. Levi essentially argues at length two basic points. 1) “Greek Wisdom” includes all kinds of literature, some of
93 Livyat Ḥen: The Secrets of the Faith and the Gate of the Haggadah, 209; cf. Livyat Ḥen: The Quality of Prophecy and the Secrets of the Torah, 677. In a similar manner, Radak explains this story; see his Commentary on Genesis 30:39.
94 See Livyat Ḥen: The Secrets of the Faith and the Gate of the Haggadah, 187-192.
See also my introduction, lx-ixvii, and Dov Schwartz, “’Greek Wisdom’—A Reexamination of this Issue in the Period of the Polemics on the Study of Philosophy,” Sinai 104 (1989): 148-153 (Heb.). The Talmudic prohibition is found in BT Sotah 49b.
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which were prohibited, such as books of Greek religion, while others were regarded as a waste of time, such as books on the art of poetry, Greek fables, chronologies of kings. Yet there certainly was never any intent on the part of the Sages to prohibit “the books of wisdom written by the true philosophers, such as Socrates, Plato and Aristot-le.”95 2) The Jews of ancient times already possessed books of science and transmitted this knowledge to the other nations, who suppressed the origins of the knowledge they received. In the course of time, the Jews themselves forgot this knowledge and lost most of these books.
Among the Sages there were still those that possessed much of this wisdom and even some of the ancient books in Hebrew that contained it, as evidenced by the scientific knowledge ascribed to them in the Talmud.96 While Levi’s first point shows that learning science and philosophy is in fact permissible, the second point shows its desir-ability. Moreover, this point lays the foundation for reading philosophic and scientific views into many of the rabbinic homilies and tales, particularly the more outlandish ones. It shows why such a reading is not anachronistic, but uncovers the Sages’ original intent.
The idea of the antiquity of science and philosophy among the Jews, who then transmitted this knowledge to the gentiles, is one that existed well before Levi’s time. It served both to justify the contempo-rary study of science and to underscore the greatness of the ancient Israelites as compared to all other nations.97 The manner in which Levi advances this idea is of particular interest. He does not hold that most of the knowledge possessed by the Sages in philosophic and scientific matters was originally received in revelation. Rather, it was knowledge that was discovered in ancient times by way of rational investigation, in the spirit of Maimonides’ depiction of the rational speculations of the patriarch Abraham pertaining to the existence of God.98 He also does not claim that the knowledge the Jews transmitted to the other
95 Livyat Ḥen: The Secrets of the Faith and the Gate of the Haggadah, 192.
96 Ibid., 192-204.
97 For a comprehensive study of this notion see Abraham Melamed, The Myth of the Jewish Origins of Science and Philosophy (Haifa and Jerusalem: Haifa University Press and Magnes Press, 2010) (Heb.).
98 See Guide 3.29; cf. Mishneh Torah, Laws of Idolatry 1.3.
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nations was the same knowledge that the Jews learned, or relearned by reading the Greek books in science and philosophy. It is clear from Levi’s account that the Sages learned many new things from these books. In turn, they took an active role in the further advancement of science, such as in the fields of astronomy and medicine. They wrote their own books on these subjects, which together with the older Hebrew books of science were lost or destroyed. In short, in Levi’s view there was a lot of Greek in Jewish Palestine when it came to phil-osophic and scientific matters.
Following Moses Ibn Tibbon, Levi is not of the opinion that all the Sages possessed scientific and philosophic knowledge. Those who did generally lived in the Land of Israel, since they benefited from the superior qualities of this land.99 The rabbinic homilies that convey this knowledge, which were far more common in Israel than Babylonia, reveal the intellectual superiority of their authors. It is interesting to note that Levi draws a critical distinction between homilies and tales.
The rabbinic homilies, midrashim, he sees as resulting from wisdom and inquiry, as evidenced from the Hebrew term derash, signaling that they in fact contain a concealed layer. The apparent disagreements among the Sages in many of the homilies should often be interpreted as reflecting disagreements in scientific and philosophic matters, though at times one of the opinions is simply supplementing the knowledge conveyed by a previous opinion. The same approach, however, should not be adopted in regard to the haggadot, which are stories; only some of them should be understood esoterically.100
In keeping with his approach to the Sages as philosophers and scientists, Levi denies that they believed in demons. As is true of most Aristotelian philosophers, Levi rejects the existence of such creatures, particularly since he does not believe in the possibility of the existence
99 See Livyat Ḥen: The Secrets of the Faith and the Gate of the Haggadah, 207. For a study of this notion see Abraham Melamed, “The Land of Israel and Clima-tology in Jewish Thought,” in The Land of Israel in Medieval Jewish Thought, ed.
Moshe Hallamish and Aviezer Ravitzky (Jerusalem: Yad Yiẓḥak Ben-Ẓevi, 1991), 52-78 (Heb.).
100 See Livyat Ḥen: The Secrets of the Faith and the Gate of the Haggadah, 207-208, 243
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of disembodied souls,101 hence the same stance he ascribes to the Sages.
When they speak of such creatures, Levi interprets them as referring to the products of the imagination of weak minded people, or to small harmful creatures, or allegorically, as a reference to the evil inclination.
In each instance, the demons should be understood in accord with the context in which they are mentioned.102 Levi also tries to show that many seemingly superstitious practices advocated by the Sages actually have a rational basis.103 In general, Levi advises his readers that they should attempt to interpret the words of the Sages as much as possible in a manner that conforms to what is known by the intellect.104
Levi does not ignore the issue of the reasons for the Sages’ esoter-icism. Like his philosophic predecessors, he feels that philosophic and scientific knowledge in the wrong hands—namely, those who do not possess the required prerequisites for such study—can be detrimental to the individual’s belief.105 Yet in writing an encyclopedia of science he shows his agreement with Samuel Ibn Tibbon, who was convinced that the times had changed. The current situation requires that the learning of science and philosophy be encouraged among Jews, and that they should view this knowledge as underlying much of Jewish tradi-tion. In other words, Levi’s endeavors were very much part of the battle for hearts and minds among his Jewish brethren in determining what they should believe.106
Despite his view that many of the stories in the Talmud do not contain an esoteric level, Levi offers explanations to a number of fantastic rabbinic tales, many of which he treats as dreams akin to prophetic ones. More than a few of the explanations brought by Levi
101 From among the Islamic philosophers, Avicenna accepted such a possibility; see Avicenna, The Metaphysics of the Healing, ed. and trans. Michael E. Marmura (Provo, UT: Brigham Young University Press, 2005), 347-357.
102 Livyat Ḥen: The Secrets of the Faith and the Gate of the Haggadah, 296-301.
103 Ibid., 244-245.
104 Ibid., 264; cf. The Writings of R. Moshe Ibn Tibbon, ed. Howard Kreisel, Colette Sirat, and Avraham Israel (Beer-Sheva: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev Press, 2010), 198-201 (Heb.); see above, chapter 4, 000.
105 See Livyat Ḥen: The Secrets of the Faith and the Gate of the Haggadah, 243.
106 See Ma’amar Yiqqavu ha-Mayyim, chap. 22, 174. For a partial quote of Samuel Ibn Tibbon’s argument, see below, chapter 7, 247; see also above, chapter 4, 82-83.
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are taken from the writings of Moses Ibn Tibbon. On a few occasions Levi implicitly rejects Ibn Tibbon’s interpretation and offers an alter-native one instead.
A good example is the interpretation of the strange Talmudic tale in BT Baba Batra 58a regarding R. Bana’ah, which we explored in the previous chapter.107 Moses Ibn Tibbon transformed the story of R. Bana’ah finding a cave in which he actually saw Abraham and Sarah, and even Adam, into a story of his finding a crypt in which these figures were artfully depicted. He ends his interpretation with the remark: “If he [the story teller] spoke by way of wisdom, the enlightened one should attempt to find its meaning,”108 though he himself rests content with his more literal but naturalistic interpreta-tion. Levi, who was well acquainted with Moses Ibn Tibbon’s works and in all probability knew this explanation, picks up the gauntlet laid down by Ibn Tibbon. Rather than treat the story as depicting an actual occurrence concerning the discovery of a treasure trove of works of art, he interprets the story as a philosophic parable, or more precisely, as a prophetic type dream of these ancient figures, which represent philosophic notions. The cave represents the human intel-lect dwelling in the body, Abraham represents a level of intelintel-lectual perfection to which R. Bana’ah aspired, and Sarah represents the pure matter that allows the intellect to achieve its perfection. R.
Bana’ah succeeds in achieving this level, hinted at in the dream by his entering the cave and beholding Abraham and Sarah. He then aspires to achieve an even greater level of intellectual perfection, that of Adam, which is denied him. In this manner Levi continues his inter-pretation, shedding light at the same time on his view of conjunction with the Active Intellect.109
107 See above, chapter 4, 109-110.
108 See The Writings of R. Moshe Ibn Tibbon, 200.
109 See Livyat Ḥen: The Secrets of the Faith and the Gate of the Haggadah, 305-309. In a similar manner, Levi interprets the story of Abba Saul, who entered the thigh bone of Og (BT Niddah 24b), as an allegory referring to sexual desire, while Moses Ibn Tibbon treats the thigh bone of Og as part of a giant ancient statue. See Livyat Ḥen: The Work of Creation, 315-316; cf. The Writings of R. Moshe Ibn Tibbon, 197-198.
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One can easily understand why Levi was reluctant to accept Moses Ibn Tibbon’s interpretation, in keeping with Ibn Tibbon’s own advice.
The more fantastic the story, the more it is a clear sign that it contains a concealed level, with the natural sciences and metaphysics providing the key to deciphering its true meaning. While Ibn Tibbon allows the possibility that the story of R. Bana’ah contains such a level, it is Levi who seeks to reveal it.
A similar approach marks Levi’s interpretation of the strange “tall”
tale in BT Berakhot 54b of Moses smiting Og, whose head got stuck in the mountain he lifted to throw upon Israel. Moses Ibn Tibbon, as we have seen in the previous chapter, treats the tale as a historical allegory describing the war between Og and the Israelites, and Og’s swearing of allegiance to a powerful king in exchange for help to destroy Israel. The alliance broke up due to mutual rancor, and Moses was able to slay Og while Og was sitting in his siege tower, which was thirty cubits high.110 Levi does not reject Ibn Tibbon’s interpretation in this instance, but he adds another layer. He treats it as a philosophic allegory in addition to a historic one. It refers to the activity of the evil inclination that comes to overthrow the powers of the intellect and is not successful. The stone and the mountain refer to evil desires. The size of Moses is given as ten cubits to allude to his apprehension of all the forms of the sublunar world; his leap is given as ten cubits to allude to his apprehension of the motions of the spheres; and the size of his ax is given as ten cubits to allude to his apprehension of the Separate Intellects and his conjunc-tion with the tenth one (the Active Intellect). In this manner he defeated Og, who denied the existence of non-material existents and God’s governance of the world.111 Levi’s encyclopedia contains many more examples of tales in which he discerns an esoteric level alluding to scientific and philosophic matters, in addition to the numerous homi-lies he weaves into all his discussions and interprets in this manner.
110 See above, chapter 4, 107-109.
111 See Livyat Ḥen:The Work of Creation, 309-313.
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