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Stability analysis in a Bertrand duopoly with different product quality and

heterogeneous expectations

Fanti, Luciano and Gori, Luca

Department of Economics, University of Pisa, Department of Law and Economics "G.L.M. Casaregi", University of Genoa

17 September 2011

Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/33480/

MPRA Paper No. 33480, posted 17 Sep 2011 18:55 UTC

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