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Efficient bargaining versus right to manage: a stability analysis with

heterogeneous players in a duopoly with quantity competition and trade unions

Fanti, Luciano and Gori, Luca

Department of Economics, University of Pisa, Department of Law and Economics "G.L.M. Casaregi", University of Genoa

1 November 2011

Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/34434/

MPRA Paper No. 34434, posted 01 Nov 2011 23:13 UTC

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