The Long-Term Impact of Alternative Security Policy Options: Disarmament and Foreign Policy Change in East-West Relations

Veroffentlichungsreihe der Forschungsgruppe Internationale Beziehungen

p 89-301

The Long-Term Impact of Alternative Security Policy Options:

Disarmament and Foreign Policy Change in East-West Relations

by

Wolf-Dieter Eberwein and

Wil Groenen

Publication Series of the International Relations Research Group Reichpietschufer 50

D 1000 Berlin 30

The views expressed in this paper are those of the .author and not necessarily those of the International Relations Research Group.

considered: a gradual change by a foreign policy reorientation with greater cooperation and less hostility, and a more fundamental change by arms reduction measures. In addition, the unilateral and the bilateral approach to East-West relations is analyzed. Finally, both foreign policy change and disarmament are implemented.

Foreign policy change improves East-West diplomatic relations and East-West trade but does not have any significant impact upon the arms race. In addition, tensions within each block increase in relative terms. Disarmament measures are offset by increased East-West tensions and a reduction in East-West trade. A combination of both policy options does also lead to greater intra-block tensions. Unilateralism is reciprocated in the foreign policy behavior of the opposing block but not in the military sector.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Zwei grundlegende Politikoptionen aus dem Gesamtspektrum der Ost-West

· Beziehungen werden betrachtet: schrittweise Veranderungen durch einen Wechsel der diplomatischen Beziehungen mit weniger Feindseligkeit und erhohter Kooperation, sowie grundsatzliche Veranderungen durch AbrtistungsmaBnahmen.

Darliber hinaus werden sowhol das unilaterale als auch das bilaterale Vorgehen.

SchlieBlich werden die entsprechenden Szenarien analysiert, in denen beide Optionen, Wechsel der AuBenpolitik sowie AbrtistungsmaBnahmen, miteinander verkntipft werden. Der Wechsel der AuBenpolitik ftihrt zu einer Verbesserung der diplomatischen Beziehungen zwischen Ost und West und zur Ausweitung des Ost-West-Handels, hat aber nur einen rninimalen EinfluB auf das Rlistungsniveau.

Zugleich resultiert daraus eine erhohte Spannung innerhalb der BlOcke.

AbrlistungsmaBnahmen werden durch erhohte Ost-West-Spannungen und einen Rtickgang des Ost-West-Handels aufgewogen. Die Kombination beider Politikoptionen erhoht ebenfalls die Spannung zwischen den Biindnispartnem. Im diplomatischen Bereich wird Unilateralismus durch entsprechendes Verhalten der Gegenseite erwidert, was im Faile von AbrtistungsmaBnahmen allerdings nicht zutrifft.

Disarmament or War? ... ... ... .... 1

The GLOBUS Model . . ...._...._...._....... 3

The Scenarios ... .. .. ... .... ... ... .. .. ... ... .. .. ... .. .. .. .. .. ... .. ... .. .. .. .. .. . 5

The Results- Three Alternative Policy Options ... ... ... 8

Foreign Policy Change - No Disarmament ^...^...._...._...._...._......_..... . . 8

Disarmament - No Foreign Policy Change ... 11

Disarmament - Foreign Policy Change ....... ... 13

Summary Discussion and Outlook ... 15

References ._. .. .... ... .. .. .. ... .. .... .. ... ... .. ... ... ... .. .. .. .... .. .... 18

Appendix 1 ....._....... ... ... ... 19

Figures ... 20

blocks since the Cold War broke out. Looking back, it seems that the political and military efforts undertaken by both the East and the West have contributed to that objective. But the price that had to be paid was considerable. Huge arsenals of nuclear and conventional military capabilities have accumulated during that time period for billions of dollars.

But never did the accumulation process reach an equilibrium bringing the arms race to an end. The unending advances in technology continue to fuel the arms race which becomes more and more· costly in order to maintain the balance of terror. These efforts do not solve, as the critics argue, the problem as how to overcome East-West confrontation and thereby eliminate the danger of total destruction. The reliance on the balance of (military) power can not reduce mutual fear and distrust, but rather keeps both alive.

Today policy-makers advocate fundamental changes from the past policy by calling for less and less arms to secure peace. The very concept of disarmament seems as elegant as simple a concept to overcome both mutual fear and the arms race simultaneously. Some first practical bilateral and unilateral steps have already been made, the former with the intermediate nuclear forces treaty between the two superpowers, the latter by the Soviet Union and the GDR with their reductions of tanks and airplanes.

But we do know very little about the practical consequences of disarmament. One of the reasons is that there is almost no historical evidence available. The disarmament issue is but a part of the broad issue of national security. Bremer and Hughes (1987:7) distinguish two major schools of thought, the idealists and the realists. The former believe that arms accumulation represent an increasing threat to peace, whereas the latter believe that in the anarchic world of inte�national relations only military power can ultimately reduce the danger of war and guarantee the preservation of peace.

That latter assumption is contradicted by the evidence from the research on the causes of war: the power status of nations is not only positive! y related to war involvement (Bremer, 19 80) but also to the involvement of nations in military disputes (Eberwein: 1982). With respect to the arms race issue the results are inconclusive: the answer "depends upon how one defines arms races and their outcomes" (Bremer and Hughes, 19 87: 11).2>

Therefore the simple assumption of the realists seems untenable. The chances are that the belief in disarmament as being conducive to peace embodied in the idealist view is equally untenable. As Frei and Ruloff (1983: 279) argue in their systematic analysis of East-West relations the voluntaristic approach to East-West cooperation in particular, international relations

1) The f ollowing analysis is part of a larger study on the various aspects of Western Security Policy Options.

In this paper we present the f irst preliminary results. We wish to acknowledge the helpf ul criticism by Harold Guetzkow. This paper is an expanded version of the one presented to the IF AC/SWISS workshop in Budapest, june 4-8 , 1989.

2) See Diehl (1983), Wallace (1979; 1980 ; 1982 ), and Weede (1980 )

in general, is likely to be wrong. That approach implies the belief that if decision-makers are willing to promote cooperation many of the constraints they face domestically and internationally could be overcome.

Frei and Ruloff develop at some length the argument as to why the voluntaristic approach is likely to be wrong. They infer from their empirical investigation of East-West relations that this system is but a part of the larger, very complex, and dynamic global system. That overall system is characterized by a number of highly unpleasant properties: the global system produces counterintuitive behavior, it is insensitive to changes in many of its parameters, it is resistant to changes, and, finally, the system itself neutralizes specific efforts intended to change it as a result of overall system adaptation.

In light of these general arguments realistically assessing the effects of disarmament seems hopeless. Even if there were a large body of data available, which is not, traditional methods of analysis would not allow to track down simultaneously the various dynamic short term and long term effects related to any specific policy. One reason is that the various short term and long term effects of the different policies pursued simultaneously by different nations can not be disentangled and identified in reality. Another reason is that even if we could do so we would still not know the difference a different set of policy options could make. A policy is by definition a choice for only one among many other options at a time.

The ideal situation would be the conduct of a whole set of experiments in order to identify what the best policy would be to achieve a fundamental policy shift many believe to be related to disarmament. But as we all know, history consists of single experiments. Complex dynamic simulation models, in contrast, do allow the scholar to conduct such experiments. Using such models he can study systematically the short term and long term effects of a whole set of alternative policy options and assess their effects. At the same time he can keep the "rest of the world" constant, something which is virtually impossible in the real world. Constant, in this instance, means that all the other policies pursued by the actors included in the model remain unchanged.

Given the advances in modelling the complex interaction between economic and political processes, nationally and internationally, we are in a position to develop a whole set of scenarios, i. e. experiments, relating to the East-West conflict. In this paper, the we will take. up the disarmament issue. Naturally, disarmament represents but one aspect of East-West relations.

But we believe it is a very critical issue in light of the contradictory expectations related to it.

For that purpose we will use the global model GLOBUS developed at the Science Center Berlin.

Some studies relating to East-West relations have already been undertaken with that model.

The present analysis represents the continuing effort ^to explore in greater depth East-West relations. Before going into the substantive discussion a short overview of that model will be given.

The GLOBUS Model

GLOBUS3> is a global model. The acronym stands for Generating Long-term Options By Using Simulation. At the heart of the GLOBUS model is the nation-state-as-actor. The basic assumption is that the sovereign nation states represented by their respective governments are, and will continue to be for a long time, the dominant actors in national and international politics.

The world at present consists of more than a 170 sovereign nation states, GLOBUS is limited to twenty-five nations only. These nations belong to one of the following regional groups, the EAST, the OPEC (the oil exporting developing nations), the SOUTH (non oil exporting developing nations), and the WEST, listed in figure 1.4>

Fig. 1: The Twenty-Five GLOBUS Nations

EAST OPEC

Czechoslovakia Indonesia

Gennan Democratic Iran

Republic Nigeria

Poland Saudi Arabia

Soviet Union Venezuela

WEST SOUTH

Canada Argentina

Federal Republic of Brazil

Gennany China

France Egypt

Italy India

Japan Mexico

United Kingdom Pakistan

United States South Af rica

Turkey

This limited number of nations is dominant in comparison to the rest of the world. These few nations are in control of 85 percent of the worlds arms build-up. They are in command of 80 percent of the world's production and 68 percent of world trade. Two thirds of international conflict occurs among them. We can therefore assume that the subset of nations included in the model will play a major role in shaping future global developments. GLOBUS has been specifically designed to analyze these developments.5>

3) That model has been f ully documented and published (Bremer, 1 987) elsewhere. In addition, a micro computer version is available which includes among other things the original source code (Bremer and Gruhn, 1 988) 4) The regional subdivision is a matter of convenience and not the result of a well def ined theoretical concept

of regions.

5) Naturally, the model design detennines its specific bias. Clearly, GLOBUS is biased in f avour of those f ew nations which are believed to dominate in world af f airs and which are assumed to play a decisive role in shaping the world's f uture. In the appendix the basic characteristics of the model are listed.

Substantively, GLOBUS focuses on the interdependence between economics and politics at the national and international levels. The governments have a fairly detailed budget to manage (including taxation, investment, consumption, and military and social welfare expenditures).

They try to maintain political stability at home and to improve the level of welfare in society.

They intervene in the national economy and in international trade. In international politics, the governments try to enhance their power status by spending resources for defense. They engage conflict and cooperative activities with other nations expressing thereby their foreign policy preferences.

GLOBUS represents the national economies and international trade (including arms, m;1nufactured goods, food, raw material, services, and primary energy). GLOBUS includes as well the national political system with government support (popularity), mass opposition (protest and violence) and government repression. International politics is incorporated in terms of the balance of military power, bilateral international conflict interaction, and bilateral international cooperative interaction.

The relations between these twenty-five national actors and their national and international environments is shown in figure 2 which outlines the basic structure of the model. At the center we find the national government, which is embedded in four specific environments: the domestic economic, the domestic political, the foreign economic, and the foreign political. The government as an actor has various instruments at its disposal to influence the specific developments in each of these respective environments. The figure lists some of them for illustrative purposes.

0

�

w :z

g

FIG. 2: The GLOBUS Model Structure

ECONOMIC

Growth, Employment,

& Prices ,..___ --�

POLITICAL

Mass Protest &

Organized Violence

t �---1---� t

1 ( Tax & i Political 'I 1

I ^{1 1} Spending : Stabilization Policies : Policy ^{I I} I

I ^{I ' I} I

----r---+1 ^---

� GOVE�NMENT _�

1 _' I

I

z "

iil a:

f2

I I I

'

I Aid : Se

. I

1 , Import, : curlty ^I 1

\ & Exchange : & Foreign )

��:J ��:J� +

Export, Import,

& Capital Flows ,..__^{_ --}� Military Balance;

Diplornetlc Relations

This figure conceals two additional properties of the model. First, the twenty-five nations are linked directly and indirectly to one another. In the international political arena each government in GLOBUS can interact with each of the others via conflict and cooperative behavior. Direct linkages exist as well in international economics. The 25 nations can also exchange six different types of goods with each other.6> Finally, there are numerous indirect linkages between the four environments themselves and the governments, such as the effects of national security policies, the international economy, and the national economies.

As in the real world the GLOBUS governments act towards, and react to, the different environments as a function of the conditions they perceive and consider necessary to be maintained or changed. The GLOBUS governments are not conceptualized as rational unitary actors. They have been designed as adaptive collective actors. As such their constituent members pursue a number of goals they want to accomplish. By observing the environment, they assess and evaluate the state of affairs against their goals. If gaps exist, either decisions will be made and actions be taken in order to close these gaps or the goals themselves adjusted to newly arising conditions. These decisions will be implemented and action taken according to standard operating procedures.

The Scenarios

Having completed the brief review of GLOBUS we want to come back to the substantive issue. A major problem characterizing East-West relations consists, as Frei and Ruloff (1983:

282) argue, in the incongruence between expectations and real policy evolution. The result very often consists in disappointment which leads to a shift in policy.7) This is probably a good characterization of the net result of the period of Detente where the expectations where not matched by real developments .

. Incongruence is very likely to occur because the time horizon of the expectations is shorter than the time required for any policy reorientation to lead to visible changes. Policy-makers hope for short-term success which is highly unlikely to be the case. The structure of the East-West system has evolved over decades. Therefore the structural conditions are highly resistant to changes. If a fundamental change is to occur then the policies to bring it about have only a chance to be successful if they are pursued on a long term basis. That implies as well that the time horizon of the expectations themselves has to become longer. Unless a long term orientation - one may even call it a visionary perspective - is taken success will not be obtained.

6) In the intern ational political sector there are 25*24 such dyadic linkages f or intern ational conf lict, and 25*24 such dyadic linkages f or intern ational cooperation, which gives a total of 1020 dyadic linkages. In the intern ational economic sector, there are 26*25 such dyadic trade linkages f or six dif f erent commodities, a total of 3900 bilateral linkages in intern ational economics. In this case the twenty- sixth actor is the residual category "Rest of the World".

7) Frei and Rulof f give greater details of the conditions determining that process.

It would be naive to expect disarmament to solve the East-West conflict at large. One can postulate, however, that such a policy can contribute to the solution of that conflict only in the long run. Three studies, thus far, have used GLOBUS to investigate the impact of alternative security policy options of which disarmament is one part. In his experiments with alternative defense policy options in the West Cusack (1984) found that reduced defense spending in the West contributes to relatively more cooperative and less hostile East-West relations.

Bremer and Hughes (1987) analyzed simultaneously the linkage between the East-West conflict and the North-South gap in order to find out to what extent the South would actually profit from disarmament in the North. They implemented a balanced force reduction policy for a limited number of years in the East and in the West. The findings indicate that balanced arms reductions both in the West and in the East have little effect on the overall climate between the two blocks. The relationship between the two superpowers, however, improves and becomes more cooperative in the long run. But as Bremer and Hughes (1987:78) conclude, disarmament is unlikely to eliminate all of the East-West tensions.

Dale Smith ( 1988; 1987 a) examined the long term impact of a policy of confrontation ·as envisaged by Reagan when he took office towards the USSR in conjunction with an annual three percent increase in real terms of the desired defense expenditures. The long term effect of such a policy consists in the deterioration of Soviet-American relations. In addition, the envisaged continuous growth of the defense budget can not be maintained for long. The attempt to

"outspend" the USSR in order to improve the balance of power in favour of the USA can not be achieved. In the end the Soviet Union is even better off.

These scenarios provide us with two insights. First, disarmament alone does not fundamentally alter the structure of East-West relations if pursued only for a limited period in time. Second, a policy of confrontation leading to the "outspending" of the opponent leaves both sides worse off resulting in a higher defense burden and the deterioration of the East-West diplomatic climate. In other words, the prevailing structure is asymmetrical in that it is easier to make things worst and much harder to improve it systematically to the better.

The scenario analyses conducted thus far nevertheless fall short of the goal to assess systematically the whole spectrum of options related to disarmament:

First, the issue has not been investigated to what extent a fundamental foreign policy shift by the East and/or the West could contribute not only to improve East-West relations in general, but also lead to a spin-off effect in the military sector, i. e. to disarmament in particular. The threat reduction such a foreign policy shift entails could motivate policy-makers to slow down the arms race or even revert it. One would not expect that to happen immediately, but in the long run.

Second, what would happen if both blocks would systematically pursue disarmament as a long term policy? Would that lead to a spin-off effect in the foreign policy domain, and enhance cooperation and reduce hostility? Again, such effects are unlikely to take place immediately. A certain adjustment period is required before one would expect that process to take place, that is in the longer run, if at all.

Third, unilateralism either in the foreign policy domain or in the defense sector have thus far not been investigated at all. As we all know negotiations are complex, take a long time, and usually do not lead to the expected outcome. One could argue unilateralism, specifically in the military sector, may be risky. 8> But on the other hand such a unilateral policy pursued by one of the block could be matched in the long run by the other side in light of the expected gains. Thus, unilateral policies could possibly have the effect negotiations envisage but usually fail to achieve, especially with respect to disarmament given the technical complexity of that broad issue area.

The recent unilateral arms reduction measures announced by the Soviet Union and the GDR have been interpreted with mixed feelings by the West. They have been interpreted as insufficient. In addition policy-makers in the West have characterized these actions as propaganda moves intended primarily to influence positively Western public opinion. Both arguments would not apply if such unilateral policies were maintained over a prolonged period of time. In addition, we would expect that in the long run East-West relations should improve significantly.

In order to find out whether these expectations are true all the three alternatives have been implemented in a series of nine scenarios. They all start with the year 1990 and end in the year 2010, the year GLOBUS runs usually end. In the first two scenarios the foreign policy shift is implemented unilaterally by the West respectively by the East. In the third scenario the foreign policy shift option is implemented by the East and the West simultaneously.

In a second step we have implemented three disarmament scenarios: two scenarios in which such a policy option is implemented unilaterally by the West or the East, and a third where bilateral disarmament takes place.

Arms Reduction Yes Arms Reduction

No

Fig. 3: THE SCENARIOS

Foreign Policy Change

No Yes

West Run2 Run3

East Run4 RunS

Both Run6 Run?

West Base Run Run 8

East Base Run Run9

Both Base Run Run 10

8) That argument has been developed theoretically among others by Weede (19 89: 262-6 3). The central point is that it would lead to a point where mutual deterence no longer prevails. As unilateral disarmament can always be reversed in principle the process of reversal could possibly lead to war if reciprocity does not occur.

Finally, both scenarios mentioned above have been combined. The foreign policy shift is and the disarmament policy option are implemented simultaneously, unilaterally for the East and the West and for both East and West. This combination can be considered as a fundamental security policy reorientation. The list of the nine scenarios is represented in figure 3.

The foreign policy option has been implemented by reducing the hostility reactivity parameter by one half and at the same time by increasing by a factor of two the cooperation reactivity parameter, either for the East nations and/or the West nations in the foreign policy module (cf. Smith, 1 987b). The disarmament policy option was implemented by reducing the appropriate bargaining weight parameter of the defense sector in the budgetary allocation module (cf. Cusack, 1987) by 50 percent. The other bargaining parameters were raised accordingly.9>

The Results - Three Alternative Policy Options

Given the specific focus of this paper we will only present results relating to East-West relations in general, i. e. foreign policy relations, defense, and East-West trade. We will also limit ourselves to the aggregate block level, East and West in order to keep the data presentation within reasonable bounds. 10l In general the results will be presented in terms of the deviations in percent from the base run or reference run of the model.

Foreign Policy Change- No Disarmament

Foreign policy in GLOBUS is represented by two basic indicators: hostility and cooperation. The logic of that conceptualization has been developed and outlined by Dale Smith (1987b). What is very likely a time consuming process can easily be enforced in GLOBUS by changing the hostility and cooperation reactivity constants HREAC and CREAC.11l

The shift in foreign policy does not, as one might be inclined to believe, lead to a reduction in defense expenditures in the West As Fig. 4[a] shows a unilateral foreign policy reorientation of the West towards the East is accompanied by a continuous even though small additional increase in the level of defense expenditures of that block when compared to the base run. The East, in contrast, reacts differently (cf. Fig. 4[b]) in that the unilateral foreign policy shift by the West is accompanied by a slight reduction in its own defense expenditures level. But that reduction is practically no more than a sign of good will, if one wishes, given its order of about one percent.

The unilateral foreign policy shift by the East, however, is reciprocated by the West:

the level of defense expenditures is slightly lower than that of the base run. At the same time

9) The respective routines are available f rom the authors upon request

10) GLOBUS produces a massive amount of data. Theref ore the a priori limitation to a small set of variables to be analyzed is necessary.

11) That does not imply, however, that overall reactivity remains constant. The opposite is the case ( cf . Smith, 19 87b: 610-23 ).

the East also reduces its defense expenditures level over a prolonged period of time before the readjustment process begins (around the year 2006) and converges again to the original level of the base run.

Insert Fig. 4: Defense Expenditures: Foreign Policy Change Here

The most interesting case is the change in foreign policy by both blocks. As the graphs in Fig. 4 show the West responds favourably to the bilateral policy change by reducing quite considerably its level of defense expenditures in the first seven years after the policy change by about 6.5 percent below the base run level. From then on a readjustment process begins leading to a level which is roughly 3.5 percent below its original level.

In the Eastern block, however, the bilateral foreign policy shift leads to a prolonged reduction of the defense expenditures (15 years), but then the readjustment process begins and by the year 2010 the original defense expenditures level is reached again. In other words, the West reacts more positively to a bilateral foreign policy reorientation in the long run whereas the East seems to react most favourably to a unilateral Western foreign policy change.

Given the enforced foreign policy shift, the East-West climate should improve.

East-West climate is operationalized as the ratio of the total hostile event flows from East to West and West to East over the total cooperative event flows from East to West and West to East. Therefore negative percent deviations indicate a relative improvement of the climate.

As Fig. 5[a] shows both unilateral as well as the bilateral foreign policy shifts all lead to a considerable improvement of the East-West diplomatic climate. The bilateral foreign policy change has the greatest positive impact, which is what one would expect to occur. New equilibria seem to be reached for the climate which are 50 to 80 per cent below the base run level. In absolute values the index of 0.9 for the base run reaches a value between 0.2 and 0.4 for the three alternative scenarios. That means that by the end of the simulation run cooperation clearly dominates over hostility.

Insert Fig. 5: East-West Climate: Foreign Policy Change Here

To what extent are intra-block relations affected by the foreign policy reorientation?

As the graphs in Fig 6[a] show for the West the unilateral foreign policy shift leads to a prolonged period of deterioration of the intra-block climate in relative terms. Hostility relative to cooperation increases by as much as 20 per cent.

Yet this is not as dramatic as it may seem because the overall ratio of hostility to cooperation is still below the index value of 1.0, that is to say that cooperation nevertheless prevails. The index value varies between 0.29 (1990) and 0.29 (2010) for the base run. For the three different scenarios the values are .31 (Run 8), .22 (Run 9) and .29 (Run 10) by the year 2010. That is to say that the predominant mode of foreign policy interaction within the Western block is still cooperation.

If the East changes unilaterally its foreign policy, however, the intra-West relations become even more cooperative. Thus, intra-block cohesion is likely to be enhanced by such a unilateral move of the East (cf. Fig. 6[a]). Still different is the evolution of the intra-West diplomatic climate when the foreign policy shift is implemented bilaterally. For a prolonged period of time hostile events increase relatively more than cooperative events before the original hostility to cooperation ratio is reached again by the year 2010.

Insert Fig. 6: Intra-Block Climate: Foreign Policy Change Here

A first glance at Fig. 6[b] shows quite a different reaction pattern within the Eastern block. The unilateral foreign policy shift by the West as well as the bilateral foreign policy shift both raise intra-block hostility relative to intra-block cooperation. Again, the absolute values show that this does not mean a serious deterioration of the diplomatic climate within the East. The overall climate index is still much below the 1.0 threshold. This means that cooperative interaction still dominates over hostile interaction among the block members.

Only in the case of the bilateral foreign policy shift is the intra-East diplomatic climate affected negatively in relative terms. In that case we find the same pattern for the West: a prolonged period of deterioration of the diplomatic climate in relative terms is finally overcome by the year 2010.

Again, looking at the absolute index values reveals much less dramatic changes.

Whereas the index varies between 0.1 (1990)and 0.16 (2010) for the base run, the corresponding values for the year 2010 for the three different scenarios are 0.2 (run 8), 0.21 (run 9) and 0.22 (run 10) respectively.

According to Poll ins ( 1988) Trade Follows the Flag. The evidence he presents supports that assumption. Given the results from the foreign policy change scenarios presented thus far one would expect that East-West trade would improve. Is that supported by the results?

As we can see from the graphs 7[a] and 7[b] this is generally the case. East-West trade increases for all the three options implemented. There are, however, some noticeable differences.

For the West, the unilateral foreign policy shift has the smallest impact with respect to the imports from the East. The same holds for the East with respect to the imports from the West. In both cases the increases are in the order of about 10 per cent by the en·d of the simulation run.

The unilateral foreign policy shift by the East raises that percentage to about 50 percent for the Eastern imports by the West and almost 60 per cent for Western imports by the East by the end of the simulation in the year 2010. The bilateral foreign policy shift gives additional momentum to East-West trade. The imports by the West from the East stabilize at a level roughly 70 per cent above the base run level, whereas in the East Western imports have almost doubled by the year 2010. The difference is that in the West a saturation level is reached before the end of the simulation run whereas in the East only the momentum of Western import growth is declining. Foreign policy does affect positively the trade relationships between the blocks.

Insert Fig. 7: East-West Trade: Foreign Policy Change Here

Summing up the results presented thus far, foreign policy, it seems, does make a difference - but that difference is neither simple nor clear cut. With respect to disarmament a foreign policy shift does not seem to have any major impact upon the traditional power politics perspective which relies on military means. But the change in the East-West diplomatic relations affects intra -block relations. This is to be expected because such a policy shift amounts to a general realignment in international relations. But at the same time the changes are hardly dramatic.

Disarmament - No Foreign Policy Change

A change in foreign policy, as the first set of scenarios has revealed does not significantly influence the defense sector. Therefore one wonders whether in contrast a change of the defense policy, i. e. disarmament, does have an impact upon foreign relations.

In figure 8 the results from the disarmament scenarios are presented, where the disarmament policy option has been implemented, unilaterally by the West or the East, and multilaterally by both blocks. Disarmament, it should be noted, has been implemented by reducing the level of defense expenditures. 12>

Insert Fig. 8: Defense Expenditures: Disarmament Here

Unilateral disarmament alone, as can be seen from the two graphs, does neither in the short run nor in the long run influence the opposing block to reciprocate the same policy. If the West disarms unilaterally (Run 2) the defense expenditures of that block decrease to a level 20 percent below that of the base run by the year 2010. The defense expenditure level of the East is virtually identical to that of the base run.

If the East reduces its defense expenditures (Run 4) the reductions are substantial. They are about 30 percent below the level of the base run by the year 201 0.13> The West begins to react moderate! y to the Eastern unilateral disarmament policy by the year 2006. Its reductions in defense expenditures in the year 2010 are about two percent below the base run level by then.

In sum unilateral disarmament does not have any effect worth mentioning upon the opposing block's behavior. That implies that East-West relations are relatively insensitive with respect to the other block's defense spending behavior. A substantive effect in terms

12) Reducing def ense expenditures is certainly one aspect of the disarmament process but not identical to disarmament proper. The military balance of power is certainly determined by additional f actors such as the size of the military personnel, the weapon systems, the of f ensive and def ensive capabilities etc. We are aware of the f act that this is a weakness of the present analysis.

13) The reductions in the East are more substantial than in the West given the dif f erent sizes of the bargaining weight parameters of the def ense sector in East and West. In the East the nation specific parameters are much larger.

of arms reductions occurs when both sides decide to disarm systematically (Run 6). But these reductions differ only marginally from the unilateral disarmament policy. Mutual disarmament does not add further momentum to the disarmament process as such.

How does that policy option affect the East-West diplomatic climate? Climate, as mentioned above, is represented by the ratio of total hostility exchanged between the two blocks over the total cooperation exchanged between East and West. If the West disarms unilateral! y the East-West climate deteriorates. The ratio increases by 18 percent as compared to the base run. If, however, the East disarms unilaterally the East-West climate improves temporarily. But after about eight years the climate begins to deteriorate relative to the base run. But it does not deteriorate as much as in the case of Western unilateralism. The climate becomes worst when both sides decide do disarm systematically. (see Fig. 9 [a]).

Insert Fig. 9: East-West Climate: Disarmament Here

Obviously, there is a trade-off between disarmament and foreign policy relations between the two blocks. The loss in military preponderance is substituted by a relative increase in inter-block hostility. In absolute terms the index varies between 1.12 and 0.9 for the base run between 1990 and 2010. For the three scenarios the values reaches by 2010 are 1.16 (run 2), 1.09 (run 4), and 1.21 (run 6) respectively. Even though hostility is dominating in all three cases over cooperation the ratio is not heavily tilted towards the former.

Does disarmament affect the diplomatic climate among the allies within each block, and if so, how does it evolve? Figure 10 shows the results for both the West and the East.

First of all, an interesting difference between East and West shows up: unilateral disarmament by the West leads to a significant and increasing deterioration of foreign policy relations among the allies. If the East alone disarms foreign policy relations within that block remain practically unaffected (cf. Run 2 in Fig. 10 [a] and Run 4 in Fig. 10 [b]). Unilateral disarmament by the East contributes to the improvement of the diplomatic climate within the Western alliance. The same is true for the Eastern alliance if the West disarms unilaterally, an interesting parallel to note (cf. Run 2 in Fig. 6 [b] and Run 4 in Fig. 6 [a]).

For the West as well as the East the index value for the diplomatic climate is still way below the 1.0 level where hostility relative to cooperation would balance. For the West the index reaches maximum value of 0.32 in run 2 as opposed to a value of 0.29 in the base run by the year 2010. For the East the highest value the index reaches is in run 4 with a value of 0.16 in the year 2010 which is identical to the value of the base run value for that year.

Insert Fig. 10: Intra-Block Climate: Disarmament Here

Finally, bilateral disarmament shows a different pattern within each of the two alliances. In the West intra-block climate deteriorates first slightly for about 16 years before improving at an accelerating pace from then on. In the East the intra-block climate improves gradually from the beginning on of that policy change throughout the rest of the simulation run. This indicates that the Western allies seem to have much less faith in their common disarmament policy than their Eastern counterparts.

In sum, the unilateral and bilateral disarmament policies show different results for each block. It seems that the West is much more suspicious of disarmament than the East. Part of the explanation might be that the Eastern block is much more hierarchically structured.

With a dominant block leader that alliance displays a much greater coherence in its policy than the West.

Insert Fig. 11: East-West Trade: Disarmament Here

What effect does disarmament have with respect to East-West trade? As figure 11 shows Western unilateral disarmament leads to a dissociation tendency: imports from the East decrease systematically and are about six percent lower as compared to the base run by the end of the simulation run in the year 2010. Bilateral disarmament has practically the same effect. Only unilateral disarmament by the East leads to increased imports ( up to about four percent in 1998) from the East by the West. In the long run the trade flows from the East decline to a level below that of the base run.

That effect is mirrored in the slightly improved change of imports from the West by the East (cf figure 11 [b], Run 4) when the East disarms unilaterally. In the other two cases the imports of the West by the East are somewhat lower than for the base run. Given the logic of the GLOBUS model's trade algorithm ( see Pollins and Brecke, 1987) this is in effect what one would expect. The deterioration of the East-West climate affects negatively East-West trade.

The message these results convey is clear: disarmament alone does not change in any fundamental way East-West relations. Even worse, disarmament leads to greater East-West tensions. In addition, intra-block diplomatic relations deteriorate in the West if the allies decide to disarm. The advocates of disarmament might be deceived. But the results qevertheless seem plausible. Disarmament per se does not really change the long established patterns of threat perception on the one hand, the established patterns of foreign policy making on the other. Disarmament as conceptualized in the scenarios affect only the government budget of the disarming block. In addition, the trade ties are reduced in the long run. If one assumes that trade contributes to peaceful relations disarmament alone does have the unexpected averse effect.

All in all, disarmament does not seem to pay off. But is this really the case? One can argue that such a dramatic shift in policy will certainly not be pursued without a corresponding shift in foreign policy. If such a shift in foreign policy goes hand in hand with disarmament will the results be more beneficial? This issue will be addressed in the next section.

Disarmament - Foreign Policy Change

The effects of unilateral and bilateral disarmament upon the level of defense expenditures in the West and the East are graphically shown in figure 12. The foreign policy shift does not lend further support to disarmament. The unilateral and bilateral decreases in defense spending relative to the base run remain the same when compared to the

disarmament-only scenarios presented above. The bureaucratic momentum involved in the budgetary allocation process related to defense remains obviously largely unaffected by foreign policy considerations.

Fig. 12: Defense Expenditures: Disarmament and Foreign Policy Change Here

But what one would expect is definitely an improvement of East-West relations in terms of the diplomatic climate. This is, as figures 12[a] and 12[b] show, in fact the case.

The East-West climate improves dramatically in all of the three cases. If the West disarms unilaterally and changes its foreign policy towards the East the East-West climate becomes much more cooperative in relative terms. If the East disarms unilaterally the climate improves even more. And, finally, if both blocks disarm and change their foreign policy towards the other block the process of detente becomes even more pronounced as it should according to the changes enforced by the scenario design.

This dramatic change becomes clear when looking at the absolute values of the climate index. For the base run the values vary between 1.2 (1990) and 0.9 (2010). For the three different scenarios the values of that index vary between 0.26 (run 7) and 0.4 (run 3) by the year 2010. Therefore, the foreign policy interaction between the two blocks does in fact become considerably more cooperative relative to hostility.

Insert: Fig. 13: East-West Climate: Disarmament and Foreign Policy Change Here

What happens to the intra-alliance relationships in the East and in the West if the governments from each block decide to change their foreign policy towards the other block members? As far as the West is concerned unilateral disarmament by the East improves the climate within the Western alliance. If the West alone disarms and changes its foreign policy towards the East foreign policy relations among the allies worsen continuously. The intra-block cohesion therefore suffers from such a fundamental security policy shift.

If, however, both sides disarm and change their foreign policy towards each other then the diplomatic climate among the Western alliance members becomes more hostile in relative terms. But after a prolonged period of time foreign policy relations within the West nations converge again towards the original level by the end of the simulation run. As one can see, the adjustment to the change in security policy in the West requires a considerable time.

Insert Fig. 14: Intra-Block Climate: Disarmament and Foreign Policy Change Here

Within the East there is no such differentiated pattern. Irrespective of the block who disarms and changes its foreign policy the intra-block climate within the East becomes more and more tense in relative terms. A change in Western security policy does in fact seem to trigger a tendency towards greater conflict within the East. That tendency is most pronounced when the security policy change is implemented by both blocks. In other words, there is a clear trade-off between the improvement of East-West relations and intra-block relations in the East.

Therefore the results are quite recomforting when considering the effects of disarmament and foreign policy change with respect to East-West relations. But they are deceiving when looking at the consequences such a security policy shift has for intra-block or alliance relations. They deteriorate permanently or temporarily in all but one case. Those advocating disarmament implicitly assume such a policy to have positive consequences which the scenarios presented do not substantiate.

One has to be cautious, however, not to overinterpret the intra-alliance diplomatic climate evolution. In both blocks, as the absolute index values reveal, cooperation is still predominant. For the West the base run index value in the year 2010 is 0.29. For the three scenarios the index varies between 0.36 (run 3) and 0.23 (run 5) by the year 2010. The index values for the East vary between 0.2 (run 3) and 0.23 (run 7) by the year 2010 as compared to a value of 0.16 in 2010 for the base run.

If the assumption of the scenarios implemented amounts to a basic shift in security policy the trade following the flag hypothesis would suggest an increase in East-West trade.

This is exactly what happens. In increasing order of magnitude imports from the East by the West increase from about 12 percent (unilateral disarmament by the West), to 50 percent (unilateral disarmament by the East), and to about 70 percent (bilateral disarmament) if accompanied by a foreign policy shift (see figure 15[a]). Almost identical is the pattern for the imports from the West by the East (cf. figure 15[b]).

Insert Fig. 15: East-West Trade: Disarmament and Foreign Policy Change Here

As one would expect, intra-block trade in the West declines even though that decline is not very dramatic (between three and six percent). In the East, in contrast, intra-block imports within the East rise to about ten percent above the base run level by the year 2010.

If the West disarms only then a marginal decrease of intra-block imports occurs. If, instead, the East disarms unilaterally then intra-block imports increase to a level two percent above the base run (results not shown).

Both disarmament and the foreign policy shift do alter significantly not only East-West relations but also block relations. This is the most general conclusion one can draw. Yet if we compare the results from the disarmament-foreign policy scenarios with those from the foreign policy change scenarios the overall result is that East-West climate, intra-block climate, and East-West trade are most favourably influenced predominantly by the foreign policy behavior. Disarmament alone has only a negligible impact upon the foreign policy relations. Foreign policy relations do only have a minor impact upon defense expenditures.

Therefore, a fundamental change in East-West relations can not be brought about alone either by a change in foreign policy or by disarmament.

Summary Discussion and Outlook

We assumed that disarmament is a necessary condition to reduce the danger of war in the first place. In addition we assumed that a change in foreign policy would also contribute to that

end. The GLOBUS model used to investigate the consequences of disarmament and a foreign policy change does not allow the direct assessment of the reduction in the probability of war.

Nevertheless that model provides us with a number of critical variables to evaluate East-West relations and how they could evolve if East and West would implement unilaterally or bilaterally such policy changes.

We have designed alternative policy options, foreign policy change and arms reductions to assess their longer-term effect upon East-West relations in general. In addition, we have looked at two different approaches for improving East-West relations: unilateralism and bilateralism. Do the results obtained strengthen the initial assumption?

A foreign policy shift as a gradualist approach to East-West relations where the aim consists in creating a favourable foreign policy environment reducing the existing threat perceptions seems to be supported by the results. That gradualist approach seems to be effective, both in terms of the unilateral approach and the bilateral approach because foreign policy is characterized by a considerable degree of reciprocity.

The military sector, however, does neither in the short run nor in the long run react favourably to the change in the overall diplomatic climate. The military sector is resistant to that change, both in the East and in the West. The assumption of a spin-off effect from foreign relations to the military sector turns out to be wrong.

Such a spin-off effect takes place in the realm of East-West trade relations. The improvement of the diplomatic climate favourably influences the evolution of the trade ties between both blocks. Clearly the bilateral approach turns out to be the most effective in terms of the impact upon the growth of East-West trade.

The favourable evolution of East-West relations in general has a drawback, though. It leads to a temporary or permanent deterioration of intra-block diplomatic relations in relative terms, even though that tendency is anything but dramatic. In addition, unilateralism and bilateralism produce quite different results. Counterintuitive at first sight, these results are nevertheless plausible. A change in the overall foreign policy of the respective blocks is identical to a foreign policy reorientation which should have repercussions within the respective alliances.

If we consider the disarmament policy option as a more fundamental policy shift the results obtained point to a different reaction pattern. Unilateralism does not seem to be very promising.

Reciprocity . is virtually nonexistent, thus, unilateral disarmament does not seem to pay as opposed to the bilateral approach.

Such a more radical approach to improve East-West relations by an arms reduction policy does not lead to the expected spill-over effect. Rather the opposite occurs. The loss in military power is counterbalanced by the increase in inter-block conflict relative to cooperation. At the same time the increased insecurity resulting from disarmament increases the diplomatic tensions among the respective block members. In sum, the inertia of the established East-West subsystem seems to be relatively high.

In addition to worsening the intra- and inter-block diplomatic climate disarmament also reduces the economic ties between the blocks. East-West trade ties are gradually loosened. In sum then, disarmament as such does not contribute to fundamentally alter East-West relations.

The net result is the continuation of the arms race with diplomatic means, to put it bluntly.

Furthermore, the unilateral approach is not really promising.

The fundamental policy reorientation implemented by combining the shift in foreign policy with the disarmament policy is the most successful but only if pursued bilaterally. Defense expenditures are reduced, East-West diplomatic relations improved, and East-West trade ties strengthened. The expectations that the combination of both policies would lead to an additional reinforcement effect turn out to be wrong. Very little is gained in addition with respect to arms reductions as well as diplomatic climate.

Therefore, to come back to the original assumption of the study, if arms reductions and the improvement of East-West foreign relations reduce the probability of war, the results of the study presented above strongly suggest that both policies should be pursued simultaneously by both alliances. Neither unilateralism nor disarmament alone would contribute significantly to that end. In addition, improving East-West relations must be accompanied by corresponding policies to offset the tensions they could produce within the alliances themselves.

A final critical note needs to be added. Disarmament has been conceptualized in terms of the reduction of defense expenditures. It may well be that such an approach is not adequate and responsible for some of the unexpected results obtained. This suspicion is substantiated by the final figure 16, were the ratio of the military power of the West over the East for the base run as well as the three combined disarmament and policy change scenarios have been plotted. That index consists of the conventional military capabilities combining both defense capital and defense labor (cf. Cusack, 1987:365:71).

Insert Fig. 16: The East-West Balance of Military Power Here

The conventional balance of power (cf Fig. 16[a]) does improve quite considerably for the West in relative terms if both policies are implemented. The strategic balance of power, however, does improve in relative terms for the East (cf; Fig. 16[b]). Thus, the reduction in defense expenditures does not a priori guarantee that the existing balance of power, either in the conventional sector or in the strategic sector, remains untouched. Quite the contrary is the case.

Furthermore, the two blocks differ with respect to the allocation of the reduced resources for conventional and strategic military means.

If disarmament is to have a long term positive effect the reduction in expenditures should be accompanied by the maintenance of the existing balance of power if not the reduction of the imbalance of power. That goal has not been achieved by the scenarios. But the results do alert us to the fact that expenditures reductions alone do not necessarily mean that the military balance will change automatically towards parity. The opposite may well be the case thus counterbalancing the positive effect attached to the reduction in defense expenditures.

References

Bremer, Stuart A. (ed) (1 987) THE GLOBUS MODEL - Computer Simulation of Worldwide Political and EconomicDevelopments.Frankf^urta^.M. / Boulder CO.: Campus/ Westview^. Bremer, Stuart A. and Walter L Gruhn (1988) MICRO GLOBUS. Berlin: Edition Sigma.

Bremer, Stuart A. and Barry B. Hughes (1987) Reducing East-West Conflict and The North-South Gap. FGG Papers, GLOBUS Research Group, Science Center Berlin.

FGG/dp 87-3.

Cusack, Thomas R. (1 987) Government Budget Processes.In: S. A. Bremer (ed) (1987) THE GLOBUS MODEL - Computer Simulation of Worldwide Political and Economic Developments.Frankfurt a. M. I Boulder CO.: Campus/ Westview, pp. 325-458.

Cusack, Thomas R. ( 1 984) One Problem. Three Solutions: A Simulation Analysis of Alternative Western Defense Policy Options. IIVG discussion paper, IIVG/dp 84- 1 09, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin.

Diehl, Paul F. (1983) Arms Races and the Outbreak of War, 1816-1980. Ph. D. Dissertationm Political Science, University of Michigan.

Eberwein, Wolf-Dieter (1 982) The Seduction of Power: Serious International Disputes and the Power Status of Nations, 1 900- 1 976, International Interactions 9 (1): 57-74.

Frei, Daniel, and Dieter Ruloff (1983) East-West Relations - Volume 1, A Systematic Survey.

Cambridge, MA:Gun, Oehlschlager & Hain.

Pollins, Brian M ( 1 988) Does Trade Still Follow the Flag? A M odel of International Diplomacy and Commerce. Paper prep. for delivery at the Third World Peace Science Congress, Mai 30- June 3, 1 988, College Park, MA.

Pollins Brian M, and Peter K. Brecke ( 1 987) International Economic Processes. In: S. A. Bremer (ed) (1987) THE GLOBUS MODEL - Computer Simulation of Worldwide Political and EconomicDevelopments.Frankfurt a. M. / Boulder CO.: Campus/ Westview, pp. 459-567.

Smith, Dale (1 988) Reagan' s National Security Legacy - Model-Based Analyses of Recent Changes in American Policy. Journal of Conflict Resolution Vo1.32(4): 595-625.

Smith, Dale (1 987a) REAGAN IN MACHINA: Model-Based Analyses of Recent Changes in American National Security Policy. FGG Papers, Science Center Berlin, FGG/dp 87-4, September.

Smith, Dale (1 987b) International Political Processes. In: S. A. Bremer (ed) (1 987) THE GLOBUS MODEL - Computer Simulation of Worldwide Political and Economic Developments.Frankfurt a. M. I Boulder CO.: Campus/ Westview, pp. 569-721.

Wallace, Michael D. (1 982) Armaments and Escalation: Two Competing Hypotheses.

International Studies Quarterly 26(1 ): 37-56.

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Politische Vierteljahresschrift 30 (2): 254-272.

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Appendix 1

A Summary of the GLOBUS Characteristics

The GLOBUS Structure

Purpose Evaluation of Alternative Long-Term Policies with Respect to Global Economic and Political Problems Time Span 1970-2010

Domain 25 nations

Focus National and International Political and Economic Developments

Issues + Economic Growth and Vulnerability

• Governability

• Political Stability and Unrest

• North-South Relations + International Conflict

. + East-West Relations

Structure Modular, Continuous-Time Computer Simulation

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