We assumed that disarmament is a necessary condition to reduce the danger of war in the first place. In addition we assumed that a change in foreign policy would also contribute to that
end. The GLOBUS model used to investigate the consequences of disarmament and a foreign policy change does not allow the direct assessment of the reduction in the probability of war.
Nevertheless that model provides us with a number of critical variables to evaluate East-West relations and how they could evolve if East and West would implement unilaterally or bilaterally such policy changes.
We have designed alternative policy options, foreign policy change and arms reductions to assess their longer-term effect upon East-West relations in general. In addition, we have looked at two different approaches for improving East-West relations: unilateralism and bilateralism. Do the results obtained strengthen the initial assumption?
A foreign policy shift as a gradualist approach to East-West relations where the aim consists in creating a favourable foreign policy environment reducing the existing threat perceptions seems to be supported by the results. That gradualist approach seems to be effective, both in terms of the unilateral approach and the bilateral approach because foreign policy is characterized by a considerable degree of reciprocity.
The military sector, however, does neither in the short run nor in the long run react favourably to the change in the overall diplomatic climate. The military sector is resistant to that change, both in the East and in the West. The assumption of a spin-off effect from foreign relations to the military sector turns out to be wrong.
Such a spin-off effect takes place in the realm of East-West trade relations. The improvement of the diplomatic climate favourably influences the evolution of the trade ties between both blocks. Clearly the bilateral approach turns out to be the most effective in terms of the impact upon the growth of East-West trade.
The favourable evolution of East-West relations in general has a drawback, though. It leads to a temporary or permanent deterioration of intra-block diplomatic relations in relative terms, even though that tendency is anything but dramatic. In addition, unilateralism and bilateralism produce quite different results. Counterintuitive at first sight, these results are nevertheless plausible. A change in the overall foreign policy of the respective blocks is identical to a foreign policy reorientation which should have repercussions within the respective alliances.
If we consider the disarmament policy option as a more fundamental policy shift the results obtained point to a different reaction pattern. Unilateralism does not seem to be very promising.
Reciprocity . is virtually nonexistent, thus, unilateral disarmament does not seem to pay as opposed to the bilateral approach.
Such a more radical approach to improve East-West relations by an arms reduction policy does not lead to the expected spill-over effect. Rather the opposite occurs. The loss in military power is counterbalanced by the increase in inter-block conflict relative to cooperation. At the same time the increased insecurity resulting from disarmament increases the diplomatic tensions among the respective block members. In sum, the inertia of the established East-West subsystem seems to be relatively high.
In addition to worsening the intra- and inter-block diplomatic climate disarmament also reduces the economic ties between the blocks. East-West trade ties are gradually loosened. In sum then, disarmament as such does not contribute to fundamentally alter East-West relations.
The net result is the continuation of the arms race with diplomatic means, to put it bluntly.
Furthermore, the unilateral approach is not really promising.
The fundamental policy reorientation implemented by combining the shift in foreign policy with the disarmament policy is the most successful but only if pursued bilaterally. Defense expenditures are reduced, East-West diplomatic relations improved, and East-West trade ties strengthened. The expectations that the combination of both policies would lead to an additional reinforcement effect turn out to be wrong. Very little is gained in addition with respect to arms reductions as well as diplomatic climate.
Therefore, to come back to the original assumption of the study, if arms reductions and the improvement of East-West foreign relations reduce the probability of war, the results of the study presented above strongly suggest that both policies should be pursued simultaneously by both alliances. Neither unilateralism nor disarmament alone would contribute significantly to that end. In addition, improving East-West relations must be accompanied by corresponding policies to offset the tensions they could produce within the alliances themselves.
A final critical note needs to be added. Disarmament has been conceptualized in terms of the reduction of defense expenditures. It may well be that such an approach is not adequate and responsible for some of the unexpected results obtained. This suspicion is substantiated by the final figure 16, were the ratio of the military power of the West over the East for the base run as well as the three combined disarmament and policy change scenarios have been plotted. That index consists of the conventional military capabilities combining both defense capital and defense labor (cf. Cusack, 1987:365:71).
Insert Fig. 16: The East-West Balance of Military Power Here
The conventional balance of power (cf Fig. 16[a]) does improve quite considerably for the West in relative terms if both policies are implemented. The strategic balance of power, however, does improve in relative terms for the East (cf; Fig. 16[b]). Thus, the reduction in defense expenditures does not a priori guarantee that the existing balance of power, either in the conventional sector or in the strategic sector, remains untouched. Quite the contrary is the case.
Furthermore, the two blocks differ with respect to the allocation of the reduced resources for conventional and strategic military means.
If disarmament is to have a long term positive effect the reduction in expenditures should be accompanied by the maintenance of the existing balance of power if not the reduction of the imbalance of power. That goal has not been achieved by the scenarios. But the results do alert us to the fact that expenditures reductions alone do not necessarily mean that the military balance will change automatically towards parity. The opposite may well be the case thus counterbalancing the positive effect attached to the reduction in defense expenditures.
References
Bremer, Stuart A. (ed) (1 987) THE GLOBUS MODEL - Computer Simulation of Worldwide Political and EconomicDevelopments.Frankfurta.M. / Boulder CO.: Campus/ Westview. Bremer, Stuart A. and Walter L Gruhn (1988) MICRO GLOBUS. Berlin: Edition Sigma.
Bremer, Stuart A. and Barry B. Hughes (1987) Reducing East-West Conflict and The North-South Gap. FGG Papers, GLOBUS Research Group, Science Center Berlin.
FGG/dp 87-3.
Cusack, Thomas R. (1 987) Government Budget Processes.In: S. A. Bremer (ed) (1987) THE GLOBUS MODEL - Computer Simulation of Worldwide Political and Economic Developments.Frankfurt a. M. I Boulder CO.: Campus/ Westview, pp. 325-458.
Cusack, Thomas R. ( 1 984) One Problem. Three Solutions: A Simulation Analysis of Alternative Western Defense Policy Options. IIVG discussion paper, IIVG/dp 84- 1 09, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin.
Diehl, Paul F. (1983) Arms Races and the Outbreak of War, 1816-1980. Ph. D. Dissertationm Political Science, University of Michigan.
Eberwein, Wolf-Dieter (1 982) The Seduction of Power: Serious International Disputes and the Power Status of Nations, 1 900- 1 976, International Interactions 9 (1): 57-74.
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Cambridge, MA:Gun, Oehlschlager & Hain.
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Pollins Brian M, and Peter K. Brecke ( 1 987) International Economic Processes. In: S. A. Bremer (ed) (1987) THE GLOBUS MODEL - Computer Simulation of Worldwide Political and EconomicDevelopments.Frankfurt a. M. / Boulder CO.: Campus/ Westview, pp. 459-567.
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Appendix 1
A Summary of the GLOBUS Characteristics
The GLOBUS Structure
Purpose Evaluation of Alternative Long-Term Policies with Respect to Global Economic and Political Problems Time Span 1970-2010
Domain 25 nations
Focus National and International Political and Economic Developments
Issues + Economic Growth and Vulnerability
• Governability
• Political Stability and Unrest
• North-South Relations + International Conflict
. + East-West Relations
Structure Modular, Continuous-Time Computer Simulation
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