Goal setting and goal striving

Chapter Fifteen

Goal Setting and Goal Striving

Gabriele Oetlingen and Peter M. Gollwitzer

In this chapter we focus on the determinants and processes of goal emergence and goal implementation. We first address personal and situational variables leading to the forma- tion of behavioral goals and what kind of psychological processes help or hinder goal set- ting. In the second parr of the chapter, we discuss how set goals of different qualities predict goal attainment and which self-regulatory strategies help successful goal striving.

Goal effects on cognition are discussed as possible mediators of the goal-behavior link.

The History of the Goal Concept

Behaviorists recognize goal-directed behavior by its features. Goal-directed behavior is per- sistent. A hungry rat persists in searching a maze until the pellets are reached (Tolman, 1925). Goal-directed behavior is appropriate. \~hen one path is blocked, another path to the same goal is taken, or if the goal moves. the organism readily follows it. Finally, goal- directed organisms starr )'earching when exposed to stimuli associated with the goal.

A behaviorist's statement that a certain piece of food is a goal for the hungry organism means (1) that the food qualifies as an incentive for the organism, and (2) that the re- searcher has chosen to describe the behavior of the organism relative to the food stimulus rather than relative to any other object or event. Skinner (1953) referred to goal-directedness as a shorthand descriptlon of behavior resulting from some kind of operant conditioning.

Thus in the behaviorist tradition, the reference point for goal-directed behavior lS not the intention or the goal set by (he organism itself.

In contrast, the reference point of modern goal theories is the internal subjective goal.

Goal-directed behavior refers to goals held by the individual (e.g. a person's goal to Stop smoking serves as the reference point for his or her efforts to achieve (his goal). Research questions focus on how and in what form goals are set and how goal serring affects behavior.

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The behaviorist distinctions between needs (motives), incentives. and goal-directed behavior are, however. still present in modern goal theories which consider needs (e.g. the need for approval) as forces that narrow down classes of incentives (e.g. being popular or accom- plished), and see behavioral goals in the service of these incentives. For example, Geen (1995) defined an incentive as a desired outcome that subsumes several lower order goals.

Incentives (e.g. being popular or accomplished) are considered co be a product of a per- son's need (i.e. (he need for social approval) and the perceived situacional opportunities (i.e. the person's friends or scientific communiC)', respectively). Intentions co accain popu- larity or(0 accomplish oumanding scientific achievements are underscood as higher order goals served by many lower order behavioral goals (e.g. intending co use the weekend co visit friends or co write an outstanding scientific article, respectively).

The modern perspective of analyzing goal-directed behaviors in relacion co subjective goals has its own precursors: William lames and William McDougall in America, and NaaiB Ach and Kurc Lewin in Europe. In his Principles ofPsychology (1890/1950) lames held that behavior can be regulated by resolutions (i.e. intentions. subjeccive goals), even though this may be difficult at times. However, if certain preliminaries are fulfilled, behavior specified in resolutions comes true. McDougall (1908/1931) postulated that goals guide behavior through cognitive activiry that pertains co the analysis of the present siwation and the intended goal. Progress cowards, and the accainment of, the goal are seen as pleasurable and thwarting and failing as painful.

In Europe, the scientific debate on goal striving was dominated by controversy becween Ach and Lewin. Ach (1935) assumed that mental links beC'A-'een an anticipated situation and an intended behavior create whac he called a determination, which urges the person co initi- ate the intended action when che specified siwation is encountered. The strength of a deter- mination should depend on how concretely che anticipated situation is specitled and on the intensity of the intention. Determination was seen as direcdy eliciting the behavior v,:ithout conscious intent. Le\l;'in (1926) critically referred co Ach's ideas as a "linkage cheory ofinten- tion" and proposed a need theory of intention. Goals (intentions), like needs, are assumed co assign a \'alence(Aufforderungscharakter) co objects and events in one's surroundings. Similar co basic needs (e.g. hunger) which can be satisfied by a variety ofbehaviors (e.g. eating fruit,

\'egetables, or bread), the quasi-needs associated with intentions (e.g. co be popular) may be satisfied by various behaviors (e.g. inviting one's friends for a party, buying birthday gifts).

The tension associaced with the quasi-need determines che intensity of goal striving. This tension depends on che strength of relevant real needs (i.e. superordinate drives or general life goals) and how strongly these are related (0 the quasi-need. Lewin's tension-scate meta- phor accounts for the flexibility of goal striving.

Many of the ideas on goal-directed behaviors as presented by lames, McDougall, Ach, Lewin. and the behaviorists, have been absorbed into modern goal theories, whereby goal implementation has received much more theoretical and empirical accention than goal seccing. Karoly (1993, p. 27) states chat "che study of goals as dependent variables remains infrequent" and Carver & Scheier (1999) conclude that "the question of where goals come from and how they are synthesized is one that has nor been well explored." \Y/e will start, chen, with the quescion of what faccors determine goal selection and which psychological processes promore goal seccing.

Goal Setting

Detemzinanti ofgoal )'erring

AHigned goals Goals are often assignedby others (e.g. employers, teachers, parents). It matters who assigns goals co whom, and how the persuasive message is framed. Relevant variables may include amibutes of the source, the recipient, and the message (McGuire.

1969). Locke & Latham (1990) report that source variables, such as legitimacy and trust- worthiness. play an important role in the transformation of an assigned goal inco a per- sonal goal. For recipients of such assignments, perception of the goal as desirable and feasible, personal reddlnition of the goal. and integration with other existing goals are important (Cantor & Fleeson, '1994). Finally. relevant message variables may be the dis- crepancy between the suggested goal and the recipient's respeCtive current goal (e.g. when a very low calorie diet is suggested to a person with a moderate dieting goal). and whether fear appeals are used (e.g. information on the dramatic medical consequences of health- damaging behavior is pro\·ided). Effective sellers of goals must also consider the processing ability and motivation of the recipient as a moderator of the effects of source. recipient.

and message \'ariables on accepting assigned goals as personal goals (Petty & Cacioppo.

1986; Chaiken. 1987).

Selfser goal)' Goals do noc need tobe assigned, as people also sec goals on their own. Self- sec goals. ho\vever, are often influenced by ochers. for example. \vhen goals are conjoindy sec (e.g. in participacive decision making and employee involvement; Wilperc. 1994). or when goals are adopced from highly respected models kg. adopting scandards for self- reward: Mischd & Lieben. 1966). Cantor & Fleeson (1994) point ouc chac social contexc cues. such as normative expeccations of the social community". also influence goal selec- Clon.

The personal accribuces chac most strongly decermine goal choice are perceived desirabil- icy and feasibility. People prefer co choose goals chat are desirable and feasible (Ajzen.

1985; Heckhausen, 1991; Gollwiczer, 1990; Locke & Lacham, 1990). Desirability· is de- cermined by che estimated accractiveness of likely shorc-cerm and long-cerm consequences of goal accainment. Such consequences may pertain co anticipaced self-evaluations. evalua- cions by significant ochers, progress coward some higher order goal, excernal rewards of having accained the goal. and che joy/pain associated wich moving cowards che goal (Heckhausen. 1977). Feasibility depends upon people's judgments of their capabilicies to

perform relevant goal-direcced behaviors (i.e. self-efficacy expectations; Bandura. 1997), cheir belief chac chese goal-direcced behaviors will lead co (he desired ouccome (i.e. ouc- come expeccacions; Bandura. 1997), or che judged likelihood of accaining che desired ouc- come (i.e. generalized expeccations; Oectingen, 1996) or desired events in general (general opcimism; Scheier & Carver. 1985). The information source for efficacy expeccations.

ouccome expectacions, generalized expectacions, and opcimism is pasc experiences: one's own past performances, che observed performances of others. received relevant persuasive messages. and one's previous physiological responsestochallenge (Bandura. 1997). Proper assessmenr of che feasibilicy and desirability of a pocential goal also requires seeing che goal

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in relation co other potential goals. A goal associated with many accractive consequences may suddenly appear less desirable in light of a superordinate goal, or it might seem more feasible in connection \\,ith other, compatible goals (Cancor & Fleeson, 1994; Gotl\vitur.

1990).

Estimated desirability and feasibilicy determine the choice of a goal's diHlculcy level.

Festinger (1942), in his theory of resultant valence, argued that people choose goal diffi- culcy levels where the resultant expected valence is the highest - this being a multiplicative function of the probabilicy of success or failure and the valence of success or failure.

Atkinson's (1957) risk taking model modified and extended Festinger's reasoning co make separate prediCtions for individuals with hope for success versus fear of failure. The laccer prefer low and high difficulcy levels, whereas the former choose goals of medium difficulty.

Set goals may also differ in other structural features (e.g. abscract vs. concrete) and in content (e.g. materialistic vs. social integrative). People generally prefer to set themselves abstract goals, and adopt concrete goals only when they run into problems attaining an abstract goal. According co act identification theory (Vallacher & \'V'egner. 1987), people conceive of their actions in rather abstract terms (e.g. cleaning the apartment) and only drop down co lower, concrete levels (e.g. vacuuming the carpet) when difficulties in carry- ing out the activity as construed at the higher level arise. Some people cypically think of their aCtions in low-level terms, whereas others prefer high-level identifications (Vallacher

& \'V'egner. 1989). This general preference for either an abstract or a concrete level of identifying actions should be reflected in the choice of abstract versus concrete goals.

Goals can be framed with a positive or negative outcome focus (i.e. goals that focus on establishing and keeping positive outcomes as compared co avoiding and ameliorating negative outcomes). Higgins (1997) argues that people construe their self either as an ideal self that they intrinsically desire co be, or as an ought self that they feel compelled co be.

The former orientation focuses on promotion, whereas the laccer focuses on prevention.

Part of the promotion orientation is a predilection for seccing goals with a positive out- come focus, whereas pare of the prevention orientation is a predilection for setting goals with a negative outcome focus.

Goals can also be framed as performance versus learning goals (Dweck, 1996), also referred co as performance versus mastery goals (Ames & Archer, 1988), or ego invoke- ment versus task invokement goals (Nicholls, 1979). Goals in the achievement domain.

for example. can either focus on finding Out how capable one is (performance goals) or on learning how co carry out the task (learning goals). D\"eck (1996) reportS that implicit theories on the nature of abilicy determine the preference for performance versus learning goals. If people believe that ability is fixed and cannot be easily changed (i.e. hold an entity theory of ability)' they prefer performance goals. However, if people believe that ability can be improved by learning (i.e. hold an incremental theory of ability), they prefer learn- ing goals. Similar implicit theories concerning the malleability of moral character affect the selection of punitive versus educational correctional goals.

The content of set goals is influenced by needs, wishes, and higher order goals. Ryan, Sheldon, Kasser, & Deci (1996) argue, for example, that the content of people's goals reflect their needs. Auconomy, competence, and social integration needs are expected co promote goal seccing focused on self-realization rather than materialistic gains. Markus

& Nurius (1986; Oyserman, chapter 23, this volume) argue that people conceive of

themselves not only in terms of what they are (i.e. the self-concepd, but also what they wish re become in the future (i.e. the possible selt). These possible selves should give peo- ple ideas on what kind of personal goals they may suive for.

Once higher order goals are formed (e.g. co become a physician). they determine the comems of lower order goals. The comems of such "Be" goals determine the comems of respective "Do" goals which in turn determine the comems of respective "mo(Or-comrol"

goals (Carver & 5cheier. 1998, p. 72; Carver. chapter 14. this volume). "Be" goals have been described by using terms such as currem concerns (Klinger, 1977), self-defining goals (\Vicklund & Gollwitzer, 1982), personal projects (Linle, 1983). personal suivings (Emmons, 1996). and (individualized) life tasks (Camor & Fleeson. 1994). \Vhereas choos- ing higher order "Be" goals should be determined by their perceived desirabiliry and feasi- bility (Klinger, 1977). choosing the respective lower order "Do" goals also depends on the commitmem co the respective "Be" goals (Gollwirzer. 1987).

Processes ofgoat setting

Reflective processes So far we have discussed which variables determine the choice of goals with cercain suuctural and thematic features. \Ve now consider the question of what trig- gers goal sening. Bandura (1997) suggests that having successfully achieved a set goal stimu- lates the sening of ever more challenging goals. due co a person's heightened sense uf efficacy which is based on having successfully anained the prior goal. Others have poimed out that the core processes of goal sening involve commining oneself co achieving a cercain incemive (Klinger. 1977). Heckhausen & Kuhl (1985) argued that the lowest degree of commitmem co an incemi\'e is a mere wish co am.in ir. A wish that is tested for feasibility becomes a wam which carries a higher degree of commitment. To develop a full goal commitmem (i.e. co form the imemion or goal co achieve the incemive), a further rel- evance check must be carried our relating co necessary means, opportunities, time, relative imporcance, and urgency.

In their Rubicon model of action phases Heckhausen & Gollwitzer (1987; Heckhausen, 1991; GolI\vitzer. 1990) assume that people emercain more wishes than they have time or opporcunities co realize. Therefore they must select between wishes in order co accomplish at least some of them. The criteria for selection are feasibility and desirability. \Vishes with_{I •} high feasibility and desirability have the best chance ⁽⁰ become goals. The transformation of wishes inco goals is a resolution, resulting in a feeling of determination co act. Through this resolution the desired end state specified by the wish becomes an end state that the individual feels committed ⁽⁰ achieve. To catch the flavor of this transition from wishing co willing. the metaphor of crossing the Rubicon is used.

\'\'hat are the preliminaries of crossing the Rubicon? The model of action phases (Gollwitzer, 1990; Heckhausen, 1991) states that the realization of a wish demands the completion of four successive tasks: deliberating between wishes co select appropriate ones (predecision phase), planning the implememation of chosen \vishes (i.e. goals or imen- tions) co help get starred with goal-directed behaviors (preaction phase), monicoring goal- directed behaviors co bring them ⁽⁰ a successful ending (action phase), and evaluating what has been achieved as compared co what was desired co terminate goal pursuit or ⁽⁰ restart

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it (evaluation phase). People decide ⁽⁰"cross the Rubicon" (i.e. move from the predecision phase ⁽⁰ the preaction phase) when they sense that the feasibility and desirability of a wish is not only accept3.bly high, but has been exhaustively deliberated and correcdy assessed.

Gollwitzer, Heckhausen, & Ratajczak (1989) observed that undecided people more read- ily formed goals when they had been asked ⁽⁰judge the likelihood of wish fulfillment and

(0 list likely positive and negative, shore-rerm and long-rerm consequences. In addition, when undecided people were lured into planning the implementation of the wish by sim- ply connecring anticipated opportunities with intended goal-direcred behaviors, rhey also showed a grearer readiness ⁽⁰ cross rhe Rubicon. Apparendy, when undecided people fed that the task of assessing the feasibility and desirability of a given wish is completed, they show a grearer readiness ⁽⁰ move on and set rhemselves the respecrive goal.

A recent theory on fantasy realization (Oerringen, 1996) analyzes goal serring by delin- eating different routes ⁽⁰ goal formation. The rheory disringuishes betw'een ^(\"'0 forms of thinking about the future, expecrations and free fantasies. Expecrations are judgments of the likelihood that a certain future behavior or outcome will occur. Free fantasies about the future, ⁽⁰ the COntrary, are thoughts and images of future behaviors or outcomes in the mind's eye, independent of the likelihoods rhar these events will actually occur. For exam- ple, despite perceiving low chances of successfully resolving a confliCt with a parmer, peo- ple can indulge in positive fantasies of harmony.

Fantasy realization theory specifies three routes ⁽⁰ goal serring which result from how people deal with their fantasies about the furure. One route is expectancy based, while the other (\\!O are independent of expectations. The expecrancy based route rests on mentally cOntrasting posirive fantasies abour the future with negative aspects of impeding realiry.

This mental contrast ties free fantasies about the future⁽⁰ the here and now. Consequendy, the desired future appears as something rhat must be achieved and the impeding realic:' as something that must be changed. The resulting necessity ⁽⁰ acr raises the question: can realiry be alrered ⁽⁰ match fantasy? The answer is given by the subjeCtive expectation of successfull;' arraining fantasy in realic:'. Accordingly, mental contraSting of positive fanta- sies about [he future with negative aspects of the impeding reality causes expeCtations of success ⁽⁰ become activated and used. If expeCtations of success are high, a person will commit herself⁽⁰ fantasy attainment; if expecrarions of success are low, a person will re- frain.

The second route⁽⁰ goal serring stems from merely indulging in positive fantasies about the desir~d future, thereby disregarding impeding realiry. This indulgence seduces one ⁽⁰ consummate and consume the desired future envisioned in the mind's eye. Accordingly, no necessiry to act is experienced and relevant expectarions of success are nor aCtivated and used. Commitment⁽⁰ act (Owards fantasy fulfillment reflects solely the pull of the desired eVents imagined in one's fantasies. It is moderate and independent ofa person's percei\'ed chances of success (i.e. expectations). As a consequence, the level of goal commitment is either ^[00 high (when expeCtations are low) or ⁽⁰⁰ low (when expeCtations are high),

The third route is based on merely dwelling on the negative aspects. of impeding realir)", thereby disreg:uding positive fantasies about the future. Again, no necessity ro act is expe- rienced, this rime because nothing points ⁽⁰ a direCtion in \....hich ro ace. Expectations of success are not activated and used. Commitment ⁽⁰ act merely reflecrs the push of the negative aspects of impeding reality. Similar ⁽⁰ indulgence in positive fantasies about the

future. dwelling on the negative reality leads co a moderate. expectancy independent level of commitment. which is either coo high ("''''hen expeCtations are low) or coo low (when expectations are high).

Fantasy realization theory is supporeed by various experimental srudies. In one srudy (Oeccingen, in press-a, Srudy 1) pareicipants were confronted with an imerpc:rsonal oppor- runity: geccing co know an amactive person. Female parcicipants first judged the probabil- icy of successfully getting co know an accractive male doccoral studem, whose picture they saw. Participants then generated positive aspects of geccing co know the accractive man (e.g.

love, friendship) and negative aspens of impeding reality (e.g. being shy, his pOtential disimerest). They were then divided inco three groups for elaboration of these aspens. In the famasy-realicy contrast group, pareicipams memally elaborated both positive aspects of geccing co know the man and negative aspects of reality standing in the way; this was done in alternating order beginning with a positive aspect. In the positive famasy group, participams memally elaborated only positive aspects of getting co know the man; and in the negative realicy group. participants mentally elaborated only negative aspects ofimped- lng reality.

In the fantasy-realicy contrast group. goal commitmem (assessed as eagerness co get co know the person and anticipated frustration in case of failure) was strictly dependem on pareicipants' expectations, w'hile in the positive famasy and the negative reality groups, expectations had no effects on goal commitment. Whether expectations were low or high.

goal commitment was at a medium level. Apparently, mental cOntrasting makes people set themselves binding goals ...,·hen expectations of success are high, and it makes people re- frain from goal seccing when expectations of success are low. Indulging in positive famasies and ruminating about impeding reali!)'. co the comrary. cause goal commitmem co be weakly pulled by the positi\'e furure or pushed by the negative realicy. respectivel:·.

A fureher experiment (Oettingen. in press-a, Study 2) with childless female doccoral studems dealt wi'th the emergence of the goal co combine work and family life. Again, mental cOntrasting of positi\'e famasies about the future \\-'jth negative aspects of impeding reality made expectations determine goal commitmem (assessed as amicipated fruStration in case oFfailure, imended effore expenditure. and planning goal imp!ememation via proc- ess simulations; Taylor, Pham, Rivkin, & Armor, 1998). Goal commitment was mild and unaffected by expectations in pareicipams \vho had indulged in positive famasies or who had dwelled on the negative reality. In bOth experimems only contrasting parcicipants behaved rationally in the sense that their expectations of success determined their level of commitment. Famasizing and ruminating pareicipams behaved irrationally. Their level of commitment was either coo high (when expeCtations of success were low) or coo low (when expectations of success were high). A series of fureher experiments (Oeccingen, in press-b) using various fantasy themes related co personality development (e.g. academic achieve- ment, contlict resolution, emotional and financial independence, occupational success) and different experimental paradigms to induce the three modes of self-regulacory thought (i.e. mental contrasting. indulging in positive fantasies about the future, dwelling on im- peding reality) replicated this paccern of results. Taken together, the experimental findings suggest that whether people arrive at goal commitment in a rational (expectancy based) or irrational (expectancy independent) manner depends on how they mentally deal wjch a desired future.

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Reflexiveprow'Je)' So far we have discussed goal sening as a reflective process. People think about potencial goals in differenc ways. and based on these reflections they either choose a goal or refrain from doing so. However. goals may become aCtivated outside of awareness (Bargh. 1990). Bargh's automotive theory suggests that strong mental links de- velop between the cognitive represencation of situations and the goals the individual chroni- cally pursues within them, As a consequence of repeated and consistenc pairing. these goals are aCtivated automaticall~' when the person encers the critical situation. The automatically activated goal then guides behavior within the situation without choice or incention. Re- flective choice. originally crucial, is now by-passed,

Bargh, Gollwitzer. Lee Chai, and Barndollar (1999) tested the assumption of direct goal activation in several experiments by assessing whether directly activated goals lead to the same behavioral consequences as reflectively set goals. Indeed, nonconscious priming of an achievement goal caused participants to perform bener on an intellectual task than a non- primed control group. ~vforeover) nonconsciously primed achievement goals led to in- creased persistence and a higher frequency of task resumption. By applying a dissociation paradigm it could be ruled Out that these effeCts were based on the mere priming of the semantic concept of achievement.

The processes described by Bargh and colleagues are based on reflective goal sening at an earlier point in time. Automatization relates only to the activation of a set goal in a given situation. It seems possible, however. that goal-directed behavior can occur in the absence of previously or ad hoc set goals.As noted in the introduction, behaviorist research has shown that conscious goal sening or the nonconscious activation of the representation of a goal are not needed to produce behavior that carries features of goal-directedness. Such behavior can also be produced by applying principles of operanc conditioning.

The idea that goal-directed behavior can be reflexively elicited is supported by recent work in the area of motor concrol that adheres to dynamic systems theorizing (Kelso, 1995). This work suggests that complex goal-directed behaviors can emerge without men- tal representations of goals. ~(oreover. robOtics research (Brooks, 1991; Zvfaes. 1994) finds that robOts can be programmed to perform rather complex, goal-directed like behaviors without having to install goal concepts. Connectionist theorizing is also wary of the goal concept. Some connectionist theories completely abolish the goal concept. while others try to replace the refleCtive processes of goal choice by suggesting parallel constraint satisfac- tion models (Read, Vanman. & Miller, 1997).

Finally. Carver& Scheier (1999) point out that there might be two kinds of goal related automaticity. The first is described by Bargh (1990) in his automotive model and relates to automatization through repeated and consistent pairing of a goal with a situational con- text. The second relates to primitive built-in behavioral tendencies that are presenc also in nonhuman species. Carver and Scheier describe this type of automaticit}' as an intuitive, crudely differentiated "quick and dirty" way of responding to reality that provides a default response. One does not wait to form an intention, but aces immediately. This mode of responding reminds of \vhat McClelland and his colleagues (McClelland, Koesmer. &

\X!einberger, 1989) describe as behavior based on implicit motives. Implicit motives are belien:d to be biologically based. directly guiding behavior through natural incentives.

\X{e have pointed to these reflexive origins of goal-directed behavior to make the reader aware that (as behaviorim have long asserted) behaviors carrying features of goal-directedness

do not necessarily require subjective goal seccing based on refleCtive thought or the activa- cion of a mencal represencation of an existing goal. Although some theorists may question che existence and relevance of reflective goal seccing or the mencal represencation of goals.

a more challenging research question for the fucure is how the(WO (reflective and reflexive) systems Interact.

Goal Striving

Detenninants ofgoal )·triving

Goal concencs vary in scruccural feacures. They may be challenging or modest, specific or vague, abscract or concrete, proximal or distal, framed with a negative or posicive outcome focus, and so forch. As well, goals differ chematically. All of these differences affeCt the success of goal striving.

Locke & Latham (1990) demonscrated thac challenging goals spelled out in specifiC terms are superior co modest specific goals, as well as co challenging buc vague (i.e. "do your besc") goals in facilitating goal accainment. This effect has a number of prerequisites:

frequenc performance feedback, a scrong goal commitmenc, the goal should not be coo complex, and limitations in calenc or situacional cOnJcraincs should noc make goal accain- menc impossible. \X'Oac does noc seem co maccer is whether goal seccing is decermined from outside (assigned goals), freely chosen by individuals (self-sec goals), or chosen in incerac- cion with ochers (parciclpative goals). As pocencial mediacors of che goal speciflcicy effeCt Locke & Latham (1990) poinc co heighcened persistence, focusing accencion on che execu- tion of goal-directed behJ\'iors, a greacer readiness co plan che goal pursuic. and co feedback and self-monicoring ad\·ancages.

Further scructural differences be(ween goals include cime frame. ouccome focus. and learning versus performance oriencacion. Bandura& Schunk (1981) divide che cime frame of goal accainmenc inco proximal and discal goals. Proximal goals reI ace co what che indi- vidual does in the presenc or near future, while discal goals poinc far inco che future. Chil- dren who were weak and uninceresced in mathematics pursued a program of self-direcced learning (a cotal of 42 pages of instruccion) under conditions involving either a discal goal only (42 pages in 7 sessions), or che distal goal plus proximal subgoals (6 pages per session for 7 sessions). Addicional proximal goals improved che children's arithmecic scores by providing more performance feedback, thus making it easier co monicor progress in goal pursuit. However. this feedback advancage may turn inco a decrimenc when inhibicional goals (e.g. dieting goals) are concerned, as people more readily discover failures which may cause chem co give up premacurely. Indeed, Cochran & T esser (1996) observed that che goal proximic;.' effect is reversed for goals framed in terms of prevencing failures.

Higgins (1997) reportS that goals framed with a posicive ouccome focus lead co task performance that is strongest when boch expectations of success and che incencive value of success are high; when people hold goals wich a negacive ouccome focus this effecc is less pronounced. In Other words, when highly desirable and feasible wishes are transferred into goals it seems \vise co frame these goals with a positive ouccome focus. Goals with a positive

ouccome focus conscrue achievement as accomplishment, whereas goals wich a negacive ourcome focus conscrue achievement as providing securicy.

Finally, learning goals and performance goals have different effeccs on performance (Dweck, 1996). Learning goals lead co beccer achievements chan performance goals be- cause che former allow for a more effeccive coping wich failure chan che laccer. For people wich performance goals, failure signals a lack of ability and chus cause reactions of giving up. People wich learning goals, on che ocher hand, view sec-backs as cues co focus on new strategies. Accordingly, cheir behavior is oriented coward mastering che causes of che sec- back, ulcimacely furchering goal actainment. Ellioc& Church (1997) have recendy found chac performance goals are less decrimental when chey are framed as approach goals (e.g.

I want co gee good grades) racher chan avoidance goals (e.g. I do noc want co gee bad grades).

Wich respecc co che chemacic contents of goals, Ryan, Sheldon, Kasser, & Deci (1996) suggesc chac goals of auconomy, compecence, and social integracion lead co greacer creaciv- ity, higher cognicive flexibility, greater depch of informa cion processing, and more effeccive coping wich failure. These effeccs are mediaced by an intrinsic self-regulacion, as che needs of auconomy, compecence, and social integracion are assumed co further intrinsic goal striving. This posicive kind of goal striving is contrasced wich being unrefleccively control- led from oucside (e.g. goal assignments from auchoricies) or from inside (e.g. goal sening based on feelings of obligacion). Ryan, ec al. (1996) also discuss side effeccs of goal-direcced aCtions. Goals based on auconomy, compecence, and social integracion needs are associaced wich higher well-being and life sacisfaccion. Kasser & Ryan (1993) observed chac people with goals such as making money, becoming famous, and acquiring high status, experience a worse subjeccive well-being as compared co chose wich goals such as culcivacing friend- ship or becoming accive in communal services. This is particularly crue for individuals who feel highly efficacious, implying thac people who successfully implement macerialiscic goals are particularly ac risk for low well-being.

\Y/ell-being has been analyzed in ocher goal content approaches as welL Emmons (1996) repom chac a strong prediccor of a person's well-being is che proportion of intimacy goals co che cocal number of goals. The proportion of achievement and power goals, however, cends co be negacively relaced co well-being. Moreover, highly abstracc goals (e.g. gecting co know people) cends co be associaced \vich psychological distress (particularly anxiety and depression), whereas low level strivings (e.g. speak friendly co strangers) are linked co greacer levels of psychological well-being, bur also co more physical illness. Finally, having a high proportion of avoidance strivings (e.g. avoid being lonely, avoid being upsec) is associaced wich suppressed posicive mood, reduced life sacisfaction, heighcened anxiety, and weaker physical healch.

Recendy, Brunscein, Schulcheiss, & Maier (in press) pointed ouc chac structural feacures also macter in prediccing well-being on the basis of goal pursuit. For inscance, high com- micment co a personal goal furthers life satisfaction only ...hen che person perceives che personal goal as feasible; when feasibility is low, goal commicment reduces life sacisfaccion.

Moreover, che posicive effeccs of intimacy goals strongly depend on social suPPOrt from significant orhers. The effeccs of goals on emocional well-being are also influenced by how well people's goals macch their needs or implicic mocives (McClelland, 1985). People wich strong achievement and power needs, and goals of the same cheme - as well as people wich

strong affiliation and intimac), needs, and goals of the same theme - repOrt higher emo- tional well-being than those whose needs and goals do not match.

Processes ofgoal striving

Experience tells us that it is often a long way from goal setting to goal attainment. Having set a goal is juSt a first step, usually followed by a host of implementational problems that must be successfully solved. In the section above, predictions about successful goal attain- ment were made on the basis of structural and thematic properties of the set goals. A process-related approach focuses on how the problems of goal pursuit are solved by the individual. To effectively solve these problems, which pertain to initiating goal-directed actions and bringing them to a successful ending, the person needs to seize opportunities

to act, ward off distractions, flexibly step up effortS in the face of difticulties, by-pass barri- ers, compensate for failures and shortcomings, and negOtiate conflicts berween goals. Vari- ous theories address how the individual effeCtively solves these problems of goal implementation.

ImpLemental mindsa The model of action phases (Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, 1987;

Gollwitzer, 1990; Heckhausen, 1991) sees successful goal pursuit as solving a series of successive tasks: deliberating wishes (potential goals) and choosing between them, plan- ning goal-directed actions and getting started, bringing goal pursuit to a successful end, and evaluating its Outcome. The task notion implies that people can promOte goal pursuit by developing the respeCtive mindsets which facilitate task completion (Gollwitzer, 1990).

Studies conducted on the mindsets associated with either deliberating bet\veen wishes (i.e.

deliberative mindset:) or with planning goal-directed actions (i.e. implemental mindset) suPPOrt this idea.

\'Vhen participants are asked to plan the implementation of a set goal, an implemental mindset with the following attributes originates (Gollwirzer& Barer, 1999); participants become closed-minded in that they are no longer disuacted by irrelevant information, while processing information relatedto goal implementation very effeCtively (e.g. informa- tion on the sequencing of aCtions). Moreover, desirability-related information is processed in a partial manner favoring pros over cons, and feasibility-related information is analyzed in a manner that favors illusory optimism. This optimism extends to an illusion of conuol over uncontrollable outcomes, and even holds for depressed individuals. Self-perception of impOrtant personal attributes (e.g. cheerfulness, smartness, social sensitivity) is strength- ened, while perceived vulnerabilitytobOth controllable and unCOntrollable risks is lowered (e.g. developing an addiction to prescription drugs or losing a partner to an early death, respectively). The implemental mindset favors goal attainment by helping the individual

to effectively cope with classic problems of goal striving, such as becoming disuacted, doubting the anractiveness of the pursued goal, or being pessimiStic about its feasibility.

Planning Set goals commit an individual to attaining the specified desired fumre, bu(

thev do not commit the individual_, to when, where, and how she intends (0 act. Such additi0!1al commitments can be added by planning goal pursuit via implementation inten-

340

cions wich the formac of "if I encouncer situation x. then I will perform the goal-directed behavior y!" Gollwitzer (1993) argued that implementation intentions are a powerful self- regulacory strategy for overcoming problems of gecting started with goal-direcced actions (e.g. when people are cired. absorbed with some other acciviry. or lost in thoughts, and thus miss good opportunities co acc). [n support of chis hypochesis. ic was observed in numerous studies (for a summary. see Gollwitzer, 1999) that difficult co reach goals benefiC gready from being furnished with implementation intentions. This effect extends co projects such as resolving important interpersonal conflicts. performing a medical self-examination. regular intake of a vitamin supplement, eating healchy foods, and doing vigorous exercise. It also holds true for people who have problems turning goals into action. such as opiate addiCts under withdrawal or schizophrenic patients.

Because implementation intentions spell out links between situational cues and goal- direCted behavior. it is assumed (Gollwitzer. 1993) that by forming such intentions people delegate the concrol of behavior co the environment. thus facilitating the initiation of goal- direCted actions. The mental representations of the specified situational cues become highly activated, making these cues more accessible. Various experiments (for a summary, see Gollwitzer. 1999) demonstrate that situational cues specified in implementation inten- tions are more easil\' deteCted and remembered, as well as more readilv actended co than

.

comparable non-intended situations. Moreover. implementation intentions creace strong associative links between mental representations of situations and actions which other...ise are achieved only through consistent and repeated pairing. As a consequence, action initia- tion becomes aucomatized. Various experiments demonstrate that the goal-directed behavior specified in implementation intentions is initiated swifdy and effordessly in the presence of the critical situation. Moreover, the subliminal presentation of the critical situation suffices co activate cognitive concepts and knowledge relevant co the efficient initiation of the incended behavior. Finally, patients with a froncallobe injury. who have severe deficits in the conscious and effortful concrol of behavior. while remaining unaffected in perform- ing aucomatized behaviors, benefit gready from forming implementation intentions.

Implementation incencions ameliorate not only problems of the initiation of goal-di- rected behavior. but also other problems of goal striving (Gollwitzer& Schaa!. 1998). In a series of studies, implementation incentions created resistence co tempting distractions while solving tedious arithmetic problems. Moreover, set goals co escape unwanted ha- bitual responses (i.e. stereotypical beliefs and prejudicial feelings) are more successfully actained when furnished with implementation intentions. Finally. implementation inten- tions can protect people from the unwanted influences of goals direcdy activated by situational cues (Bargh, 1990). People need only prepare themselves bysening antagonis- ric behavioral goals and furnish them with implementarion intentions (Gollwitzer. 1999).

In summary. implementation incentions create a type of behavioral aucomaticity that does not originate from laborious and efforcful practice. Rather, people strategically del- egate their COntrol O\'er goal-directed behavior co anticipated, critical situational cues. This easily accessible self-regulacory strategy of forming implementation intencions can be used co increase tenacity in initiating goal-directed action. At the same time it helps co increase flexibility in escaping unwanced habits of thinking, feeling. and behaving.

There are other effective types of planning besides forming implementation incentions.

Planning can be approached in a more reflective way as in mental simulations exploring

possible ways co achieving a goal. Taylor, Pham. Rivkin, & Armor. (1998) call such men- tal simulations process simulations. If applied repeatedly. they further goal attainment.

such as achieving good grades in academic exams. Apparencly, repeated mencal simulations of how co achieve a goal also resulc in firm plans.

Aaion verms srare orimrarion Competing goal pursuits are paid particular accencion in Kuhl's action concrol theory (for a summary. see Kuhl & Beckmann, 1994). For an or- dered action sequence co occur, a currenc guiding goal must be shielded from competing goal incentions (e.g. the goal of making a phone call from the competing incention co tidy one's desk). Kuhl calls this shielding mechanism action concrol and differenciates a number of concrol strategies, such as attencion concrol. emotion concrol, and environment concrol.

Through environment concrol, for example, the individual prevencs the derailing of an ongoing goal pursuit by removing competing temptations from the situation.

\Vhether and hovY' effectively these strategies are used depends on the current concrol mode of the individual.Anaction-oriented person concentrates on planning and initiating of goal-directed aCtion. responds flexibly co sicuational demands, and uses control strate- gies effectively. A state-oriented person, in contrast, cannot disengage from incomplete goals and is caught up in uncontrollable perseveration of thoughts related co aversive expe- riences orin dysfunctional thoughts about future successes. Action and state oriencation may be induced by situational variables (e.g. a surprising event, persistent failure), but is rounded in personal disposition.

Recent experimental research on state oriencation has discovered a further volitional handicap. State-oriented individuals readily misperceive assigned goals as self-generated.

These findings have stimulated a new theoretical perspective (Kuhl, in press) which sees the volitional control of action as a result of the cooperation of various mencal subsystems (i.e. intention memory. eXtenSlon memory, intuitive behavior control, and object recogni- tion). Action versus scate orientation is underscood as a parameter that modulates the co- operation beC\veen these systems thus leading co different kinds of volitional concrol of action ''lith different outcomes.

Resumprion ofdimtpted goal pursuir Higher order goals (e.g. co become popular) offer multiple routes co approach them. If one pathway is blocked, an individual can approach the goal anOther way. Self-completion theory (\Vicklund & Gollwitzer. 1982) addresses this issue of compensation by analyzing self-defining goals. Such goals specify as the de- sired end state an identity, such as scientist. mother. or a political liberal. As many different things indicate the possession of such identities, the striving for an identity is a process of collecting these indicacors (or self-defining symbols), These indicacors extend from rel- evant material symbols (e.g. for a scientist. books and awards) to relevanc self-descriptions kg. using tides) and performances (e.g. accomplishing importanc research). \Vhenever shortcomings in one type of symbol are encountered, an individual will experience self- ddtnitional incompleteness. which leads to compensatory self-symbolizing efforts. These may take the form of poincing co the possession of alternative symbols or acquiring new symbols.

This compensation principle has been suppOrted with various self-defining goals and different types of symbols (for a summary. see Gollwitzer& Kirchhof, 1998). Easily acces-

<"

sible symbols (e.g. selF-description$) are powerful substirures for sY'mbols that are harder co come by (e.g. relevam performances). Newcomers co a field of imeresr (e.g. science) can rhus symbolize rhe related identiry withour full command of the relevant performances.

Further. elderly people do not have co leave the field when age relared deficits hamper performance. Research on self-completion has discovered rhat effecri\'e self-symbolizing requires a social reality. Compensacory efforts are particularly effecrive \vhen other people notice them. This, however. has cosrs. Compensating individuals see orhers only in rerms of their capabiliry co notice compensacory efforts and thus lack social sensitiviry. Also.

when people make public their intention co acquire a certain self-definitional indicacor (e.g. studying hard). actual effort will be reduced, as the proclamation alone produces self- definitional completeness (Gollwitzer, Bayer. Scherer, & Seifert, in press).

Finally, self-completion theory may sound similar co Steele's (1988) self-affirmation theory, but self-completion is a goal theory. not a self-esteem theory (for a different view.

see Tesser. Martin, & Cornell, 1996). According co Sreele. anything that makes you feel good will reaffirm a weakened self-eSteem. Self-complerion theory, however. postulates that self-definitional incompleteness can only be substituted for by acquiring an alternative but related symbol. Recem research demonstrates that merely reaffirming self-esteem can- not produce self-detlnirional complereness (Gollwirzer, er aI.. in press).

fl"fobiliwcion ofefforr People may promote goal achievement by compensating for fail- ures bue rhey also try co avoid commiccing errors in rhe first place. \'V'arding off failure becomes a pressing issue whenever difficulries mount. Brehm & \'V'right's (Brehm & Self.

1989; \'V'right, 1996) energization theory of motivation assumes that the readiness co exert effOrt is direcdy derermined by the perceived difficulry of a task. As perceived difficulry increases, so does effore expenditure, unless the task is recognized co be unsolvable. There is, however, a second limit co the increase of effore in response co heightened task diffi- culry: poremial motivation. Porential motivarion is fed by need related variables (i.e. scrength of the rdared need or higher order goal, the incentive value of the rask. and rhe inscrumen- raliry of cask completion for satisfaction or accainmem). If pocential morivation is low.

people do not rind ir WOrthwhile co expend more drort when an eas}" task becomes more difficulc. The upper limic of effort expenditure is low and quickly reached. If potentia!

motivacion is high, however. an increase in difficulry is matched by investment of effort up co high levels of dit1lculry. The upper limit of effort expenditure is high and is reached only after much effOrt expenditure has occurred.

Empirical tesrs of the theory have varied potential morivation either by offering high or low rewards for task completion or making a high rev.rard more or less likely. Effort mobi- lization is usually assessed by cardiovascular responses (i.e. heare rate and syscolic blood pressure). In general. low poceneial morivarion curbs the linear relationship berween rask difficulry and etTorc. Recent research uses energizarion cheory co undersrand the differ- ences berween men and women in effore on sex-ryped rasks. and co explore rhe effecrs of privare \'ersus public performance condirions on effort (\'V'righc. T unstalL \'Villiams. Good- win, & Harmon-Jones, 1995; Wrighc. Murray, Score;:. & \'V'illiams, 1997).

Discrepancy reduaion The goal scriving theories discussed so far implicidy or explicidy view goals as something atcraccive that the individual wanes co accain. Goals are not simply

"cold" memal represemations that specify standards or reference poims. but are cognitively explicated and elaborated incemives. Such motivational goal theories are rivaled by a more cognitive view that sees goals as specifying performance standards. According co Bandura (1997). goals have no motivational consequences per se. They only specify the conditions that allow a positive or negative self-evaluation. If the set goal is attained. positive sdf- evaluation prevails. whereas staying below one's goal leads co n~ative self-evaluation. The individual is pushed by the negative self-evaluation associated with the discrepancy. and pulled by the amicipated positive self-evaluation linked to closing the gap bet\veen the status quo and the goaL Accordingly, goals stimulate effortful aCtion only when people notice a discrepancy bet\veen the status quo and the set goal. Bandura proposes frequent feedback as a powerful measure co stimulate goal pursuit. However, people will try co reduce a discrepancy only when they feel self-efficacious with respect co goal-directed ac- tions.

Carver & Scheier (1998) propose a differem discrepancy reduction theory of goal pur- suit. Based on cybernetic control theory. the cemral concept of their analysis is the negative feedback loop. Carver and Scheier highlight goal pursuits' hierarchical structure and as- sume a cascading loop structure. Goal-directed behavior is regulated at the middle level (" Do-goals") \vith actions at higher levels ("Be-goals") suspended umil the individual be- comes self-aware. Discovery of discrepancies on the "Be-level" or the "Do-level" triggers lower level goals or behaviors aimed at discrepancy redUCtion, respectively. An individual tries co close discrepancies only when outcome expectations are high. However, a positive affeCtive response as a consequence of goal attainment is not assumed. nor is the detection of a discrepancy associated with negative affect. Rather. the source of positive or negative feelings in goal pursuit is the speed of discrepancy reduction. The intensity of these feelings is regulated again in a negative feedback loop. If the speed meets a set criterion. positive feelings result. \vhereas negative feelings are experienced with speeds that stay below thls cntenon.

The discrepancy notions discussed above construe goals as "cold" mental representa- tlons of performance standards with no links co needs or incemives. This conceprualiz;ltion of goals makes it difficult co explain why motivation (see Brehm and \\highc's notion of pOtential motivation) moderates the relation bet\veen task difficulty and effort. :-'[oreover.

according co discrepancy theory an increase in task difficulty should reduce efforts at task completion. because an experienced increase in task difficulty should lead co reduced self- efficacy and less positive outcome expectations. As Brehm and \X!right have repeatedly demonstrated. however. high pocential motivation makes it worthwhile for people co mo- bilize additional effort whenever heighcened task difficulty threatens task completion. Fi- nally. Carver and Scheier's construal of the regulation of the speed of discrepancy reduction assumes that positive discrepancies (i.e. moving cowards the goal coo fase) are reduced as readily as negative discrepancies (i.e. moving cowards the goal coo slowly). However, from the perspeCtive that goals represent a desired outcome, a person should be less motivated co reduce positive discrepancies than negative discrepancies (Goll\vitzer & Rohloff. 1999).

344

Prospects of Future Research on Goals

Alrhough research on che dererminants and processes of goal sercing and gOJI striving has won momentum in recent years, rhere are goal relared phenomena chac hJve nor yer re- ceived much rheorecical and empirical arrention. One is rhe issue of goal conHicr. For insrance, furure research will have re discover how conflicring goals emerge. Answers may come from an analysis of when and how famasies abour a desired furure originare. Such visions should be a producr of a person's culrural conrexr and rhe needs. values. arrirudes.

and imeresrs rhe person has developed wirhin ir. Moreover. wherher a person is willing re rransfer rhese famasies into binding goals should depend on wherher rhe person is ready re conrrasr her famasies wirh realiry; again, rh is mode of self-regularery rhoughr abouc rhe furure may have culrural underpinnings (Oerringen. 1997).

Once ser goals are in conflicr, rhese conflicrs have re be resolved. Emmons (1996) points co rhe possibiliry of crearive integrarions. where new goals are formed which serve borh of (he conflicring goals (e.g. agentic and communal srrivings are reconciled by caking on communal responsibilicies). Moreover. Camor& Fleeson (1994) argue chac re meec higher order life rasks (e.g. graduaring from college) people can srraregically link behavioral goals rhar apparendy conflicr (e.g. rhe conHicr berween srudying and being wich orher people is reconciled by srud:'ing in a group). Bur more often rhan nor, conflicts can only be resolved by giving up one goal. This raises rhe quesrion of when and how people mosr effecrively disengage from goals. Alrhough Klinger (1977) has offered a srage rheory of disengage- ment from incentives, sysremaric research on disengagement from ser goals is srill missing.

Simply ruminaring abour rhe impediments of arraining the goal should nor suffice Uvlarrin

& Tesser. 1996; Oerringen. 1996). Rarher, people's low expecrarions of success need re be

acrivared and used co fosrer acrive disengagement, and rhis becomes more likely when rhe desired furure is mentally contrasred wirh negacive aspecrs of impeding reality.

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