GAME ANALYSIS - An analytical framework to bridge the practitioner- researcher gap in negotiation research

W O R K I N G P A P E R

GAME ANALYSIS

An analytical framework to bridge the

practitioner-researcher gap in negotiation r e s e a r c h

Laurent Mermet

September

1987

WP-87-084

-

I n t e r n a t i o n a l l n s t r t u t e for Appl~ed Systems Analys~s

NOT FOR QUOTATION WITHOUT THE PERMISSION OF THE AUTHOR

GAME ANALYSIS

An analytical framework t o bridge t h e

p r a c t i t i o n e r - r e s e a r c h e r gap in negotiation r e s e a r c h

L a u r e n t Mermet

September

1987 WP-87-084

Working P a p e r s are interim r e p o r t s on work of t h e International Institute f o r Applied Systems Analysis and have received only limited review. Views o r opinions expressed h e r e i n d o not necessarily r e p r e s e n t t h o s e of t h e Institute o r of i t s National Member Organiza- tions.

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS A-2361 Laxenburg, Austria

Bridging t h e gap between r e s e a r c h e r s and p r a c t i t i o n e r s through t h e c r e a t i n g of opportunities f o r exchange of ideas and e x p e r i e n c e is one of t h e main aims of t h e PIN p r o j e c t . One of t h e problems t o b e d e a l t with in t h i s connection i s t h e difference in world view and problem-structuring t h a t e x i s t s between practition- e r s , who are p a r t i c i p a n t s in negotiations, and r e s e a r c h e r s , who are o b s e r v e r s . Thus bridging t h e gap i s not just a m a t t e r of t r a n s f e r r i n g more actively r e s e a r c h r e s u l t s and lessons from e x p e r i e n c e . I t must a l s o a f f e c t r e s e a r c h design, and ideally t h i s should involve both p r a c t i t i o n e r s and r e s e a r c h e r s .

This p a p e r of L a u r e n t Mermet discusses t h e issue a t t h e level of t h e paradigms through which, implicitly o r explicitly, negotiation r e s e a r c h s t r u c t u r e s t h e o b j e c t of i t s inquiries. I t points o u t fundamental r e a s o n s which give t h e game paradigm -in a v e r y wide sense- a unique capability t o s t r u c t u r e t h e reflections of both r e s e a r c h e r s and p r a c t i t i o n e r s in a way t h a t helps to f a c i l i t a t e and enhance t h e i r mutual communication and understanding.

The issue i s analysed h e r e in a n a b s t r a c t p e r s p e c t i v e , b u t t h e conclusions point t o a r a n g e of applications in debriefing methodology, applied r e s e a r c h a n d training. a n example of such a n application i s p r e s e n t e d in detail in a n o t h e r work- ing p a p e r issued in p a r a l l e l with t h e p r e s e n t one: On Getting Simulation Models Used in International Negotiations

-

^A Debriefing E x e r c i s e ; L. Mermet, L. Hordijk.

Dr. F r a n c e s Mautner-Markhof Principal Investigator

P r o c e s s e s of International Negotiations

GAMF, ANALYSIS

An analytical framework t o b r i d g e t h e

p r a c t i t i o n e r - r e s e a r c h e r gap in negotiation r e s e a r c h L a u r e n t Mermet

Introduction

This p a p e r focuses on a discussion of t h e five major paradigms c u r r e n t l y involved in negotiation r e s e a r c h : mechanism, p r o c e s s , system, field, and game. It s c a n s t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e potential t o c o p e with two challenges of negotiation r e s e a r c h . The f i r s t i s t o b r i d g e t h e gap between p r a c t i t i o n e r s and r e s e a r c h e r s . The second i s t o c l a r i f y t h e ambiguity, p r e s e n t in most analysis, between t h o s e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of a negotiation which stem out of t h e specifics of t h e problem being negotiated, and t h o s e which p e r t a i n generally t o t h e negotiation p r o c e s s itself.

The discussion will show t h a t t h e game paradigm, although c u r r e n t l y l e s s sys- tematically used t h a n t h e o t h e r s , h a s a unique c a p a c i t y in both t h e s e r e s p e c t s . I t needs; however, a thorough reexamination, t o which much of t h e p a p e r i s dedi- cated. Our conclusion i s t h a t a systematic r e f l e c t i o n o n , and utilization of t h e game paradigm, p r o v i d e a sound b a s i s f o r a wide r a n g e of applications which c a n b e labelled Game Analysis, a n d are quite useful in negotiation r e s e a r c h and o t h e r similar fields in which t h e p r a c t i t i o n e r s ' p r e s e n t and p a s t e x p e r i e n c e i s a c r u c i a l f a c t o r .

T h e r e s e a r c h e r - p r a c t i t i o n e r g a p

Discussions o n t h e b a s i c problems of negotiation r e s e a r c h , such as t h o s e s u r - rounding t h e launching of t h e PIN r e s e a r c h p r o j e c t , have underlined two major difficulties t h a t t h e negotiation r e s e a r c h field will h a v e t o face.

The f i r s t i s t h e gap existing between r e s e a r c h e r s on t h e o n e s i d e and p r a c t i - t i o n e r s on t h e o t h e r (1). I t c a n b e s k e t c h e d by just two questions: t h e o n e t h a t p r a c t i t i o n e r s a s k a b o u t analysts: "is h e r e a l l y useful?" and t h e o n e a s k e d by analysts a b o u t p r a c t i t i o n e r s : "do t h e y r e a l i z e what t h e y are actually doing?"

Why is there such a g a p ?

P a r t of t h e answer i s c e r t a i n l y in o b s t a c l e s of a contingent n a t u r e . One i s t h e r a r i t y of o p p o r t u n i t i e s to m e e t . Another is t h e fact t h a t r e s e a r c h e r s and p r a c t i - t i o n e r s live p r a c t i c a l l y in t w o s e p a r a t e worlds widely differing in values, in methods, in language, in time c o n s t r a i n t s , in incentive systems

....

To overcome such contingent o b s t a c l e s , i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o foster communication through workshops a n d c o n f e r e n c e s , to provide incentives f o r t h e application of r e s e a r c h work, and for t h e s h a r i n g of t h e i r e x p e r i e n c e by p r a c t i t i o n e r s . The PIN network and t h e PIN Conference are s u c h e f f o r t s .

But beyond t h i s level of contingent difficulties, t h e r e i s a d e e p e r ground f o r t h e practice-analysis gap, which i s t h a t some of t h e world-views r e s e a r c h e r s b a s e t h e i r analysis upon c a n b e held only f r o m a n uninvolved r e s e a r a h e r s s position, and cannot b e used by p a r t i c i p a n t s in t h e phenomena t h e y d e s c r i b e . Reciprocally, some d e s c r i p t i o n s of t h e i r own e x p e r i e n c e by p r a c t i t i o n e r s are "formatted" in a way t h a t makes them difficult or even p r a c t i c a l l y impossible f o r r e s e a r c h e r s ' use.

In o t h e r terms, to establish f r u i t f u l a c t o r - o b s e r v e r collaboration, i t i s indispensi- b l e t h a t both t h e p r a c t i t i o n e r a n d t h e analyst o p e r a t e within a framework of refer- e n c e , o r analytical framework, s u c h t h a t what t h e y e x p e r i e n c e a n d d i s c o v e r will possibly b e exchanged a n d eventually synthesized.

Such a framework will h a v e to fulfill, amongst o t h e r things, t h e following m a j o r condition: i t must b e a b l e to accommodate both t h e points of view of t h e involved p a r t i c i p a n t , a n d t h a t of t h e r a t h e r d e t a c h e d o b s e r v e r , on t h e same situa- tion.

T h e c o n t e n t - p r o c e s s a m b i g u i t y

A second difficulty in negotiation r e s e a r c h i s t h a t t h e aim of negotiation i s not only to a g r e e , b u t both to a g r e e and solve a c e r t a i n problem. Negotiatiors are, at t h e same time, managing t h e negotiation t a c t i c s a n d s t r a t e g i e s , a n d a d d r e s s i n g t h e p a r t i c u l a r problem which i s t h e c o n t e n t of t h e negotiation. S o to a l a r g e e x t e n t , much of what t h e y d o i s a c t u a l l y s t r u c t u r e d by t h e problem itself. This i s a diffi- culty for negotiation r e s e a r c h : ideally, o n e would l i k e t o b e a b l e to isolate pat- t e r n s of negotiation which are independent of t h e problem being negotiated. But when doing r e s e a r c h , o n e i s f a r from t h a t ideal.

In a case study on a negotiation, much of t h e p r o c e s s d e s c r i b e d i s linked to t h e content of t h e negotiation. It i s difficult, f o r example. t o a d o p t a g e n e r a l methodology f o r s u c h studies, beyond adopting a check-list o n some information one would like to find as s t a n d a r d f e a t u r e s in a case-study. This h a s led some his- t o r i a n s and policy-science r e s e a r c h e r s to question t h e specificity of negotiation r e s e a r c h (2).

The same problem e x i s t s , at t h e o t h e r e x t r e m e of t h e r e s e a r c h field, in formal t h e o r e t i c a l s t u d i e s on negotiation, a n d in p a r t i c u l a r in game t h e o r y . When w e s p e a k of z e r o o r non-zero sum games f o r instance, w e r e f e r not t o t h e negotiation p r o c e s s , but to t h e s t r u c t u r e of t h e problem being negotiated. The message con- cerns negotiation r a t h e r indirectly: "in t h e negotiation p r o c e s s , d o not mistake non-zero sum situations f o r z e r o sum ones." From t h i s point, t h e r e s e a r c h work s p l i t s in t w o d i v e r g e n t directions. The f i r s t i s a s e a r c h f o r solutions a n d optimums through mathematics, which i s a typical c a s e of t h e s t r u c t u r e of t h e problem p r o - viding a p r o p o s e d p r o c e s s . Incidentally, t h i s work a p p l i e s not specifically to nego-

tiations, but to all p r o c e s s e s t h a t c a n a d d r e s s t h e considered problem. The second t r e n d of r e s e a r c h i s a p r a c t i c a l reflexion on: how to r e a c h solutions suggested by t h e s t r u c t u r e of t h e problem, but in t h e setting of real negotiations (3)? This i s a qualitative reflection, often useful, but vulnerable

to

a questioning of w h e t h e r t h i s is s c i e n c e , or c l e v e r self-help.

To sum up, t h e difficulty of a r t i c u l a t i n g analysis of p r o c e s s and of content i s a d u r a b l e stumbling s t o n e in t h e constitution of a c o h e r e n t a n d s p e c i f i c negotiation r e s e a r c h field.

Questioning paradigms in negotiation research

To d e a l b e t t e r with t h e s e difficulties, negotiation r e s e a r c h will h a v e

to

b e p a r t l y re-examined, but at what level?

T h e r e are indeed t w o main s e p a r a t e levels of p r o d u c t s in t h e field:

-

_case s t u d i e s a n d experimental work are c o n c e r n e d with empirical facts. If t h e work i s w e l l done, t h e f a c t s t h e y state will r e c e i v e a g r e e m e n t of all. But t h e lessons t h e y t e a c h

-

a n d thus t h e i r usefulness

-

will b e a matter of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , grounded out of t h e c a s e o r t h e experiment itself, and t h u s v e r y d e b a t a b l e .

-

t h e o r e t i c a l and pragmatic generalizations are c o n c e r n e d with t h e c h a r a c - t e r i s t i c s of a l l , or of complete c l a s s e s of negotiations. H e r e , generality of statements i s a promise of usefulness, tempered however by t h e possible lack of agreement on t h e validity of t h e statements.

These t w o levels of "products" imply t h e e x i s t e n c e of t w o o t h e r levels of work:

-

methodology, which c o n c e r n s t h e articulation of f a c t and t h e o r y , of case and g e n e r a l statement. The issue Is e i t h e r how to identify o r f a b r i c a t e a case which will p r o v e or d i s p r o v e a g e n e r a l statement, or r e c i p r o c a l l y , how to find r u l e s o n how to d e r i v e valid generalizations from a case or set of cases.

Without sound methodology, case studies are bound to multiply b u t remain f r u i t l e s s , and t h e o r i e s to expand b u t s t a y aloof from application.

-

paradigms, which are t h e basic c o n c e p t s through which t h e negotiation situa- tion is p r e - s t r u c t u r e d , or p e r c e i v e d , even b e f o r e i t is discussed, b e i t o n a case or o n a t h e o r e t i c a l basis. When w e d e s c r i b e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of t h e nego- tiation p r o c e s s , o r system, or game, w e d o not just d e s c r i b e t h e p a t t e r n s w e have identified in our case study or t h e o r e t i c a l reflexions, b u t w e also assign to negotiation t h e s t r u c t u r e of a p r o c e s s , a system, a game. The s t r u c t u r i n g provided by a paradigm rests o n a fundamental metaphor, even if concepts like mechanism and p r o c e s s have become so used in a l l fields of social s c i e n c e t h a t i t is h a r d l y s t i l l realized t h a t t h e y are a transposition of physics and chemistry r e s p e c t i v e l y into t h e social world. However, t h e understanding provided will find both i t s basis and i t s limits in t h o s e of t h e s e metaphors. The existing l p a r a d i g m s provide a l t e r n a t i v e basic world-views or analytical frameworks, which will communicate t h e i r v a r i o u s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s to all t h e p r o d u c t s of negotiation-research.

Since what is sought h e r e i s a n analytical framework bridging t h e gap i n world-views between p r a c t i t i o n e r s and r e s e a r c h e r s a n d clarifying t h e s t r u c t u r e of t h e content-process articulation, i t is t h i s paradigmatic level of negotiation r e s e a r c h which will have to b e a d d r e s s e d f i r s t .

The consequences f o r t h e o r y , methodology, and t h u s case studies will d e r i v e from t h a t e f f o r t .

What a r e , indeed, t h e main paradigms underlying negotiation r e s e a r c h ?

Mechankn

The s t r u c t u r i n g of a situation provided by t h e mechanism paradigm i s simple:

agent A-acts-on patient B- with r e s u l t R. The d e e p metaphor i s c l e a r : i t i s t h a t of t h e most elementary action like cutting b r e a d into pieces, o r painting someting green. The same paradigm grounds t h e cause-effect relationship.

Needless t o say, t h i s paradigm i s almost everywhere. How w e l l does i t serve negotiation r e s e a r c h ? T h e r e are two basic ways t o use t h e paradigm in t h e field.

The f i r s t i s t o consider t h e negotiator as t h e agent. his opponent a s t h e patient. and negotiation as t h e agent doing things t o t h e patient to g e t c e r t a i n r e s u l t s . I t i s a conception of negotiation as a manipulation(4).

The p r a c t i c a l limitation of this conception i s obvious: i t r e q u i r e s t h a t one negotiator b e much m o r e c l e v e r , o r powerful t h a t t h e o t h e r . This i s generally not t h e case in negotiations.

This p r a c t i c a l limit comes from t h e following limits of t h e paradigm:

-

thinking in t e r m s of mechanism does not allow t o c o n s i d e r feed-back

-

t h a t is, t h e p a t i e n t affecting t h e a g e n t ,

-

thinking in t e r m s of mechanism cannot t a k e a v a r i a b l e c o n t e x t into account:

this is t h e classical " c e t e r i s paribus" clause.

Negotiation i s basically i n t e r a c t i v e , and extremely sensitive t o dynamic con- t e x t s . I t i s t h u s c l e a r t h a t o n e h a s t o

-

^{and does}

-

r e s o r t t o paradigms o t h e r than mechanism-manipulation.

The second possible use of t h e mechanism concept i s t o consider (a) t h e nego- tiation as t h e patient, (b) someone who wants t o improve t h e negotiation as t h e agent, and (c) improvement as t h e r e s u l t of action based on some understanding of a c a u s a l relation. This is t h e impact a p p r o a c h f o r instance in t h e following prob- lematique: What e f f e c t s will various t y p e s of facilitation interventions have on negotiations (5)? Here t h e paradigm is more promising, because t h e dissymetry i t implies i s p r e s e n t in t h e real situation. Hopefully t h e i n t e r v e n o r h a s t h e advantage of training and of a r e l a t i v e l y d e t a c h e d p e r s p e c t i v e , at l e a s t a s lucid as t h e nego- t i a t o r s ' ; o r t h e a u t h o r i t y manipulating a negotiation on which i t i s responsible h a s enough power to d o so. However, t h e paradigm will s t i l l find its limitations in t h e complexity of negotiation, a complexity which t h e l i n e a r chains of mechanism can- not adequately accommodate. To a d d r e s s t h e mechanisms of intervention, one will s t i l l have t o resort t o analysis based on more complex paradigms.

This i s r e g r e t t a b l e b e c a u s e t h e mechanism paradigm h a s a g r e a t a d v a n t a g e t o b r i d g e t h e t h e o r y - p r a c t i c e gap. Describing how t h e mechanism works t e l l s what t h e a g e n t c a n d o to influence it. This works wonders in t h e love s t o r y between bio- physico-chemical s c i e n c e s a n d technology, a love-story t h a t h a s n o t y e t begun between p r o c e s s

-

^{or system}

-

based s o c i a l s c i e n c e a p p r o a c h e s a n d t h e i r poten- t i a l u s e r s , f o r r e a s o n s t h a t t h e discussion below o n o t h e r paradigms will h e l p clar- ify.

Process and systan

P r o c e s s a n d system c a n b e b e s t t r e a t e d t o g e t h e r h e r e . They are r e l a t e d dee- ply, a n d in a way t h a t gives them t h e same p r o s a n d c o n s with r e g a r d t o t h e r e s e a r c h - p r a c t i c e g a p a n d t h e content- p r o c e s s ambiguity. Both t h e p r o c e s s a n d system paradigms install t h e same b a s i c s t r u c t u r e : state of a f f a i r s S1 l e a d s to state of a f f a i r s S2 (which in t u r n l e a d s t o S3, etc ...). In t h e p r o c e s s image, e a c h state of a f f a i r s is c o n s t i t u t e d of elements with a t t r i b u t e s ; t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n r e s u l t s from i n t e r a c t i o n of elements. In t h e system image, t h e f o c u s i s o n t h e glo- b a l s t r u c t u r e of t h e state of a f f a i r s ( t h e system), of which elements a n d t h e i r a t t r i - b u t e s are only components; i t i s t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of t h e state of a f f a i r s itself

(not just of t h e elements) t h a t will s h a p e t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n . In both images, t h e r e i s some room (though limited) f o r influences of some c o n t e x t u a l f a c t o r s ("external"

f a c t o r s ) .

The p r o c e s s paradigm i s widely used in negotiation r e s e a r c h ( 6 ) . I t h a s e v e n made i t s way into t h e name of t h e IIASA PIN program. The elements of a state of a f f a i r s are t h e n e g o t i a t o r s with t h e i r a t t r i b u t e s ( i n t e r e s t s , c u l t u r a l s t y l e , ...) a n d some elements of t h e s i t u a t i o n itself: s t a k e s , r u l e s of p r o c e d u r e , etc

...

Negotia- tion t h e n c o n s i s t s in a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of t h e initial s i t u a t i o n t h r o u g h s u c c e s s i v e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s b r o u g t h a b o u t by i n t e r a c t i o n s a n d e x t e r n a l f a c t o r s until t h e final s t a g e , t h e outcome. i s r e a c h e d . This view i s so p e r v a s i v e as t o seem to b e a s t r a i g h t d e s c r i p t i o n of r e a l i t y i t s e l f ; as will b e s e e n , i t i s n o t beyond c r i t i q u e a n d discussion.

A f i r s t limit of t h e p r o c e s s paradigm i s t h a t i t c a n accommodate only limited complexity. With two, t h r e e , f o u r n e g o t i a t o r s in o n e o r t w o i n t e r a c t i o n s c e n e s , i t i s p r o d u c t i v e to follow t h e line of t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of t h e p r o c e s s , a n d to trace b a c k i t s p r o p e r t i e s to elements, a t t r i b u t e s , a n d f a c t o r s in t h e negotiation. However, with h u n d r e d s of n e g o t i a t o r s , a n d s e v e r a l o r many i n t e r d e p e n d e n t i n t e r a c t i o n

scenes, this view is no longer productive. The line of transformation is h a r d e r t o follow, and above all, i t s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s often cannot b e t r a c e d back t o any identi- fied elements, but only t o t h e overall s t r u c t u r e of t h e situation at a given move- ment

-

thus t h e n e c e s s a r y replacement of t h e p r o c e s s by t h e system paradigm t o a d d r e s s complex multi- p a r t y multi-issue negotiations (7). In b r i e f , t h e p r o c e s s paradigm i s f i t t o d e s c r i b e negotiations of limited complexity, and t h e system para- digm t o t h e more complex ones. In both c a s e s , t h e situation is viewed in terms of a successive transformations of a s t r u c t u r e d state of affairs.

How do t h e s e two paradigms perform in t e r m s of t h e two c o n c e r n s underlined e a r l i e r : t h e r e s e a r c h - p r a c t i c e gap, and t h e process- content ambiguity?

A s c o n c e r n s t h e r e s e a r c h - p r a c t i c e gap, they imply a contradiction between t h e o b s e r v e r ' s and t h e p a r t i c i p a n t ' s world views. The o b s e r v e r ' s ideal would b e t h a t if h e knew t h e state of a f f a i r s S at s t e p s , h e would b e a b l e t o deduce what will happen, and what t h e state of a f f a i r s S 1 will b e at s t e p s+l. For t h e participant t o p r e p a r e action, i t must b e t h e c a s e t h a t S + 1 depends as largely as possible on what h e does. The same will b e t r u e f o r all participants: they will s t r i v e not t o b e subjected t o t h e situation: good s t r a t e g i c action g e n e r a t e s unpredictability. I t i s only a f t e r t h e negotiation h a s o c c u r e d t h a t both p r a c t i t i o n e r s and r e s e a r c h e r s c a n a g r e e on a description and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of what h a s happened. P r o c e s s and systems are g r e a t paradigms f o r descriptive c a s e studies. But they are a p o o r basis f o r t h e p r e p a r a t i o n of action, and thus, f o r validatable understanding of how negotiation works.

P r o c e s s and system paradigms are a l s o problematic from t h e point of view of process-context ambiguity. A s a n example, one can imagine two c o u n t r i e s negotiat- ing o v e r t h e management of a r i v e r . Suppose a l s o t h a t t h e negotiatons are pro- t r a c t e d s o t h a t t h e evolution of t h e river-problem with time will a f f e c t t h e negotia- tion, and t h e negotiation p r o c e s s will in r e t u r n have a n impact on r i v e r manage- ment, and t h u s on t h e evolution of t h e r i v e r problem. How should t h i s situation b e s t r u c t u r e d ? The r i v e r , s o t h e bio-physico-chemical sciences t e l l us, i s adequately r e p r e s e n t e d by a bio-physico-chemical system (undergoing, if o n e wishes, a transformation process). Should r i v e r and negotiation b e mixed into a wider nego- tiation system? Should t h e r i v e r b e viewed as a specific sub-system of a wider

"negotiation on t h e r i v e r " system? Should t h e negotiation p r o c e s s b e viewed as connected with t h e river-system, and if s o , what should t h e s t r u c t u r e of t h e con- nection be? A c e r t a i n confusion r e i g n s on t h e s e questions in t h e c u r r e n t state of negotiation r e s e a r c h . Often, in qualitative case-oriented monographs, problem-

r e l a t e d and negotiation-related p r o c e s s e s are loosely intertwined, decisions of negotiators being a t t r i b u t e d alternatively to f a c t o r s in t h e problem a n d to t h e relations with t h e opponent. In t h e o r e t i c a l r e s e a r c h , t h e emphasis is, more often than not, on t h e s t r u c t u r e of t h e problem shaping up t h e negotiation, t h e s u b t l e t i e s of t a c t i c s and of t h e human factors being r e d u c e d t h r o u g h more o r l e s s r a d i c a l p r e f e r e n c e hypotheses. The p r o c e s s a n d system paradigms tolerate a lot of fantasy in dealing with t h e content-process issue, but t h e y c o n t r i b u t e little to s t r u c t u r i n g i t in a productive fashion.

In b r i e f , t h e p r o c e s s and system paradigms a r e good frameworks f o r a post- mortem or a s t a t i c d e s c r i p t i o n of negotiation. But t h e y s u f f e r s t r u c t u r a l limita- tions when i t comes to bridging t h e p r a c t i c e - r e s e a r c h gap with r e s p e c t t o p r e p a r a t i o n of action or to clarifying t h e ambiguity between negotiation p r o c e s s and negotiated problem. To overcome t h e s e limitations, t h e field and game p a r a - digms as discussed below are eminent candidates.

The field paradigm

While t h e mechanism, p r o c e s s and system paradigms r e p r e s e n t l a r g e l y a n attempt to c a r r y o v e r basic problem-structurations f r o m t h e bio-physico-chemical s c i e n c e s to t h e social sciences, field is a paradigm t h a t i s mostly developed a n d applied in t h e l a t t e r . The emphasis of t h e field paradigm is o n context. The image is t h a t of a s p a c e ;i. ... in which d i f f e r e n t location, or situations have s p e c i f i c c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s in t e r m s of c e r t a i n a t t r i b u t e s ; actors in t h e s e situations will find themselves in specific c o n t e x t s with a bearing on t h e i r actions, thoughts, communi- cations, etc

...

The field, however, does not determine actions or communication: i t gives them a meaning (8).

In negotiation r e s e a r c h , a good point of application of t h e field paradigm i s c u l t u r a l r e s e a r c h : how are similar moves differently i n t e r p r e t e d by n e g o t i a t o r s situated differently in t h e c u l t u r a l field (in d i f f e r e n t social classes as f o r instance) or in d i f f e r e n t c u l t u r a l fields (in d i f f e r e n t civilizations for instance)?

How, in t h e same a c t u a l context, d o similar intentions a n d p e r c e p t i o n s lead to dif- f e r e n t actions and communication? Also based o n t h e field paradigm i s negotiation r e s e a r c h focusing o n p e r c e p t i o n , and interventions to improve negotiation which are based o n reframing, t h a t is, a modification of t h e way t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s p e r - c e i v e t h e s t r u c t u r e of t h e situation.

In t e r m s of field, action i s not understood so much in t e r m s of i t s r e s u l t s , but r a t h e r of i t s intentions, of i t s conception, of t h e meaning of i t s context, of i t s p r e p a r a t i o n . Field i s a unique paradigm f o r both r e s e a r c h e r s and p r a c t i t i o n e r s to understand t h e situation of a negotiator, and what i t implies in designing communi- cation and action.

However, t h e paradigm h a s i t s own limitations. I t enlightens t h e ecology of action and communication, b u t does not a d d r e s s t h e i r consequences, o r only indirectly, as t h e y are

-

or are not

-

perceived by t h e actors. I t illuminates t h e content of negotiation, but veils t h e objectivity of t h e problem being negotiated. I t c l a r i f i e s t h e process-content ambiguity, s o t o s p e a k , by evacuating t h e content: all becomes p e r c e p t i o n and communication. T h e r e is no r e a l i t y of problems beyond what actors p e r c e i v e as such.

This h a s a bearing on o u r o t h e r preoccupation: t h e p r a c t i c e - r e s e a r c h gap.

On t h e one hand, t h e field paradigm helps b r i d g e t h e g a p by providing a good basis f o r p r a c t i t i o n e r s and r e s e a r c h e r s to discuss t h e labile c o n t e n t s of action, p e r c e p - tions, situations and p e r s p e c t i v e s , beyond t h e o p e r a t i o n a l a s p e c t s of a negotiation.

But, p r a c t i t i o n e r s d o have, often enough, o p e r a t i o n a l preoccupations: action demands, from t h e i r p e r s p e c t i v e , t h a t o n e c o n s i d e r s t h e r e is a r e a l i t y on which t o act: a r i v e r , a f o r e s t , a demography, etc.

...

Social science, when r e s t r i c t e d to p e r c e p t i o n s a n d meanings (i.e., to t h e field paradigm) tends to a g g r a v a t e p r a c t i - t i o n e r s , and h a s met o v e r and o v e r again with difficulties in use.

S o t h e field paradigm complements t h e t h r e e previous o n e s both in terms of process-content relation. and of t h e communication between r e s e a r c h e r s a n d p r a c - t i t i o n e r s o v e r t h e p r e p a r a t i o n of action. But it still s u f f e r s s e v e r e limitations which might b e overcome by a n analytical framework integrating t h e mechanisms- process-system and t h e field perspectives. The game paradigm c a n provide such a n analytical framework.

In negotiation r e s e a r c h . a n d in o t h e r r e l a t e d areas as well, t h e image of a game, and t h e u s e of c o n c e p t s r e l a t e d t o t h e game paradigm are quite pervasive.

First, a b s t r a c t , t h e o r e t i c a l r e s e a r c h on negotiation. decision-making, policy- making, r e s o r t s o f t e n to a n analysis of situations in terms of games. This i s t r u e of c o u r s e of game t h e o r y . But i t is a l s o t r u e in a m o r e implicit way of o t h e r a p p r o a c h e s , like decision analysis f o r instance. A decision tree i s based on t h e

assumption t h a t decision-making in r e a l life is s t r u c t u r e d in t h e same way i t is at a c a r d o r r o u l e t t e table: t o a s s e s s probability and value of gains associated with different s t r a t e g i e s , and t o play accordingly. Incidentally, t h e concept of mathematical expectation, on which decision analysis r e l i e s w a s proposed by t h e 17th c e n t u r y French mathematician and philosopher Pascal t o help his gambling friends r e f l e c t on t h e more basic choices in t h e i r personal life.

Second, experimental r e s e a r c h in t h e field r e l i e s heavily on simulations. Be they quantitative o r qualitative in orientation t h e s e simulations r e s t on stylized negotiation situations which a r e staged, leading t o t h e organization of what a r e r e a l l y simulation games.

Third, in t h e i r daily reflections and discussions, which s t r u c t u r e l a r g e l y t h e i r perception of t h e i r own e x p e r i e n c e , p r a c t i t i o n e r s use consistently metaphors which d e s c r i b e t h e i r p r a c t i c e in t e r m s of games, using e x p r e s s i o n s like; "stakes",

"winner and loser", "rules of t h e game", "moves", etc.

However, t h e r e i s as y e t no g e n e r a l analysis integrating t h e s e various u s e s of game concepts into a g e n e r a l framework comparable, f o r instance, with systems analysis, even taking into account t h e ambiguities, diversities, and contradictions which e x i s t in t h e l a t t e r . In t h e more quantitative a p p r o a c h e s t o games, only a f e w simpler kinds of games are involved. They are a l s o t r e a t e d in a way t h a t r e d u c e s t h e specificity of t h e game situation, through s t r o n g hypotheses on t h e rationality of a c t o r s , o r through a probabilistic treatment of uncertainty. Game t h e o r y , f o r instance, i s f a r from a n extensive, multidisciplinary and c o h e r e n t use of t h e game paradigm such as is envisaged h e r e . Experimental simulations s t r i v e t o discover, through t h e manipulation of various p a r a m e t e r s , what determines t h e negotiators' behavior. Although t h e experimental s e t u p is a game, i t s exploitation p e r t a i n s c l e a r l y t o t h e mechanisms- process-system paradigm. Gaming r e s t s on a v e r y heteroclitous a r r a y of definitions and t h e o r i e s of games.

This i s not t h e place t o discuss t h e various existing t h e o r e t i c a l a p p r o a c h e s of t h e game concept, o r t o introduce detailed elements of a new approach. I t should b e enough h e r e t o r e t a i n in s h o r t those elements which r e l a t e t o t h e use of game as a basic paradigm f o r negotiation and o t h e r s t r a t e g i c action situations. I t should b e noted, in p a r t i c u l a r , t h a t existing conceptions of games s t o p s h o r t of a s t e p which i s n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e game paradigm t o b e exploited systematically. I t i s t o see t h a t t h e concept applies t o r e a l life social phenomena -a t r i a l , a firm, a negotiation,

...-

and not only t o t h e i r simulated, stylized o r modelled r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s . This more extensive use of t h e concept r e q u i r e s a discussion of t h e issue of "seriousness" in

games. Actually, a s i t is p r e s e n t l y used, t h e game concept is somewhat ambiguous.

I t i s used:

-

_to point at what s e p a r a t e s fun games from t h e s e r i o u s situations of real life ("this i s s e r i o u s , t h i s is not a game"),

-

_to point at t h e element of fun a n d playful involvement which c a n e x i s t even in t h e most s e r i o u s situations ("I enjoyed playing stupid as a t a c t i c in t h i s nego- tiation"),

-

_{to point at} t h e fundamental s t r u c t u r e s t h a t fun games a n d social life have in common ("rules of t h e game, moves, winners and l o s e r s in elections").

I t is t h i s last meaning which must b e r e t a i n e d h e r e : t h a t t h e s e r i o u s games of r e a l life, t h e i r simulations f o r training and r e s e a r c h , a n d t h e fun games of s p a r e time s h a r e a common s t r u c t u r e , which i s t h e game paradigm.

What is t h i s s t r u c t u r e ? What kind of v e r y g e n e r a l basic framework d o e s think- ing in t e r m s of game provide f o r t h e negotiation issue?

The example of simulation games suggests t h e following basis f o r a n answer.

Such games involve t w o layers:

-

t h e "accounting system"

-

^or "institutional model", which i s t h e set of r u l e s which governs t h e outcomes of t h e players' moves

-

t h e behavior of p l a y e r s , a n d t h e communication between them, outside of t h e formal codes of t h e accounting system.

How d o e s c u r r e n t negotiation r e s e a r c h a d d r e s s t h e s e t w o levels in t h e simu- lat&d or real "negotiation games"? A s i t s name indicates, t h e accounting system c a n b e v e r y well r e p r e s e n t e d in t e r m s of t h e mechanism-process-system p a r a - digms. Actually, most work o n games and o n negotiation d e a l s with t h i s l a y e r of negotiation.

The behavioural l a y e r

-

t h a t where p l a y e r s give t h e i r own meaning to t h e situation, communicate informally among themselves, p r e p a r e t h e i r inputs into t h e accounting systems ( t h a t is, t h e i r actions) t e n d s to b e e i t h e r :

-

r e d u c e d to insignificance or even non-existence through devices such as rationality hypotheses,

-

l e f t open by default or by a totally loose flow of qualitative comments;

-

s e p a r a t e d from t h e system level.

The f i r s t two a t t i t u d e s fail t o provide intelligibility of many a s p e c t s of p l a y e r ' s behaviors, by not recognizing t h a t t h e s e are i n s e r t e d in a field of meaning and communication which cannot b e r e d u c e d to a n "accounting system".

The t h i r d , as discussed e a r l i e r about t h e field paradigm, f a i l s t o p r o p o s e p r o p e r links between t h e informal communication in a negotiation and t h e o p e r a - tional problems a d d r e s s e d by t h e negotiation.

S o t h e r e is a second s t e p t o t a k e beyond t h e c u r r e n t p a r t i a l u s e s of t h e game concept. I t i s to recognize t h a t t h e communication around t h e accounting system (communication which i s t h e e s s e n c e of negotiation) is a l s o s t r u c t u r e d , but cannot b e understood fully in t h e same t e r m s of mechanisms, p r o c e s s e s , systems. I t i s t o use t h e field paradigm as t h e p r o p e r analytical framework when i t comes t o mean- ing and communication. I t i s finally to a r t i c u l a t e t h e field of communication and t h e accounting system into a wider s t r u c t u r e : t h a t provided by t h e game concept.

From t h e a b o v e discussions e m e r g e s a basic, global image of a game as a sys- t e m of physical and institutional r u l e s and c o n s t r a i n t s , s u r r o u n d e d by a field of meaning and communication. Both levels are distinct, but interdependent in a way t h a t is not formalizable independently at e i t h e r level. The moves of t h e p l a y e r s c a n a f f e c t o n e l a y e r o r t h e o t h e r , or both distinctly. This image

-

t h e game p a r a - digm

-

a p p l i e s both to fun and simulation games and t o t h e s e r i o u s s t r a t e g i c a l situations of social life, in p a r t i c u l a r , negotiation.

How d o e s t h i s view apply t o a full-scale negotiation? A s a n example, l e t two c o u n t r i e s again negotiate o v e r t h e management of a r i v e r . The c o n t e n t p a r t , understood adequately in t e r m s of mechanisms-processes-systems, c a n b e viewed as t h r e e layered:

-

t h e a c t u a l r i v e r , Nature, which will always e s c a p e t o t a l description;

-

t h e r i v e r as i t is known through science, and handled through technology, is a physical "accounting system" through which a given set of physical actions will determine a given r e s u l t ;

-

t h e r u l e s , p r o c e d u r e s , economic dealings through which t h e problem i s han- dled constitute a second l a y e r of accounting system; t o a move, a n institu- tional action, t h e y a s s o c i a t e "quasi-mechanically" a given outcome. This l a y e r is distinct from t h e f o r m e r one; t h e "interactions" between institutions a n d bio-physico- chemical phenomena, if t h e y e x i s t at a l l , d i f f e r fundamentally from t h o s e within e a c h of t h e s e l a y e r s . But both l a y e r s c a n b e understood in t e r m s of mechanisms (hydrological o r budgetary), of p r o c e s s e s ( r e p r o d u c t i v e

o r legislative), of systems (ecological o r legal).

"Around" t h e s e content systems t h e r e i s a n o t h e r l a y e r which i s both t h e one c r u c i a l to make a game, and to make a negotiation: a field of informal meanings s t a k e s , communications. Such a field i s at o n c e both s t r u c t u r e d a n d impossible to formalize completely. Indeed, if i t i s formalized completely in a specific situation, and t h u s becomes predictable, t h e n negotiators will h a v e a n i n t e r e s t to g e n e r a t e unpredictability and to d i v e r t t h e system, making i t s previous d e s c r i p t i o n obsolete, and so o n a d infiniturn. I t o r i e n t s communication and behavior, but d o e s not determine them. I t c a n b e fruitfully discussed, but n e v e r totally accounted f o r . I t will evolve with t h e evolution of t h e state of t h e issue in a significant, but not totally p r e d i c t a b l e , way.

Different a s p e c t s of t h e field are r e f e r r e d to by t e r m s like personality, cul- t u r a l style, competitive atmosphere, body language, good manners, and many oth- e r s , forming a q u i t e d i s p a r a t e collection. I t i s t h e elusive material of social life, which various disciplines of human ( o r social science) endeavor to c a p t u r e .

How d o e s t h i s game paradigm relate to t h e paradigms discussed previously? I t c a n b e said t h a t t h e content p a r t is adequately d e s c r i b a b l e in t e r m of mechanisms, processes, systems. F o r t h e bio-physico-chemical p a r t , t h e s c i e n t i s t s tell u s so.

For t h e social system t h i s will hold with a r e s t r i c t i o n : i t is t r u e as long as all o n e wants i s to d e s c r i b e organization and t h e i r mechanisms. But i t becomes prob- lematic as soon as o n e wants to understand how t h e y a r e brought i n t o play in a c t u a l p r a c t i c e . The o t h e r l a y e r , t h e play l a y e r h a s t h e n to b e included to make sense.

Things are more i n t r i c a t e at t h e "play" l a y e r . Mechanism, p r o c e s s and system paradigms will still b e used h e r e , but o n a d i f f e r e n t basis

-

t h a t is, only with a metaphorical value. They will b e images c a r r i e d o v e r from t h e worlds of n a t u r e o r of r u l e , to help u s g r a s p t h e elusive a s p e c t s of t h e social fields. But if t h e y are t a k e n literally, t h e salt of social action, of t a c t i c s and s t r a t e g y . i s lost, and p r a c t i - c a l value falls. A t t h i s level, t h e b e s t available paradigm i s t h e field as w e have d e s c r i b e d i t e a r l i e r .

How d o e s t h i s basic s t r u c t u r a t i o n provided by t h e game paradigm p e r f o r m in t e r m s of bridging t h e r e s e a r c h - p r a c t i c e gap, and clarifying t h e content-process ambiguity? In a game, p l a y e r s and s p e c t a t o r s h a v e d i f f e r e n t but c l e a r l y specified roles. The s p e c t a t o r cannot p a r t i c i p a t e in manipulating t h e system, but h e partici- p a t e s in t h e field surrounding t h e game: his comments create or modify significa- tions and in p a r t i c u l a r , t h e c o n t e x t of t h e players' actions, and thus, t h e i r deci- sion making. The o b s e r v e r also g e t s t h e comments of t h e p l a y e r s , and t h u s i s a b l e

-

as t h e analogy with any game demonstrates

-

t o s e e t h e situation from t h e p l a y e r s B point of view, even though i t may d i f f e r from his. Reciprocally, t h e notion of being a p l a y e r in a game supposes a possibility of acquiring a distance t o t h e situation, of "stepping out" in mind t o think as if one were a n o b s e r v e r .

The game paradigm s t r u c t u r e s t h e negotiation situation in a way t h a t s u p p o r t s both analysis by t h e o b s e r v e r and p r e p a r a t i o n of action by t h e negotiator. Furth- ermore, considering t h e communication field in t h e negotiation, within which they both o p e r a t e , o b s e r v e r s and negotiators c a n analyse not only what they s e e , but a l s o t h e i r relations and t h e bearing of t h e s e on t h e negotiation.

A s f o r t h e content-process ambiguity, t h e game paradigm provides a neces- s a r y clarification by allowing a c l e a r distinction t o b e maintained constantly between t h e p a r t i c u l a r mechanics of a problem, t h e determination of p r o c e d u r e s , and t h e meanings in t h e communication field around them.

H e r e again, t h e game paradigm does not just distinguish, b u t a l s o articulates.

The game is t h e interplay between t h e system and t h e significations t h e p l a y e r s a t t r i b u t e t o it. I t i s t h e unique human capability t h a t n a t u r a l and social l a w s will r a d i a t e a field of signification within which a c t o r s will move in a way both f r e e and significant. I t i s t h e unique capability t h a t w e have of transforming t h e elusive meanings w e a t t a c h t o things into laws of society and n a t u r e , and t h u s build a world of o u r own.

If negotiation i s s o crucial in running o u r complex societies, i s i t not because of t h e s a m e qualities? What seems a n impasse of n a t u r a l o r social mechanisms, it allows t o t u r n into flexible p e r c e p t i o n s t o b e p r o b e d tentatively in discussion. And what seems a volatile agreement of opinion, i t will transform into a c o n t r a c t , a pro- ject, a t r e a t y , a f a c t t h a t will t h e n become p a r t of t h e social o r n a t u r a l systems, and acquire, s o t o s p e a k , a life of t h e i r own.

Applications

A s t h e focus of t h i s p a p e r i s on paradigms, t h e applications of t h e game analytical framework will b e discussed only v e r y briefly h e r e .

A s i s t h e g e n e r a l c a s e with t h e "sciences of action", in t h e field of negotiation r e s e a r c h t h e r e is no lack of f a c t s , and no s h o r t a g e of proposed i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . The difficulties m e t are r a t h e r in validation, in applicability of r e s e a r c h r e s u l t s , in t h e use of p r a c t i t i o n e r ' s e x p e r i e n c e t o supply material f o r r e s e a r c h and

training. These challenges in t h e development of "sciences of action" r e s e a r c h are indeed problems in t r a n s f e r of understanding:

-

from p r a c t i t i o n e r s t o r e s e a r c h e r s (mobilization of e x p e r i e n c e ) ,

-

from r e s e a r c h e r s to p r a c t i t i o n e r s (application of r e s e a r c h , education a n d training),

-

between r e s e a r c h e r s ("valid" knowledge i s o n e t h a t t r a n s f e r s from s c i e n t i s t t o s c i e n t i s t with minimal distortion of understanding, a n d maximal a c c e p - tance),

-

between p r a c t i t i o n e r s (post-event spontaneous d e b r i e f i n g a n d self-training of p r a c t i t i o n e r s ) .

What are t h e p e r s p e c t i v e s f o r u s e of t h e game paradigm as discussed above, in t h e s e f o u r areas (of which t h e f i r s t t w o constitute t h e potential bridging of t h e p r a c t i c e - r e s e a r c h gap)? F i r s t , t h e mobilization of p r a c t i t i o n e r s e x p e r i e n c e f o r r e s e a r c h and training p u r p o s e s i s increasingly recognized as important, widely used and quite useful. Done in a spontaneous fashion as in l e c t u r e s or memoirs, i t s efficiency i s limited however by t h e f a c t t h a t much of what makes a p r a c t i t i o n e r effective remains implicit (because t o o obvious to him, or unconcious, f o r instance), a n d l a r g e l y e s c a p e s t r a n s f e r . The p r a c t i t i o n e r ' s tendency is r a t h e r to underline t h i s or t h a t a s p e c t of his activity which h e c o n s i d e r s as intriguing, origi- nal, generally overlooked, e t c .

...

The notion of debriefing w a s t h u s introduced, to mobilize t h e p r a c t i t i o n e r s e x p e r i e n c e m o r e systematically. Doing s o improves significantly t h e t r a n s f e r of understanding from p r a c t i t i o n e r s to r e s e a r c h e r s (10). However, t h e b a s i c diffi- culties just mentioned about "spontaneous debriefing" remain, although to a smaller extent. This h a s suggested to me t h e use of t h e game analytical framework p r e s e n t e d h e r e f o r systematical debriefing. I h a v e used i t experimentally o n c e a l r e a d y , leading to p r o p o s e methodological tools to apply t h e game analytical framework in debriefing p r a c t i c e , a n d t o suggest d i r e c t i o n s f o r a more detailed c o n s t r u c t on t h e analysis of games at a t h e o r e t i c a l level ( a s defined e a r l i e r in t h i s p a p e r ) (11).

Second, application of r e s u l t s of s o c i a l s c i e n c e s ( or "sciences of action"), and training of p r a c t i t i o n e r s in t h e s e fields is notoriously problematic (12). In a n e f f o r t extending o v e r t h e y e a r s , I h a v e been endeavoring to synthesize t h e teach- ings of a wide a r r a y of case studies and methodological studies on t h e s t r a t e g i c a s p e c t s of environmental management. The aim was to t u r n t h e s e r e s e a r c h r e s u l t s

into a c o h e r e n t e x p e r t i s e a p p r o a c h , and make i t available t o p r a c t i t i o n e r s (13).

Main difficulties were t h e heterogeneity of t h e analytical frameworks of t h e stu- dies themselves, and t h e difficulty to find p e r s p e c t i v e s g e n e r a l enough and useful f o r both o b s e r v e r s and actors in t h e decision processes. The last t w o difficulties are t h e o n e s discussed at t h e beginning of t h e p a p e r .

I t i s t h i s problematique t h a t led m e to t h e development of t h e p r e s e n t analysis of t h e game paradigm. On t h i s basis, I w a s a b l e to a r t i c u l a t e a n initial set of more or less empirically heterogeneous methodologies into a detailed and c o h e r e n t a p p r o a c h to problems of s t r a t e g y and negotiation in environmental management.

This provides a n example of t h e possibility to build, f o r a c e r t a i n field of applica- tion, a specific game analytical methodology, based o n t h e game paradigm as dis- cussed in t h i s p a p e r (14).

The t w o applications just mentioned are a n example of t h e renewed use of t h e game paradigm which is advocated h e r e . If t h e analysis in t h i s p a p e r is c o r r e c t , if t h e r e s u l t s of t h e s e f i r s t applications fulfill t h e i r promise, i t s potential to b r i d g e t h e r e s e a r c h - p r a c t i c e g a p is important, and much remains to b e done to t a p it.

A s discussed e a r l i e r , t h e r e are a l r e a d y many applications based o n t h e game concept, r e s t i n g e i t h e r on a n empirical basis, or on p a r t i a l t h e o r e t i c a l formula- tions of t h e concept, such a game t h e o r y (see note 9). They c a n only benefit from a more comprehensive and systematic analytical framework. This c a n help improve f u r t h e r t h e design of application (in p a r t i c u l a r in gaming). I t c a n allow b e t t e r situating of t h e various analytical a p p r o a c h e s to assess t h e i r potential, to discuss t h e i r relations.. So, by i t s c a p a c i t y to i n t e g r a t e t h e existing n a r r o w e r analytical frameworks, t h e game paradigm is a good basis f o r t r a n s f e r of understanding between r e s e a r c h e r s

-

t h e t h i r d point in o u r discussion of solving t h e t r a n s f e r - of-understanding problems in negotiation r e s e a r c h . But t h e r e remains a challenge to go beyond t h i s integration of n a r r o w e r paradigms. I t will b e , in f u r t h e r work, to answer t h e question: "how b e s t c a n o n e understand a game a p a r t from in r e d u c t i v e terms of mechanisms, p r o c e s s , system, or field?" I t h a s too often been assumed t h a t because simulation games are s m a l l and made by us, w e understand how t h e y work. Whoever h a s had to d e b r i e f a complex gaming session knows otherwise. A new understanding of games is needed both f o r fun and simulation games and for life-size games. and t h e f i r s t will c o n t r i b u t e to t h e second.

A s f o r t h e f o u r t h t y p e of t r a n s f e r

-

p r a c t i t i o n e r to p r a c t i t i o n e r

-

i t h a s a l r e a d y been mentioned t h a t game metaphors are p e r v a s i v e among " p r a c t i t i o n e r s at coffee-breaks and o t h e r informal encounter b e f o r e or a f t e r negotiations; t h e s e

a r e t h e professional equivalents of t h e debriefing of s o c c e r games as p r a c t i s e d in dressing rooms. The analysis above provides a rationale t o continue t h i s p r a c t i c e , and a challenge t o improve it.

Conclusion

There i s a Zen saying t h a t goes: 'When t h e f i n g e r points a t t h e moon, t h e fool looks at t h e f i n g e r

..."

If paradigms are like finger-positions pointing t o d i f f e r e n t s t r u c t u r e s and a s p e c t s in negotiation, t h i s p a p e r h a s discussed and compared finger- positions f o r t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e merits. These were assessed mainly in t e r m s of potential f o r bridging t h e p r a c t i c e - r e s e a r c h gap and f o r clarifying t h e content-process ambiguity

-

two main stumbling blocks in negotiation r e s a r c h . On t h i s basis, t h e p a p e r h a s proposed and defended a c e r t a i n s h i f t in t h e f i n g e r posi- tion: t h a t towards t h e game paradigm.

G a m e metaphors are c u r r e n t l y used pervasively t o underline t h i s o r t h a t a s p e c t of negotiation; they a l s o ground a n a r r a y of s e p a r a t e methodologies, from gaming t o decision analysis. But t h e s e r e l y largely on implicit o r on artificially r e s t r i c t e d notions of game. A reexamination of t h e game paradigm shows t h a t i t i s wider than t h e o t h e r s most c u r r e n t l y used ones (like mechanism, p r o c e s s , system, field) and t h a t i t c a n i n t e g r a t e them. I t h a s a l s o shown t o b e more r e l e v a n t t o t h e

"sciences of action"

-

such as negotiation r e s e a r c h , f o r i t s unique capacity t o d e a l with t h e p r a c t i c e - r e s e a r c h gap, and t h e process-context ambiguity.

Using a game analytical framework more systematically t o s t r u c t u r e o u r investigation of negotiation c a n both bring more c o h e r e n c e , understanding and applicability in some c u r r e n t t h e o r i e s and methodologies, and initiate new develop- ments in negotiation r e s e a r c h . The game paradigm seems t o b e t h e potential basis f o r a more ample and c o h e r e n t field of analysis t h a n i s p r e s e n t l y realized and t h a t could b e labelled Game Analysis.

Alas, discussing paradigms i s not a n immediately rewarding e f f o r t . Indeed, while discussing points of views from which negotiations c a n be viewed w e have turned o u r back t o negotiation itself, and

-

fools of a moment

-

haven't s e e n much of it.

While more detailed applications could only b e discussed v e r y briefly h e r e , t h e r e s u l t s of t h e e f f o r t , t h e c o n c r e t e and usable products of a more systematic use of t h e game paradigm, will become visible only as w e t u r n around and look a t what t h e newly positioned finger shows us. But if t h e analysis p r e s e n t e d h e r e i s

c o r r e c t , if the first applications currently being developed hold their promises, new perspectives in negotiation theory, methodology in negotiation study, and negotiation practice and case description a r e bound t o develop.

Notes

[I] ^{A t} t h e t a s k f o r c e meeting on PIN held 9-10 December 1 9 8 5 at Laxenburg, bridging t h e g a p between p r a c t i t i o n e r s and r e s e a r c h e r s emerged as o n e of t h e main themes to b e a d d r e s s e d by t h e PIN p r o j e c t .

[2] This difficulty w a s r a i s e d , f o r instance, at t h e S e p t e m b e r 2 3 r d , 1985 meeting of t h e French PIN Network, in p a r t i c u l a r through t h e intervention of M r . Duclos (Centre dlAnalyse d e P r o s p e c t i v e , Minist re d e s Affaires E t r a n g e r e s ) . [3] These two t r e n d s of r e s e a r c h are illustrated by numerous p a p e r s in t h e PIN

Conference.

[4] The a p p r o a c h p r e s e n t e d by H. Cohen in h i s book: "You c a n negotiate any- thing" (Bantam Books, 1982) is a good illustration of t h i s conception.

[5] This t y p e of a p p r o a c h i s w e l l illustrated by: P r u i t t , Dean G., 1986, Trends in t h e Scientific Study of Negotiation and Mediation, Negotiation Journal, Vol. 2, No. 3, July 1986

[6] On conceptions of negotiation in t e r m s of p r o c e s s e s , see Zartman, I. William, ed. 1978. "The Negotiation Process: Theories a n d Application". Beverly Hills, Calif

.:

S a g e Publications.

[7] S e e Kremenyuk, A., The system of international negotiations a n d i t s impact o n t h e p r o c e s s e s of negotiation, p a p e r t o b e p r e s e n t e d at t h e PIN c o n f e r e n c e , IIASA, Laxenburg, 18-22 May 1987.

[8] On t h e t h e o r y of fields, see Willard C. Arthur, 1982, Argument fields, in Cox, J.

R o b e r t a n d Willard, C. A r t h u r , eds. Advances in Argumentation Theory a n d R e s e a r c h , S o u t h e r n Illinois University P r e s s , 1982.

[9] But t h e r e are many interesting publications presenting various p e r s p e c t i v e s on t h e game c o n c e p t a n d i t s use. Here is a s h o r t selection of r e f e r e n c e s r e l e v a n t h e r e :

-

On Gaming:

Duke, R.D. Gaming: The Future's Language, Beverly-Hills: S a g e Pub- lications, 1974

Stahl, Ingolf; Operational Gaming

-

a n International Approach; IIASA Pergamon P r e s s , 1983

On Game Theory and i t s use in negotiation:

Von Neumann, J., Morgenstern, 0 ; Theory of G a m e s and Economic Bahviour; Princeton University P r e s s , 1953

Raiffa, H.; The A r t and Science of Negotiation, H a r v a r d University P r e s s , 1982

-

On t h e game concept, i t s philosophical basis and daily use:

Huizinga, J.; Homoludens

-

A study of t h e play element in c u l t u r e , London, Routledge and Kegan Ltd., 1949

Caillois, R.; l e s Jeus e t l e s Hommes

-

l e masque et l e v e r t i g e , Gal- limand, 1958

Carse, J.P.; Finite and Infinite Games

-

A vision of life as Play and Possibility, Macmillan F r e e P r e s s , 1986.

[lo]

On systematical debriefing in t h e negotiation field, see Wheeler, M.; Protocols f o r debriefing p r a c t i t i o n e r s , Program on Negotiation working p a p e r 85-2, January 1985

[Ill

For a p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h i s work and of i t s f i r s t results: Mermet, L. and Hor- dijk, L.; On getting simulation models used in international negotiation, a debriefing e x e r c i s e p a p e r p r e s e n t e d at t h e IIASA PIN Conference, Laxenburg,

Austria, 18-22 May 1987

[I21 S e e f o r instance: Holner B., K n o r r K.D., S t r a s s e r H.; Realizing Social Science Knowledge, Vienna, Physica-Verlag, 1983

[I31

This e f f o r t i s p r e s e n t e d in: Mermet, L.; Aims in Nature, Means in Society, unpublished, IIASA 1986.

[I41 The a p p r o a c h r e f e r r e d t o h e r e h a s been used by t h e a u t h o r f o r t h e f i r s t time in a one-week workshop f o r p r a c t i t i o n e r s of n a t u r a l r e s o u r c e s management, at t h e Ecole Nationale du Genie Rural, d e s Eaux e t d e s Forets, P a r i s , in December 1986. I t will be p r e s e n t e d in writing in t h r e e f u r t h e r p a p e r s , (which are summarized in t h e document identified in note 13).