Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Theory of civil war under asymmetric information
Jellal, Mohamed
Al Makrîzi Institut D’économie, Rabat , Morocco
26 July 2014
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/57600/
MPRA Paper No. 57600, posted 27 Jul 2014 20:36 UTC
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0, 1
F f
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d
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M r s, , .
sT
T - s + sw - s (2)
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sy +
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y + w
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r
M r s, , .
= 0 and r = , .
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𝑀(𝜃) 𝑉(𝜃,𝜃) 𝜃 𝜃
𝑉(𝜃,𝜃)
∀𝜃,𝜃 ∈ Ω)
𝑉(𝜃,𝜃) = 𝑇 − 𝑠 𝜃 𝜃 − 𝑟 𝜃 +𝑠 𝜃 𝑦
𝑉 𝜃 = 𝑉(𝜃,𝜃)
∀𝜃,𝜃 ∈ Ω (𝜃,𝜃) ≥ 𝑉(𝜃,𝜃)
∀𝜃 ∈ Ω 𝑉(𝜃,𝜃) ≥0
Max𝑠(.)𝑈 = 𝑇 − 𝑠 𝜃 𝑟 𝜃 𝜃𝜃 +𝑠 𝜃 𝑤 − Ψ 𝑠 𝜃 𝑑𝐹 𝜃
∀𝜃,𝜃 ∈ Ω 𝑉(𝜃,𝜃) ≥ 𝑉(𝜃,𝜃)
∀𝜃 ∈ Ω 𝑉(𝜃,𝜃) ≥0
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𝑀(𝜃)
𝑀(𝜃) 𝑉 𝜃 = 𝑇 − 𝑠 𝑥 𝑑𝑥𝜃𝜃 𝑠′ 𝜃 ≤0 ∀𝜃 ∈ Ω
𝑉 𝜃 𝑉 𝜃 = Max
𝜃) 𝑉(𝜃,𝜃) = 𝑇 − 𝑠 𝜃 𝜃 − 𝑟 𝜃 +𝑠 𝜃 𝑦 𝑉 𝜃
∀𝜃 ∈ Ω 𝑉′ 𝜃 = 𝑇 − 𝑠 𝜃 ≥0 𝑉′′ 𝜃 =−𝑠′ 𝜃 ≥ 0 𝑠′ 𝜃 ≤ 0 ∀𝜃 ∈ Ω
𝑉′ 𝜃 = 𝑇 − 𝑠 𝜃 𝑉 𝜃 = 0 𝑉 𝜃 = 𝑇 − 𝑠 𝑥 𝑑𝑥𝜃𝜃
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𝑉 𝜃 = 𝑇 − 𝑠 𝑥 𝑑𝑥𝜃𝜃
𝑉 𝜃 𝜃
𝜃
𝜃 𝑠′ 𝜃 ≤0
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𝑉(𝜃) = 𝑇 − 𝑠 𝜃 𝜃 − 𝑟 𝜃 +𝑠 𝜃 𝑦
𝑇 − 𝑠 𝜃 𝑟 𝜃 = 𝑇 − 𝑠 𝜃 𝜃+ 𝑠 𝜃 𝑦+𝑉(𝜃)
U = 𝑇 − 𝑠 𝜃 𝜃𝜃𝜃 +𝑠 𝜃 𝑦+𝑤 − Ψ 𝑠 𝜃 − 𝑉(𝜃) 𝑑𝐹 𝜃
𝑉 𝜃
𝑉 𝜃 = 𝑇 − 𝑠 𝑥 𝑑𝑥
𝜃 𝜃
U = 𝑇 − 𝑠 𝜃 𝜃𝜃𝜃 +𝑠 𝜃 𝑦+𝑤 − Ψ 𝑠 𝜃 −1−𝐹𝑓(𝜃(𝜃)) 𝑇 − 𝑠 𝜃 𝑑𝐹 𝜃
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Max𝑠(.)𝑈 = 𝑇 − 𝑠 𝜃 𝜃𝜃𝜃 +𝑠 𝜃 𝑦+𝑤 − Ψ 𝑠 𝜃 −1−𝐹𝑓(𝜃(𝜃)) 𝑇 − 𝑠 𝜃 𝑑𝐹 𝜃
Ψ′ 𝑠 𝜃 = 𝑦+𝑤 − 𝜃+1− 𝐹(𝜃) 𝑓(𝜃)
𝑑𝑈
𝑑𝑠 𝜃 =−𝜃+𝑦+𝑤 − Ψ′ 𝑠 𝜃 +1− 𝐹 𝜃 𝑓 𝜃 = 0
Ψ′ 𝑠 𝜃 𝑦 +𝑤
−𝜃+1−𝐹(𝜃)
𝑓(𝜃)
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𝑑𝑠 𝜃
𝑑 𝑦+𝑤 = 1
Ψ" 𝑠 𝜃 ≥ 0
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