CHAPTER 9. TROPE ONTOLOGY 122
9.2 Trope Ontology as a Solution to the
CHAPTER 9. TROPE ONTOLOGY 123 but only its red trope which is a proper part of the whole red thing.
In a similar fashion the trope ontologist is able to analyse all kinds of complex statements which the realist about universals can explain and the classical nominalist cannot. David Armstrong classifies this third al-ternative as ‘moderate nominalism’.8 Trope ontology is moderate since it includes properties and relations into its ontological scheme. It is still closer to nominalism, however, than to realism about universals because only par-ticulars are admitted since power properties are taken as parpar-ticulars and not as universals. We thus almost have a middle ground between nomi-nalism and realism about universals and this fact makes trope ontology so strong in its range of explanatory power.
Summing up one can say that there are at least four reasons for adopt-ing a trope-ontological conception of the world. First, the gap between universals and concrete particulars is bridged by admitting properties as basic entities in the ontological scheme. This is achieved by letting proper-ties enter as particulars and not as repeatable universals. Second, a middle ground between nominalism and realism about universals is found in virtue of which the problems of either side can be avoided while their respective achievements are retained. Third, as properties are empirically more basic and accessible than everyday things it seems natural to put these entities at the bottom of the ontology and not those more complex things which can be seen to be made up by them. Forth and last, the trope ontological scheme is very economical because there is just one main class or category of basic entities, viz. tropes.9 These four reasons for adopting a trope-ontological account of the world are far less controversial than another feature of trope ontology which will be discussed in the following section, namely the bundling of tropes in order to get an object which can exist by itself. This much debated feature of trope ontology is of particular
im-8Armstrong (1989), p. xi.
9It is instructive to compare how economical different ontological conceptions are.
In general one can say that the number of entities which belong to one category rises quickly the fewer basic categories of entities are assumed. It does not seem to be just a matter of inverse proportion.
CHAPTER 9. TROPE ONTOLOGY 124 portance in the context of the present study since the ontological status of universals as such is not the relevant question but rather the constitution of physical objects.
9.3 The Bundle Theory of Tropes
In its classical form10trope ontology is conceived as abundle theory. Every-day objects as well as objects in scientific theories like elementary particles, molecules and genes are considered to be bundles of tropes, or bundles of bundles of tropes. In order to illustrate the strength of this assertion I will again give an example which is not quite right but which is sufficiently cor-rect for the current purpose. According to the bundle theory of tropes, this particular cupisthe bundle of this green, this roundness, this consistency, this gloss, etc. It isnotsaid that we first have some kind of ‘bare cup’ and and than we can add its colour trope, its shape trope and so forth. When we take away all its tropes nothing is left no matter whether this taking away is conceived of as an actual process or mere abstraction.
Simons stresses that tropes should not be thought of as proper parts of the whole bundle.11 Simons agrees with some other authors that to think of tropes as “ways something can be” catches the nature of some natural kinds of tropes better than thinking of them as things which are at the same place as parts of an object. However, Simons has various cautions to add.
One of them is that these ways would have to be particularized ways since a trope ontologist cannot accept ways which are considerd as universals.
The other and more important caution is about the view not to think of tropes as things at all. Simons argues, and I agree to him, that tropes are in
10Keith Campbell is probably the best-known advocate of the “traditional” bundle theory of tropes. To my knowledge Campbell’s Abstract Particulars Campbell (1990) is the latest monograph on trope ontology. Earlier trope ontologists are G. F. Stout in the twenties and thirties and D. C. Williams in the sixties.
11For the details of his emphasis that tropes are not proper parts of the whole bundle see Simons (1994), pp. 561-565, as well as his bookParts. A Study in OntologySimons (1987).
CHAPTER 9. TROPE ONTOLOGY 125 the end meant to make up substantial objects. If tropes are not somehow real entities, i. e. things, even if they cannot exist independently like substances, then how can something real arise by bundling tropes together.
To put the bundle view of objects in classical terms, we have no split-up into underlying persisting substratum on the one side and changeable attributeson the other side. The advantage of abandoning this division lies in the impression that the discrimination of substratum and attributes is artificial and derives primarily from the misguiding structure of most west-ern languages. Although it is convenient to speak of something permanent and its changing properties it is dubious what this something is. It seems that it is merely a product of mental abstraction from all properties which has no real counterpart outside of our mind. It is a “something I know not what” (Locke) which is hard to grasp. This makes it understandable why it is so appealing to dispose of it.
However, trope ontology in its bundle version faces some questions which might not be easy to answer. What makes a bundle of tropes a bundle? The individuating power of the substratum has to be at least substituted in trope ontology. The traditional answer of trope ontologists is to postulate the so-calledcompresence relation. In virtue of this relation among the tropes of a bundle these tropes exist together to make up one unified object.
Postulating the compresence relation is not unproblematic for at least four reasons. First, it lowers the economy of trope ontology since one category of basic items, i. e. tropes, is not enough any more. Second, what kind of entity is the compresence relation? Is it not a universal?
This would be embarassing for the trope ontologist since the abandoning of universals is his credo. Third, one could argue that this postulation is a costly or even unfair move. It could be compared to Carnap’s reaction on Quine’s assertion that the analytic/synthetic distinction is one of the two dogmas of empiricism. Quine argued that sentences like ’All bachelors are unmarried.’ are neither analytic nor synthetic which shows that the whole distinction is rather a dogma than a fact.12 In response, Carnap added
12“Two dogmas of empiricism” Quine (1951).
CHAPTER 9. TROPE ONTOLOGY 126 so-called meaning postulates like
For all x it holds that if x is a bachelor than x is not married.
to the ordinary logical rules like the tertium non datur.13 Including these postulates in the semantical system sentences like
All bachelors are unmarried.
become analytic sentences. The postulation of the compresence relation may seem somewhat similar. The substratum is thrown out of the ontology since only something like the attributes, here the tropes, are needed. And then, suddenly the compresence relation is added. One could ask: is not compresence actually the same as the old substratum?
Fourth and last, one could go the opposite way and object that the in-troduction of compresence is a mere verbal trick. The question why tropes are together in a bundle is answered with recourse to the ‘being-together-relation’. There seem to be only two ways out for the trope ontologist who postulates the compresence relation. Either compresence must be given up in favour of something else or it must be explicated and justified in a convincing way.
Another question to the bundle theorist of tropes concerns the transtem-poral identity of a bundle of tropes. What ensures the identity of a bundle at two different times? This problem together with the status and explica-tion of the compresence relaexplica-tion place a heavy burden on the bundle view of tropes and are not completely settled yet for my taste.