Towards Theorising the Role of Power in Institutional Change

The history of the concept of power is closely inter-twined with the concept of causality (cf. Clegg, Courpasson et al. 2006, 207ff). This attempt at theo-rising the role of power in institutional change there-fore takes a reflection on causality as its point of departure. It reconstructs the concept of causality that underpins much of the writing on power and suggests a different conceptualisation capable of incorporating the many ways power is created iden-tified above. Robert Dahl’s (1957, 202f) seminal defi-nition of power reads: “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do.” The exercise of A’s power is the cause of B’s behaviour. Dahl – a prominent fig-ure in the behaviouralist movement – calls for politi-cal analyses that seek to “explain the empiripoliti-cal aspects of political life by means of methods, theo-ries, and criteria of proof that are acceptable accord-ing to the canons, conventions, and assumptions of modern empirical science” (Dahl 1961, 767). The con-ceptualisation of causation as regularities between events (causality as “constant conjunctions” or suc-cessionist view of causation) is a corollary to this (cf.

Isaac 1987, 5ff). “The only meaning that is strictly causal in the notion of power is one of regular sequence: that is, a regular sequence such that when A does something, what follows, or what probably follows, is an action by B” Dahl (1965, 94). As a result, the empirical focus of power is overt conflict only.

However, there are less obvious but at least as impor-tant forms of power. These forms of power do not enter research conducted in a behaviouralist tradi-tion.

The “generative concept of causality” (Ekström 1992, 113)⁴⁹ approaches thinking about causes from a differ-ent perspective. Its core is summarised by the fol-lowing quote “What causes an event has nothing to do with the number of times it has been observed to occur and nothing to do with whether we happen to be able to predict it” (Sayer 1992, 110). A causal claim in this understanding is “not about a regularity between separate things or events but about what an object is like and what it can do and only derivatively what it will do in any particular situation” (ibid, 105).

Human beings, for example, have the causal power to

strive for cooperative resource governance irrespec-tive of whether they decide to employ it. Causal pow-ers can be attributed to social elements regardless of whether they have been followed by a particular event. Whether the exercise of causal powers by agents lead to a desired event depends on the con-text, i. e. other agents – and other social elements (see section 2.3 and 2.4) – operating at the same time. An event is contingent upon other social objects (with their causal powers). Nobody would call into ques-tion the law of gravity only because she has observed an airplane flying. Events are the effect of “multiple determination” (Elder-Vass 2007d, 472). Under-standing an event, therefore, necessitates an analysis of the social elements (and their causal powers) co-operating to produce an event. For example, although the rubber tappers in the Brazilian state of Acre hold a marginalised position politically, the assassination of Chico Mendes and the following national and international pressure on the Brazilian Government opened up new ways to get traditional people’s claims for land rights regularisation recog-nised (cf. Silva 1994). While the causal powers (the ability to produce events) of agents and institutions are elaborated above, speaking of causal powers of discourses might be contentious. This relates to the discussion on whether reasons can be considered as causes or not. Those who oppose the notion of “rea-sons as causes”, often do so referring to the absence of regularity between reasons and actions. That is, they refer to the successionist view of causation rejected earlier (Sayer 2000, 96). Through their influence on the process by which agents construct meaning and form reasons of action, discourses become causally efficacious. This conceptualisation is in line with other scholars who oppose far-reach-ing definitions of discourses as practices. They call for an acknowledgement of other social elements alongside discourses in causing events (cf. Fair-clough, Jessop et al. 2002); a point shared by those arguing for a discursive institutionalism (Schmidt 2008).

Power, building on the generative view of causality, is a capacity, not its exercise.⁵⁰ To hold a causal power means that I do have the power to do something irre-spective of whether I decide to employ it. This includes the capacity to impose my will on others (as the definition above suggests). That is, power over is a

subset of power to (Lukes 2005, 73f). Power can be exercised by influencing legal rules or by being in the social position of ignoring legal rules altogether.

Power could also stem from attempts at changing the institutions of a society. The gender struggle and associated rights to resources by women is an exam-ple in this regard. The definition of power relates to a discussion of the role of institutions on human behaviour. In institutional economics, scholars often highlight the constraining role of institutions. If power is employed to change institutions (presum-ably in the interest of the agent), the resulting institu-tions fulfil an enabling role for some instead of being uniformly constraining (cf. Bromley 1989a, 27a).

Mosse’s (2004, 62) assessment that it “(…) is political systems (…) that determine the interests and identi-ties that shape the democratic process. Political sys-tems have their own logic, which may or may not enhance the political capabilities of the poor,” mir-rors this finding.

Table 3-1 provides an overview of the different sources of power identified above. When two or more social elements with their causal powers oper-ate to produce the same effect, the situation can be called “over-determined” (Sayer 1992, 108). The mar-ginalised position of the chronically poor in influenc-ing processes of institutional change can be attrib-uted to such an over-determined situation. If, for example, the social position influenced by several social structures and the prevailing discourses in society together put the poor in a marginalised posi-tion, their abilities to influence institutional change are likely to be very limited. Their situation of expe-riencing “significant capability deprivations” proba-bly extends for longer periods of time. They become (or remain) chronically poor. Some sources of power are particularly efficacious when operating in con-junction with other causal powers. Take the example of coercion, or violence as its extreme form. Vio-lence, despite its brutishness, can be a very efficient way of exercising power, as the abundance of exam-ples of land theft demonstrates (see, for example, Keck 1995). In particular, if the one exercising power is embedded in a web of social relations that allows him or her to exercise coercion without needing to fear punishment.⁵¹

The majority of the ways of producing power out-lined above refer to the social construction of power.

The examples of violence and brute force point at a further aspect of creating power, which requires fur-ther elaboration: the material of power. The exam-ples of resource ownership, physical properties of the resource, and the physical location of the resource user serve to underline this point. First, Knight convincingly makes the point that resource ownership is a crucial source of power. Often, how-ever, resource ownership is the result of entrenched societal structures. The two are interdependent. As actors do need resources at their disposal to exercise power (to employ a resource use strategy) at a par-ticular moment in time, a separate treatment is nev-ertheless necessary. Depending on the type of resource, a significant amount of resources might be necessary to actually exploit and derive benefits from it. Béné (2003, 960) forcefully make this point in his discussion of the term “open access” in fisher-ies. He concludes “(…) the fact that the most profit-able gears are usually the most expensive to purchase and to operate, and that the most productive fishing spots (…) are usually either ‘privaterized’ or their access requires high bribes and / or fees induces that fisheries, defined in terms of costs of entry, are far from open.” This analysis applies to other resources as well. The capital intensive extraction of timber serves as a different example (Sunderlin, Angelsen et al. 2005, 1390). Corruption is another case in point (Robbins 2000).

Second, the physical properties of the resource influ-ence the conditions that allow resource users to actually benefit from resource extraction (Hagedorn 2008). The physical properties of the resource influ-ence which ways of creating power might come into play. The extraction and marketing of timber (because of the weight of the withdrawn resource unit and the associated difficulties of transporting it) need to involve agents who have considerably differ-ent characteristics than those of the smallholder family. Even if the community should own a small lorry and a boat that would allow for transporting timber (in profitable quantities) to market centres, a particular family needs to engage with many other families in order to withdraw and benefit from the resource unit. This need to engage with others opens up more possibilities of power influencing a

particu-Way of creating power Basis of power on which the

capacity rests Examples regarding natural resource governance⁵² Institutions establishing or sustaining social structures as sources of power

Power created by social order Social structures allocate power to

social positions • Property rights (acknowledged by law, custom or convention) (Schlager and Ostrom 1992)

Power created by system bias Social structures preclude certain

actions • Duties that the non­rights holder has

regarding the rights holder and the resource (Bromley 1992, 2)

• Strategies by traditional rural elites to hinder or obstruct redistributive land reforms (Kuhnen 1982; de Janvry and Sadoulet 1989)

Power created by tacit knowledge Socialisation (within particular social structures) influences our habits (through reconstitutive downward causation)

• Control of access to resources by others is perceived as natural, e. g.

women’s rights to land (Agarwal 2002, 24; Jackson 2003, 465f ) Power created by discipline Socialisation (within a certain group)

influences our habits (through reconsti­

tutive downward causation)

• Environmental department officials pressing for “rational” forest use in terms of currently dominant scientific findings (Holmes­Watts and Watts 2008, 441)

Discourses as a source of power

Power created by systems of thought Systems of thought make ways of think­

ing and acting possible & others impos­

sible (or very costly)

• Attitude towards indigenous forest people: from being perceived as backward to being granted property rights to the resources they hold (Colchester 2007)

• Acceptance of corruption (Robbins 2000)

Power created by reification Science reifies knowledge • Prohibition of indigenous land use practices by reference to scientific knowledge (Sletto 2008) Agential capacities as a source of power

Power created by coercion By the use of physical force or the threat of using it A makes B to do something B would otherwise not do

• Land theft (Keck 1995)

Power created by deliberation Asking for and giving of reasons • Bargaining for sustainable resource governance (Ostrom 1990) Physical / material conditions influencing the ways of creating power: for example, resource endowments, attributes of the resource (Hagedorn 2008), or physical location

TABLE 3-1: WAYS OF CREATING POWER: AN OVERVIEW OF MECHANISMS OF POWER & APPLICATION TO NATURAL RESOURCE USE.

Based on Haugaard (2003), adapted, and expanded by the author.

lar family’s options to benefit from the withdrawal of a resource unit.⁵³ The marketing of a relatively light-weight non-timber forest product (like Brazil nut) does not necessarily require the smallholder family to engage with other agents. Hence, the possibilities of power influencing the extraction and the distribu-tion of benefits are relatively smaller. The fact that the extraction of light weight non-timber forest products (like rubber) was for a long time organised in structures of debt peonage underlines the impor-tance of the social but does diminish the point that physical properties of the resource matter. Third, the physical location of the resource user matters. The distance to the next town, for example, influences whether agents need to enter relationships of depen-dency, as the sole source of “services” is the logging company present in the area.

3.6 Conclusions

The overall argument of the chapter is that chronic poverty research sheds light on the factors that con-tribute to the marginalised position of chronically poor in natural resource governance. Chronic pov-erty research considers social structures and dis-courses as social elements influencing the social position of the chronically poor alongside analytical attention paid to agential capacities. It offers a broader perspective on power in institutional change than analyses conducted from an individualist per-spective. The generative view of causality allows blending these different sources of power in a coher-ent frame. By highlighting the joint operation of social elements (with their causal powers), it offers an explanation of the marginalised position of the chronically poor in processes of institutional change.

They often find themselves in an over-determined situation. This raises the question of whether ana-lytical frameworks rooted in individualist perspec-tives on institutional change will actually be able to grasp the various ways power works. There is, for example, a long way to go to move from positions as

“anonymous slots that are filled by participants and to which specific action sets are assigned at junc-tures in a decision process” (Ostrom 2005b, 193) to social positions as they are conceptualised here.

So, what is there to be learned for those who aim at implementing common pool resource governance regimes that incorporate the views of marginalised resource users? It is necessary to understand the fac-tors that lead to perpetuated marginalisation of parts of society. One way is to deconstruct the various ways power works. Such an understanding offers a range of strategies for the empowerment of margin-alised groups. These encompass, for example, the deconstruction of discourses that sustain legal rules that contribute to marginalisation and attempts to alter the institutional fabric of society. In general, these considerations lead to a strategic approach to natural resource governance. Questions of alliances between the chronically poor and other societal actors become central (cf. Silva 1994). In this context, chronic poverty research emphasizes the impor-tance of social movements in attaining social change (Bebbington 2007). They hold the potential to politi-cise a debate on governance which might be phrased in technical terms primarily. To achieve this, histori-cally shaped relations of inequality need to be over-come. Power matters to achieve natural resource governance that incorporates the needs of those who most urgently depend on it.

4. A Political Ecology of Frontier Dynamics