A Hermeneutic Approach to Institutional Analysis: a frame and six

points of departure

Preceding sections advance several arguments in favour of a hermeneutic approach to institutional analysis. This section suggests elements that such a hermeneutic approach implies. It is intended to be a contribution to a debate instead of a finalised list of guidelines. First, this section advances three princi-ples that together form a frame for a hermeneutic approach to institutional analysis and outline stages of discovery. Second, based on this frame, this sec-tion outlines six points of departure to put this her-meneutic approach into practice.

Frame for a hermeneutic approach to institutional analysis

Reasoning needs to take into account the depth ontology.

Reality comprises the domains of the real, the actual, and the empirical. Understanding and explanation need to go beyond the empirical to seek the underly-ing causal powers within the domain of the real to understand the phenomena under analysis. Bromley (2006, 169ff) gives an illuminating example that is indicative of the move from the empirical to the real domain of reality.²⁶ Discussing explanations of tropi-cal deforestation he criticizes that many of those treat proximate causes (like roads) as reasons for deforestation. “Let us consider road building into remote forested regions, an activity that will, in many instances, be followed by deforestation. Can we therefore conclude that roads ‘cause’ deforesta-tion? Assume that the roads are built into remote for-ested areas precisely to gain access to timber. Here, the desire for access to timber is the reason for roads (…). The quest for timber constitutes a reason for roads to be built, so roads are the mechanical cause of deforestation [the empirically observable event associated with deforestation, J.W.], but they are not the reason for deforestation” (Bromley 2006, 169ff).

Some pages (ibid, 175) later he suggests an – abduc-tively formed – competing hypothesis for a possible reason for deforestation. This hypothesis is about causal powers in the domain of the real although Bromley does not apply this terminology. He sug-gests the following thought experiment. Assume that a large part of the non-forested land is in the hands

of a politically well connected elite which is able to obstruct land redistribution. In such a situation the State could have a reason to invest in settlement pro-grammes (and associated infrastructure measures) in forested regions to reduce pressure for land reform and to make land available for landless peas-ants.²⁷ As alluded to earlier, the reconstruction of the frame of orientation – the unveiling of tacit knowl-edge – involves the same mode of inference to under-lying causal powers. A focus on the empirical level is insufficient.

Several sections highlight the need for abduction as a mode of inference.²⁸ Abduction, in the terminology advanced here, hypothesises a causal power or a combination of causal powers that accounts for a phenomenon under analysis. How to move from a hypothesis to a corroborated explanation? I build on Wuisman (2005) to outline stages of discovery in a critical realist institutional analysis. I use the term stages deliberately as stages imply “tasks which can be returned to repeatedly and do not come in a strict linear order” (Olsen and Morgan 2005, 269). Stages emphasise the iterative character of understanding and explanation. Wuisman builds on Charles Sand-ers Peirce considerations on the modes of inference and combines these with the critical realist concep-tualisation of different domains of reality. His “cycle of scientific discovery” acknowledges that the differ-ent modes of inference deduction, induction, and abduction have different strengths and weaknesses and that none of them alone can account for the pro-cess of scientific discovery. The cycle of scientific dis-covery begins with an unexplained fact. From this unexplained fact a cause is hypothesised (a social ele-ment with its causal powers) that, if it were actually operating, would explain the fact. This represents a move from the consequent (effect) to the antecedent (cause) and, hence, it is necessary to analyse whether the hypothesised cause is actually operating. The second stage in the cycle of discovery therefore involves deducing the “(…) information required to corroborate the hypothesis about the underlying mechanism” (ibid, 385). Lastly, an induction based on carefully collected empirical material is made whether the observed fact can actually be under-stood and explained by the hypothesized cause (whether it fits with the information deduced from the hypothesis).

An inductive approach to institutional analysis. This principle highlights the need to remain open to unanticipated insights suggested by the empirical material.²⁹ It furthermore underlines the risk associ-ated with deductive approaches of forcing data into preconceived theories (see Layder 1998, 151). Institu-tional analyses of common pool resource use address a range of ontological elements giving rise to institu-tions and associated resource use practices. The empirically observable manifestations of land-use change are often the result of several institutions operating jointly. At the same time, observations are theory-laden. A deductive approach to institutional analysis, therefore, bears the risk of focussing on a particular set of factors that carry the explanatory burden but the relevance of which in the overall pic-ture is difficult to assess. This principle emphasises as well the importance of context in institutional analysis. Context is essential to the hermeneutic endeavour. The hermeneutic circle stresses the inter-play between the parts and the whole meaning that the part can only be understood in relation to the context (Poser 2001, 213f; Danermark, Ekström et al.

2002, 159f). The institutional reasons for common pool resource use can only be understood against the social, historical, and physical context in which it takes place. Many scholars highlight the importance of the physical and social environment for institu-tional analysis (Ostrom 2005b; Hagedorn 2008).

Approach and methods need to allow for understanding.

Several insights highlight the need for an approach and for the application of methods that allow for understanding: the social construction of institu-tions and the resulting importance of meaning, the double hermeneutics involved in social analysis, the indexical character of statements, and the need to access tacit knowledge in institutional analysis. This calls for an approach to institutional analysis that enables the researcher to familiarise oneself with the environment of the interlocutors to understand the meaning that our interlocutors attach to the terms they are using. The same applies to methods of data collection and analysis. Our interview partners must be enabled to express themselves in their terminol-ogy.

Six points of departure

Case studies as the principle research strategy. Method-ological reviews on institutional analyses of common pool resources acknowledge the value of case studies (Meinzen-Dick, DiGregorio et al. 2004; Poteete and Ostrom 2004). This is a welcome departure from views that maintain that case studies can at best serve as a stepping stone for large-N studies or as a complement to “rigid” hypothesis testing approaches (see Flyvbjerg 2006, for a review of criticisms in this vein). Against the setting of the discussion above and for reasons given below, I would underline and qual-ify this assessment by adding “principle” to the term

“research strategy.” Some scholars characterise case studies by reference to the topic to which they are applied or the methods that are being used in con-ducting them (often “qualitative”). Yin (2003, 12ff) is among those arguing forcefully for case studies as a research strategy. It is the approach followed here.

Case studies are then “(…) a way of organizing social data so as to preserve the unitary character of the social object being studied. Expressed somewhat dif-ferently, it is an approach which views any social unit as a whole” (Goode and Hatt in Blaikie 2000, 215).

The importance of context is a logical successor (Yin 2003, 13; Flyvbjerg 2006, 221ff). Creswell adds the time dimension to the definition of case studies by pointing out that the phenomenon under analysis is analysed over a “sustained period of time” (Creswell in Blaikie 2000, 216). In order to “preserve the uni-tary character of the social object being studied”

case studies can make use of several types of meth-ods and sources (Yin 2003, 14). Hence, the case study is well suited to put the principles above into practice. They allow for an inductive approach and for the application of methods that take into account the social construction of institutions and the impor-tance of meaning in analysing them. Surveys, in comparison, have a highly limited ability to investi-gate context (Yin 2003, 13). Within Critical Realism, case studies are an integral part of intensive research design. An intensive research design aims at provid-ing “causal explanations of the production of certain objects or events (…)” (Danermark, Ekström et al.

2002, 165). Its focus is on substantial relations, which are internal relations in the sense defined above.³⁰

Qualitative methods are indispensable. Generally, research questions indicate the most appropriate method for institutional analysis. A caveat applies.

The need to unveil tacit knowledge and the impor-tance of understanding meaning make in-depth interviews and other techniques to familiarise one-self with the milieu essential. It is difficult to imagine causal analysis without these. The extent to which these methods need to be applied depend, of course, on the research question. This also impinges on data analysis and calls for procedures that allow for the analysis of verbal data (see Miles and Huberman 1984). Discovering tacit knowledge requires specific data analysis procedures. Bohnsack (2003a) suggests the so-called Documentary Method for this purpose.

The necessity of extensive field exposure. The necessity of extensive field exposure is largely a consequence of the points raised earlier. Olivier de Sardan (2008) observes “The researcher in the field begins by improvising awkwardly, until he becomes, little by little, capable of improvising competently. One needs to have wasted time, an awful lot of time, in the field, in order to understand that these slack times were necessary.” There is a further practical aspect to this.

Often, use of common pool resources involves illicit acts. The widespread occurrence of illegal logging is one example among others. These land-use decisions are often associated with other illicit acts like cor-ruption (Robbins 2000). These in turn might pro-vide important insights into the institutions at work.

Obtaining insights into these sensitive issues require relationships of trust. Establishing these relation-ships demands time (Evans, de Jong et al. 2006, 6).

Adaptive Theorising. Adaptive Theory (Layder 1998) calls for a process of theorising that is iterative or continuous in character (ibid, 174) and which builds on a “dialogical relation” between theory and the empirical findings. In this conceptualisation of theo-rising theories exist prior to the collection of data but are sensitive to and adapt to the insights obtained in data collection and analysis. Theorising is a con-tinuous process in which theoretical concepts and empirical insights inform each other mutually. In the stages of discovery referred to earlier, theories are a crucial input into the process of abductively forming tentative explanations of the phenomenon under analysis (Danermark, Ekström et al. 2002, 90). In

this context and taking into account the earlier point made in favour of case studies as research strategy, the question might arise whether case studies can contribute to theorising. Case studies have long been criticised for not contributing to theory-building, as they do not allow for generalisation. Against the set-ting of the depth ontology and the need to identify causal powers in the domain of the real, it is obvious that in-depth knowledge is required for theorising. It is important to point out that this type of generalisa-tion (to ontologically real social elements) is different from the type of generalisation in the meaning of applicable to a wider universe of cases.³¹

Unit of analysis. Often, studies of common pool resources or of land-use change define spatial units as the unit of analysis, e. g. a watershed or a particu-lar forest. Talk of “local communities” or “local resource users” often accompanies this. While every resource use strategy manifests itself locally, the motivations of agents who, for example, do not live within the confines of this spatial unit might be very different. Think of a branch of an European logging company which happens to operate in an otherwise communally managed forest in the Brazilian Ama-zon. While spatial units can be a starting point, they are insufficient as unit of analysis. Conceptually, the unit of analysis instead needs to build on those agents and processes that stand in substantial rela-tions to each other with regard to a particular resource. This is in line with Hagedorn’s (2008, 361ff) claim that transactions should form the unit of analysis.³² In consequence, the definition of the actual unit of analysis in the field is an open empiri-cal question. ³³

The importance of history. As individuals we are born into a world that is not of our choosing. Institutions pre-exist individual action. “Individual interactions with a social structure are engagements with some-thing already made; in this sense, social structure pre-dates the individual. As individuals we do not make society: it is there in some form at our birth, bearing the marks of past practices of the former – even deceased – generations“ (Hodgson 2000b, 12).

The social positions occupied by members of society are influenced by history. Recognizing their trajec-tory is crucial to understand the differing capacities of agents to mould institutions or legal rules.

2.7 Conclusions

There are, for sure, several loose ends within this chapter. I am aware of some of them and happy to learn of more. The question in how far the consider-ations presented here are tied to one’s affiliation with Critical Realism is one. Hodgson’s (2000a) elabora-tions on emergence or Bromley’s (2006) attribution of a pivotal role to abduction as a mode of inference suggest that some of the findings might be of broader relevance for institutional economics. A second refers to the scope of institutional theories in the face of limitations to generalisation within the social sciences.

Social influences on the process of producing scien-tific knowledge are a third one. Although alluding to it, the chapter did not yet take up this thought. That is an omission that I would like to correct here albeit in a cursory manner. The Sociology of Scientific Knowledge shows that the findings of environmental science are not apolitical. Through framings of sci-ence and by other means, findings tend to reflect the interests of particular groups (Forsyth 2003, 76ff).

One possible source of influence is the potential recipients of findings. Mosse (2006, 720) finds that

“the strong presence of economic thinking in the centres of policy and power has encouraged the criti-cal observation that economistic models (…) are use-ful because they are consistent with certain policy priorities in a normative or ideological sense.” Large-N studies and other research approaches commonly associated with holding predictive power are there-fore likely to be requested by decision makers. The earlier discussion of the possibility of generalisation within the social sciences shows that this type of generalisation within the social sciences is a fugitive goal. Irrespective of these considerations, backing of a particular research approach by decision-making elements (and the associated material resources) might become decisive in decisions on how to go about researching institutions of the commons (cf.

Campbell and Pederson 2001). Defending a herme-neutic approach to the analysis of institutions of the commons in the face of these demands might become a challenging task.

The hermeneutic approach to understand institu-tions of the commons and policy advice are not at a dead end. The identification of social objects and their causal powers might offer an alternative route for policy advice. It addresses the question of causal-ity and draws attention to influencing factors, which might become the targets and instruments of poli-cies. At the same time, the assumption of multiple determination requires a deeper analysis of the cases subject to policies. More differentiation within policy advice is likely to result, as is modesty regarding its possible breadth and impact.