Summary report of the Workshop on International Governance of Geoengineering, 5-6 November 2012, Ecologic Institute, Berlin, Germany. It was held as part of the UBA research project “Approaches to regulating the research and deployment of geoengineering” (FKZ 3711 11 101).
8.2.1 Introduction
The objective of the workshop was to discuss and assess specific governance options and proposals at the international level. A discussion paper was distributed before the workshop.
The workshop was under Chatham House rules and did not aim at reaching a consensus view on specific issues. The following minutes reflect views raised and discussed during the
workshop. This summary does not report in detail the presentations given by speakers, which are collected as separate files and are part of the this report, as is the list of participants.
The workshop discussed and touched upon a number of issues in more or less depth. Some of the issues that were not discussed in detail are reported in bullet point format.
8.2.2 Background presentations
After presenting the background and aims of the workshop, a number of presentations set the scene for discussing specific issues. Ralph Bodle (Ecologic Institute) presented an overview of the state-of-play in selected fora, including an overview on existing international legal rules and regimes that are potentially relevant for geoengineering. Simone Schiele (CBD secretariat) explained the developments on geoengineering under the CBD, including decision X/20 of COP11 in October 2012. Harald Ginzky (UBA) presented the developments under the LC/LP, including its key resolutions (of 2008 and 2010), the adoption of a risk assessment framework for ocean fertilisation activities, and current proposals for a binding framework. Andy Parker (Harvard Kennedy School) presented the Solar Radiation Management Governance Initiative (SRMGI), an NGO-driven initiative with the aim to accelerate progress on the governance of geoengineering.
8.2.3 General points
General points discussed included:
• Geoengineering concepts had dual-use potential and therefore the intention behind a particular activity mattered for governance purposes.
• Geoengineering concepts could be classified into “encapsulated” activities, e.g. artificial trees, and open interventions with the physical environment.
• The criteria and objectives for governance design should distinguish between those that were essential and those that were merely desirable.
• The “criteria” in the discussion paper were not all criteria in the strict meaning of the term. Some were presumptions and objectives. Some were normative, some were political assessments, some both.
• It was noted that not all governance criteria listed in the discussion paper can be achieved at the same time and to the same degree. Different governance designs were likely to fulfil different criteria and objectives to different degrees. It was a political choice to be made, based on an assessment of these design options.
• There was a tension in the criteria between their purpose of restricting or facilitating geoengineering.
8.2.4 Governance design
Participants made the following points and discussed the following issues:
• It was clarified that the range of governance design options included more than the simple alternatives of either one central, general regime or specialised regimes without a centre of gravity. These were just basic options and did not imply a “one size fits all”
governance structure. The institutional perspective was broader than just treaties.
• There was a governance gap in respect of SRM and atmospheric geoengineering.
• Some participants argued that a technique-specific governance was best, because specialised regimes were effective. It was also argued that it could be left open whether a central institution was needed.
• Any division of labour between governance regimes would ultimately require some form of coordination, regardless of preferred or actual roles. Forum shopping was likely, but regime conflict was not necessarily a bad thing. It could mean more compliance and enforcement opportunities and more options for trying out different governance designs.
• The ILC was mentioned as a possible option for developing rules and principles, possibly as part of their new mandate to work on protection of the atmosphere. However, the ILC might take a long time to develop such guidance and it might not be sufficiently specific to be more than a contributory guidance regarding useful for geoengineering
• An international geoengineering agency with a comprehensive mandate was highly unlikely
• Several participants stressed transparency and public participation as elements of “good governance”. One participant argued that existing mechanisms were not very
participatory.
The UNFCCC was at least an option, because the US is a party, it had a strong institutional structure and mechanisms. However, is had not been very successful in achieving its primary objective. Moreover, addressing geoengineering under the UNFCCC regime could open a can of worms (as argued in discussion paper).
8.2.5 In particular: CBD
The current and potential future role of the CBD was a recurrent issue during the workshop.
Some participants questioned whether the CBD’s mandate and expertise was sufficiently broad to address geoengineering in general and to give general guidance in this respect. It could be regarded as a sectoral agreement that is assuming a role it is unable to fulfil. For instance, small-scale research had no impact on biodiversity. In particular, how much further could CBD guidance go if in the medium-term there was no risk to biodiversity? In addition,
geoengineering might benefit biodiversity, which could call into question the CBD’s credibility.
Participants also questioned the CBD’s suitability from a technical and scientific point of view.
For instance, the COP9 decision did not make scientific sense and used unsuitable terms such as
“coastal waters”. Some regarded the previous processes under the CBD as being politicised to an extent that might suggest regulatory capture. Others argued that it was for parties to decide whether an issue could be addressed by the CBD. Although not every party had been