Proposals for geoengineering governance rose significantly in the late 2000s, alongside interest in the subject of geoengineering. Such proposals commonly cover key characteristics and principles for governance of research and deployment. Proposals are split between informal and formal governance methods, though fewer offer concrete and actionable frameworks. On the whole, geoengineering scholarship concurs that the existing international law framework does not fully or sufficiently constrain field research or deployment of contemplated
techniques, and therefore some form of additional governance is needed. An overview of existing proposals is provided in the annex.
455 Cf. the similar definitions in the Oxford and Cambridge Dictionaries, <
http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/criterion?q=criterion>;
<http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/british/criterion?q=criterion>.
6.2.1 Historical overview
Proposals for geoengineering governance began to rise along with interest in the concept of geoengineering in the mid- to late- 2000s and as international climate change negotiations became more entrenched, with only a handful of papers and analyses on geoengineering governance before that time.456 The concept of geoengineering, however, existed long before this increase in attention and geoengineering techniques were proposed as a response to anthropogenic climate change as early as the 1960s.457
While discussion on geoengineering initially existed largely within the scientific community, increasing attention has come from policymakers, academics, and social scientists.458 Likewise, the late 2000s saw a number of geoengineering governance initiatives arise. For instance, in 2008, the Royal Society established a working group of international experts to provide an assessment of geoengineering proposals, including examination of governance aspects.459 In 2009, a group of academics submitted the “Oxford Principles” on the regulation of
geoengineering research to the UK House of Commons Science and Technology Select
Committee, which later endorsed the principles, as did the UK government.460 In 2010, a group of experts gathered at the Asilomar Conference to address geoengineering risks and research standards, recalling earlier efforts that produced voluntary research guidelines on recombinant DNA.461 The Solar Radiation Management Research Governance Initiative (SRMGI), an
international NGO-led project focusing on governance of SRM, was created in 2010 in response to the Royal Society’s 2009 report.462
Alongside these efforts were government-led initiatives examining geoengineering risks and governance. A joint inquiry on geoengineering was initiated in 2009 by the Science and Technology committees of the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.K. House of Commons, with attention to domestic and international governance issues.463
6.2.2 Common features of existing governance proposals
Almost all governance proposals view geoengineering as a “last-resort” and maintain that attention should not deviate from mitigation efforts, although most consider that additional research should be performed and governance mechanisms explored. There are notable exceptions, such as Jay Michaelson (1998) calling for abandoning efforts towards a binding mitigation agreement and shifting attention instead towards investment in a “Climate Change
456 Lin (2009); Parson and Ernst (2012).
457 Keith (2000); Parson and Ernst (2012).
458 Virgoe (2007).
459 Royal Society (2009).
460 ‘Oxford Principles, History’ http://www.geoengineering.ox.ac.uk/oxford-principles/history/.
461 Asilomar (2010).
462 “SRMGI Solar Radiation Management Research Governance Initiative”, www.srmgi.org/about-srmgi/
463 “The Regulation of Geoengineering - Science and Technology Committee,”
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmsctech/221/22111.htm
Manhattan Project” on geoengineering. On the other end of the spectrum is the ETC Group, calling for a strict moratorium on all geoengineering experimentation and concluding that geoengineering violates international law.464
Options for geoengineering governance are generally grouped into categories of: unilateral state action; review and authorisation by an international consortium; and prohibition on activity.465 Of these alternatives, the majority of proposals advocate for governance through a multilateral association of states, of sufficient size to foster a sense of legitimacy within the international community. Unilateral action is seen as an outcome to be avoided, and one that adequate governance mechanisms would circumvent. A complete ban on geoengineering activity is generally undesirable, too, as limited research is commonly supported and
deployment may become a necessary option in the future, though it has been suggested that imposing a ban would be “easier” than developing an international regulatory regime.466 Governance may be either formal (e.g. binding measure through new or existing treaties or under domestic regulation467) or informal (e.g. through voluntary codes of conduct, principles, and soft law measures468) in nature. Consideration of these two options is split. Some proposals advocate for regulation through modification of existing frameworks or by creating a new framework. Others suggest that preliminary steps should first be taken through less binding, soft law approaches. Voluntary codes of conduct and “bottom-up” efforts are frequently proposed to serve as a foundation for establishing norms and consensus while avoiding political barriers. This is usually discussed in the context of research, rather than deployment.
Advocates of formal regulation lean towards supporting the use of existing instruments versus crafting a new geoengineering-specific agreement, as existing instruments already possess clear decision-making authority and would entail less financial and political costs. On the other hand, some scholars feel that the use of existing instruments will result in a patchwork,
ineffective, and insufficiently-integrated approach, and that a new instrument, at least for SRM, could better cover novel geoengineering issues and concerns.469
Some proposals address “geoengineering” as a whole, though distinctions are made between governance of CDR and SRM as well as for individual techniques.470 CDR tends to be viewed as less threatening and correspondingly, governance proposals for CDR are often less strict and receive less focus.471
Governance principles that are commonly cited for geoengineering include, inter alia:
• Public participation and consultation in decision-making
464 ETC Group (2010).
465 See e.g. Bodansky (1996); Virgoe (2007).
466 Bodansky (1996).
467 “Although some of this literature has considered domestic law and governance, the main focus of interest and concern is at the international level, due to the global scale of effects of both climate change and potential CE interventions.” Parsons (2012).
468 See e.g. Banargee (2011); SRMGI (2011).
469 See e.g. Zedalis (2010).
470 See e.g. House of Commons (2010); Scott (2010).
471 See e.g. SRMGI; Royal Society (2009); Morgan and Ricke (2010).
• Evaluation of impacts (e.g. environmental, social, economic, cultural)
• Disclosure and transparency in research, and assessment and supervision of research progress
• International cooperation
• Compensation and remediation for damage
• Precautionary principle
• Decision-making based on best scientific evidence
• Flexibility
At the international level the CBD has explicitly called for some criteria for a regulatory framework, namely that it be “global”, “science-based”, “transparent”, and “effective”.472 Potential governance forums suggested include, inter alia, the United Nations (UN), United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), World Meteorological Organisation (WMO), UN Commission on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, LRTAP Executive Body, UN Commission for Sustainable
Development, and London Convention/London Protocol – either for all geoengineering activity categories (e.g. CDR or SRM), or for individual techniques. The UN is often cited as a forum for governance, at least in part because the UN could seemingly provide legitimacy in the form of a multilateral mandate.473 Proposals for considering governing geoengineering under the UNFCCC, such as through a new protocol, are also common. Reasons for doing so include the UNFCCC’s existing jurisdiction over climate change, established expert bodies such as the SBSTA, use of the CDM and JI mechanisms to address CDR, UN-based legitimacy, and hope that addressing geoengineering in conjunction with climate change mitigation would lessen the risk of the “moral hazard.”474
Many proposals for geoengineering governance focus on research, rather than deployment.475 Parson and Ernst (2012) suggest that there is consensus in the literature that research and informal international research collaboration are the most immediate geoengineering needs, that research requires governance, and that informal international consultation and
collaboration on research governance should begin soon. Regulation of research presents a natural first, and likely easier, step prior to consideration of deployment.476 Further, many believe that governance of research could act as a platform for establishing processes and principles for future regulation of deployment and would avoid “lock in” as environmental, technological, and political circumstances evolve. Frequent suggestions are for voluntary governance by the scientific community or states, using principles and codes of conduct, and establishing processes for transparency and coordination of research efforts and results.
472 On these criteria see Bodle et al (2012) 108-109.
473 See e.g. Virgoe (2007).
474 Lin (2009); Barrett (2010); Scott (2010); Rickels et al (2011); UBA (2011); House of Commons (2009); Royal Society (2009).
475 See e.g. Oxford Principles, Asilomar (2010); Morgan and Ricke (2010).
476 Bodansky (2012).
According to Parson and Ernst (2012), there are major gaps in the existing literature: most geoengineering proposals give only negative guidance, are limited to governance of research and avoid questions of deployment, favour elaboration of normative principles without consideration of factors such as states’ interests and political risks, and fail to define practical aspects of implementation.