Single-Pyramid and Multi-Pyramid Systems: The Deter- Deter-minants of Democratization in the Three Historical Regions

That civilizational belonging and the influence of communism determined the level of sep-aration of spheres of social action that dominated after the regime change does not invite a jump to hasty conclusions. That is, we do not claim what theoreticians of moderniza-tion often rebuke Huntington for, that “the relamoderniza-tionship between the economy, democracy, and culture is […] biunique, unambiguous, or rigid.”⁹⁸ Indeed, even in the Orthodox and Islamic historical regions, the strong presence of structures of Figure 1.4 per se only determined the emergence of patronal regimes—not whether they are democratic or autocratic.⁹⁹ Furthermore, a patronal regime can be “single-pyramid,” which refers to one patronal network dominating with other networks being subjugated, marginalized or eliminated, or “multi-pyramid,” where multiple networks compete, each representing roughly equal power and neither being strong enough to dominate the others [à 4.4].¹⁰⁰ Which category a country moved to after the collapse of communism, through its

“pri-98 Kollmorgen, “Modernization Theories,” 59.

99 In general, we refer to regimes that prominently feature the structures of Figure 1.4 “patronal.” We emphasize this feature out of the four because we conceptualize regimes, the definitive social actors of which are the ruling elites [à 2].

100 Hale calls the multi-pyramid arrangement “competing-pyramid configuration.” Hale, Patronal Politics, 64–66.

1.5. Thesis D: Democratization Did Not Change the Separation of Spheres • 59 mary trajectory” [à 7.3.2], depended mainly on two factors: (1) the presence or lack of

presidentialism and proportionate electoral system and (2) Western linkage and leverage.

The first factor concerns the variant of formally democratic institutions that came into being after the regime change. Specifically, the type of executive power and the elec-toral system were two elements that influenced whether single or multi-pyramid systems came into being. While the exact form of these institutions was often adventitious, de-pending on elite bargains and political opportunities during the regime change,¹⁰¹ they had a profound effect later on the structure of political competition. This can be observed if we analyze the systems that evolved in the countries of Table 1.4, which presents regimes along the lines of patronalism and the type of executive.

Table 1.4. Formal constitutions and patronalism in post-communist countries since the mid-1990s.

Source: modified from Hale (2015, 459).

What we can see does not merely signify that a parliamentary system tends to work against the dominance of a single network. It also means that in contrast to the purely presidential setup, a system with divided executive power can offer more institutional possibilities for competing networks to keep each other in check, establishing more “democratic”

conditions as they settle around the positions of president and prime minister as key seats of executive power. It is no coincidence that when a patronal network strives for a domi-nant role in a regime characterized by such divided executive power, it usually attempts to switch to a purely presidential system. And similarly, when such attempts fail, the other

101 On the case of Hungary, see Széky, Bárányvakság [Daytime-Blindness].

60 • 1. Stubborn Structures

patronal networks fight for the reintroduction of divided ex-ecutive power. Events proceeded like this in Eastern-Ortho-dox countries like Ukraine [à 7.3.4.2], Moldova [à 7.3.4.4]

and also, Romania [à 7.3.4.2].

A high degree of patronalism and presidentialism go hand in hand in the formation of single-pyramid systems, and the direct election of presidents is taken as a matter of fact. This does not, however, mean that where there are di-rect presidential elections, a presidentialist system must de-velop. Constitutional arrangements may allow, for example, a strong mandate for a directly elected president while giving that same president only a narrow scope of executive power.

We can speak of a presidentialist system in effect when the person of the prime minister depends not on a parliamentary majority, but the president. Meanwhile, in countries where the competencies of executive power are substantially shared between the president and the prime minister, there is once again only the direct election of presidents. In parliamentary systems, the impediment to the formation of single-pyramid patronal networks can basically be provided by the propor-tionality of the electoral system, which is normally able to make sure that no single political actor acquires a constitu-tional majority, or the exclusive opportunity to decide who staffs the key institutions guaranteeing the system of checks and balances. Wherever the electoral system is dispropor-tionate, a monopoly on political power may come about even in a parliamentary system, opening the gates to the formation of a single-pyramid patronal system. Hungary managed to avoid this situation for two decades after the regime change, maintaining democracy, but it eventually could not resist pa-tronal transformation nor an autocratic breakthrough, which was made possible by its disproportionate electoral system in 2010 [à 7.3.3.4].

The second factor that influenced single or multi-pyr-amid arrangement was Western linkage and leverage, pro-viding various incentives for democracy and against auto-cratic rule (see Box 1.3). As Hale writes, the logic of patronal politics in countries with high Western linkage and lever-age expects “that Western actors may in fact be able to exert enough power to alter the expectations of incumbent and opposition networks as to whether the incumbent leader is likely to remain in power beyond a given point. In [such]

countries, Western powers are also better able to support external material sustenance and asset protection in large enough measure to induce significant networks not to coor-dinate around a given chief patron’s authority. All this serves to weaken […] the tendency Box 1.3. Western linkage and leverage.

[Where] linkage to the West was extensive, as in Eastern Europe and the Americas, competitive au-thoritarian regimes democratized during the post–

Cold War period. By heightening the international salience of autocratic abuse, increasing the likelihood of Western response, expanding the number of do-mestic actors with a stake in avoiding international isolation, and shifting the balance of resources and prestige in favor of oppositions, linkage raised the cost of building and sustaining authoritarian rule.

High linkage created powerful incentives for au-thoritarian rulers to abandon power, rather than crack down, in the face of opposition challenges. It also created incentives for successor governments to rule democratically. Among high-linkage cases, […]

nearly every transition resulted in democracy. This outcome occurred even where domestic conditions for democracy were unfavorable (e.g. Guyana, Mace-donia, and Romania). […] Where linkage was low, as in most of […] the former Soviet Union, external democratizing pressure was weaker. Consequently, regime outcomes were driven primarily by domes-tic factors, pardomes-ticularly the organizational power of incumbents. Where state and/or governing parties were well organized and cohesive […], incumbents were able to manage elite conflict and thwart even serious opposition challenges […], and competitive authoritarian regimes survived. […] In this context, [the] states’ vulnerability to Western democratizing pressure […] was often decisive. Where countries’

strategic or economic importance inhibited external pressure (e.g. Russia), […] even relatively weak re-gimes survived. Where Western leverage was high, such governments were more likely to fall. In these cases, turnover created an opportunity for democra-tization. […] However, in […] low-linkage cases, […] low organizational power was associated with unstable competitive authoritarianism.

– Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, Competitive Au-thoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 23–24.

1.5. Thesis D: Democratization Did Not Change the Separation of Spheres • 61 of single-pyramid politics and regime cycles more generally.”¹⁰² Indeed, each of the three

historical regions—firstly, the Western-Christian region with socialist countries outside the Soviet Union, secondly, the Orthodox region with European member states of the Soviet Union, and thirdly, the Islamic region with former member states of the Soviet Union in Central Asia—show a great deal of idiosyncrasy in this respect, and have been urged to different degrees to adapt to the institutional system of liberal democracy.

In the Western-Christian historical region, the former Central-East-European communist countries (now including the Baltic states) are bound to the economies of the EU member states through innumerable ties after having entered the gravitational field of the European Union. The change of direction in foreign trade had already begun by the seventies and only intensified after the change of regimes and the transition cri-sis. The dissolution of Comecon in 1991 was only a post-hoc acknowledgement of what had already de facto taken place. Economic reorientation was only further entrenched by the privatization of a decisive portion of state property, bringing Western capital into a favorable position everywhere (though to varying degrees). Then the expansion of the European Union between 2004 and 2013 also incorporated a decisive majority of those former socialist countries that had been outside of the Soviet Union, and all those that had historically belonged to the Western-Christian civilization.

A precondition for accession to EU (and also to NATO) was the establishment of a lib-eral democratic institutional system. Therefore, the only question for these countries was who would win the inner struggle between an imported and more or less domesticated Western institutional system and what many perceived as an Eastern culture weighed down by a com-munist past. Those optimistic in the outcome believed that shortcomings in the operation of the democratic institutional system, the provisions for human rights, or the proper managing of public finances were only temporary difficulties that could be handled through the control of EU institutions (“the stick”) and the desired access to EU resources (“the carrot”). In terms of traditional corruption, Romania and Bulgaria seemed to be the most infected countries, but the consecutive governments of each state upheld their strong commitments to the EU.

In contrast, democratic backsliding in general [à 7.3.3], and the Hungarian autocracy in particular, signifies a challenge to those EU leaders trying to implant EU values in a state that its own leaders see as a “cash cow” there to be milked [à 7.4.4.2, 7.4.6.2].

In the Orthodox historical region, for the European Soviet republics the regime change meant only a collapse of the communist power structure. This was followed not by the consistent development of liberal democratic institutions but rather a presidential system that gave only limited rein to democratic institutions. Even the development of such presidentialism was in some instances preempted—or accompanied during various crises—by weakening of stateness and the appearance of a sort of “oligarchic anarchy” in the wake of massive privatization [à 2.5]. For them, the gravitational pull of the EU was faint, and where present—as in Moldova and Ukraine—it was used more to defend against what they saw as renewed Russian expansionism and empire-building than as part of any attempt to actually adopt the EU’s liberal socio-structural values.

Finally, in the former Soviet republics of Central Asia, post-communist regimes never entered the gravitational pull of Western liberal democracies and thus they

cre-102 Hale, Patronal Politics, 457.

62 • 1. Stubborn Structures

ated their own fields of power and continued on a separate orbit. Yet it would be a mistake to describe these countries merely in terms of their “deficiencies” with respect to the ideals of liberal democracy. We must face the fact of path dependence, or more precisely that there exist deeply influential, historically constituted value structures and civilizational patterns that limit the possibility of social-political transformation.

1.6. Beyond Hybridology: A Triangular Conceptual