The Basic Structure of Merged Spheres in Communist DictatorshipsDictatorships

Pre-communist times ended with the coming of communist dictatorships after the 1917 October Revolution in Russia, and after World War II in China and in Soviet satellite states.⁵⁰ Together, we refer to the Soviet Union and its satellite states as the “Soviet em-pire,” which consisted of the three historical regions explained above. Thesis C of the stub-born-structures argument concerns the separation of spheres of social action in different civilizations under communism.

Thesis C. In communist times, countries of different civilizations were put under the “polit-ical lid” of dictatorship. On the one hand, this lid arrested the social development in those countries. On the other hand, the communist system brought its own series of interrelated phenomena that represented a merger of spheres of social action, reinforcing the preexisting patterns of (lack of) separation. While different kinds of communism could develop in dif-ferent civilizations, the one-party system and the monopoly of state property induced similar social phenomena and did homogenize the countries to some degree.

Hale calls the communist takeover in Russia a “failed antipatronalist revolution,” where the rhetoric of smashing the prevalent structures of the tsarist period ended up with the practice of the new elites resorting to patronal politics and reproducing it in new forms.⁵¹ This is part of the truth. Indeed, communist systems renewed all the basic structures of pre-communism, for communism itself, aggressively imposed though it was, represented a merger of the spheres of social action. By the abolishment of private property, the pri-vate sphere and autonomous communities, totalitarian communism effectively merged the

49 Szűcs, “The Three Historical Regions of Europe,” 141–42.

50 By “satellite states,” we refer to the communist dictatorships in Central-Eastern Europe. Mongolia, while also a Soviet satellite state, is excluded from our discussion of the post-communist region (although Hale suggests that the same conceptual framework that is applicable to the three historical regions are applicable to Mongolia as well). See Hale, Patronal Politics, 471–72.

51 Hale, Patronal Politics, 47–54.

1.4. Thesis C: Communist Dictatorships Arrested and Reversed the Separation of Spheres • 45 three spheres, which reinforced the root cause of the basic structures, together with the

above-described societal and rulership structures.

Nevertheless, it is important to note that the merger of spheres imposed by commu-nism was different from the spheres’ preexisting rudimentary or lack of separation. Indeed, communism constituted a form of path creation, whereby the lack of separation that fol-lowed civilizational specificities and the traditional way of life of pre-communist peoples was overwritten by top-down imposed communism, using state coercion to engineer soci-eties according to the utopian blueprints of communist ideologists. Therefore, the starting point of every communist regime per se was the Marxist-Leninist ideology driven party state. As Kornai explains in his renowned The Socialist System, from this ideology-driven rule of the party state follows (1) the dominant position of state and quasi-state owner-ship and (2) the preponderance of bureaucratic coordination.⁵² For these consequences were manifestations of the merger of spheres the party state imposed, we can transform Kornai’s analysis to our terms, and also expand it by adding rulership structures as well as the dimension of personal relations. Thus, we can sketch the internal logic of communist systems in a similar way to the basic structures of pre-communist countries (Figure 1.3).

Figure 1.3. The internal logic of communist systems. Dark grey represents the root cause, medium grey represents the consequences for personal relations, and light grey represents institutional conse-quences. Source: modified from Kornai (1992, 361).

As opposed to the traditional and feudal structures existing in pre-communist societies, we can see a bureaucratization of relationships under communist rule. The consequences for personal relations can be sketched as follows:

◆

Formal (bureaucratic) networks. For the primary means of communist social en-gineering was the state, a massive coercive apparatus was erected and the people were subordinated to it, having their freedom deprived in favor of central plan-ning through formal, bureaucratic channels. The continuity between this societal structure and the traditional feudal networks is nicely illustrated by the regional party secretaries in the USSR, who did not eliminate patronage networks but cul-tivated them as central actors. As Hale explains, “regional […] party secretaries,

52 Kornai, The Socialist System, 360–65.

Marxist-Leninist ideology driven party state

Treating society as a party domain Nomenklatura (bureaucratic

patronal network) Root cause

Societal structures

Rulership structures

Monopoly of state ownership of the means of production Formal (bureaucratic) networks

46 • 1. Stubborn Structures

the famous ‘Soviet prefects’ […] were the critical local hubs in the most important networks, collecting and cultivating vast arrays of informal relationships with any-one who might be willing to trade favors when the need arose.”⁵³ As this example shows, even informal networks were formed along the formal structure, which defined who had access to power and resources in the system. The importance of patronage that fueled its survival was that the people under communist re-gimes wanted to overcome economic shortages, which were system-specific con-sequences of the bureaucratic coordination of the economy.⁵⁴

Turning to the elites, just like in the feudal times, a great deal of informality could be observed within their formal ranks. As Alena Ledeneva explains, in the USSR “personal networks became embedded in the institutional order, person-alised power and supported it. […] In Soviet times, oral and personal commands used to be much more important and were followed much more closely than writ-ten decrees (ukazy) and instructions (rasporyazheniya) […]. The primacy of the informal oral commands and handshake agreements reflected the weakness of the law [and] insidious secrecy and mistrust […].”⁵⁵ However, it must be noticed that these informal relations were formed inside the formal network, that is, between formal members of the nomenklatura and respecting the bureaucratic hierarchy of the party. The classical literature of “Kremlinology,” while studying leadership conflict and the differences in the level of power between those in positions of power that are formally on an identical level, cannot disregard the fact that even the very question of informal power makes sense only within a formalized party structure—for without being a member of the political committee, no one can exercise real power and influence decision-making.⁵⁶

◆

Nomenklatura (bureaucratic patron-client network). Patron-client relations also took a bureaucratic form in the new ruling elite. This was the single-pyra-mid patronal network called the nomenklatura, which basically included all the above-mentioned decision-makers, members of the Marxist-Leninist party, from the politburo to directors of factories. In other words, the nomenklatura was a reg-ister of ruling positions, including party positions—the political decision-mak-ers on national and local level—and administrative positions—decision-makdecision-mak-ers in state companies and other places where central plans are executed.⁵⁷

Indeed, the transformation of feudal patron-client relations into bureaucratic ones shows how communists, who claimed to have put an end to feudalism, relied on feudal traditions. In imperial times, the two main types of nobles defined by the Table of Ranks, established in 1722 by Peter the Great,⁵⁸ were hereditary nobility

53 Hale, Patronal Politics, 53. Indeed, such trade of favors was denoted in the Soviet Union by the term blat [à 5.3.5].

54 Kornai, The Socialist System, 229–52 and passim.

55 Ledeneva, Can Russia Modernise?, 30.

56 For a late example of the Kremlinology, see D’Agostino, Soviet Succession Struggles.

57 Voslensky, Nomenklatura.

58 Lieven et al., The Cambridge History of Russia, 223–50.

1.4. Thesis C: Communist Dictatorships Arrested and Reversed the Separation of Spheres • 47 (potomstvennoye dvoryanstvo) and personal nobility (lichnoye dvoryanstvo). The

latter position was inferior to the former as personal nobles had no right to keep an estate and serfs, and their children could not inherit their ancestors’ nobiliary rank (hence they were not hereditary).⁵⁹ The communist system continued this logic of the Table of Ranks, the main difference being that the abolishment of private prop-erty put an end to hereditary nobility, and a new personal nobility, also without the right to accumulate personal wealth and transfer position to heirs, sprung up in the form of the nomenklatura.

Throughout the book, we will describe communist institutional consequences in great de-tail.⁶⁰ At this point, we may provide a sketch, for the purposes of the argument, as follows:

◆

Monopoly on state property of the means of production. The abolishment of pri-vate property in favor of public ownership of the means of production implies a bureaucratic merger of power and ownership, where decision making regard-ing property relations is centralized in the hands of the hyper-expanded bureau-cracy. In this structure, instead of tradition and more informal discretionality, ownership rights are exercised by the nomenklatura: the politburo or the general secretary at the top level; regional or municipal party secretaries at the intermedi-ate level; and directors of factories or organizations at the lowest level.⁶¹

While none of the communist dictatorships had a total monopoly of state own-ership, the share of the public sector was extremely high in every communist coun-try. In the 1970s and 1980s, the share of the public sector was 99.7% in Bulgaria, 97% in Czechoslovakia, 96% in the Soviet Union, 95.5% in Romania, 83.4% in Poland, and 77.6% in China.⁶² The data suggest similarity instead of difference along civilizational boundaries, signifying the homogenizing “political lid” nature of single-party dictatorship and preponderant state ownership that was placed upon countries of different civilizations.

◆

Treating society as a party domain. As Kornai points out, virtual monopoly on state property was necessary for communists because “[the] indivisibility of power and the concomitant totalitarianism are incompatible with the autonomy that pri-vate ownership entails.”⁶³ From the abolishment of such autonomy, it follows that the classical communist system treated the society as a domain of the party, rep-resented by its members in the state apparatus. Indeed, this can be interpreted as a bureaucratized version of patrimonialism where, instead of the whims of the lord, the subjects were subjugated to the (ideological) goals of the party. Under such circumstances, “[only] those who joined the Communist Party had a chance to climb to the top of the social hierarchy. Only those whose loyalty to the political boss was unquestionable, and whose dedication to the Marxist-Leninist

world-59 Sz. Bíró, Az elmaradt alkotmányozás [The cancelled constitution making], 186–200.

60 See Chapters 2–6. Also, see Kornai, The Socialist System, 62–130.

61 Nureev, “Power-Property as a Path-Dependence Problem.”

62 Pei, From Reform to Revolution, 14.

63 Kornai, The Socialist System, 362.

48 • 1. Stubborn Structures

view was beyond doubt, could be successful. […] Indeed, the social structure of classical Stalinism could probably be described with some accuracy as a dichotomy comprising dominant, caste-like ruling estate confronting a relatively immobi-lized, passive ‘mass’. […] Its cohesion and authority were based on patron-client relations.”⁶⁴

The last sentence of the quote denotes the relationship between the two types of rulership structures. Indeed, that the nomenklatura was made up of the decision-makers already shows how the bureaucratic patron-client network reinforced the bureaucratic domain feature of communism and vice versa. As for the societal structures, the monopoly of state property and formal networks went hand in hand, too, for private property would have entailed such autonomy that was incompatible with totalitarian social engineering, which was carried out in turn by the bureaucratic networks of the party state.

1.4.2. The Effect of Communism on the Separation of Spheres

Im Dokument POST-COMMUNIST REGIMES (Seite 72-76)