Reporting survey results

Given the considerable volume of activities since Accra, it was time to take stock of progress. Two major exercises were undertaken: the OECD/DAC Third Monitoring Survey and the Evaluation of Phase 2 of the Paris Declaration; the latter was carried out by an independent team of evaluators.

1. Third Monitoring Survey: What did all the consultations and actions produce in concrete results on the ground? What results were tangible enough to support partner countries’ push towards more sustainable development? Two results-scenarios were conceivable: one would plead for more time to generate results, as the tough global recession was not conducive to accelerating the pace of progress; the other would argue that enough time had gone by and, given sweeping expressions of support by stakeholders, we should have expected positive results by now.

The third Monitoring Survey was launched in January 2011 with a reporting deadline set for the end of March (OECD, 2010g). The Survey Report (OECD, 2011d) outlined the findings about the 2010 status of implementing commitments. The following paragraphs quote from the report. The key finding stated that:

The results are sobering. At the global level, only one out of the 13 targets established for 2010 – co-ordinated technical co-operation (a measure of the extent to which donors co-ordinate their efforts to support countries’ capacity development objectives) – has been met, albeit by a narrow margin. Nonetheless, it is important to note that considerable progress has been made towards many of the remaining 12 targets.

There had been considerable variations in progress “across donors and partner countries” since 2005. Partner countries made significant progress in the quality of tools and systems for financial planning and results-management resulting from “deep reforms”

that went beyond aid to address broader government processes. It was hoped that the exchange of information and experiences among partner countries would motivate those lagging behind to accelerate the pace of reform. Where results required joint actions by partner countries and development partners, stakeholders at the country level often cited constraints imposed by the headquarters of many of the latter – constraints mainly of a political nature. Box 7 sums up key findings.

Were these overall results disappointing? Absolutely, especially for those who were deeply immersed in activities to facilitate progress and who had been encouraged through repeated announcements which confirmed that both political and technical measures would be taken to honour them.

Box 7: Aid effectiveness 2005–2010: An overview of progress Substantial progress in:

 Sound development strategies in place – no. of countries more than triples since 2005

 Results-oriented frameworks for monitoring progress in 25 per cent of 2005 survey countries

Moderate / mixed progress in:

 More non-state actors involved in development strategies, but challenges remain in providing enabling environment for CSOs to play their role

Box 7 (cont.): Aid effectiveness 2005–2010: An overview of progress

 Capacity development efforts were mixed; technical assistance still mainly supply-driven

 For PFM systems, more than one-third of partner countries introduced quality improvements, whereas one-fourth experienced setback in quality

 Aid providers made somewhat more use of country systems, but this has not been systematic in areas where these systems were made more reliable

Little or no progress in:

 Untying aid in participating countries

 Implementing common arrangements for joint analytic work and missions

 Dealing with aid fragmentation, which has increased

 Medium-term aid predictability, which improved in isolated cases rather than being the norm

Setting up mutual reviews of performance, based on broader participation Source: OECD (2011d, Executive Summary)

One must, however, take heart in that significant progress was made in a few critical areas, as detailed in the Survey Report. One of the significant findings was that more partner countries had gone ahead with reforms, unpopular and challenging, to put their own house in order for their own sake, not merely to meet commitments. These reflected a healthy change in behaviour, which would ultimately enable more partner countries to exit aid and become self-reliant.

2. Independent Evaluation of the Paris Declaration – Phase 2: The independent evaluation had two phases: Phase 1 was completed in 2008 and Phase 2 in May 2011, which was in time to provide updated, concrete evidence for HLF4. Both phases dealt with a wide range of aid effectiveness issues. Phase 2 comprised more than 50 studies in 22 partner countries and across 18 donor agencies in addition to several thematic studies (Wood et al., 2011). The evaluation responded to three key questions:

 What were the factors that shaped and limited implementation of reforms?

 What improvements were made in aid effectiveness?

 What contributions did such improvements make to sustainable development results?

Boxes 8 and 9 give a condensed summary of conclusions and recommendations. An independent audit confirmed the report to be

“trusted as independent, evidence-based and adhering to international standards of quality evaluation” (Patton & Gornick, 2011). These reports gave the negotiating group – which had yet to meet – plenty of food for thought.

Box 8: Summary conclusions

 First, the Paris Declaration proved relevant to improving aid quality and resilient in withstanding the negative effects of global crises; it raised expectations for rapid change and higher norms and standards – leading to an aid situation based on greater transparency – and became less “donor-driven” than it was 20–25 years ago.

 Second, of the five Paris Principles, country ownership advanced the most, with alignment and harmonisation progressing unevenly, and managing for development results and mutual accountability showing the least progress.

 Third, although the quality of aid improved, there was no evidence of a reduction in the overall burdens of aid management.

 Fourth, there was lack of transparency and data reliability in “other forms and flows of cooperation beyond the current scope of the Declaration”, thereby urging the adoption of transparency and mutual accountability principles to these flows, which amounted to as much as one-quarter of OECD/DAC aid flows.

 Fifth, expectations about rapid reforms were unrealistic and unreasonable, and a wider perspective was needed to carry out these reforms to their full potential.

Source: Author

The intent was not to replicate another Paris or Accra in drafting the Busan Document, but to become more ambitious and set our sights higher to put in place an architecture that would motivate, press and engage the international community to really deliver in earnest what had been pledged.

Based on these evaluations, why have many aid providers consistently lagged behind in meeting their commitments under Paris, relative to the pace of reform undertaken by most recipient countries? Although the latter have more reform work ahead and show varying paces of progress, why is it that many of their providers, equipped with more resources and institutional capacities, have been resistant to reforming their own systems and policies? If the Paris Principles were not in their interest, why did they endorse them unanimously? Could it be bureaucratic inertia or opposition on the part of their agencies or politicians? Did / do they feel some reforms threaten vested interests? Was the risk of changing policies and practices higher than acceptable? And, if so, what about sharing risk management?

Or – as argued by some – do such reforms require much more time than we had anticipated? I personally do not subscribe to the last “excuse”, because experience shows that similar – or even more challenging – actions have been taken when there was enough political will and determination to act.

Were we heading once more to a repeat scenario in which we organise another HLF, listen to energising political pledges, spend limitless hours in consultations – not to mention allocating significant financial and human resources – only to end up a few years later with similarly disappointing results? Let us see what Busan could contribute to change this gloomy outlook to one that is more promising.

Box 9: Recommendations of the Independent Evaluation Report The report addressed policy-makers in partner countries and development partners and agencies, urging them to:

a) make the hard political choices and follow through to achieve desired results;

b) focus on transparency, mutual accountability and shared risk management;

c) reinforce aid effectiveness efforts at the country level to take due note of national contexts and encourage multi- stakeholder involvement;

d) extend aid reform gains to all forms of development cooperation; and e) reinforce the improved international partnerships in the next phase of

reforms.

For policy-makers in partner countries:

a) take full leadership and responsibility for reforms in their respective countries;

b) set strategies and priorities for strengthening capacities;

c) intensify political priorities and actions to combat poverty, exclusion and corruption.

For policy-makers in aid-providing countries:

a) match crucial global stakes in aid and reform to better deliver on promises made;

b) face up to and manage risks honestly and admit failures;

c) intensify peer pressure on free-riders for more balanced efforts by aid providers.

Source: Author

Box 10: Excerpt from the Arab Funds’ Statement of Resolve at Busan

“We are prepared to play an active role in the post-Busan Development Agenda. We believe that this Agenda will be built on the values of solidarity and global partnerships and would include the principles of sustainable and equitable development. We commit to building a broad paradigm based on the new development landscape and involving all resources and all actors in line with Goal 8 of the MDGs and in the continuation of the Monterrey Consensus. The experience of the Coordination Group in development issues and the close relations its institutions have built with the developing countries as beneficiaries and shareholders are most valuable. We believe that the Group is in a particular position to play an active role in the international efforts to devise a post-Busan architecture that integrates aid efficiency and development effectiveness.”

Source: Arab Funds of the Coordination Group (2011)

7 Negotiating the Global Partnership: Processes,