Partner countries

Partner countries focussed on refining their poverty-reduction-strategy programmes and carrying out a variety of reform measures. They had come to realise that, although these measures were urged by aid providers and international financial institutions (IFIs), such actions promised to improve their overall development outcomes. We will not discuss the controversy about the efficacy of these programmes in their original or modified forms, but the fact remains that these triggered a series of country-owned actions that went beyond their framework.

Ghana had shown, from the outset, firm commitments to implement the Paris Principles in close consultation with its development partners. It outlined a harmonisation and aid effectiveness action plan, endorsed by its Consultative Group. This was an ambitious plan specifying actions under four headings: country environment, programme-based frameworks, transaction costs and partnership framework. Details under each of these spelt out expected outcomes, planned activities, responsibility for implementation, target completion dates and current status (Government of Ghana, 2005).

The large majority of these activities were to be either initiated or completed by the end of 2006. Taking procurement as an example, the objective was to “score substantially better” over the period to that date.

Actions included implementing the public procurement act, developing legislative instruments to implement, establishing standards for monitoring, issuing manuals and conducting necessary training. Promoting joint analytic work was another example shared with Ghana’s partners to agree on areas for joint work such as public financial management and procurement and evaluation, and on the terms of reference for each task.

Vietnam was another country that made firm commitments and participated early in the aid effectiveness dialogue, even prior to the Rome HLF. A Hanoi Statement on Aid Effectiveness was issued (Government of Vietnam, 2005), with a plan outlining actions to implement Paris Principles, together with set goals, outputs, and parties responsible for each action. These measures were guided by a consultative process with aid partners and a list of definitions under each Paris indicator.

Under harmonisation, joint reviews were carried out to establish baselines as a basis for defining a strategy and roadmap to share diagnostic work and take stock of aid providers’ systems and procedures as a prelude to agreeing on common arrangements. Under “mutual accountability”, the goal to be reached by 2010 was to have in place a periodic mutual assessment mechanism to review progress in implementing commitments, with a first mutual and independent assessment to be conducted in 2006, and results published.

Bangladesh was the third country example. Its Harmonisation Action Plan was prepared by a Task Force of representatives of key ministries. Similar to Vietnam’s approach, measures were listed under Paris Principles with specific outcomes and target-completion dates and lead actors. Under alignment, for example, government and development partners considered how to align assistance to the country’s poverty-reduction priorities in line with the comparative advantage of each partner, and how to involve NGOs and other stakeholders in aid delivery and coordination at the sector level.

Under managing for results, monitoring was to be strengthened, with an emphasis on evaluating development impact. Strengthening development partners’ accountability was part of the plan, requiring their aid policies and procedures to become more public and transparent (Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, 2006).

What about other partner countries? These cases were not the only ones demonstrating efforts to meet commitments. But the same could not be said of other partner countries. One could visualise a continuum where, at one end, countries not only made commitments but implemented specific action plans; at the other end are countries that have not yet taken serious actions. In between are the majority of countries, which are at various stages of action-planning and implementation (Ministry of Finance and Economic Development of the Republic of Mauritius, 2008).

It is important to note that many partner countries developed their action plans with important – if not “pressuring” – inputs and guidance from the World Bank and the IMF, in addition to an intensive dialogue between them and their bilateral development partners (Tujan, 2007). It was not uncommon to hear of statements indicating that some partner countries simply followed the edicts of their major external funding agencies as a precondition to receiving financial support. Well-intentioned as these pressures may have been, they were clearly inconsistent with the Paris

Principle promoting national ownership and leadership. Not only that, but there were also claims that the stringent conditions imposed caused unnecessary damage to the economic and social fabric of society and the suffering of its citizens (Levinsohn, 2003).

Regional workshops were organised to share partner countries’

experiences in improving national action plans. An example was the two-day workshop held in Uganda and attended by African countries, development partners and civil society, during which implementation issues were discussed and contacts established among delegates for future consultations (African Development Bank Group [ADBG], 2005).

An integral part of partner countries is the group called “fragile states”, which had called for special attention from the outset due to the particular circumstances that distinguished them from other partner countries. The Paris Declaration stated: “While the guiding principles of effective aid apply equally to fragile states, they need to be adapted to environments of weak ownership and capacity and to immediate needs for basic service delivery.” This was translated into specific recommendations as Principles for Good International Engagement developed in January 2005 (and later updated in 2007) (OECD, 2005d):

The Principles recognise that:

 Fragile states confront particularly severe development challenges such as weak governance, limited administrative capacity, chronic humanitarian crisis, persistent social tensions, violence or the legacy of civil war.

 A durable exit from poverty and insecurity for the world’s most fragile states will need to be driven by their own leadership and people.

 Although international engagement will not by itself put an end to state fragility, the adoption of the shared principles can help maximize the positive impact of engagement and minimise unintentional harm.

These principles required coordinated actions by development partners, which had to take “national contexts” as the starting point; apply the “no harm” principle; focus on state-building; recognise the links between political, security and development objectives; and act fast but staying long enough to give success a chance. Fragile states continued to draw

attention at international forums and organised themselves into the g7+

group, inaugurated during its first meeting in 2010.