Question 1: Exploitation of cleavages

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Almost the same scenarion runs in the case of the Italian policy towards the Orthodox – probably the next easier part in the cleavage to cultivate a positive attitude towards them, as being “relatives in religion.” But as concerning the Orthodox, they were, on the one hand, concerned about the favour being shown to the Catholics and on the other, as the Greek vice-Consul in Gjirokaster –Chimarios- reports, “[…] they were deeply disappointed because the Muslims still enjoyed the prerogatives they had during Zog’s reign, kept on occupying, almost exclusively, the positions in public service, and kept close contacts with the Italian administration. While the Christians, even though they consituted the majority of the population in the south prefectures, were obliged to keep out of public life. People’s discontent was gathering head as their hopes, that their position would be improved now that Albania was occupied by a Christian nation, were belied” (Kontis, 1997, p.352). The Commading Officer of Gjirokaster, De Fuccia, had promised that both the Christians and the Muslims would be treated in the same way (Kontis, 1997, p.340), but he had broken his word.

Moreover, the Italians ignored the ethnical aspect of this part of the population. The Greek minority in the south (which also happened to be Orthodox) was even more alienated and ill disposed towards the Italians as they tried, through every possible way,²¹⁹ to oblige it not to come in touch with Greece. The situation deteriorated as in

219As the Greek Vice-Consul in Saranta –Bensis- refers to his report to the Greek Foreign Ministry on July 22^nd 1939 : “[…] the Italian Consul Representative mostly denies an exit visa to those who wish to visit Greece for reasons of health, recommending to visit Italy for the same reasons; he tries in every possible way to oblige them to use the Italian ships instead of the Greek ones, in the case that they travel to Greece; and he did not mostly accept applications for the supply of exchange to those who wish either to travel to Greece or to support their relatives especially their children who study there, by sending money. In the case of a positive answer, the exchange can not be above $30 […]” (Kontis, 1997, p.348). The Vice-Consul in Avlona-Tsagris- also registers a week later –July 28^th 1939- that in “his region” all the members of the Greek minority who

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1940 Albanian instead of Greek was the language of instruction in their schools (Fischer, 1999, p.96). What should not be underestimated is that the Tosks in general (Christians and Muslims) had since independence been dominated by the Ghegs of the North and during Zog´s reign had felt embittered being put aside; a situation maintained by the Italians.

At this point one could expect that the remaining part within this religious cleavage, namely the Muslims, would enjoy the outcomes of the Italian policy, being in some way favoured in comparison to the others, so that they could come to support or even to be neutral towards the conqueror. But the Italians did not excersise a clever policy with regard to the 70 per cent of the country’s population which was Muslim. The change of the Albanian flag was their first step on the wrong course of action; a step of decisive meaning. The Italians took the old flag, a black double eagle on a red field, and added a fascis on either side, looking as if they were about to crush the old symbol. To make matters worse, the Italians topped the eagle off with the crown of savoy, which itself is topped by a cross! Muslims were even more outraged when Italian curfew restrictions began to interfere with the traditional fast of Ramadan.

The Italians had a similar attitude and policy towards the good old cleavage between feudals, landowners or ruling class and peasants. The outcome of their imprudent policy towards both sides was that, those willing to colaborate were, in the end alienated, while the others, whose position, at the beginning, was neutral, were in the course of time deeply dissatisfied. To be more specific, among the representatives of the ruling class, there were many who rallied round the occupying party and completely supported its politics; a number of industrialists and businessmen became partners in Italian firms to further their lucrative economic activity. Others, disturbed by events, merely waited to see what would happen. However, on the one hand, there was the Italian economic occupied a public service position had been substituted either by Italians or Albanians (Kontis, 1997, p.350).

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policy, which was a pure failure, while on the other, was the behaviour of the Italians towards these important segment of the Albanian society that alienated them.

As far as conserns the Italian policy and the economicaly preveleged members of the Albanian society (whose attitude towards the Italians was at the beginning positive) the story goes as following. On 22^nd April 1939 proclaimed the customs union and after that industry and home crafts, already weak, were almost ruined. Merchants complained of the restrictions of currency control and the system of obligatory import and export permits and were dissatisfied with the fact that the Albanian currency was pegged to the lira. Albanian busimessmen of all types complained that they were being elbowed out as they could not obtain approval for any new entrprise unless it had an Italo-Albanian character (Fischer, 1999, p.96). Apart from that, they (the collaborators in general) complained that the Italians did not understand or trust them, that the Italians hoped to disenfranchise them in their own state. They complained that they were being shut out of all major decisions, that the Italians were involving themselves in every facet of Albanian administration, even in those areas where they had demonstrated nothing but incopetence, and they complained that the Italians often acted disgracefully, and that public safety had declined since Zog’s days (Fischer, 1999, p.96). From all evidence, even though none of these forces shows itself capable of conducting the anti-fascist resistance, by the middle of 1941, the Italians had lost any chance of a “true collaboration.”

But it was not only the collaborators (and collaborators-to-be) who became alienated, it was also the simple Albanian people (moreover the peasants and poor) who, driven to despair as the country’s economy was seriously damaged²²⁰ through the faulty Italian

220 The fact that the National Bank of Albania produced at the end of 1939 26,316,000 francs, at the end of 1940 80,178,000 francs and the end of 1941 108,417,000 francs in comparison with “monetary production” prior the Italian occupation of 11,131,000 francs at the end of 1937 and 10,526,000 francs at the end of 1938 reveals that, apart from the

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policy, were awoken and realised that they had nothing to expect from the Italians. There was shortages and price rises. And outwardly beneficient Italian measures for local economic reconstruction, including the reclamation of land and the mortgage and loan facilities for farmers, were perceived by the Albanians as a mere preparation for extensive Italian colonisation. Moreover, the methods employed by the banks in granting agricultural loans and arranging mortgages seemed to Albanians to be designed mainly to acquire the best lands and the best olive trees for eventual distribution to Italian settlers, who, thanks to the constitution, were now able to own land in Albania (Kontis, 1997, p.355). As concerns the various business and infrastucture projects, for the Albanians these were nothing more than pompous attempts at propaganda victories aimed at enriching Italian companies, exploiting Albanians, and paving the way for more Italian workers and colonists (Fischer, 1999, p.95). One could not even dare to dream of an agrarian reform in any shape or form.