Conclusions

With regard to the first of the questions, formulated at the beginning of this chapter (exploitation of the country’s peculiarities and the existing cleavages – in this case – by the Italians), one could argue that the Italians proved unable to exploit either the country’s peculiarities or the existing cleavages.

They underestimated the “personality” aspect in their effort to find collaborators and to

“secure their quislings” and they did not make the slightest effort to mobilise the one or the other group of people. They simply welcomed everyone who was willing to cooperate. After having achieved their first aim, namely legalizing their seizure of the country, they tried to make the basis of their occupation as stable as they could. At this phase they made an effort to utilize the Albanian dream of a “Great Albania”. But once again their approach proved to be “spontaneous”. They did not take into consideration the fact that after the Italian occupation, the Albanians had abandoned any revisionist ambitions (Fischer, 1994, p.371). As Omari puts it “The Italian effort to bring Kosova region into Albania had been interpreted [by the Albanians] as an act of pure colonialist annexation” (Omari, 1986, p.50)

They also acted spontaneously and imprudently as far as any attempt to exploit the existing “cleavages” was concerned. They made an effort to exploit each of the cleavages separately, without taking into account the other, which also “run” parallel. So in the case of the religious cleavage, even though they had a good point to start (a part of the

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population was Christians with a potential positive attitude towards the Christian occupants) they did not manage to use it to their advantage. They ignored the problems and needs of the Catholic Ghegs, who wished to keep arms in order to protect their land from raids mounted by Montenegrins (territorial cleavage); they did not take into consideration the expectations of both Orthodox and Catholics not to be kept out of public life (social aspect of the religious cleavage); they did not consider the ethnic aspect of the Orthodox Tosks who wished to retain the Greek language (territorial cleavage) and they disrespected the Muslim tradition.

Similarly, any attempt to exploit the feudal/anti-feudal cleavage proved fruitless. Through their imprudent policy both landowners and landless were dissatisfied and alienated. The landowners had been left out of any decisions, the merchants had to deal with a series of restrictions of currency control and the system of obligatory import and export permits, while the landless realised in a short time that through the agricultural loans and the arranging mortgages the best lands could end in the hands of the Italians.

With regard to the second question (the implementation of cleavages theory in the interpretation process for the understanding of the basis and reasons of the formation of political parties and opposition movements during this period) the research came up with the following conclusions.

The cleavages theory could assist the interpretation and understanding of the formation of the various resistance groups and political parties in a restricted way. (under two restrictions) The first “restriction” derives from the fact that, as already mentioned, not only the cleavages but other factors – the so-called “country’s peculiarities” – played their role as well and should be taken into consideration in such an effort. And even then things would not be so clear. There is no clear line between the cleavages and the country’s peculiarities. Even to distinguish the cleavages would be difficult, if not impossible; it is not easy for someone to find the border lines. Moreover, one ought not to forget that parallel to these two parameters – cleavages and peculiarities – runs a third

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one, namely the deep desire of many Albanians to fulfil pure personal interests. And this desire had provoked the mobilisation and collaboration of some with one or the other side of a cleavage on the one hand, or with the occupiers on the other.

The second “restriction” is related to the fact that the cleavages theory cannot in any case be of much help. So, even though it is a useful tool for the interpretation and understanding process of the formation and basis of the Communist movement and the Balli Kompetar, one cannot say the same in the case of some of the first resistance groups or the Fascist Party of Albania. Especially the latter – the Fascist Party of Albania – was not the result of any kind of social conflicts and cleavages and did not represent in any way the interests of any social group in the country. So it would be ineffective to try to interpret the formation of such a party either through the cleavage theory or the

“country’s peculiarities.” The “Fascist party of Albania” was a “plant” imported direct from Italy in a country where the soil was poor and inappropriate for such a “plant” to grow roots.

It would also be groundless to interpret the formation of the first resistance groups with the help of the cleavages theory. Many of them were just groups of people who intended to protect their own land (area) not only from the Italians but from others as well (Ghegs).

On the other hand groups formed by Abaz Kupi, Muharrem Bajraktari, Myslim Peza and Bey Kryeziou, even though they were distinct with regard to their pro-royalist or anti-royalist position, their divisions were not about the political system or the kind of the regime after the liberation but about Zog himself and his role in the post-war Albanian administration.

Now, as regards the formation of the Communist movement and later of the Communist Party an approach through the prism of cleavages theory reveals that the existing cleavages, “acting” within the historical conditions of the period 1939-1944, affected its route and dynamism. The research concludes that the formation of the Communist Party was not based on the secession of the left wing from the Social-democracy (deprivation

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of ideological basis), and the theory of classes has no implementation in the effort to analyze the making-up of the Albanian Communist Party. “Responsible” for the formation and dynamism of the party was the “haves / have-nots” cleavage (the term in this case includes all the other cleavages). With the term “haves” we refer to all these people who possessed either land or privileges before the occupation and who wished to restore the pre-war status quo after its end; while the term “have nots” denotes those who were deprived of land, money, rights, privileges and dreams (to the last groups belonged especially young people and young intellectuals who did not even dare to dream of a better future in the case that the pre-war situation was re-established after Albania’s liberation) and who were ready to fight not only with the aim to liberate their country, but to build a new post-war state.

Product of the “have / have nots” cleavage and the antipode of the Communist Party and of the sum of interests which it represented, was Balli Kompetar (National Front). This nationalistic resistance movement was a political organization intending to protect the interests, the privileges and the economic and political positions of the great landowners.

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