Public  actors

Public actors describe the actions of government and its institutions. However, governments have lost some of their steering capacity to other actors because of globalisation and economic liberalisation resulting in the shift to governance (Catney and Doyle, 2011). In general, economic liberalisation frames environmental concerns as slowing down economic growth, the primary objective. As a result, governments face higher political costs if they enact ecologically motivated policies because they must overcome stronger opposition (Bailey et al., 2011). For this reason, many analysts have feared that globalisation could result in an environmental ‘race to the bottom’ since governments have incentives to lower their environmental standards in order to attract business and become so-called ‘pollution havens’.

However, the opposite, a ‘race to the top’ of environmental standards, is empirically observed (Jänicke and Jacob, 2004). Despite this debate on the state’s waning influence, they remain key for the governance of the transition to a green economy for several reasons. States are the

• cornerstone of existing governance regimes since “[T]there is no functional equivalent to national governments as highly visible, legitimized and competent territorial actors and protectors” (Jänicke and Jacob, 2004: 30).

• only actors with the institutional capacity for the necessary strategic planning and to adjust the macroeconomic framework and other policy areas (German Advisory Council on Global Change, 2011).

20 In case of the European Union, the supranational level can be seen as the national level because the member states have transferred crucial competences to the supranational level.

21 See ‘3.2.1.2. Vertical environmental policy integration’ for a more detailed discussion of the interplay of the state layers.

Governing the Transition to a Green Economy 59

• main actors in the multilateral negotiations on mitigating climate change as only they are legitimized to sign and ratify binding international treaties (Meadowcroft, 2009a, Underdal, 2010).

2.3.1.1. ‘Administrative  rationalism’  

The historically predominant governance framework in developed countries is that the state bureaucracy implements government decisions. Dryzek (2005) labels this problem-solving discourse ‘administrative rationalism’ in which governance is almost equivalent to government. The approach highlights “the role of the expert rather than the citizen or producer/consumer in social problem solving, and ... stresses social relationships of hierarchy rather than equality or competition” (Dryzek, 2005: 75). The focus is on bureaucrats working in ministries – understood as silos that rarely cooperate and interact across thematic boundaries – solving problems with their topic-specific expertise. This specialisation has created high degrees of knowledge on specific issues while neglecting cross-cutting problems (Kemp et al., 2005). As a result, authorities implement regulatory policies and institutions based on precise cost-benefit evaluation of the impact. Hence, the primary approach is top-down regulation instead of more flexible alternatives. Transition governance will continue to rely on regulation as an important part of the instrument mix, but it “will have to be more collaborative, flexible, and performance-based than it has been” (Fiorino, 2009: 64).

However, public actors face additional structural challenges besides improving regulations.

While some countries deal with environmental affairs in environment ministries, they are in general politically weak and lack sufficient resources (Fiorino, 2009). Environmental policy integration (EPI) meaning the integration of environmental concerns in other policy fields is rarely taking place because of the strict boundaries between the various ministries.²² Hence, administrative rationalism is largely incapable of handling long-term and cross-cutting topics, especially since it is “often constrained by lack of political will, weak penalties, imperfect information, or high transaction costs” (Lyon, 2009: 48). The result is fragmented policymaking. In addition, the strict hierarchies within the silos hamper the capacity for meaningful engagement with other relevant stakeholders. In particular bottom-up groups are marginalised. “Governing is therefore not about democracy, but about rational management in the service of a clearly defined public interest, informed by the best available expertise.”

(Dryzek, 2005: 87) This must change since including a broad array of actors is a prerequisite for a successful low-carbon transition. Coming back to the subject and object role of the state

22 See chapter ‘3.2.1. Including the entire government in the transition process’ for more details.

it is problematic that existing bureaucratic structures require external pressure to reform for which they leave little room.

2.3.1.2. ‘Ensuring  state’  

In Giddens (2009) ‘ensuring state’ public actors are not solely responsible for steering the process, but state authorities monitor public goals and ensure that they are achieved “in a visible and acceptable fashion” (Giddens, 2009: 69). The German Advisory Council on Global Change (2011: 395) proposes a similar understanding under the label ‘proactive state’, which combines “on the one hand empowerment of a state which actively determines priorities in the political multilevel system and underlines these with clear signals ... and, on the other hand, the provision of more extensive participation opportunities to citizens to make their voices heard, get more involved, and join in decision-making processes”. These two approaches are clearly separating themselves from administrative rationalism by engaging public actors with other stakeholders to ensure the public good. The state is no longer the only actor but the most important of many.

Amongst other tools Giddens (2009) envisions an independent body that makes sure that targets adopted by governments are met and not abandoned over time. This generates long-term stability by binding later governments to the reached consensus. In order to give this body enforcement power, he wants to enable it to take governments to court when they breach announced targets or weaken existing policies. In addition to controlling the executive branch, Giddens (2009) puts strong emphasis on involving different actors, many of which are bottom-up groups, in the decision-making process. It becomes a key task of government to offer societal actors opportunities for meaningful participation. This can include reliable macroeconomic signals to business, strengthening environmental education, engaging cities and rural areas, fostering sector-specific stakeholder input and encouraging public discourse (Meadowcroft, 2009a). The ensuring state approach takes up the challenge of finding ways to allow for EPI by increasing the number of players involved. While this by itself does not ensure more coherent policies but potentially increases turf fights, it significantly alters state structures to generate more consistent outcomes. This is an important step away from bureaucratic silos with public actors remaining in control since “despite the apparent weaknesses of the state to address complex, long-term cross-boundary social and environmental problems, it provides a more stable counterweight to both the fluidity and lack of citizen responsibility found in marketplaces and civil society” (Catney and Doyle, 2011:

Governing the Transition to a Green Economy 61 100-101). The challenge is to find the right balance between state leadership and interaction

with other stakeholders.

2.3.1.3. ‘Critical  Political  Ecology’  

Eckersley (2004) normatively deliberates creating a green state from the starting point of the liberal democratic state. She assumes that the state is the venue in which ecological governance is implemented. Her analytical approach ‘Critical Political Ecology’ envisions creating an ecological democracy by enshrining environmental rights into an outward looking society. Eckersley (2004) specifies these rights and responsibilities as follows:

• Access to all relevant environmental and risk-associated information,

• participation in environmental impact assessments and decision-making on new technologies,

• compensation when environmental damage is suffered,

• litigation rights for non-governmental organisations to ensure that environmental standards are upheld,

• constitutional changes that ensure independent authorities to represent environmental concerns and public consultations on (transnational) issues, and

• federal states must tackle environmental issues on the federal level with the power to override local authorities.

Such a governance framework would significantly strengthen non-public actors. It “would help integrate the diversity of groups whose activities are relevant to climate change policy”

(Giddens, 2009: 119) like non-governmental organisations and businesses which have in the past defined themselves against each other. Hence, it would foster a perception that all actors are relevant for the final outcome, which is crucial to achieve a societal consensus. In addition, Eckersley (2004) aims to include the effects of national decision on people who are living in other countries in the decision-making process. Her motivation “is not to replace states but rather to find more effective and more legitimate ways of addressing the shortcomings of exclusive territorial governance” (Eckersley, 2004: 193). It indicates a relevant issue: The global nature of environmental problems such as climate change challenges the boundaries of sovereign nation states. Hence, national action must be embedded in international action to avoid the discussed problem of free-riding. While this thinking is rather abstract, it gives practical advice on how to form such a green state for example by establishing a “green constitution” which ensures ecological protection would be

a first step as progress towards a transnational green state depends on a “broad cultural shift”

(Eckersley, 2004: 245). This requires the interplay of various actors resulting in a vivid public sphere arguing for environmentally friendly behaviour.

McCarthy (2007: 184) concludes that the approach is “powerful, and an important counter-point to many current political projects that seem prepared to give up on the modern state”.

Nevertheless, he points out a relevant weakness: Eckersley (2004) assumes that democratic polities want to build a green state. This must not be the case as they can knowingly decide that they want to ignore climate change. This gives rise to the argument that a strong steering organisation in form of the state that bases its decision on scientific knowledge and is legitimised to act must govern the sustainable transition. When existing structures have failed to tackle environmental problems in the past it was the civil society that drew attention to excessive pollution and environmental degradation.