The World Bank defi nes instability as “the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism.”440 Many factors contribute to in-stability besides organised crime and corruption, but es-pecially in new states, the credibility of the government may be closely related to its longevity. In states with small economies, organised crime groups may have the fi nancial strength to pose a genuine threat, especially if they have historical linkages to political groups. Great fortunes were made off the previous era of instability.
There are those who would benefi t economically from further political confl ict, and some of these may be in a position to generate further disruption.
In terms of the World Bank governance indicators, the region shows quite a lot of variation in political stability rankings. On the one hand, Serbia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Albania and Bosnia and
Herze-govina were all ranked lower than the average for sub-Saharan Africa in 2006. On the other, Romania, Mon-tenegro, Bulgaria and Croatia seem to exhibit far less likelihood of such confl ict emerging, but these countries would still be greatly affected by regional instability.
Serbia’s low ranking is propably due to the question of the fi nal status of Kosovo (Serbia) and related problems in the south, which have the potential to trigger confl icts in several other parts of the region. It has been argued that, due to the importance of smuggling during the con-fl ict, many of the leaders in the province have a criminal background, and may still be involved in traffi cking, or at least providing protection to traffi ckers. According to one senior UNMIK offi cial, “When we talk of organised crime in Kosovo, we are very much dealing with politicians, [and] ministers.”441
These alleged inter-linkages and the incentives they create are complex, so it is diffi cult to say how this might affect stability. But the case of the ethnic-Albanian Na-tional Liberation Army, which sparked off confl ict in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 2001, is in-structive. These rebels/criminals were also tied to the KLA, and it has been alleged that the struggle was as much about protecting traffi cking routes as it was about advancing an ethnic agenda. As the International Crisis Group wrote at the time:
The vision of a “Greater Kosovo” only partly explains the motivation of the NLA. Few ethnic Albanians in Mac-edonia – as distinct from the diaspora – would want to be part of Kosovo or Albania. Yet, a borderless criminal network already operates freely in Macedonia, Albania Index of state capture in 1999
Figure 111:
Source: World Bank 0
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
Uzbekistan Armenia Hungary Slovenia Belarus Estonia Czech Rep Lithuania Kazakhstan Poland Albania Romania Georgia Slovak Rep Croatia Bulgaria Kyrgyzstan Latvia Russia Ukraine Moldova Azerbaijan
aggregate capture economic index
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107 The impact of crime on social, economic and political progress
and Kosovo. Keeping Macedonia at risk allows the con-traband trade in drugs, weapons, cigarettes, and hu-mans to fl ourish unchecked. A destabilised Macedonia is profi table both for criminals and for those who dream of a pure Albanian section of western Macedonia.443 In the end, the two objectives – the political and the criminal – were probably intertwined in the minds of the rebels, as they were during the time of the Kosovo war. But do criminal groups really have the capacity to take on the states of the region? A recent seizure in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia provides some indication. In November 2007, a major arms cache, suf-fi cient to equip 650 soldiers, was discovered, including anti-aircraft weaponry. It was found in the possession of what was initially described as an “organised crime group” but was later labeled a terrorist cell, a shift in per-spective that is telling in itself. The group had been shel-tering two escapees from Kosovo prisons.444 In Albania, the new Deputy Minister of the Interior Gent Strazmiri speaks of criminals, particularly in the border areas, who don a “patriotic disguise” and give “political excuses” for their illicit activity.445 All this suggests that the overlap be-tween the political and the criminal that was manifest during open hostilities still prevails along the borders of Kosovo, and that these forces have the armament to engage militaries if it proves in their interest to do so.
The risks are not just tied to the regions around Kosovo.
The stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina is also at issue.
There are elements within Bosnia and Herzegovina’s fragmented political landscape that would profi t from a further dissolution of the country, and again, political and criminal motives are diffi cult to disentangle.
In the end, it is impossible to statistically demonstrate a correlation between the presence of organised crime and instability because neither issue can be satisfacto-rily quantifi ed. But there appears to be good reason to treat organised crime as a stability threat in South East Europe, due to the role it has played in past confl icts.
World Bank Political Stability rankings in 2006 Figure 112:
Source: World Bank442 0
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Serbia FYR Macedonia Albania
SS Africa average Romania Montenegro East Europe average Bulgaria Croatia OECD average
Bosnia & Herzegovina
country percentile rank
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109
Conclusion
This report argues that there are many encouraging signs that South East Europe is on the path to security, prosperity, and stability. Based on what we know about the social conditions that support crime internationally, this region should not have a conventional crime prob-lem, and all indications are that it does not, in fact, have one. The presence of organised crime in an area without conventional crime is telling. It suggests that there is lit-tle competition among the players, which itself implies that the number of actors are limited and that they are organised in such a way that they do not often come into confl ict with each other or with the authorities. In other words, organised crime in the Balkans involves a limited number of well-connected individuals. These individuals will eventually be incarcerated, retire, or die. Whether they are replaced depends on the responses of the na-tions concerned and of the international community.
This narrative is in keeping with the notion that organ-ised crime in this region was a rational response to a specifi c set of very challenging historical circumstances.
The incentives encountered during times of transition and war are different than the incentives encountered today. It may well be that the profi teers of the past are increasingly seeking legitimacy, and that as democracy consolidates, they will be nudged toward more socially productive ways of doing business. Supporting this tran-sition means keeping the incentives, and the deterrents, locked fi rmly on course.
The fact that both murder rates and the main organised crime markets are in decline provides credence to both trends – for whatever reason, things do seem to be get-ting better. But serious challenges persist. Tons of heroin continue to transit the region, corruption continues to be encountered at all levels, and judicial reform is crucial.
Even more disquieting are the enduring interests who would profi t off further instability. Despite progress, the centrifugal forces remain strong.
Bringing these elements into line requires the establish-ment of the rule of law, and in particular the criminal law.
Based on the trends, it appears that interventions in this regard are working, but further support is needed.
The problems of South East Europe are complex and inter-twined, but progress in one area is likely to support progress in all others. Barring another major crisis, the trajectory is distinctly upwards.
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