Most organised crime transactions are conducted on a cash basis. Bringing this cash into the legitimate econ-omy requires concealing its origins, and this is where the business of money laundering comes in. It is diffi -cult to estimate the extent or describe trends in money laundering, for precisely the same reason the region is vulnerable: the economies remain largely cash-based, and fi nancial sector regulation remains underdevel-oped. Only a minority of households have a bank ac-count (Figure). In many jurisdictions, money laundering was only recently or is incompletely criminalised, and the mechanisms for monitoring compliance are still be-ing implemented. But the presence of organised crime necessitates money laundering, so even if it is diffi cult to see, it is there.
Albania is a country at great risk for money laundering.
Share of the regional population that experienced consumer fraud in the previous year Figure 93:
Source: ICVS, 2000 or most recent available data
9.0 9.5
19.5
22.5 22.8
28.6
38.2
49.9
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55
Oceania North America West-Central Europe
South-Central America
Asia Sub-Saharan Africa
South Eastern Europe
Eastern Europe
% victims
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95 The real problem: Organised crime and corruption
Albania remains highly cash based, and its banking sec-tor is only now recovering from the loss of confi dence in institutions engendered by the 1997 crisis. Until 2004, the Government of Albania even paid its own civil serv-ants in cash. At the end of 2004, there were only 76 ATMs in Albania. According to the Albania’s Central Bank, 25% of the money in circulation is outside of the banking system (the average in transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe is approximately 10%).401 The Bankers Association estimates that only 20-30%
of transactions with trading partners take place through formal banking channels.
The huge volume of remittances is another point of vul-nerability to money laundering. About half of the remit-tances sent to Albania enter the country unoffi cially.402 Customs fails to control large cash infl ows and outfl ows.
Money illegally acquired by Albanians abroad is sent back to Albania, where it is easily laundered due to the lack of a strong formal economy and weak controls, through the investment in real estate, the construction sector, hotels, restaurants, fashion shops, travel agen-cies and trading/purchase of luxury cars and electrical equipment. Under-the-counter operations in foreign cur-rency exchange offi ces and fi ctitious shipping insurance are additional problems.
InBosnia and Herzegovina, the economy is also pre-dominantly cash-based. Whereas the non-bank fi nancial sector is not strong and not considered to be a money-laundering problem, offi cial banks are more vulnerable due to weak bank supervision.403 A special problem in Bosnia and Herzegovina is money laundering by some
non-governmental organizations which use direct cash transfers from abroad as a source of funding. Tax and customs evasion are widespread.404 According to the 2007 European Commission Progress Report on Bos-nia and Herzegovina, “During 2006, the FIU reported to the Prosecutor’s Offi ce of Bosnia and Herzegovina 23 money laundering cases involving approximately € 26 million and 40 persons. The FIU froze 23 transactions adding up to some € 1.2 million.”405
Bulgaria’s problems relating to money laundering are linked with its geographical position, bordering the Black Sea and strategically located between Western and Eastern Europe and Middle East. It has a well-developed fi nancial sector compared to other South East Europe countries and lenient controls. Financial crime, including bank and credit card fraud, tax fraud, smuggling of persons and goods are the main sources of laundered money, in addition to the illicit traffi cking in drugs and precursors. The banking sector, as well as exchange offi ces and casinos, are vulnerable at the placement stage.406
Tourism is Croatia’s largest economic sector, with more guests per year than Croatia’s inhabitants. Money laun-dering cases are therefore mainly related to domestic fi nancial crime such as privatization fraud and tax eva-sion, in addition to a recent rise in drug-traffi cking relat-ed money laundering, extortion, racketeering, theft and smuggling of motor vehicles, prostitution, smuggling of migrants and weapons, and counterfeiting.407 The pro-ceeds of crime are mainly invested into real estate and luxury goods.
Share of households with a bank account Figure 94:
Source: World Bank400 3
13
27 28
34
39
65
78
88 92
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Armenia Russia Romania Bulgaria Albania Bosnia &
Herzegovina
Czech Republic
Italy Switzerland Belgium
% Households
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96
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia still has problems with combating money laundering. The main sources of illegal proceeds are from narcotics-related crimes, economic crime, traffi cking in weapons, all of which have sharply increased since the Kosovo (Serbia) crisis and the confl ict in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia itself. With more foreign capital coming in recent years, economic and fi nancial crime is becoming more widespread (especially fraud and tax evasion). The control over the infl ux of foreign money is very loose, in particular with regard to cross-border cash transactions but also in the privatization process. Casinos are par-ticularly vulnerable to money laundering.408
TheMoldovan authorities estimate that criminal organi-zations’ income constitutes over half the GNI. It mainly comes from drug, arms and oil traffi cking, prostitution, alienation of state and private assets, smuggling of ciga-rettes and alcohol, bank and fi nancial fraud and tax eva-sion. Financial losses incurred through economic crime in 1999 were estimated at US$ 11.3 million.409 A large part of this illegal income is laundered through offi cial fi nancial institutions and entire sectors of the economy have been infi ltrated by criminal organizations. Offshore companies are currently the main source of money laun-dering, in addition to casinos, insurance companies, and moneylenders.
Romania’s National Bank estimates the value of fi nan-cial crimes to range from US$ 1 billion to US$ 1.5 billion per year. Tax evasion and VAT fraud constitute approxi-mately 45% (US$ 500-600 million per year) of this sum.
Financial sector fraud, establishment of phantom compa-nies and fraudulent bankruptcy are other types of fi nan-cial crime. Romania is also one of the main sources of online credit card fraud in the world. The main economic sectors affected by money laundering are: domestic and foreign trade, the banking sector, and capital markets.
A special problem is foreign currency exchange. Laun-dered money comes from domestic criminal activity car-ried out by international groups. From Romania, most of the laundered money goes to offshore fi nancial cen-tres in the Caribbean (and funds may then be returned to Romania for integration).410 Romania criminalized money laundering in 1999.411 According to estimates from the Romanian National Offi ce for the Prevention and Control of Money Laundering, the annual amounts of money laundered reached US$ 651.7 million in 2003, US$ 604.5 million in 2004, and US$ 349.1 million in the fi rst ten months of 2005.
Drug traffi cking, smuggling of migrants, weapons and pirated goods, corruption, tax evasion and other criminal activities provide the basis for money laundering in Ser-bia and Montenegro. Some SerSer-bian offi cials estimated that almost half of all fi nancial transactions in Serbia and Montenegro might be connected with money
laun-dering.412 Proceeds from illegal activities are invested mainly in real estate. Tax evasion and over- and under-invoicing are other common methods to launder money.
Serbia introduced a VAT only in 2005.413
Josip Bogi}, Head of the Department for the Fight against Organized Financial Crime of Serbia’s Ministry of the In-terior, argues that many people who were prosecuted for criminal activities in the last 15 years are nowadays successful “business people”. They are taking part in the privatization process, trade and real estate business.
Predrag Rankovi} Peconi, owner of the “Invej” compa-ny, bought a number of successful food companies in Serbia. According to the “White Book”, an offi cial record of organized crime groups, he was directly involved in laundering the money of the Sur~in clan, which was involved in the assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Ðin|i}. “Invej” was proclaimed the most successful pri-vate company in Serbia in 2004.414 Another newspaper report claimed that money was taken out of Serbia from 1992 to 2000 through the Beogradska Bank in Cyprus.
At the time of sanctions against Serbia, the Beogradska Bank established offshore companies in Cyprus which were receiving money from Serbia. In the second half of 1992, money (from state funds and citizens’ sav-ings) was transported in cash, in suitcases and bags, to such companies. Money was taken on special fl ights to Larnaca, Cyprus. These cash shipments were used to avoid sanctions but also to launder money. Offshore companies took 3-5% for each transfer. During the sanc-tions, the Yugoslav national bank had to approve each transaction, but the Beogradska Bank was transferring much more money than authorized.415 Thanks to the new law, a number of fake fi rms were discovered. There are still few convictions for money laundering in Serbia.416 Investment by foreigners in real estate along the Mon-tenegro coast has raised many suspicions of money laundering, in particular with money coming from the Russian Federation. Money laundering was criminal-ized in 2002 (until then, the 1977 code from the former Yugoslavia was still in force in Montenegro), with new legislation in 2003 which enables the confi scation of as-sets from criminal activity. The FIU became operational in 2003. Customs are not able investigate money laun-dering which comes from customs offences. Until 2004, no money laundering cases were initiated, neither by the police nor the prosecutor’s offi ce.417 In September 2004, Montenegro seized over EUR 1 million in connection with the arrest of two Chinese who were attempting to enter Montenegro, and who transferred over EUR 4 mil-lion through Montenegrin banks. However, the charges against them were dismissed by the court, claiming that the Prosecutor did not provide suffi cient proof that the funds were illegal.418 According to the European Com-mission, “In 2006, 170,000 transactions were reported
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97 The real problem: Organised crime and corruption
to the FIU, of which 29 were forwarded to the police and the prosecutor’s offi ce on suspicion of money laundering, along with eight cases relating to other criminal offences.
From January to April 2007, 109,000 transactions were reported, with 18 cases being forwarded to the relevant bodies on suspicion of money-laundering, along with four cases concerning other criminal offences.”419
Kosovo (Serbia) is extremely vulnerable to organized crime and thus to money laundering. UNMIK issued a regulation on the deterrence of money laundering and related offences only in March 2004. The regulation pro-vided for seizure of the proceeds and created the FIU, the Kosovo Financial Intelligence Centre (KFIC) within the Police and Justice Pillar, which is functional but still plagued with initial problems. The regulation also lim-ited the receipt by NGOs of currency contributions to 1,000 euros per day from a single source and the distri-bution by NGOs greater than 5,000 euros to any single recipient in a single day (a problem similar to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s).420 According to the European Com-mission, “ In the fourth quarter of 2006, [the provisional institutions of self government] closed 30 cases and opened 32 new cases of alleged violations of the anti-money laundering legislation. In the fi rst quarter of 2007, 17 cases were closed and 45 new cases were opened.
Investigations include banks, foreign currency exchange offi ces and casinos.”421