The process of decolonisation and the rise of the South

The allies’ blueprint for a new order did not seek to do away with colonialism but rather to give it more legitimacy by submitting it to regulations and oversight. When the war ended, however, colonialism quickly began to

44 Some recent examples of a very long series are the call of the German government as head of the G20 in 2017 for a “Marshall Plan for Africa” and the recent call of the OECD for a

“Marshall Plan” to address the coronavirus crisis.

unravel. The interwar years had witnessed an upsurge of nationalism in many Asian colonies, which were inspired partly by Wilson and increasingly by communism. The outcome of WWII encouraged this trend in two ways. First, it further delegitimised the racial ideology on which the colonial venture was based. Not only had Europeans once again fought barbarously among themselves, costing the colonial world both lives and resources, but before the US entry into the war, they had been defeated throughout the Pacific by Japan – a racially non-white power. Second, the war led to the de facto liberation of several colonial territories before the US entry into the war. In many places, imperial Japan had freed Asian colonies from European rule, thus realising “the liberation of Asia” (Mishra, 2012). After the Japanese defeat, the old European masters generally attempted a comeback, but the power vacuum had given nationalists a window of opportunity to strengthen their cause, particularly in Indonesia and Vietnam.

The most important event in the decolonisation process, however, was probably the failure of the British to keep India, “the jewel in the crown”, within its imperial community. After WWI, Britain had made a number of efforts to co-opt the well-educated Indian elite who had joined the Indian National Congress movement. Among other perks, it offered to involve them gradually in the administration of the country with the eventual aim of preparing India for the self-governing “dominion status” that had already been granted to Britain’s white settler colonies (including South Africa).⁴⁵ Like the mandate system, now relabelled the trusteeship system, this British policy was intended to indicate that colonialism had a development mission and would eventually give way to an orderly and gradual decolonisation.

This rhetoric would allow Britain to keep its worldwide sphere of influence.

But the UK proved to have more power in designing the postwar blueprint than in putting it into effect.

Opposing British plans, the Congress movement radicalised its position during WWII and demanded full independence. As the war ended, the US once again hesitated (as Wilson had done) as to the right policy to follow on the colonial question. On the one hand, the UK, its main ally, was the main imperial nation in the world. Moreover, as the Cold War unfolded, the importance of colonial rule in certain parts of the world for containing communism became increasingly evident. On the other hand, as a former

45 Among its “concessions”, Britain pushed for India to have independent representation, even if still under colonial rule, both at the League of Nations and at later at the UN.

colony, the US considered itself to be a natural anti-colonial power (just as the USSR was presuming to be). Furthermore, the exclusive spheres of economic influence in colonial systems (especially in the case of the British Empire) went against the liberal order that the US was aiming to impose (Zeiler, 1999). This divided loyalty would lead the US to embrace an inconsistent policy.⁴⁶ It went along with a British-inspired pro-colonial UN mandate and in certain cases encouraged colonial powers to regain control, as with the French in Indochina. At the same time, however, it granted almost immediate independence to the Philippines in July 1946 and openly welcomed the independence of the Indian sub-continent, which came to pass on 15 August 1947.

Although independence gave way to a fratricidal partition war, given India’s size, history and geopolitical importance, it shook the incipient postwar order.

As soon as the UN General Assembly (UNGA) began to operate, India used its chair to undermine the UN colonial narrative, to foster decolonisation and to launch the Third World movement (Guha, 2007; Jain, 2012). Under the pressure of indigenous nationalism, the economic and moral collapse of the imperial metropolis, the de-legitimisation of the colonial venture and the vacillations of the US, a rapid process of decolonisation followed, resulting by the mid-1950s in the formal independence of almost all Asia and the Middle East.

The unravelling of the new postwar blueprint for the colonial world had clear implications for the emergence of the modern development cooperation agenda. According to the League of Nations’ and more clearly, the UN’s blueprints, imperial countries were responsible for providing aid to their colonies. But as we have seen, their record in doing so was rather poor.

Even the UK, which was particularly interested in leaving a good legacy in India, left the newly independent country with only a handful of doctors and well-trained indigenous professionals to govern it (Drèze & Sen, 2014).

With the notable exception of Mahatma Gandhi, most nationalists embraced the goal of modern economic growth, and, as the colonial system had done little to achieve it, they portrayed self-determination not only as a right but also as a condition for development. At the same time, however, they knew that they lacked the resources and means to make their countries prosper without assistance. What was to supplant the loss of colonial support,

46 At Yalta, Roosevelt aimed at bringing all colonies under trusteeship, but faced with British resistance and Soviet indifference he dropped this initiative (Droz, 2006, p. 103).

however limited, once independence had been achieved? The emergence and consolidation of a development aid agenda would eventually fill this gap.