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Fighting Maritime Piracy – On Possible Actions and Consequences

B. The problem

Piracy is possibly one of the oldest occupations and has for centuries been a challenge to seafarers. Today, pirate activities are being registered in a number of the world’s regions, such as, for example, off the coast of West Africa (Gulf of Guinea) and in East Asian waters (Malacca Straits)3. While the situation in West Africa is seen in particular by the shipping industry4 as a growing major concern, international focus still rests on the situation in the region of the Horn of Africa and the Indian Ocean. The reasons for focusing on piracy in this area may vary but three main reasons seem to be dominant. The first of these reasons is the modus operandi of the pirates in the region. Piracy in this region does not only mean different forms of vio-lence and robbery against ships and crews but usually includes hijacking the attacked vessel and taking the crew hostage with the aim of securing the payment of a substantial ransom by the ship owner/manager.5 The sec-ond reason is that Somalia, the costal state where the pirates are based and from where they launch their operations, can be categorised as a “failed

3 See IMB, Piracy Map 2012: http://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/live-piracy-map (last visited 15.7.2012).

4 See Jyllandsposten, 1.3.2012, 1 and §2, 6–7.

5 See Struwe (2009), 16 f. and Feldtmann (2010), 107 f.

state”6, which in the context of the problem of piracy means that Somalia, even if regional differences and certain positive developments on shore are taken into account, is basically unable to guard its coast or to prevent its citizens from committing acts of piracy and is unable to initiate acceptable criminal proceedings against suspected pirates.7 The final reason is that Somali pirates operate in a region that has one of the world’s most crucial maritime routes8 – the passage from Asia to Europe through the Suez Ca-nal, which is used by an average of 1,700–2,000 vessels a month.9

In December 2010, it was reported that since January 2007, 2,600 sea-farers have been held hostage by Somali pirates.10 The problem of “Somali piracy” seems to have peaked at the beginning of 2011 when the Interna-tional Maritime Bureau (IMB) registered 32 vessels hijacked by Somali pirates and 746 seafarers held hostage.11 More than a year and a half later the numbers are down to 11 vessels and 188 hostages (registered on 30 August 2012).12 The decrease in vessels and hostages held by Somali pi-rates is linked to the fact that the number of (successful) pirate attacks has fallen. The reasons for the fall in the number of attempted hijackings are complex and may vary, the most prominent being named in the interna-tional debate are the efforts of the different counter-piracy operations and the factor that the majority of vessels today are following the recommenda-tions and Best Management Practises (BMPs) to prevent hijackings. Fur-thermore, there has been slow but positive progress in different regions of Somalia and this has also been pointed out as a relevant factor. In addition, there has been a general improvement in security measures on board ves-sels sailing in the area, including the use of (private) armed guards. It has been claimed that there has not been a successful hijacking of any vessel that had armed guards at its disposal.13

The problem of piracy committed by Somali pirates has, as mentioned above, been met by the international community by encouraging and initi-ating a number of anti-piracy operations in the region with the

6 See Silva (2009), 3 ff.

7 See Pham (2010), 31 ff. who also gives an insight in the complex internal structure of Somalia, the role of clan-structure and the diversion between different regions.

8 Pham (2010), 42.

9 Struwe (2009), 2 and 9 f.

10 BIMCO, 500 Seafarers held hostage by pirates at Christmas: https://www.bim co.org/Members/News/2010/2010/12/21_500_seafarers.aspx (last visited 15.7.2012).

11 IMB, Piracy news & facts (21.01.2011): http://www.icc-ccs.org/home/piracyreporti ng-centre/piracynewsafigures.

12 IMB, Piracy news & facts (30.08.2012): http://www.icc-ccs.org/home/piracyreporti ng-centre/piracynewsafigures.

13 The Economist, Piracy and armed security; Laws and guns; armed guards on ships deter pirates. But who says they are legal: http://www.economist.com/node/21552553 (last visited 30.08.2012).

tion of various nations.14 Today three major international military opera-tions are (partly or fully) aimed at counter-piracy: The “alliance of the willing” CTF 151 under the United States led Combined Maritime Forces, NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield and EU NAVFOR’s Operation Atalan-ta.15 Furthermore, a number of nations, such as China and India, are engag-ing in their own counter-piracy activities in the region, without formally participating in any international operation.

The background and the specific mandate for each of the different coun-ter-piracy operations varies, which means for example, that certain measures against suspected pirates and their property may be used by one naval force acting under one of the international operations, while the same measures may not be used by another naval force operating under the rules of another operation.16 The fact that the efforts of counter-piracy activities are fragmented and are not organised into one collective international op-eration has led to a number of practical, opop-erational and organisational challenges, for example in connection with the issue of cooperation in connection with specific operations and information sharing. Today many of those problems and challenges have been addressed and practical ap-proaches have been developed, with the result that fragmentation of the counter-piracy operations no longer substantially jeopardises the success of the efforts at sea.

However, the improved cooperation of nations and international opera-tions in counter-piracy is most likely an important factor in the above-mentioned decrease in piracy attacks but it has not been able to put an end to the problem of piracy in the region: Somali pirates still account for a considerable amount of registered attacks on vessels17 and the radius of the area in which the Somali pirates operate has grown considerably:18 in 2007 acts of piracy were mainly reported from the Gulf of Aden and close to Somalia’s coast. Today piracy concerns the wider Horn of Africa region, including large parts of the Indian Ocean and up to the Red Sea. To illus-trate the scale of the radius of piracy attacks: NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield now covers an area of about 6.5 million nautical square miles – an

14 See Struwe (2009), 10 ff. and Guilfoyle (2010a), 141 ff. (145 ff.).

15 See Taylor (2012), 337 f. and Geiss/Petrig (2011), 17 ff.

16 See below D.

17 On 20.11.2012 71 piracy incidents were reported for Somalia in 2012, with 13 h i-jackings and 212 hostages: IMB, Piracy news & facts (20.11.2012): http://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/piracynewsafigures

18 IMB, Hostage-taking at sea rises to record levels says IMB: http://www.iccccs.org/

news/429-hostage-taking-at-sea-rises-to-record-levels-says-imb (last visited 30.8. 2012).

area that is about half the size of the territory of the United States of Amer-ica.19

While Somali pirates have been widening their area of operation, it has also become obvious that the vast space of the Indian Ocean cannot suc-cessfully be fully monitored and secured against pirate attacks. The prob-lem caused by Somali pirates is not a brief episode and will continue to provide challenges to the international community and to maritime traffic.

Furthermore, the problem of Somali piracy has also had a substantial eco-nomic impact: piracy is a “big business”. The average ransom paid for the release of a vessel and its crew was estimated to be about USD 5.4 million in 2010 while the “unofficial record” for the payment of ransom to Somali pirates was reported to be USD 9.5 million20 in November 2010. The costs caused by Somali piracy are estimated to have been USD 7 billion in 2011.21 However, the economic aspect is one side of the effects of maritime piracy, another side is the question of human cost and the impact the threat of piracy has on seafarers and their families.22

Im Dokument Economic Analysis of International Law (Seite 189-192)