Relations Between Quarreling Neighbors
Introduction
Poland and Russia share centuries of common history as neighbors with similar cultures. Unfortunately, it is not easy to find bright periods of construc-tive partnership or even peaceful coexistence. Still, I believe it is our duty, especially as a young scholars, not to give in to crude historical determinism.
The cooperation between countries is without a doubt beneficial, not only for states, but also, or maybe especially, for societies. Moreover, in today’s globalized and regionalized world, it is often necessary to deal with upcoming crises in a cooperative and inclusive manner.
In order to make this feasible, one should start with developing the ability to imagine a desirable order of things. Obviously, there is a significant dis-tance between these two stages, with the evolution of the internal socio-politi-cal situation in Russia as a matter of particular importance.
However, there is also no reason to give up; after all, Rome wasn’t built in a day.
Moreover, the current situation in Russia, with all its shortcomings with regard to democratic standards, does not look all that bad when seen from a historical perspective. There are also historical examples, noticeably the Franco-German or Polish-German reconciliations, that may serve as a guidepost.
The importance of Polish-Russian rapprochement is even more crucial, given the similar problems (in reference to strained relations between neighbors) around the world. Some of them are much more serious, like the Indian-Pakistani dispute, while some involve the frequent use of force and resemble a Gordian Knot, like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but they share a common element — deep mistrust and the absence of the ability to understand their counterpart. Obviously, one can also cite political or economical interests driving the conflicts, but then again, political interests do not last forever, and economies always favor stability and cooperation.
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World in Their Hands: Ideas From the Next Generation
Interstate rapprochement factors
Political will and domestic political systems
A lot of potential incentives for interstate rapprochement may be listed at once, from mutual benefits concerning economic or political issues to strengthen-ing regional security levels. However, without strong and continuous political will, which can favor long-term interests over short-term perspectives, none can become reality.
The importance of political leadership in a reconciliation process between two countries is also illustrated by the Franco-German case and the role that Rob-ert Schuman played. In the aftermath of the war, Paris implemented a harsh policy aimed at dismantling German military and economic institutions.1 How-ever, Schuman realized this was unsustainable in the long-term and decided to make a deep shift towards close cooperation with the former adversary, opening up the possibility of rapprochement.
A rapprochement process is often blocked by domestic opponents in the countries advancing towards stability of mutual relations or closer coopera-tion. One of the main obstacles may be a nationalist movement, which can easily label engagement as appeasement.2 It is the determination of the ruling elites that can assure that hurdles are overcome.
In Poland this strong political will has existed since 2007, when Civic Platform came to power, with Prime Minister Donald Tusk declaring his resolve to en-gage in dialogue with Russia “as it is,” in contrast to his predecessors, who almost refused to deal with Russian authorities.3 Tusk withdrew Poland’s veto on Russia’s negotiations on OECD accession — a move meant to demonstrate Warsaw’s good will, and he kept the government from reacting emotionally to Russian-Belarusian military exercises simulating a nuclear attack on Po-land in 2009.4
Still, the real breakthrough came only when, in 2008, Moscow responded to Polish readiness to engage in intensive dialogue. The subsequent visit of President Putin, who personally decided to attend the World War II com-memoration ceremony in Gdańsk, further contributed to the change of climate in mutual relations.5 The conclusion that may be drawn from these events is that with strong asymmetry between two countries, it is the larger one that has a decisive influence on how these relations will look.
However, the Korean-Japanese case proves that the political leader’s role may not guarantee the success of reconciliation if his actions stand in stark contrast to public opinion or that of the political elites or are not understand-able to them.6 As in Japanese society, since there was no sense of guilt about
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the country’s activity in the first half of the 20th century, implementation of a coherent and ambitious policy of reconciliation towards South Korea was hampered and lacked credibility.
As the cases mentioned show, the role of political leadership, though very important in order to launch the process, doesn’t guarantee long-term suc-cess. To clarify, a political leader may take a “half-step” ahead of society, but if the distance is too great, the leader may not be able to gain public support.
There is also the question of the influence of a political regime on interstate rapprochement. Charles A. Kupchan points out that the most favorable condi-tion for interstate rapprochement is “institucondi-tionalized restraint,” 7 which “is most pronounced among liberal democracies; the rule of law, electoral accountabil-ity, and the distribution of authority among separate institutions of governance serve as potent power-checking devices.” 8 However, as the author argues, an authoritative regime is also capable of “practicing strategic restraint” — which is the actual condition necessary for rapprochement. Consequently, regime type is not a determining factor in the possibility of rapprochement.
However, Kupchan underlines the importance of the compatibility of social orders and cultural commonality for a deepened rapprochement. He writes that among states with different social orders, i.e. economically open versus protectionist, or aristocratic versus egalitarian, “the social integration that fol-lows from political reconciliation threatens privileged social sectors, causing them to block further movement towards peace.” 9 As for cultural commonal-ity, “states that enjoy a preexisting ethnic or religious commonality will find it easier to construct a shared identity than those that do not.” 10
Settling history-based disputes
Despite the fact that the international relations agenda is mostly filled with economic or security issues, the importance of historical issues in interstate relations should not be underestimated. In fact, “all political communities are in one way or another formed around questions of memory, most notably around how past traumas are used to construct a sense of shared purpose and identity.” 11
As a result, historical issues are likely to cause emotional reactions and high tensions and thus have strong “political potential.” Their destructive influence on bilateral relations may take several forms. The ruling elite may be “forced”
by society to defend (or preserve) a country’s self-identity and thus in rela-tions with their counterparts present “their” interpretation of historical events, or they may use controversies to mobilize the electorate. They may also refrain from facing the country’s tragic past because of the fear of disturbing a fragile social calm.
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World in Their Hands: Ideas From the Next Generation
Whatever the causes are, unresolved historical issues can deeply affect cur-rent relations. The Japan-South Korea example shows that even common liberal and democratic political systems or developed economies and close economic ties are not sufficient to diminish the influence of historical disputes concerning Tokyo’s activity in the first half of 20th century.12
Indisputably, in order to establish long term rapprochement, painful and often complicated historical issues must be addressed. On the other hand, as the co-chairman of The Polish-Russian Group For Difficult Issues, Adam Daniel Rot-feld, said, there is no universal model of reconciliation and using ready-made solutions does not guarantee success.13
However, there are certain institutional solutions that are commonly used in resolving historical disputes. One of them is a joint historical commission to investigate controversial issues. “These commissions share an engagement with controversial past, conduct investigation and frequently issue a report the substance of which reframes critical aspects of the national history.” 14 The main task for such a commission is to balance the dissonance between a popular acceptance of national historiography as “truth” and a professional attitude towards history as a “construction,” and to produce politically useful material.15 They also provide basic institutionalization of historical dialogue, making it more systematic and invulnerable to political fluctuation.
The next step in resolving historical disputes concerns education — the “most central societal mechanisms through which histories and political identi-ties are produced, reproduced, and entrenched.” 16 Consequently, to secure achieved rapprochement on shared history, it should be reflected in history textbooks. To put it metaphorically, the outcome of a successful historical commission is a seedling, which can bear impressive fruit if planted in the proper place. For the same reason, joint consultations on history textbooks or the application of agreed findings or interpretations are even more vulnerable and demand more good will and determination than history commissions.
The application of a regional approach
Regardless of whether tensions exist between two or several states, they influence a whole region. For that reason, the rapprochement should be seen as a regional process. A limited rapprochement may cause anxiety in other countries excluded from the process, which is counterproductive for regional stability. A regional approach also provides the process with breadth, depth, and inertia, which make it irreversible.17
What is more, bilateral issues get diluted when placed within a multilateral framework.18 As a result they produce fewer tensions and are more likely
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to advance through constructive dialogue. This is especially significant in sit-uations when tensions exist between a regional hegemonic state and several smaller states.
The benefits of a regional approach in a rapprochement process are reflected in the Southeast Asia region and are related to China’s so-called “New Di-plomacy,” which among other things involved Beijing’s efforts to gain trust and engage in multilateral cooperation. This policy was also applied towards ASEAN members, which “always have had to deal with the issue of living ad-jacent to a great power. Historically, there was the tributary system, and conti-nental Southeast Asia (Vietnam in particular) lived under the constant shadow of the Chinese empires.” 19
China and ASEAN developed numerous ties “from high-level visits by military and defense officials to port calls, small-scale joint military exercises, defense equipment transfers, military educational exchange programs, and multilat-eral dialogues by senior defense and military officers.” 20 Moreover, in 2002 the framework agreement on the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area was signed, and the FTA came into effect in 2010.
Consequently the level of trust towards Beijing among the smaller countries has increased, and the Southeast Asia states were able to overcome tenden-cies to conduct a policy of confrontation and containment towards China and chose pragmatic solutions for gradually integrating Beijing into a region-al web of interdependence.21