Building mutual trust
One of the key factors impeding the Polish-Russian rapprochement for the last twenty years has been mutual distrust. The reason for such a state of affairs deserves a separate work, but one may try to briefly outline its roots (with inevitable simplifications).
As for the Polish side, it is mainly due to painful historical experiences, which date back to the 18th century. For 173 years out of the 194 that have passed from 1795 to 1989, Poland experienced diverse forms of subordination from Moscow. Moreover, when during this period, especially in the 19th century, Polish modern national identity was being built, it was to a large degree in op-position to “Russia” on political, religious, and cultural grounds, the effects of which can still be tracked today.
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As the communist regime settled into Poland after World War II, viewed as a symbol of subordination to Moscow, the political opposition in Poland aimed both at internal changes and independence from the “big brother” — as the So-viet Union used to be called. Consequently, after the changes in 1989, Poland’s major aim was to reinforce independence, and Russia, along with united Ger-many, was seen as the biggest threat.
Of course, there were also episodes in the two countries’ common history that can be seen as a source of a mistrust towards Poland. However, one may risk stating that history has considerably less influence on Russia’s attitude towards Warsaw. Instead, it has been events after the fall of the Soviet Union, with NATO’s expansion having primary importance, that contributed to the present situation.
Existing mistrust has been highlighted many times in the first decade of 21st century. Such issues as the North Stream pipeline or Orange Revolution in Ukraine, particularly the different motives that drove them, attracted atten-tion in both capitals. For instance, while the Russians saw the North Stream mainly as a chance to reduce its dependence on transit countries, in Warsaw it was treated as an economic expansion in Europe, providing a tool to increase Moscow’s influence in the Eastern European region.
As for the Orange Revolution, for Poland it was mainly a matter of Ukrainian integration with the EU, which is perceived as strengthening the long-term stability of the Polish eastern neighborhood. Viktor Yushchenko was seen as a guarantor of Ukraine’s democratization and pro-Western foreign policy.
In Russia, Polish activity was interpreted not as driven by national interests but as an implementation of an American plan to weaken Russia’s influence on the post-Soviet area.
The long-term actions focused on building mutual trust could include regular political consultations on different levels and forums and improvement of co-operation on an academic level, i.e. joint research teams, coco-operation between universities, and conferences or seminars. Moreover, a youth exchange program should be established. The Polish-German joint letter to EU Foreign Policy Chief Catherine Ashton and representatives of other member states calls upon the EU to “enable a larger number of Russian students to study in EU member states.” 22
In addition, the creation of Centers for Dialogue and Cooperation in Moscow and Warsaw, the legal framework of which is aimed at securing indepen-dence for them from political fluctuation, could be a step in the right direc-tion. According to the status of the Polish and Russian Centers, they are to be subordinate to the ministers of culture, not foreign affairs, and to operate with
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a budget guaranteed by law. Their operational aims include the above-men-tioned issues, i.e. joint research, youth exchange programs, conferences, etc.
Change in thinking among ruling elites
The short- and mid-term actions involve a change of attitude among decision-making elites in both countries. This brings up the “Russian imperial threat”
issue — for some representing a phantasmal fear on behalf of former satellites, for others seen as a kind of historically-based lodestar, which “calls for” cau-tion and skepticism towards Russia. For sure it is a fruit of mistrust and a real obstacle to building up pragmatic cooperation. Assuming that both sides intend to overcome this situation, they should take appropriate steps.
Poland, for its part, should acknowledge that Russia is at least a regional power with aspirations to become one of the modern centers of power 23 and with strong political, economic, and cultural ties with most of the coun-tries in the region. Consequently, not every action aimed at the realization of national interests is a sign of Moscow’s imperialistic zeal. Warsaw, to a high degree dependent on energy resources from Russia, 24 should aim at maintain-ing the best possible mutual relations, keepmaintain-ing in mind that this doesn’t mean recognizing a Russian “sphere of influence” or accepting every initiative from Moscow. But a “no-step-back” policy or attempts to build regional coalitions based on an anti-Russian agenda will not clear the air in mutual relations, nor will it provide success for Polish interests.
To make this feasible, Russia should understand the importance of partner relations with smaller countries in Eastern Europe and engage in intense dialogue with them, thus soothing their fears and satisfying their ambitions (to a reasonable degree). The latter factor is especially important in the case of Poland, which sees itself as a leader of Eastern-Central Europe. Efforts to base its “European policy” on bilateral relations with major Western Eu-ropean countries (over “Poland’s head”), which Moscow undertook in 2004-2009, caused fear mixed with fury in Poland. Consequently Warsaw proved it would do literally everything it could to change this situation. True, Jarosław Kaczyński’s party, then in power, was particularly trigger-happy, but virtually no Polish government could afford to treat this lightly.
Russia should also make an effort to change its negative “imperial” image that exists in most of the countries of Eastern-Central Europe and the Baltic states.25 This image is the result not only of the mix of the high sensitivity of these countries and some “controversial” actions taken by Moscow (for many countries in the region, the 2008 war with Georgia was seen as a game changer “providing a clear demonstration of Russia’s ability and willing-ness to use force to secure its cross borders interest;” 26 the “gas wars” with Ukraine and Belarus are seen as Moscow’s “means of economic warfare” 27),
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but also of the reluctance of at least part of the Russian elite to say farewell to the imperial past.
While in some CIS countries the image of the Soviet Union may be positive,28 in Eastern-Central Europe the case looks different. Thus, to project its soft power in this region, Moscow could underline the fact that Russia was among the political forces that played a major role in dismantling the Soviet Empire, and “popular fronts in the Baltic states or Ukrainian nationalists would have never achieved their goals if the Russian democrats had not backed them.” 29 The issue of the Soviet Union’s collapse is related to Russia’s internal prob-lems. The above-mentioned reluctance to break with the Soviet Union’s legacy (and to some degree with the imperial past, as well) is to a high degree caused by what followed communism, which despite its countless shortcom-ings and many crimes provided reasonable stability for citizens. The alterna-tive was “wild capitalism,” along with overwhelming corruption, oligarchy, and the de facto failure of the state’s institutions, which caused wide-spread disappointment in society.
One can argue that sentiments towards the Soviet Union are hardly compat-ible with tendencies to recall the imperial past and are mainly connected to economic or “personal” matters. However, this phenomenon also hampers efforts to appraise the Soviet Empire and also pushes some politicians to refer to this period as a tool to gain popular support.
However, some scholars believe that the fact that Russia’s society “did not succeed in obtaining a guilty verdict against the Communist Party dur-ing a court case in the first half of the 1990s” 30 does not present an obstacle for the country’s democratization.31
Still, it wouldn’t be too much of a exaggeration to say that in Poland such ten-dencies are viewed either as an anxious sign of the undemocratic direction Moscow is heading under its current leadership, or as proof of “genetically-based Russian imperialism.” Statements such as Putin’s about the Soviet Union’s collapse being the biggest geopolitical tragedy of 20th century cause a turmoil in the Polish media.
Closing the Katyń massacre case and setting a new future-orientated agenda
Last but not least, there is the problem of Katyń. According to polls conducted in 2010, a huge number of Poles — 81 percent 32 — believe that this issue has a negative influence on mutual relations. It is promising that much effort has recently been made to overcome this controversy and separate historical is-sues from the current political agenda. Nevertheless, since there still remain
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undisclosed facts and documents (i.e. some acts from the 1994-2004 investi-gation or the copy of the decision to discontinue the investiinvesti-gation) and vic-tims have not been legally rehabilitated, the case is likely to be a serious obstacle to building trust in Poland towards Russia and moving mutual (and regional) relations forward.
The declassification of all documents related to the Katyń massacre promised by President Medvedev 33 would gain deeper meaning and significance if it were followed by an appraisal of the communist regime’s crimes against Soviet citizens. This would, without doubt, provide Russia with a dose of trust and credibility in Poland and other countries in the Eastern-Central region.
So far, Polish public opinion has received contradictory messages from Russia. At the end of November, the radio station Echo Moskvy announced that the political decision to rehabilitate the victims had already been made, and the necessary changes in the law were being worked out.34 Just few weeks later, however, the head of archives at The Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation said that due to the lack of the victims’ personal files, rehabilitation is not possible.35 Also, Russia’s positions in Strasburg Court, which is to look into complaints and demands for rehabilitation, are seen in Poland as unacceptable. Russian Deputy Justice Minister Grigori Matushkin stated that Russia is not obliged to investigate the fate of Polish victims, who, as he said, were missing as the result of “incidents in Katyń.” 36 This kind of behavior from Russian officials is at least unclear 37 and presents a serious threat to the rapprochement. If Moscow continues to drift in that di-rection, Tusk’s government will face serious domestic opposition. Moreover, opinions that “Russia is toying with Poland: having hooked it into a relation-ship where failure would be politically damaging and some sign of success is essential, it is now showing a mean and manipulative approach,” 38 will sounds more and more convincing.
Still, even if the final settlement of historical disputes has a high value as a strong foundation of mutual relations, it is the future-oriented agenda that needs to be developed, too. Recent growth of interest in Moscow concern-ing Poland was mostly due to the rather destructive (even if largely justi-fied) role Warsaw played in EU-Russia relations. To keep its high place on the foreign affairs agenda of Moscow and some EU members, Poland should “find” for itself a useful and mutually advantageous role in these relations. Promoting a visa-free regime for Kaliningrad, in which Poland has been engaged lately, seems to be a step in the right direction. The next step should be to support visa-free travel for Russian students, scholars, and businessmen.
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Poland’s support for the free movement of Russian and European citizens would earn it valuable gratitude from Russian society, as well as trust from the government. This looks even more appealing, as it generally lies in line with Polish interests. Poland is a strong supporter of Russia’s comprehensive modernization (including socio-political reforms), as well as the EU’s open-ness to its Eastern neighbors. Thus, the increased movement of people, espe-cially of youth, scholars, and businessmen, should facilitate desired changes in Russia.
So far Poland holds the position that the visa-free regime in EaP countries should be introduced no later than the one with Russia. This attitude is some-how understandable, given the “special relations” Warsaw wishes to sustain with EaP members. However, taking into account the long-term perspective, Poland should not be dogmatic if its position delays visa-free travels for Rus-sians. In other words Warsaw should support the transparency of this pro-cess, in which the country that makes progress is “rewarded,” encouraging other governments to make the necessary efforts.