Peace, conflict and state fragility

Historical analyses of various forms of violence show that violence has been declining over the past centuries (Pinker, 2011, chapter 5); Nevertheless, despite a general decline, these processes are prone to setbacks in individual regions and could possibly reverse even globally. While we observed a substantial decline of international violent conflicts between states after the end of the Cold War in 1990, intrastate conflicts have since then increased. However, given the current political tensions in global politics it does not seem too unlikely that this trend reverses.

Figure  4.5 shows a global decline in battle-related deaths in the post-Cold War era. However, following the year 2005, which saw the lowest number of victims from battle-related deaths in recent history, the past five years, have seen a renewed rise in conflict-related fatalities which exceed even the highest levels from the post-Cold War era. This strong increase can be mainly attributed to the conflicts in Syria and the rise of ISIS in the wider Middle East (Allansson et al., 2017). Although in history more people have died from hunger and epidemics than from warfare, armed conflict and the instability which arises from war and post-conflict situations can be major facilitators of hunger and epidemics (Gates et al., 2012). The data of battle-related deaths described above account only for fatalities from direct violence, the death toll and suffering inflicted through the indirect consequences of armed conflict will be much higher.³ Considering both the direct and indirect effects of major armed conflicts, battle-related death from wars and violent conflict remain a challenge in affected regions and geographical areas.

Figure  4.5. Battle-related deaths 1989-2016, own calculation based on Allansson et al. (2017).

Achieving the ambitious objectives of the 2030 Agenda and beyond will only be possible if political instability and organized violence can be avoided or at least mitigated (Brundtland et al., 1987). Examining the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which preceded the 2030 Agenda, highlights that armed conflict and war are detrimental to many development outcomes in affected countries. Major intrastate conflicts usually stall economic growth and can destroy years of economic development as well as state structures which are needed to enable sustainable development. Similarly, violent conflicts tend to exacerbate undernourishment and increase child mortality (Gates et al., 2012). 90% of all civil wars are recurrences in previously conflict-ridden countries. Walter (2015) finds that every civil war that has started after 2003 (with the exception of Libya) has been a continuation of previous civil war. Thus, affected countries risk being caught in a negative spiral which undermines any efforts to achieve the 2030 Agenda (United Nations and World Bank, 2018). While positive cases of effective international strategies to support sustainable peace do exist, armed violent conflicts and war pose a threat of widening

the gap between different countries or entire regions and puts the global ambition of the SDGs at risk.

Given that armed conflict can derail the transformation to sustainable development, it is important to target the circumstances which breed organized violence. During the past decades, academic research has provided a comprehensive assessment of the conditions which predict armed conflict (Hegre and Sambanis, 2006). Many of these conditions can be found among the targets and indicators described in the SDGs. This reveals an important circular relationship among many SDGs on one side as well as peace and stability on the other. Implementing the SDGs should coincide with substantive reduction in the risk of conflict outbreak. At the same time, however, conflicts that do occur will undermine the progress towards reaching many of the targets in the affected regions. It is thus essential to identify and work towards the targets which are linked with lower risks of violence and instability. Given the high risk of recurrence, parallel efforts need to be made to stabilize and end ongoing conflict as well as to support SDG implementation in post-conflict settings.

Box 4.2. The negative externalities of wind power in Mexico: poor governance and social conflict.

Introducing new policies such as renewable energies can foster trade-offs between SDG and create social conflict if inclusive and integrated governance is missing. Following the liberalization of its energy market in 2013, Mexico has become a regional leader in the production of renewable energy (SDG 7). However, issues of social justice and peace (SDG 16) and land control by small-scale peasants (SDGs targets 1.4 and 2.3) associated with the production of wind energy were not integrated into Mexico’s policy approach. The trade-offs and social conflicts related to the production of wind energy in Mexico were caused by inadequate multi-level and missing inclusive governance, which are characterized by top-down decision making within a weak institutional framework and exclusive decision-making.

Technical studies have identified the Isthmus of Tehuantepec in the federal state of Oaxaca as the most attractive region in the country to implement wind farms. At the same time, however, Oaxaca is one of the poorest Mexican states with 62% of its mostly indigenous population living under the poverty line and 23% living in extreme poverty. Wind energy planning has, this far, been a predominantly federal responsibility, with minor or no participation of the regional government (Oaxaca state) and local authori-ties and populations who are directly affected by the wind parks.

In view of Mexico’s limited economic and technological capacities, it was considered essential to attract foreign private investment to develop the country’s wind potential. After a long phase of state-led development starting from the 1990s, Mexico engaged in neoliberal structural adjustments. The liberalization of the energy sector and land tenure regimes paved the way for wind power as a profit-driven industry and enacted the introduction of private investment in the rural landscape of the Isthmus, which had previ-ously mainly been organized through social and collective forms of property. As a consequence, multinational foreign enterprises emerged as the main protagonists in exploiting wind power.

Wind energy in Mexico is developing under a legal framework of self-supply (autoabastecimiento) that allows private power pro-ducers to partner with industrial off-takers, who invest in the project in order to benefit from a long-term fixed price on their electricity. By August 2015, the installed capacity in the Isthmus was 2160 megawatts (MW), from over 2000 wind turbines, out of which only seven were publicly owned.

Over the past years, the Isthmus region has experienced increasing socio-environmental conflicts that are not only threatening the continued expansion of wind development but also social stability. Following the initial negotiations between private foreign inves-tors and the federal government, indigenous communities had made demands for comprehensive information about wind energy projects, to which the government did not respond. The resistance of local residents against large-scale wind energy projects is mainly targeted against the lack of formal participatory consultation (SDG target 16.7), illegal and unfair leasing contracts, and the meager compensations offered to land holders by private investors. While the worldwide average of payments to landowners fluctuates between 1 and 5% of wind farms’ gross income, on the Isthmus these average between 0.025 and 1.5%. Furthermore, with the majority of energy generated going to industrial off-takers in distant cities, impoverished residents of the Isthmus are not directly benefitting from the product that is being produced on their lands.

Sources: Avila-Calero (2017), Huesca-Pérez et al., (2015), Hernandez-Cortez and Codero, (2014), Juárez-Hernández and León, (2014).

Among the most robust findings in the study of organized violence is the fact that conflicts appear most frequently in the poorest and most undeveloped regions of the world (Hegre and Sambanis, 2006). Establishing food security (SDG 1) and making economic growth inclusive (SDG 8) worldwide should therefore coincide with a substantial decrease in conflict risk.

But economic growth alone will not be sufficient to decrease conflict incidence. For example, child mortality has been found to be a strong predictor of subsequent civil wars and political instability (Goldstone et al., 2010). Although child mortality is certainly not a direct cause of war, the statistical association can be understood as strong evidence that conflicts result from contexts of poor living conditions which leave large parts of the population excluded. Reducing child mortality substantially (SDG target 3.2) by using technical improvements will therefore not lead to a decline in conflicts. On a larger level, however, working towards universal health coverage (SDG target 3.8), can go along with a larger set of policies providing for inclusive social institutions that help promote peaceful societies.

It is important to promote inclusive political and social institutions and mitigate disparities in society (SDG 10 and SDG target 16.7). Aside from absolute deprivation, the equality and exclusion of specific social groups matters. There is increasing evidence that politically marginalized groups are more likely to engage in armed rebellion (Cederman et al., 2011). Similarly, economic inequality between ethnic, religious or other social identity groups appear to drive conflict (Buhaug et al., 2014).

However, it is unlikely that economic inequality single-handedly causes violent conflict. It only causes the outbreak of violent conflict if combined with other factors such as social identities, access to resources and particularistic interests (Bartusevičius, 2014). Promoting political and economic equality within societies (SDG 10) and establishing or strengthening inclusive institutions (SDG target 16.7) should provide more stability to diverse societies and help reduce the risk of armed conflict.

Although democracy is not explicitly enshrined in the SDGs, democratic institutions are generally associated with considerable peace and stability. Democratic regimes are more stable in the long-run when compared to most autocratic regimes (Goldstone et al., 2010). Moreover, the empirical observation that democratic nations do not wage war against each other is one of the most established empirical regularities in international relations (Dafoe et al., 2013). Nevertheless, like most major transformations, changes in political regimes are often associated with internal conflict (Hegre et al., 2001).

However, predominantly closed autocratic regimes that face an abrupt change of power are likely to cause internal war, whereas semi-open systems are less likely to face violence (Ziaja, 2017).

This should serve as a cautioning observation against dramatic action for regime change.

However conflicts with high intensity violence are not the only threat to achieving and implementing the SDGs. Protests with a lower intensity of conflict such as local protests, riots and vandalism have been increasing during the last decade. This has been an overlooked phenomenon, which increasingly occurs

across all types of states in the OECD and developing world in both democracies and autocracies. Highly mobilized social groups protest on an ad hoc-basis to complain about living conditions, for instance against the increase of food prices or unwelcome mega-infrastructure projects (see also Box 4.3). Local protests can be a blessing and a curse for sustainable development and peace, depending on the contextual circumstances. In contexts with functioning and open political institutions they can be important means to channel citizens’ interests and challenge vested interests, which would have otherwise undermined common goods. At the same time, powerful local interests can also challenge common goods, for instance protests against renewable energy generation, opposition against improved electricity grids in Central and Southern Germany. Where local conflicts meet challenging societal structures they are likely to add-up to major incidences of violence. For instance, the intensity of violence is likely to increase where political institutions fail to include peoples’ interest and unfavorable structural conditions, such as increasing inequalities and an exponential population growth (which increases the number of young and mobilized people) evolve.

All in all, the observation that implementing many SDGs should go along with a reduced risk of armed conflict is comforting. Nevertheless, SDG implementation can only serve as a long-term strategy of conflict prevention and not for managing and stopping violent conflict. Even with major advancements toward sustainable development, conflicts will always occur, especially in turbulent times of change. Recent projections contend that with the most optimistic scenarios, the number of conflicts worldwide can be substantively reduced, but war and instability cannot be prevented completely (Hegre et al., 2016). In each affected location or region, these conflicts may put sustainable development in jeopardy. In these situations, conflict will have to be contained and resolved as quickly as possible. This will require substantive efforts by the international community and reliance on well-established tools of conflict management: robust peacekeeping engagements paired with concerted diplomatic efforts to end the conflict.

The international community is not empty handed when it comes to conflict management and resolution. Simulations of global peacekeeping allocation suggest that extensive international commitment and financial contributions to peacekeeping can substantively reduce the level of conflict worldwide over the next decades (Hegre et al., 2011). There is increasing evidence that robust and well-staffed peacekeeping missions are able to deescalate ongoing conflicts and protect the civilian population (Hultman et al., 2014; Hultman et al., 2013).

These findings suggest that states should build the capacity and be willing to contribute to these missions. Alongside peacekeeping operations, the international community will need to patiently push for diplomatic solutions to ongoing conflicts and support mediated conflict resolution. Third party mediation appears to be associated with a higher chance of peaceful settlement and more durable peace (Ruhe, 2018).

Upon successful resolution, peacekeeping operations are again an important policy response to ensure that conflicts do not

Box 4.3. Reforms needed for governing the Transformations Towards Sustainability.

Basic reforms for the economy and governance need to guide the deep changes needed to implement the 2030 Agenda. They will be the basis for transformative governance and guide economic instruments and policies as well as. TWI2050 will develop principles of transformative governance further in its future work.