Overcoming the deployment gap

The deployment gap is a common feature in peace operations, which depicts the fact that

“military forces will have a greater role in early stages because it takes longer to deploy police” (Hansen 2002b: 73). Civilian police contingents are not readily available and deployable as police officers do have their “normal” jobs in their home countries and do not work together in fixed contingents. Military contingents are easier to deploy due to existing logistics and their availability in peace times (Dziedzic 1998: 8-10). A large role therefore is

9 The analysis of the reconstruction of the penal system is excluded from this analysis as

attributed to formed police units existing in many countries, which combine the aspects of police and fixed contingents (see section 1.3.). The deployment gap has to be filled as soon as possible by the international civilian police, judges and prison staff, to be able to provide basic policing and law enforcement duties (Hansen 2002b: 73-74; Strohmeyer 2001c: 61).

The United Nations Transitional Administration in Cambodia (UNTAC) was the first mission in which the deployment gap became apparent, which essentially limited its scope of tasks performed towards ensuring law and order (Serafino 2004: 45). Staffing limits were not reached until one year after the beginning of the mission (Chappell and Evans 1999: 16).

Missions afterwards encountered this problem as well: The number of civilian police adopted by UN member states at the time of the Security Council resolution did not result in subsequent deployment of these contingents. Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, was not fully staffed nine months into the mission (Stodiek 2004a: 169). The problem was even bigger in Kosovo, as an entire police force of unprecedented size had to be deployed as a local one was no longer existent: even one year into the mission, 3,156 of 4,718 officers were deployed, and the approximate full staffing level was not reached until July 2001 (Stodiek 2004a: 286, 329).

Cooperation between military and police are paramount in initial deployment phases even if not provided for in the mandate. This already points to the enforcement gap treated in the next section: IFOR’s reluctance to assist in policing tasks led to major shortfalls and loss of credibility in the beginning of the mandate of the UN International Police Task Force, e.g.

during resettlement of Serb minorities from the Sarajevo suburbs to the Republika Srpska, the Serb entity within the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Dziedzic and Bair 1998: 281-284). As Hansen argues, not only the coordination with military, but also the coordination with other civil actors on the ground is important to achieve a coherent international approach towards the local actors and populations (2002a: 66).¹⁰

The timing of deployment also remains key for newly created police forces: a late deployment of necessary components of police such as investigation capacities can create a climate of impunity undermining the credibility of the newly created police force (Stanley 1999: 121).

We find a similar situation in Kosovo, where no local police existed at all, and had to be substituted by international police.¹¹ There are other cases where non-existing local capacities were substituted by the international presence. In the UN Temporary Executive Authority

10 E.g. security provision during elections was tackled by UNMIK in Kosovo by the establishment of a Committee on Election Security, comprising KFOR, UNMIK, UNMIK Police and OSCE. Author’s interview with Eric Chevallier, former Special Advisor to the SRSG Bernard Kouchner, 19 October 2004.

11 However, we will treat the creation of the UNMIK Police as a case of interim local police force, not as a case falling in the deployment gap.

(UNTEA, 1962-1963) governing the former Dutch colony West Irian (today Irian Jaya), the UN subsequently assumed – without being mandated to do so – police functions as Dutch officers had left and local (Papuan) police forces were not sufficient in number and quality (Schmidl 1998: 31-32).

The apparent shortcomings during Civilian Police missions in the 1990s led to the creation of departments and stand-by arrangements of international and regional organizations. The UN is currently planning to enhance its strategy for deployment and recruitment of qualified police personnel, with a special emphasis on teams of experts rather than deploying single police officers to a post-conflict territory.¹² Regional organizations such as the EU, which established a Police Unit in the External and Politico-Military Affairs Directorate-General in the Council of Europe Secretariat within the CFSP-Framework, and established the EU Civilian Police Initiative providing 5,000 CIVPOL officers (Hansen 2002a: 50, fn. 22;

Hansen 2004). OSCE built up a Strategic Police Matters Unit and established the post of a Senior Police Advisor as well as rosters for Rapid Expert Assistance and Cooperation Teams (REACT) for several civilian purposes, but encountered difficulties due to an overlap with parallel planned EU mechanisms (Buwitt 2001: 11; OSCE 2003; Stodiek 2004a: 437). Other organization such as the African Union (AU) struggle with policing duties and seek advice from EU.¹³ The US State Department, through Presidential Decision Directive PDD-71, set up a nation-wide roster of 500-2000 CIVPOL officers comparable to the EU roster (Lewis, Marks and Perito 2002: 6). The German government founded a federal working group “AG IPTF” to coordinate German contributions and experiences of CIVPOL officers and contingents (Innenministerium Nordrhein-Westfalen 2004).

The bridging of the deployment gap is definitely paramount to success or failure, as the provision of immediate security leads to credibility of the international actors and stability of the overall conflict region. One of the most important aspects of peacekeeping and peace building is the immediate deployment of international actors to provide security in post-conflict situations. The population expects security and help, and should not be disappointed in their expectations; former warring groups need clear signals of leadership and commitment, and of who is capable of taking over control of security, rule of law, and stability.

12 A new strategy for roster and stand-by arrangements will be presented to UN police contributing countries on 15 December 2004. Author’s interview with Andrea Gentile, UN DPKO CPD, 26 November 2004.

13Author’s interview with John Henriksen, former Special Assistant to the UNMIK Police Commissioner, 8 October 2004.

Together with timely deployment, a sufficient amount of physical and moral authority is important for success of CIVPOL missions.