The enforcement gap

Not only due to its initial lack of manpower, in first phase of IPTF cooperation with IFOR was essential. IPTF suffered as well from the enforcement gap, which requires the military to provide more robust back up of law-enforcement to Civilian Police missions (Hansen 2002b:

73-78). Large-scale operations needed the logistical support and military backup of IFOR. To clarify the non-operational and difficult situation of IPTF in the first months, two examples of IPTF/IFOR cooperation in this first phases will be discussed: the transfer of the Bosnian-Serb Sarajevo suburbs to the Federation in February/March 1996, and the organization of the national elections on 14 September 1996.

In the former, IFOR passed responsibility for providing security to the IPTF – in accordance with the Dayton Agreement. However, IPTF was only comprised of 230 unarmed monitors, and was not operational at that point in time, nor did the mandate grant it enforcement powers so that robust action against security threats could be taken (Hansen 2002a: 86; Dziedzic and Bair 1998: 275-276, 281-284).

The fact that the operation was delayed after planning shortcomings by OHR and IFOR, gave IPTF the chance to increase its operational contingents. But it also gave the Bosnian Serbs the chance to design their own plans, and Serb police and military provided transport and protection during the evacuation. IFOR’s rules of engagement did only allow interventions where human lives would be endangered. As IPTF had no enforcement capacities, houses were emptied out and gutted by the leaving Serbs without the intervention of any of the international actors (Dziedzic and Bair 1998: 282-283). The whole operation suffered from the impression of lawlessness, leading to a huge loss of credibility of IPTF (Hansen 2002a:

86). However, it made IFOR realize that closer civil-military cooperation was necessary.

Shortfalls were recognized as well in logistical questions (Dziedzic and Bair 1998: 275), which led to an IFOR/IPTF agreement on a Logistics Support Package to IPTF including emergency help and evacuation of IPTF staff. The failure to provide joint security during the evacuation of the Serb suburbs in Sarajevo, however, led to a general considerable improvement of cooperation (Dziedzic and Bair 1998: 279; Stodiek 2004a: 171).

In the second example, the national elections on 14 September 1996, coordination improved.

IPTF’s patrolling patterns were coordinated with IFOR, and patrols included OSCE officials who were responsible for the organization of the elections. One of the most important tasks of IPTF was to ensure that at checkpoints and at controlling posts at the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) no voters were detained by local police in order the prevent them giving their vote, but only wanted criminals were detained. IFOR was in place to enforce compliance.

IFOR communication specialists and Civilian Affairs Officers deployed to IPTF HQ, and IPTF officials integrated into IFOR command ensured rapid communications. Additionally IPTF left only 600 of the total 1,700 staff in static positions: in order to supervise as many polling stations as possible, 400 two-man Mobile Patrol Teams, together with a dozen 25-men Hot-Spot-Teams, were strategically deployed throughout the country (Dziedzic and Bair 1998: 293-294).

Cooperation improved with SFOR, as both sides had realized the necessity to cooperate in order for both to fulfill their mandates (Stodiek 2004a: 254). The effectiveness of IPTF and its

credibility were increased after the introduction of joint SFOR/IPTF patrols in 1997 (Hansen 2002a: 66), which generally consisted of one IPTF car and 3 SFOR transporters, and provided quasi-enforcement ability for IPTF (Stodiek 2004a: 177). Visibility and credibility among the local police increased when IPTF introduced, in cooperation with OHR, strict rules concerning the setup of checkpoints by the local police, with IFOR providing the military backup and compliance enforcement part (Stodiek 2004a: 172, 182).

The same was valid for weapons inspections: whereas in 1996 most inspections were carried out by IFOR alone (Stodiek 2004a: 174), the IPTF continued, with the support of IFOR and later SFOR, to conduct monthly weapons inspections in police facilities since June 1997⁸⁵ (Stodiek 2004a: 183, 193), which decreased to inspections all 4-months as of July 1998. In the period from 25 November 1998 to 26 February 1999, 149 joint inspections were performed, 56 in the Republika Srpska and 93 in the Federation.⁸⁶

Within the police restructuring efforts of UNMIBH (see 3.1.4.), IFOR and SFOR did not play a large role except the control of Special Police Forces in the Republika Srpska (RS), which were handed over to SFOR control after their strong opposition and internal conflict between RS leaders hindering an agreement on restructuring between UNMIBH and RS.⁸⁷ After their disarmament and training, control over the newly created anti-terror contingents was given back to IPTF (Stodiek 2004a: 194).

To fill the gap between military forces, and the unarmed police monitors in the event of public unrest and/or large-scale operations, Multinational Specialized Units (MSUs) under SFOR command were created in 1998. Among its tasks were the protection of returning refugees, and elected officials. IPTF could call the MSU to assist “in preserving public order”

(Hansen 2002b: 71-72). The effectiveness of the MSU was hampered by its initial absence of a clear mandate.⁸⁸ Although it had the same rules of engagement as SFOR, it did not mean that cooperation and coordination problems did not arise. MSU’s strength was increased in 2000 during a SFOR restructuring, and SFOR’s Multinational Brigade South-East built an international military police contingent, which had policing duties and cooperated with IPTF.

85 This date was crucial as after this intra-Serb power and influence conflicts were used as politicians were distracted and police not unified behind one part.

86 S/1999/284, para. 21, 37

87 S/1997/694, 8 December 1997, p. 2.

88 UNMIBH raised concerns about the role of MSU as either responsibility for law enforcement would be taken away from local police, or MSU would be confused with IPTF monitors (Cordone 2000: 208).

Furthermore, IPTF and SFOR signed an agreement providing joint riot-control training to local police support units in January 2002.⁸⁹

A major change in IPTF/SFOR cooperation took place in 1998, after first pilgrimages of minorities took place through territory inhabited mainly by hostile ethnic groups. OHR deemed these pilgrimages symbolic enough that they had to be carried out despite severe security concerns, but insisted that SFOR should take a leading role in protecting these pilgrimages. However, these actions failed due to the fact that IPTF and local police were not in charge of organizing security.⁹⁰ What became clear again, is that both sides lacked a sufficient amount of planning staff, and coordinated patterns of cooperation, under normal situations.

Cooperation and coordination grew over time rather than a coherent joint approach, which was established from the beginning. Due to the fragmented nature of the international presence in Bosnia, NATO was not willing to concede more support to other international actors and to IPTF – at least in the initial period. As can be seen from the example of the organization of elections, coordination and cooperation improved after several months failing to integrate patrolling and operation plans. By the end of 1996, coordination and cooperation were good during special events. However, for day-to-day operations, the overall situation only improved with the exchange of liaison officers between IPTF and IFOR/SFOR.

Respectable levels of cooperation were not reached before 1999 (Buwitt 2002: 227).

Although functional division between military forces and Civilian police may be clear – military being responsible for providing a stable environment, and Civilian police nurturing

“capability, will and mutual confidence amongst local authorities required” for sustainable law enforcement reform – the need to coordinate, provide effective liaison, and provide mutual assistance is as important as clearly defined areas of responsibility (Hills 2001: 93).

89 Mission Implementation Plan 2002, p. 4.

90 Richard Monk, IPTF Police Commissioner at that time, warned that military assistance would not suffice to make civilian protesters move or give way to the other ethnicities’ pilgrimage, but insisted on an active role the local police should play under IPTF monitoring in protecting the pilgrimage. As predicted, SFOR could not dissolve a civilian blockade of the pilgrimage so that OHR ordered the pilgrimage to turn back. This was when SFOR realized for the first time that police should take over duties, which are connected to communities and civilians (Author’s interview with Richard Monk, 21 September 2004).