On the Art and Ethics of Ancient Rhetoric

the analysis of citizenship presented in the Politics is completed by the treatment of deliberation and judgment in the Rhetoric. As we saw in the foregoing discussion, it is these aspects of ruling in particular that characterize the function of the citizen and, when exercised with a view to justice, constitute the virtue of the citizen. In the Rhetoric Aristotle provides an account of the central role played by speech and argument in deliberation and judgment. It comes to light in the course of this account that the art of rhetoric is the necessary corollary of the ruling activity of the citizen insofar as it gives expression to the arguments necessary for decision making while acknowledging the intrinsic limits of purely logical or rational argumentation. As an art rather than a sci-ence, rhetoric is adapted to the political and human reality of decision-making processes. for it must operate within the constraints imposed both by the specific structures and temporality of political institutions and by the complex nature of human reasoning. to the degree that judg-ment is not the product of argujudg-ment or reason alone, the art of rhetoric must take into account the way in which habit, custom, character, emo-tion, and interest, in addition to argument, influence deliberation and sway judgment. Rhetoric is thus at the crossroads between the ethical and the analytical: “Rhetoric is composed of both analytical science and of the political science concerned with character.”²⁰

the art of rhetoric intervenes in precisely those contexts in which the citizen exercises specific civic functions: the assembly and the courts.

these institutions occupy a space which is left partially vacant by the law, for the law is general in nature, whereas the decision and judg-ment apply to a specific case.²¹ It is the impossibility of the law to deter-mine in advance particular matters that gives rise to jurisprudence.

However, “it is proper that laws, correctly enacted, should themselves define the issue of all cases as far as possible, and leave as little as pos-sible to the discretion of the judges.”²² this statement should forestall any tendency to interpret Aristotelian civic virtue as an idealization of political life. far from depicting a stylized version of citizenship, Aris-totle’s analysis is attentive to the limits of political virtue and to the dangers of abuses of power by citizen-rulers. It thus appears essential

Ancient, Modern, and Post-National democracy 95 that the law circumscribe the decisions of the assembly and the courts:

“first, because it is easier to come upon one or a small number who are of sound intelligence [eu phronein] and have the capacity to legislate and to judge, than a large number; next, because laws are the outcome of lengthy examination, while judgments are that of brief reflection, such that it is difficult for the judges to nobly render justice and what is fitting.”²³ On one hand, this statement acknowledges the limits of human prudence; on the other, it underscores the specific temporality which characterizes political and judicial judgment. In contrast to the relatively long temporality of legislation, that of judgment is abbreviated.

By consequence, political and judicial judgment is more susceptible not only to error but also to short-term or immediate considerations, including personal interest, which tend to adulterate the judging faculty.²⁴ Observing that the role of rhetoric in deliberation is to address a specific audience, Aristotle adds that the reasoning or calculating faculty is itself limited: “the hearers do not have the capacity to synthe-size a number of elements or to calculate [logizesthai] beyond a certain point.”²⁵

Rhetoric is thus not to be confused with a pure analytical science in which logical demonstration leads to the discovery of scientific truth or indisputable necessity.²⁶ Rather, rhetoric is concerned with the possible, the probable, and the plausible, degrees rather than absolutes, contin-gency rather than certainty. In the context of political deliberation, the rhetorician must advocate not the best course of action absolutely, but the best course of action under the circumstances, the best possible course of action: “the one who deliberates does so not about everything but only about those things that might come to pass or not. those things that are, or will be, the result of necessity, or that are impossible or can-not ever occur, are can-not subject to deliberation.”²⁷ Moreover, insofar as rhetoric seeks to persuade (concerning justice and injustice in the case of forensic rhetoric, advantage and harm in the case of deliberative rheto-ric, the noble and the base in the case of epideictic rhetoric), its methods and the conditions of its exercise are to be distinguished from those of science. while the discovery of truth constitutes the self-sufficient end of science, the attainment of accurate knowledge in the course of delib-eration does not ensure an outcome in accordance with that knowledge.

for persuasion does not in all cases follow upon knowledge: “Even if we were to possess the most exact scientific knowledge, it would never-theless not be easy to persuade certain people using arguments arising out of that knowledge; for scientific argument belongs to instruction,

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which is impossible here, as it is necessary to use proofs and arguments that accord with common conceptions.”²⁸ Persuasion presupposes not only the rhetorician’s faculty to persuade, but the hearer’s faculty to be persuaded. In this sense, emphasizing the sole oratorical aspect of rhet-oric leads to an incomplete understanding of Aristotelian deliberation, which is equally characterized by its dialogic aspect. At once a practical and demonstrative art, rhetoric aims at adherence to arguments and action on the part of the hearer.²⁹ In the absence of an implicit dialogue between the speaker and the hearer, rhetoric would be reduced to a reflexive art of oration rather than a dialectical art of persuasion. In underscoring the distinction between the practical art and the exact science, Aristotle incites both those who study and those who prac-tise rhetoric to be mindful of the intrinsic limits of persuasion through scientific knowledge alone.

It is important to recall, moreover, that Aristotle considers his inno-vation in the Rhetoric to be his interlinking of the “dialectical” element of persuasion, consisting in the adduction of proofs, with two other crucial elements: the emotive and the ethical. Having reproached his predecessors for placing disproportionate emphasis on the manipula-tion of the judges’ emomanipula-tions such that they are in fact prevented from judging (the judges in the law courts, “considering only themselves and listening for the sake of their own pleasure, give themselves over to both parties, but do not in fact make a judgment”),³⁰ the Stagirite treats the emotions, not as inhibitors of judgment but as contributors to the formation of judgment.³¹ Emotions, which are paired by opposites – such as anger and gentleness, friendship and enmity, fear and confi-dence, shame and shamelessness, compassion and indignation, envy and emulation – derive not exclusively from the personal experience of pain or pleasure, but from opinions or beliefs that are capable of influencing judgment:³² “the emotions are those affects which, in caus-ing to undergo a change, make a difference with respect to judgments, to which are joined pain and enjoyment.”³³ It is this more complete understanding of the role of emotion in deliberation that the teacher and practitioner of rhetoric must acquire. Pathos is then not opposed to logos, as Kant would affirm,³⁴ but rather shown to contribute to the reasoning faculty so as to produce in the hearer true conviction. It is when emotion is separated from the judging faculty that it becomes the object of inappropriate manipulation. when understood to be an inte-gral part of judgment, however, emotion becomes a valid and indeed indispensable object of persuasion. Equipped with the knowledge of

Ancient, Modern, and Post-National democracy 97 emotions, the speaker will be able to change the opinions and beliefs of the hearer relative to the matter at hand and not relative to the hearer’s mere personal interest and pleasure, as is the case when the manipula-tion of emomanipula-tion prevents judgment.³⁵

As Aristotle argues in his treatises devoted to ethics, the knowledge of emotions is an ethical knowledge. Indeed, the province of ethical or moral virtue (aretè èthikè) is not only that of actions, but also that of emotions, which admit of a mean in the same way as do actions. In both emotions and actions, there exist

excess, deficiency and the mean. for example, to be fearful or confident, to be desirous or angry or compassionate, and in general to experience pleas-ure and pain, either too much or not enough, is in both cases incorrect; but to experience these emotions at the right time, in the right circumstances, with respect to the right individuals, for the right reason, and in the right way, therein lies both the mean and the highest excellence, and this is the very thing which characterizes virtue.³⁶

Ethical virtue presupposes the regulation of the emotions insofar as they play a role in disposing one to action. In the same way that well-regulated emotions participate in virtuous action, emotions properly influenced participate in sound judgment. the persuasion of the emo-tions is thus not to be considered antithetical to deliberation, but as an essential component of the art of rhetoric. However, to the extent that the rhetorician’s role is to persuade rather than to provide an education in virtue, his³⁷ influence on the emotions cannot be expected to produce virtue in the hearer, but is limited to the more modest objective of ori-enting the existing emotions of the hearer, imperfectly regulated as they are, towards the best possible decision in a given case.

Consequently, the effective orator must be able to adapt his discourse to the specific audience being addressed. this means that he will be mindful of both individual characters (èthè) or groups of characters, such as those determined by age,³⁸ and political characters, that is to say, the specific character of the political regime in which the deliberation takes place. It is in the context of deliberative or political rhetoric in particular that knowledge of the character of the regime is paramount:

“what is most important and authoritative [kuriôtaton] in order to be able to persuade and advise nobly is to apprehend all the regimes and to distinguish the characters, institutions, and advantage of each. for all are persuaded by considerations of advantage, and preserving the

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regime is advantageous. Moreover, the declaration of the sovereign authority [kurios] is authoritative, and the sovereign authority is deter-mined by the regime; for there are as many sovereign authorities as there are regimes.”³⁹ Recalling the treatment of the question of sovereignty (to kurion) and the classification of regimes in the Politics,⁴⁰ Aristotle here argues that the most effective rhetorician will possess a sufficient knowledge of the different political regimes so as to be able to grasp the cultural and institutional specificities of his own regime and, armed with that knowledge, better advocate for the interests of his regime.

despite his sufficiently comprehensive political knowledge, however, the rhetorician is not to be assimilated with the political philosopher, whose knowledge and perspective tend to place him in the position of impartial judge of the various regimes. In contrast to the philosopher, the rhetorician must, to a certain extent, adopt the perspective of the regime of which he is a part. this implies not only knowledge of but attachment to the end (telos) of the regime.⁴¹ Both the sovereign author-ity (the people, the few, the wealthy, etc.) and the end or fundamental aim is specific to each regime: liberty in the case of democracy, wealth in the case of oligarchy, etc.⁴² the persuasive speaker in a democracy cannot afford to be ambivalent about his commitment to liberty. Only democratic arguments will succeed in convincing a democratic audi-ence. In this sense, the etymology of the term “advise” or “counsel” – symbouleuein – is suggestive. Literally the term implies “deliberating together”; engaging in an implicit dialogue about the city, about the action and direction it must take, the rhetorician participates in a com-mon deliberation with his fellow citizens. therein lies the Aristotelian critique of the Sophistic conception of rhetoric as an art or technique the mastery of which is independent of ethical and political knowledge.

Rejecting the notion of a technical rhetoric, Aristotle describes an intrin-sically political rhetoric rooted in the practice of citizenship and in the particularity of the political regime.