On Ancient Citizenship: The Aristotelian Conception of Deliberation, Judging, and Ruling

In order to bring to light the political and philosophic roots of the opposition between properly political conceptions of citizenship and universalistic conceptions inspired by Kantian rationalism, an exami-nation of the Aristotelian conception of citizenship is indispensa-ble. for not only did Aristotle furnish one of the earliest theoretical analyses of citizenship based on the practices developed in the city (polis), but he also profoundly influenced subsequent conceptions of civic republicanism. It is ultimately an Aristotelian form of citizenship which defines the civic republican notion of citizenship. two distinct but interdependent elements characterize the Aristotelian conception of citizenship. first, the citizen is distinguished by the activity charac-teristic of citizenship. the citizen is a political actor. Second, the activ-ity of citizenship is characterized by the capacactiv-ity to deliberate. Political deliberation requires practical reason and has as its objective decision and action. from this point of view, rhetoric is considered to play a fundamental role in the practice of citizenship. Rhetoric is the form of speech proper to the domain of political action, in which contingency and opinion reign, not predictable certitude and scientific truth. the domain of political action thus calls for an art of argument and persua-sion indispensable to good decipersua-sion making.

Ancient, Modern, and Post-National democracy 91 Aristotle problematizes the question of citizenship in the third book of the Politics. Rather than a straightforward exposition of a theory of citizenship, his discussion constitutes an examination of a series of prob-lems (aporiai) related to the question of the definition of the citizen and of the citizen’s specific virtue.² the starting point of the discussion is the affirmation that the polis is composed of citizens; put otherwise, the city cannot exist without a minimum number of active citizens.³ A pre-cise definition of the citizen as such is the subject of disagreement, not least because the criteria for citizenship vary with the political regime.

Certain definitions can, at any rate, be eliminated from the outset: a citizen is not defined simply by place of residence, nor even by certain legal rights, such as the right to sue and be sued. As Aristotle, himself a metic of Athens, observes, resident aliens share a common place of residence and certain legal rights with citizens without enjoying full citizenship.⁴ In the strict sense of the term, Aristotle argues, the citizen is one who shares in (metechein) judging (krisis) and ruling (archè). the citizen is the juryman (dikastès) or the member of the assembly (ekklè-siastès). Anticipating possible objections, the Stagirite insists that both these offices constitute ruling offices, despite the absence of the term for “ruling office” or “ruler” (archè, archôn) from their official titles, as no specific term is associated with them. Indeed, these offices are the most sovereign offices; accordingly, they are to be considered under the heading of “undetermined rule” (aoristos archè).⁵

As these passages suggest, Aristotle’s innovation consists in adapting the analytic framework and language of political theory to the reality of political life in the polis. decision making or, more generally, ruling is in fact in the hands of those who judge public and private suits as well as those who deliberate on public matters. Consequently, Aristotle pro-poses to call both types of offices archè. And it is a share in ruling that in practice distinguishes the citizen from the non-citizen, resident alien, or disenfranchised citizen. As Aristotle’s analysis emphasizes, legal rights are distinct from political rights. while legal rights are, under certain conditions, granted to residents, political rights are proper to citizens.

Only citizens share in determining the common destiny of the city. In this sense, a city is not to be assimilated with other forms of alliance or trade bloc, for in these cases there are no common ruling offices among the partner cities.⁶ while the member cities of a military alliance or a trade bloc have certain interests in common and enjoy mutual rights and protections, they do not share in a common political association (politikè koinônia). It is precisely this specific form of association or

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community that requires of its members deliberative and ruling capaci-ties. these capacities are to be put to the service of justice, in its punitive sense but more particularly in its positive sense; the end of political rule and the political association in general is virtuous or noble action: “It is for the sake of noble actions that the political association must be con-sidered to exist, rather than for the sake of living together.”⁷

Indeed, sharing a common geographic space, participating in a com-mon social life, be it through family ties, religious customs, or cultural activities, and engaging in economic exchanges constitute necessary conditions for the existence of a city, but these necessary conditions are nonetheless insufficient to constitute a veritable association of citi-zens. the end (telos) of the city as such is living well (to eu zèn),⁸ that is to say, activity in accordance with practical virtue: “Any city which is truly so called, and is not merely one in name, must be attentive to virtue.”⁹ Political or civic activity thus distinguishes the veritable city from a mere alliance whose members are not subject to common laws and institutions which, beyond the mere enforcement of covenants and punishment of individual injustices, promote virtue and justice.¹⁰ the activities of deliberating, judging, and ruling with a view to justice give the citizen the opportunity to practise the political or civic virtue (politikè aretè) evoked by Aristotle in his conclusion of the discussion concerning the political association’s specificity with respect to other types of association: “those who contribute most to this association have a greater share in the city than those who are equal to them (or even greater) in free birth and descent, but unequal in political virtue, or than those who surpass them in wealth but are surpassed by them in virtue.”¹¹ Illuminating the true character of the city thus leads to a clearer understanding of the citizen and civic virtue. Insofar as the end of the city is virtuous activity, the good citizen must be defined in light of the sole criterion of civic virtue rather than that of birth or wealth qualifications. In this sense, the Stagirite’s argument constitutes a cri-tique of both the democratic and the oligarchic perspective concerning justice. Justice is neither strict equality for those of free birth nor equal-ity proportionate to wealth, but must instead be a function of virtue.

It is by honouring civic virtue above all else that the city “distributes”

justice according to political merit.

At the same time, the Aristotelian definition of citizenship is not strictly neutral with regard to the type of political regime. Rather, it is a definition that most closely corresponds to one regime in particu-lar: democracy. for it is in (Athenian) democracy that the citizen shares

Ancient, Modern, and Post-National democracy 93 in the ruling offices in an “indeterminate” manner: on one hand, the jury has a general function, being authorized to judge a whole range of private and public cases; on the other hand, the popular assembly is a permanent institution holding regular sessions. In regimes other than democracy, such as Sparta, the popular assembly does not exist and the jury’s function is divided among different bodies convened to judge different types of cases.¹² Given the institutional specificities of the Athenian regime, the initial definition of the citizen appears too restric-tive. Aristotle thus introduces a modification of the definition to render it less regime-specific, while nonetheless maintaining its substance: the citizen is defined as one who is eligible to share in (koinônein) deliberative or judicial office, even if the said offices are not for an unlimited term.¹³

this modification does not, however, resolve all the difficulties raised by the question of citizenship. As it is pointed out in the subsequent discussion, the question of the just attribution of citizenship remains.

Even if one is authorized to partake of the function of citizen, does it necessarily follow that the attribution of citizenship was just? this was an objection raised against the democratic reforms instituted by Cleisthenes, which expanded citizenship to foreigners as well as slaves and resident aliens. Clearly, Aristotle does not wish to encourage the calling into question of the political rights of certain classes of citizens, as he dismisses this objection by reaffirming his functional definition:

one who exercises the functions of the citizen is, by definition, a citi-zen.¹⁴ this functional definition also resolves a difficulty raised by jus sanguinis. Insofar as the requirement that one’s parents be citizens can-not apply to the founders and earliest inhabitants of a city, it is clear that, in these cases, citizenship was indeed determined by its exercise and not by ancestry.¹⁵ Another difficulty concerns the legitimacy not of an individual’s title to citizenship but rather of the decisions made by the regime’s rulers. Under what circumstances and on what bases can a decision made by the city be called into question? Aristotle considers two general cases: that of the transformation of an oligarchy or tyranny into a democracy and that of a deviant democracy, that is to say, a democ-racy acting by force and contrary to the common interest. In the first case, a contract engaged by the previous regime would appear to be non-binding on the grounds that the rulers’ authority was based on force rather than the common good. Anticipating the classification of regimes into correct and deviant regimes according to which democracy is considered to be the deviant form of “constitutional government”

(politeia),¹⁶ Aristotle affirms that a similar conclusion must also apply in

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the second case.¹⁷ As the federalists,¹⁸ tocqueville,¹⁹ and others would later emphasize, democracy is not immune to despotic tendencies, despite its intimate connection to civic virtue.