Since Kagame and the RPF took power in 1994, they have attempted to establish the legitimacy of the government. This task was easier in the aftermath of
civil war because the RPF is universally credited for stopping the genocide. When Prudence Bushnell, the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, in-structed Kagame in 1994 to stop his advance and ne-gotiate with the interahamwe, his response—“Madam, they’re killing my people.” 66—later gave him a humani-tarian credibility that the global community had been lacking.
After the genocide, international guilt provided leeway for the RPF that otherwise would have been replaced with condemnation over its human rights abuses. To be fair, the controversial operations in the DRC did stem from a legitimate security threat. Geno-cidaires who had fled across the border continued their atrocities often using the safety of refugee camps as bases for operations. RPF soldiers, however, did not clearly demarcate the line between war-fighting and retribution. The operational necessity of certain bru-talities is still in question.
Nor were the human rights abuses reserved for the DRC. The immediate post-genocide period was accompanied by revenge killings of many Hutu lead-ers still in the country, including judges, local govern-ment officials, clerics and teachers. The RPA is a well-documented source of the killings.67 In 2004, judges, mayors, teachers and other government officials con-sidered opponents of the state were purged.68 A 2005 Frontline report revealed that, “for stating their beliefs about the government, Rwandans can now be impris-oned, disappear, be forced into exile, or killed.”69
When donors finally began to notice the abuses of the Rwandan government, Kagame became increas-ingly defiant, unwilling to have Rwanda’s political options hampered by financial pressures. In 2000, the Bush administration threatened to rescind support
for IMF aid to Rwanda if the country did not retreat from the DRC.70 Two years later, Kagame had yet to remove his troops so the U.S. blocked a disbursement of Rwanda’s Poverty Reduction and Growth Facil-ity.71 Afterward, Kagame announced that “Rwandans must stop being dependent on the international com-munity, whose attitude that compounds our problems emerge[s] from indifference, ignorance, and malice.”72 The president’s irritation continued for years, notably in May 2006, when he ignored an assessment by the World Food Programme that suggested that almost 300,000 Rwandans needed emergency famine re-sponse.73 He referred to the estimation as “mere fab-rication, opportunistic and serving selfish interests,”74 despite USAID’s support for the assessment with their Famine Early Warning System.75
Still, donors have shown sympathy, often owing to the Rwandan government’s technocratic abilities.76 Because of their unquestioning support for Kagame’s regime, some accuse Rwanda’s patrons of “re-creat-ing the preconditions for catastrophe.”77 Just as aid agencies believed—up until the genocide—that the Habyarimana government was isolated from early acts of Hutu violence and continued to provide fund-ing, donors today separate political and economic spheres. Countries only occasionally threaten to with-draw their funding, and they act on their threats even more rarely.
Instead, the global community has given Kagame awards highlighting his social achievements. These include the African National Achievement Award, Andrew Young Medal for Capitalism and Social Prog-ress, Global Leadership Award, the ICT Africa Award and honorary degrees from American educational in-stitutions.78
Nonetheless, not all U.S. agencies have ignored Rwanda’s political reality. While USAID remains cau-tiously optimistic about Rwanda’s security and health achievements, it does recognize the country’s short-comings in governance. The agency’s Integrated Stra-tegic Plan for Rwanda between 2004 and 2009 added a new political objective for the Rwandan government:
“Improved governance through increased citizen participation.”79 In 2008, Rwanda joined the U.S. Mil-lennium Challenge Corporation threshold assistance program to “strengthen the capacity and indepen-dence of the judiciary, expand opportunities for civic participation, and promote civil rights and liberties.”80 Again, ODA earmarked for such democratic activities has been on the rise for the past decade.
Real democracy, however, remains elusive. The first democratization process began in 2001, as the government’s transition period ended. Local elections were held, but RPF appointees controlled the voting system, the use of finger printing circumvented efforts at a secret ballot, and Human Rights Watch found the election to be “flawed from the beginning.”81 After the 2003 presidential election, grassroots political activity continued to be banned, and pluralism was reduced with further restrictions on political parties.82 In 2010—
after the five-year USAID program and over a decade of democracy assistance from the U.S.83—Kagame won the presidential elections with 93% of the vote amidst widespread concerns about pre-election coercion such as arrests and assassinations plagued opposition lead-ers and independent journalists.84 Meanwhile, two op-position parties were banned, and, as usual, the gov-ernment considered criticism of the Kagame regime to be an act of criminal “divisionism.”85 The three candi-dates who did run against Kagame were nominated by RPF cartel parties.86
NGOs in Rwanda have also been targets of politi-cal oppression. Human rights groups are particularly vulnerable if they denounce government actions. By 1996, 38 NGOs were expelled from Rwanda, and the operations of 18 others were suspended.87 The govern-ment mandates that NGOs register with the Ministry of Local Government and submit regular reports on progress and finances. While this regulates potential-ly disruptive behavior and allows the government to track development, the annual records are not always publically accessible, and the consequences of govern-ment intervention can be severe. Notably, the League for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights in Rwanda had to flee in 2004 after its assets were frozen, and it was accused of divisionism.88