For several years, the United States has been work-ing on Afghan police reform. The local police initiative has already been established as part of the military
strategy for security transition. This program was for-mally launched in 2010 after President Karzai autho-rized the establishment of Afghan local police.7 Cur-rently there are four types of local community police initiatives: The Afghan Local Police (ALP) is aimed at defending their communities. The Local Defense Ini-tiatives (also known as Village Stability Operations) are assisted by the U.S. Special Forces to protect their villages. The Afghan Provincial Protection Program (APPP) is built and funded by Department of Defense.
Finally, the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) is developed by the Ministry of Interior in partnership with ISAF and the U.S. Embassy in Kabul. The APPF was designed to replace the private security compa-nies in the protection of people, infrastructure, facili-ties, construction projects and convoys.8 The APPF is an important milestone in the ongoing transition from private security companies to government security. In view of all these programs, the United States might need to prioritize or ask allies to provide assistance, such as advisors, trainers and technology, which are the most basic needs for the maintenance and opera-tion of Afghan localized police. In practical terms, these initiatives are sustainable with little security force assistance.
Local community police are practical and effective because locally recruited police officers are connected to the community and feel responsible to their duty.
A local police officer understands the terrain and does not need to spend time learning the environment and adapting to the situation. Furthermore, trust is an im-portant factor for police officers, and a police officer who grows up in the community will already be well known. Most importantly, the local police officer will wholeheartedly be committed to his duty for
pro-tecting his community, which consists of his family, friends, relatives and other clan members. If a local policeman does something wrong he will be chastised by the community and family. Because of the fear of isolation from community and fear for the prestige of his family, he will be committed to his job and provide the best security to the locals.
Afghanistan struggles with its diverse terrain and ethnic groups, which is another reason for having a local community police. It is impracticable to install a police officer in a village where the spoken language is not his native language. A police officer who comes from another tribe might be dedicated to his job but lacks certain vital advantages. For example, he lacks the awareness and understanding of the community as compared to locally recruited police. For example, an officer who comes from southern Afghanistan to serve in a village in the central part of Afghanistan, the area that is mostly populated by Hazaras, would need to learn the language, traditions, local culture and otherwise adapt to the particular community, while a local police officer already possesses all these advantages
Police are the first line of defense and the most vis-ible face of the government to the population. There-fore, the recruitment for a local police should be done carefully. The most challenging part of creating local community police is the process of recruitment. The requirements should not be affected by nepotism, bribery, or local chiefs’ or warlords’ influence. To avoid turbulence, the person who is being recruited must be evaluated on criteria that would include both a background check and a mental, physical and health check. Unfortunately, for the past two years these cri-teria have not been measured, so local power brokers
have gained influence over the local police programs.
Recently, Human Rights Watch reported that the ALP members in several provinces have committed human rights abuses, including looting, illegal detention, beat-ings, killbeat-ings, sexual assault and extortion.9 Incidents like this undermine the legitimacy of the ALP and dis-tance the populace from the government. In order to prevent such unpleasant incidents, the national police should be trained to watch over the ALP. If a member of the ALP breaches the law and his responsibilities, it should be the ANP’s job to investigate the case, and the perpetrator should be punished. Effective security forces require checks and balances. In this case, the ANP should always gear up to restore the public trust by providing better security forces to locals. Since the United States has begun the initiative and has been in-volved with developing this program for the security transition to Afghan forces, it has a responsibility to engage with the Afghan government on developing this program post-withdrawal.
CONCLUSION
The sociopolitical and economic realities of Af-ghanistan indicate that it is not feasible to have a large security force in Afghanistan. The fragile security and peace, which has been achieved since 2001, obligate the United States to remain engaged in Afghanistan after 2014. As a matter of prudence, U.S. achievements in Afghanistan will be at risk if the withdrawal is too abrupt because Afghanistan will not be capable of handling its security by itself. The future stability of Afghanistan after 2014 requires constructive U.S. en-gagement. A comprehensive, long-term framework is essential for ensuring the proper functioning of
se-curity forces in the country. With the end of the in-surgency, the Afghan government and its American advisers should begin transforming the Afghan police from a counterinsurgency force to a law enforcement organization. This transition requires police training, procurement and advisory support. The police should be mentally and physically ready to provide protec-tion to citizens and prevent any harassment or insur-gent activities that threaten the citizens. Of course, it is not easy to resolve all problems just by reforming security forces, but the current situation requires pri-oritizing the assets that help to bring stability to the country. The Afghan security challenges cannot be solved by national police alone. There are many other areas that need improving, such as the criminal justice system. If security reform successfully takes place and the government is able to deliver good security and protection to the people, this will affect the need for reform in other systems as well.
The effectiveness and professionalism of the Af-ghan police and army depends on the performance of the United States as a partner. Advisors provided by the United States may help the country to revive its pre-Soviet era security reputation. This will require U.S. help and Afghan responsibility in building an ef-fective police force that provides security and justice to the Afghan people. The reform of the ANA and ANP is more likely to succeed if the U.S. continues its strong support for the Afghan government. Big re-forms are sometimes expensive, but in this case, they require less logistical support and expense on the part of the international community if the burden rests on the Afghans. Such reform will definitely improve the lives of the Afghan people and will strengthen the effectiveness of other reform efforts as well.
Further-more, the United States will benefit from security and stability in Afghanistan.
When it is secure, the United States and Afghani-stan can mutually profit from the trillions of dollars of untapped natural resources. More importantly, the country will stand on its own two feet and not become a safe haven for terrorists once again. Other benefits would include reduction of threats to the United States and a reduction in the number of refugees who attempt to enter to United States and other countries.
Security will bring peace and prosperity to the coun-try. Afghanistan and America could become partners in trade and investment. A secure and prosperous Af-ghanistan will also stop growing poppies for opium and will allow children who labor in the poppy fields will go to school instead. Finally, a secure and prosper-ous Afghanistan will be a place where democracy will flourish, which is the main goal of the United States.
ENDNOTES
1. Ray Rivera, “Support Expected for Plan to Beef up Afghan Forces,” New York Times, January 16, 2011.
2. Julian Borger, “Afghanistan Faces $4bn Defense Funding Shortfall,” The Guardian, December 1, 2011.
3. Joshua Parlow, “More Afghan Soldiers Deserting the Army, NATO Statistics Show,” The Washington Post, September 1, 2011.
4. International Business Publications, Burkina Faso Foreign Policy and Government Guide: Volume 1 (Washington, D.C.: Inter-national Business Publications, 2003).
5. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO Training Mis-sion - Iraq (NTM-I),” http://www.aco.nato.int/page136952.aspx.
6. Robert M. Perito, “Afghanistan’s Police: The Weak Link in Security Sector Reform,” (Washington, D.C.: United States Insti-tute of Peace, 2009).
7. U.S. Department of State, “Report on Progress toward Se-curity and Sability in Afghanistan,” (Washington, D.C.2010).
8. International Security Assistance Force, “Afghan Public Protection Force Signs First Contracts,” http://www.isaf.nato.int/
article/news/afghan-public-protection-force-signs-first-contracts.html.
9. Human Rights Watch, “Afghanistan: Don’t Expand Afghan Local Police,” http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/12/15/afghanistan-don-t-expand-afghan-local-police.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Borger, Julian. “Afghanistan Faces $4bn Defense Funding Shortfall.” The Guardian, December 1, 2011.
Human Rights Watch. “Afghanistan: Don’t Expand Afghan Local Police.” http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/12/15/afghanistan-don-t-expand-afghan-local-police.
International Business Publications. Burkina Faso Foreign Pol-icy and Government Guide: Volume 1. Washington, D.C.: Interna-tional Business Publications, 2003.
International Security Assistance Force. “Afghan Public Pro-tection Force Signs First Contracts.” http://www.isaf.nato.int/arti-cle/news/afghan-public-protection-force-signs-first-contracts.html.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. “NATO Training Mis-sion - Iraq (NTM-I).” http://www.aco.nato.int/page136952.aspx.
Parlow, Joshua. “More Afghan Soldiers Deserting the Army, NATO Statistics Show.” The Washington Post, September 1, 2011.
Perito, Robert M. “Afghanistan’s Police: The Weak Link in Se-curity Sector Reform.” Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2009.
Rivera, Ray. “Support Expected for Plan to Beef up Afghan Forces.” New York Times, January 16, 2011.
U.S. Department of State. “Report on Progress toward Secu-rity and Sability in Afghanistan.” Washington, D.C., 2010.
SECTION II:
HELPING POST-CONFLICT COUNTRIES