Some of the reflections above date from 1995, a long time ago, and have become common since then. For example, Durevall and Erlandsson (2005) ask why the at-tempts at civil-service reform have not produced results. They mention the history of a once efficient civil service and the fact that Malawi had actually a small civil service that could not easily be reduced. Performance contracts for senior civil serv-ants are the only element of reform that has been carried out. However, these inno-vations amount to nothing more than granting these officials a huge pay rise, as performance appraisals were not carried out. They therefore conclude, rightly, that civil-service reform in Malawi is an example of elite capture. This cancerous situa-tion is a logical outcome of the elite bias analysed above. Given this bias, it is not
surprising that this elite capture led to labour unrest, culminating in a massive civil service strike in 2013. The strike ended in February of that year with a 61 per cent pay rise for the lowest paid and a 5 per cent pay rise for the highest paid (Nyassatimes 2013), a reflection of the protest against the growing inequality inherent in the policy.
Civil-service reform has thus been embedded in political struggles and has been hijacked by a power elite. The extent and nature of this elite have become visible in the cashgate scandal. This became apparent in a bizarre sequence of events that to date is still not clear. Central to these was the shooting of the budget director, Paul Mphwiyo. This was the occasion for, or occasioned by, a police enquiry that revealed huge stacks of cash that had been kept out of the banking system and were found under pillows or in car boots. The government commissioned an enquiry by the ac-countancy firm, Baker Tilly, which was paid for by the British Department for Inter-national Development. The enquiry concluded that the equivalent of US$ 30 million had been siphoned off from the government, partly through outright theft, and part-ly through paying for contracts that had simppart-ly not been carried out.
Baker Tilly’s enquiry revealed networks in which the civil service played a central role. A small group of people signed most of the cheques that were issued without any consideration:
David Kandoje was the Accountant General, Auzius Kazambo Mwale was a Director in the Accountant Generals Department, Roosenelt Ndovi was a Principal Accountant and Agness Kapokosa was an Accountant.
(Baker Tilly 2014: 40)
The report also uncovered a complicated web of relations between civil servants, politicians and bogus companies. For example:
Mkhuzo Bandula James Chirwa was a Senior Quantity Surveyor with the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development in Lilongwe and also the proprietor of Zozama Civil Engineering Contractors. Zozama Civil Engineering Contractors received MK 131,224,494 from the GoM but did not provide any goods, services or works in return. Steven Mwe-nitete, the owner of Sky Civil Engineering states he received cheques from the Ministry of Local Development and Rural Development via ‘Mr Chirwa’, he then met Yohani Kaweche, the owner of Mundikhumbengi
Building Contractors in Mzuzu where he witnessed receipt of over MK 7m cash and four cheques for between MK 7m to MK 8m each noted as
‘pay cash’ to be taken back to Bandula Chirwa. The name Bandula Chirwa is a similar name to Mkhuzo Bandula James Chirwa.
Mundikhumbengi Building Contractors’ bank statements show four che-ques totalling MK 28,500,000 were cashed between 13 and 24 Septem-ber 2013 with all proceeds withdrawn by Yohani Kaweche. Steven Mwe-nitete states the cash was then handed over to Hussein Chaphazika, a Receiving Officer at the Accountant Generals Department. (Baker Tilly 2014: 68)
Cashgate is important from the perspective of civil-service reform because it arose as part of a project to improve the functioning of the civil service. With donor sup-port, there was an important and sensible attempt to introduce a computerised fi-nancial information system. If that functioned properly, it would make non-author-ised payments visible. This attempt gave rise to massive resistance and obstruction.
The attempt at reform in fact gave rise to more stealing from the government: the people at the centre of the scam were the people who knew best how to obstruct the system.
This raises questions about how the people engaged in these practices think. These social practices have to be understood and not merely portrayed as aberrations.
This raises questions about the life-worlds – the social interpretations of the world – that underlie such behaviour. It is in the first place social behaviour, and that re-quires a shared set of ideas (Berger and Luckmann 1966). Throughout Africa we find court cases and commissions of enquiry into such affairs: these should be studied in order to gain insight into the environments within which civil-service re-form founders. Such studies can provide us with a broader sociological and political analysis that produces greater understanding of the failure of technical advice.
Conclusion
Civil-service reform had been on the backburner in Malawi in the past decade, but that has now changed. After his inauguration Peter Mutharika, the recently elected president of Malawi, immediately used the language of civil-service reform. More than that is required, however. Problems of theft impact on the effectiveness of the state, but these are problems of politics, power and control. The cashgate scandal illustrates in the first place that the question is not whether there are controls, but whether they are effective. Tackling this requires power politics: the president will have to mobilise a group of people who are willing to police the civil service if steal-ing is to be contained. That is difficult, as it is dangerous to come too close to stolen money. It requires building a narrative that brings trust back into government. The kind of research suggested above may be helpful in doing this, but it cannot replace the skills of politics.
Stressing the practice of politics in this way may lead readers to believe that the technicalities of civil service reform are futile. That would be wrong. The reflections above do not belittle these efforts. Above all other considerations, appreciation of the need for an effective state is the major theme of Therkildsen’s work. The quest for more historical studies implies that an effective state is possible. The quest for more sophisticated thinking about motivation, labour markets and the state implies searching for a positive role for the latter. More sociological analysis from below will make it possible to define the problem better. It can create an awareness in which the basic bureaucratic capacities which are of such concern in Therkildsen’s work acquire meaning. There continues to be a great need for people to work on this theme despite the difficult circumstances.
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