In our comparative analysis we will search for common mechanisms that drive suc-cessful interventions in agricultural sectors but that are absent in the less success-ful cases (Geddes 2003). Table 2 summarizes in the first column the reform out-comes and highlights, in the subsequent columns, the main features of each case respectively in terms of type of intervention, and the relationship between govern-ment and interest groups.
With regard to the type of policy intervention, although the five countries had all en-tered into structural adjustment agreements with the IMF and the World Bank and had committed themselves to implementing liberalization and privatization reforms, the types of intervention on the ground varied in terms of content, and at times dif-fered considerably from the original donor recommendations.
The Burkina Faso reform was quite distinctive in its eclectic approach. First, the government implemented institutional reform in the cotton sector before market reform in order to strengthen the governance of the sector and actors’ capacities.
Then it agreed to give up majority control in the parastatal company, but instead of opening shareholding to private investors, it offered 30 percent shares to the nation-al producer association, whose leader was then very close to the president. Though liberalization in ginning occurred, the government managed to maintain control of the process: two new companies were allowed to enter the sector, but they could only control a 15 percent market share together (Kaminski and Serra 2011).
Table 2. Comparing reform outcomes and processes 1. Outcomes 2. Type of Policy
Intervention 3. Government–
Privatization No steering and no inclusion of interest groups
PalmOil Ghana Failure to increase production/exports;
Sources: APP and EPP fieldwork notes, Working Papers, and articles, in particular Kaminski and Serra (2011) for Burkina; Yérima and Affo (2011) and Serra (2012) for Benin; Fold and Whitfield (2012) for Ghana;
Buur et al. (2012) for Mozambique; and Kjær et al. (2012) for Uganda.
The success of Burkina’s cotton-sector reforms have been widely attributed to the government’s ability to combine some of the ingredients of standard economic re-form – tighter regulation and the entry of new actors improved the managerial per-formance of the main cotton company – with exigencies dictated by domestic po-litical and economic conditions (Kaminski and Serra 2011). The latter led to the adoption of a local monopoly model, whereby cotton companies operate each in their exclusive cotton zone (thus maintaining the advantage of the market coordina-tion provided by a vertically integrated monopoly) rather than openly competing with one another.
In Uganda, targeted initiatives to promote the dairy sector preceded liberalization.
The National Resistance Movement government initiated a rehabilitation of the dairy infrastructure (coolers, generators and roads) in south-west Uganda as early
as 1987, whereas liberalization was only wholeheartedly supported after some years of negotiations among various elite factions and the international financial institutions. Privatization met more resistance and was dragged out for a long time:
decided in 1993, it was only put into effect in 2006. The former state-owned Dairy Corporation was sold cheaply to a foreign investor, and the state did not acquire any shares in it. After milk production and trade had increased substantially during the 1990s, a regulatory agency, the Dairy Development Authority (DDA), was set up in 2000. The DDA’s regulatory initiatives had positive effects on the way milk was trad-ed and transporttrad-ed (Kjær et al. 2012; Kjær 2015).
In Mozambique, rather than introducing whole-scale privatization for the sugar sec-tor, a hybrid model was adopted instead. The big state-owned sugar plants were privatized and sold to companies from South Africa and Mauritius, but with the state acquiring shares. Four out of six sugar plants were privatized and rehabilitat-ed, one of them initially with the state as the majority shareholder (51 percent), and with the state acquiring some shares in all four. Also, a tariff was implemented that protected domestic sugar production. The sugar strategy also defined key state and government tasks related to foreign loan-taking, the creation and enforcement of a protected internal market, the provision of certain forms of infrastructure like elec-tricity and rail and port upgrading (Buur et al. 2011).
The two less successful cases differ from those discussed above in terms of the type of policy involved. In the early 1990s Benin appeared to be rather favourable to economic reforms thanks to the election to the presidency of a former World Bank official who was close to the Washington consensus. In 1993, President Soglo’s government embarked on liberalization reforms in the cotton sector, favouring the entry of many new players into the input distribution, seed-cotton transport and ginning sub-sectors (Yérima and Affo 2011). The privatization of the main para-statal encountered more resistance both within and outside the company. When it finally took place, the subsequent governments presided over by President Kérékou did not have the capacity to ensure transparency and enforce regulation. Dominant private investors in the country took control of the company, de facto establishing a private monopoly, which was no less prey to rent-seeking impulses than a public one would have been. Despite the implementation of several measures formerly advocated by the Washington institutions, therefore, the performance of Benin’s cotton sector was disappointing (Serra 2012).
In Ghana the new Rawlings government began implementing structural adjustment programmes in the 1980s, including liberalization in the Ghanaian palm-oil sector and the privatization of state farms and government-owned oil-palm plantations
and mills (Fold and Whitfield 2012). This process accelerated in the 1990s when the government sold off many of its shares in the oil-palm estates. After a new govern-ment led by the New Patriotic Party came to power in 2001, initiatives were intro-duced to increase the production of smallholder farmers and create farmers-owned enterprises in which farmers had a stake in mills, but capital and management were brought in by so-called strategic investors. The initiative thus required landowners and farmers to participate by investing in oil-palm production, under the assumption that existing large and medium-size mills would participate (ibid.: 21). However, since it never really included these actors in decision-making and implementation, the initiative failed to reach its goals.
The three successful cases indicate that an eclectic approach to the adoption of reform and implementation might be important. For instance, in both Uganda and Burkina Faso targeted initiatives towards the sector, namely the rehabilitation of sugar equipment and institutional reforms in the cotton sector respectively, which were essential in paving the way for more successful liberalization and averting some of the negative consequences. Furthermore, while privatization did take place it was quite unorthodox, as in Burkina Faso and Mozambique. In the former, private firms were kept out and the state sold its shares to the national producer associa-tion; in the latter, the state bought large proportions of the shares. Though the state monopoly was broken and other actors were allowed to enter the market, the main company was allowed to retain much of its market power. These details are impor-tant in supporting the view that neo-liberal blueprints in African contexts are less feasible and less likely to generate positive results (Booth 2012).
In the two less successful cases, the policies that were actually implemented looked more like pure privatization and liberalization measures. Though measures to pro-mote the cotton and palm-oil sectors actively were discussed and formally adopted in some cases, they were not fully implemented as they failed to involve the relevant stakeholders.