Nonstate actors also intervened in Africa after the Cold War. The most significant of these were the international jihadist networks, al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, along with their African branches and affiliates.
Al-Qaeda
Al-Qaeda’s origins can be traced to the Cold War and to the interven-tion of outside powers in Afghanistan (see chapter 2). In December 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan to assert control over a weak Afghan government that had failed to quash a Sunni insurgency that challenged Moscow’s hegemony in Central Asia. During the ensu-ing Soviet-Afghan War (1979–89), the United States, Saudi Arabia, Paki-stan, and their allies recruited, trained, and financed tens of thousands of Sunni militants from Africa, Asia, Europe, and North America to topple the Soviet-backed Afghan regime. After the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, the militants dispersed, fortified by sophisticated weaponry and new training in terror tactics. In the decades that followed, they established terrorist organizations and networks on several continents.
Among the most significant was al-Qaeda, a Salafi jihadist organiza-tion that had established training camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan during the war.18 In 1991 al-Qaeda moved its headquarters to Sudan, where it initiated a network of cells and allied organizations that oper-ated in the Greater Horn.
Al-QAedA’s AfricAn AffiliAtes
In 2017, al-Qaeda had two important African branches: al-Shabaab (The Youth), which was based in Somalia and launched attacks in Somalia, Kenya, and Uganda; and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which operated in North Africa and the Western Sahel.19 Al-Qaeda also claimed a number of local affiliates and associated organizations. Some of these had splintered from AQIM because of internal disputes; others were the result of mergers between AQIM and groups that were indige-nous to the region. Most of the African entities emerged from local con-ditions and turned to al-Qaeda for political, material, and propaganda aid after they were established. The following list, organized by country, is based on data collected in 2017. It is subject to change as allegiances fluctuate, existing organizations dissolve, and new ones form.
Algeria: Al-Mulathameen (Masked Brigade)—also known as al-Mua’qi’oon Biddam (Those Who Sign with Blood Brigade)—was founded by Mokhtar Belmokhtar, an Algerian veteran of the Soviet- Afghan and Algerian wars and a former AQIM leader. The organization
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cut ties to AQIM in December 2012 and reported directly to the al-Qaeda leadership.
Egypt: Ansar Beit al-Maqdis (Supporters of the Holy House) was established in the Sinai Peninsula after the 2011 ouster of the Mubarak re-gime. Although the organization’s ideology was influenced by al-Qaeda, Ansar Beit al-Maqdis’s focus was primarily local, and it was not a formal al-Qaeda affiliate. The group’s activities intensified following the 2013 military coup that removed a democratically elected Islamist president and led to a brutal crackdown on Islamists and other opponents of the new regime. In 2014, the organization split when numerous members in the Nile Valley retained links to al-Qaeda, while many in Sinai pledged allegiance to the leader of the Islamic State. Another al-Qaeda associate, Jund al-Islam (Army of Islam), was established in Sinai in 2013. After initial activity and a four-year hiatus, it reemerged in 2017. The same year, Ansar al-Islam (Followers of Islam), a new al-Qaeda-linked organiza-tion, began operating in the desert southwest of Cairo.20
Libya: The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) was founded in 1995 by Libyan veterans of the Soviet-Afghan War. Al-Qaeda members have held prominent leadership positions in the organization. Al-Qaeda- linked groups that emerged in Libya after the 2011 overthrow of Muammar Qaddafi include Ansar al-Shari’a (Followers of Islamic Law) in Benghazi, Ansar al-Shari’a in Derna, Ansar al-Shari’a in Sirte, and the Abu Salim Martyrs’ Brigade. The Derna Mujahideen Shura Council was formed in 2015 by Ansar al-Shari’a in Derna and the Abu Salim Martyrs’ Brigade to counter the Islamic Youth Shura Council in Derna, which supported the Islamic State.
Mali: Ansar Dine (Defenders of the Faith) was established in 2011 and gained AQIM support after its founding. Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) splintered from AQIM in 2011 but con-tinued to collaborate with it. Al-Mourabitoun (The Sentinels), which reported directly to the al-Qaeda leadership, was formed in August 2013 as a merger of the Algerian-based al-Mulathameen and a MUJWA faction. Al-Mourabitoun fractured in 2015, with some members main-taining their ties to al-Qaeda and others pledging allegiance to the leader of the Islamic State. In late 2015, al-Mourabitoun’s al-Qaeda
faction affiliated with AQIM. The Macina Liberation Front, which as-pires to reinstate the nineteenth-century Macina Empire in modern Mali, originated among Fulanis in central Mali in 2015. Although it was led by a fundamentalist cleric and collaborated with AQIM, MUJWA, and Ansar Dine, the organization presented itself as a liberation move-ment rather than a jihadist organization. In March 2017, Ansar Dine, al-Mourabitoun, and the Macina Liberation Front merged to form Ja-ma’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims).
Nigeria: Jama’atu Ahlis-Sunna Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad (People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad), established in 2002, is commonly known as Boko Haram (Western Education Is Forbidden). In 2014, the UN Security Council listed the organization as an associate of AQIM. However, in 2015 Boko Haram pledged allegiance to the leader of the Islamic State and began to refer to itself as the Islamic State in West Africa Province. Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis-Sudan (Vanguards for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa), commonly known as Ansaru, splintered from Boko Haram in 2012. In 2014, the UN Security Council listed Ansaru as an associate of AQIM.
Somalia: Al-Shabaab (The Youth), inspired by Somali veterans of the Soviet-Afghan War, originated as a youth militia linked to the Islamic Courts Union. It established ties to al-Qaeda following a US-backed Ethiopian invasion in 2006 and became an official branch of al-Qaeda in 2012. Its focus was primarily local. However, it also attacked Ethiopia and countries that contributed to an AU peacekeeping mission in Somalia.
Tunisia: Ansar al-Shari’a in Tunisia, established in 2011, had strong links to al-Qaeda. The Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade, which drew much of its membership from Ansar al-Shari’a, described itself as an AQIM battal-ion. In 2014 some members of both groups switched their allegiance to the leader of the Islamic State.
The Islamic State
The Islamic State is also known as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).21 In contrast
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to local Salafi jihadist groups that focus on establishing or purifying a Muslim state in a single country, the Islamic State aims to establish a caliphate that would unite Muslims worldwide in one political entity—a phenomenon last achieved in the eighth century. The origins of the mod-ern Islamic State can be traced to the US-led military intervention in Iraq in 2003, which precipitated the Second Gulf War (2003–11). The in-vasion and occupation sparked a Sunni insurgency led by the Jordanian- Palestinian militant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who transformed his orga-nization, Jama’at al-Tawhid wa’al-Jihad (Organization of Monotheism and Jihad), into al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), which targeted US military and international coalition forces as well as local collaborators. After Zarqawi was killed in a US airstrike in 2006, his successors began to refer to the al-Qaeda branch and associated organizations as the Islamic State in Iraq.
When civil war broke out in Syria in 2011, the Islamic State expanded its reach into that country, and by 2013 it was calling itself the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who honed his ideas and mobilizing skills in an US internment camp, the Is-lamic State recruited followers from among the Sunni minority that had been favored under Saddam Hussein but was marginalized politically after his ouster by US and coalition forces. In February 2014, al-Qaeda severed its ties to the Islamic State, criticizing its persistent aggression against Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, as well as its brutal treatment and indiscriminate killing of Muslim civilians, particularly Shi’as.22 Noted for its ruthless methods, the Islamic State attracted inter-national jihadis who felt that al-Qaeda was too moderate. However, both Muslims and non-Muslims widely condemned the organization for its harsh practices and attacks on civilians.
A number of African entities have pledged allegiance to the Islamic State leader. Like those that developed links to al-Qaeda, these groups emerged from local conditions and only later established ties to the in-ternational jihadist organization.
AfricAn OrgAnizAtiOns AssOciAted with the islAmic stAte
Algeria: Jund al-Khilafah (Soldiers of the Caliphate) in Algeria split from AQIM in 2014 and pledged allegiance to the leader of the Islamic State.
Egypt: Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, established in 2011, was influenced by al-Qaeda ideology but was not a formal affiliate. The organization
fractured in 2014 when many Nile Valley members retained links to al-Qaeda, while others in Sinai pledged allegiance to the leader of the Is-lamic State and named their faction Wilayat Sinai (Province of Sinai) or Islamic State–Sinai Province.
Libya: A brigade of fighters from eastern Libya, who had fought on behalf of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, returned home in 2014 and reconstituted themselves as the Islamic Youth Shura Council in Derna.
They declared eastern Libya to be a province of the Islamic State, which they called Cyrenaica Province. Two other Islamic State provinces were established in Libya in 2015: Tripolitania Province in the west and Fezzan Province in the south. In early 2015, Ansar al-Shari’a in Sirte split into two factions, with some members retaining ties to al-Qaeda and others pledging allegiance to the leader of the Islamic State.
Mali: Although most Malian jihadist organizations retained their ties to al-Qaeda, some al-Mourabitoun members left the organization in 2015 to form the Islamic State in Mali, subsequently renamed the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (sometimes translated as the Islamic State in the Sahel).
Nigeria: Jama’atu Ahlis-Sunna Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad, commonly known as Boko Haram, switched its allegiance from AQIM to the Islamic State in 2015 and adopted the name Islamic State in West Africa Province.
Somalia: Abnaa ul-Calipha (Islamic State in Somalia), based in Puntland, broke from al-Qaeda-linked al-Shabaab in 2015. Another al-Shabaab splinter, Islamic State in Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda (also known as Jahba East Africa or the East African Front) emerged in early 2016.
Tunisia: Following a government crackdown, some remnants of Ansar al-Shari’a in Tunisia, previously associated with al-Qaeda, pledged allegiance to the Islamic State leader in 2014. Some members of the AQIM-linked Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade also switched allegiances in 2014 and established a new organization, Jund al-Khilafah in Tunisia, which aligned with the Islamic State. The Tunisian jihadist group Mujahidin of Kairouan pledged allegiance to the Islamic State leader in 2015.
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Conclusion
Sustaining a pattern established during decolonization and the Cold War, foreign governments and other entities intervened in African affairs in the decades that followed. Although individual states continued to inter-cede unilaterally, multilateral intervention by organized groups of states and by nonstate actors became more frequent than previously. In some cases, the presence of nonstate actors associated with international ter-rorist networks provoked intervention by foreign states or institutions.
In other cases, intrusion by foreign entities stimulated local insurgencies that in turn attracted international terrorist support. State-based actors justified their involvement as a response to instability, an effort to pro-tect civilian lives, and a necessity for advancing the war on terror. How-ever, they also promoted their own more parochial interests. Conflicting agendas often weakened multilateral efforts, and the priorities of the most powerful countries generally took precedence. While African political and military leaders participated in war-making and peace-building pro-cesses, African civil society representatives remained in the background.
These deficiencies undermined the prospects for a lasting peace, as the following case studies demonstrate.
Chapter 4, which focuses on Somalia, is the first of two chapters that explore post–Cold War intervention in East Africa. When foreign powers withdrew their support for the Somali government after the Cold War, insurgent forces overthrew the authoritarian regime. Concerned about the humanitarian crisis inside the country as well as the potential for regional destabilization, multilateral organizations, extracontinental powers, and neighboring countries intervened. Their motivations were varied, often at odds, and subject to change over time. Although some of the initial outcomes were positive, the long-term effects were largely negative, contributing to increased human suffering and instability.
Suggested Reading
African international relations are explored in a number of recent works.
Two recommended volumes investigate the role of extracontinental powers in Africa after the Cold War, including the major Western powers along with Russia, China, Japan, India, the UN, the EU, and international financial institutions. See Ian Taylor and Paul Williams, eds., Africa in
International Politics: External Involvement on the Continent (New York:
Routledge, 2004); and Ian Taylor, The International Relations of Sub- Saharan Africa (New York: Continuum, 2010). John W. Harbeson and Donald Rothchild, eds., Africa in World Politics: Engaging a Changing World Order,5th ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2013), explores inter-state conflict, the impact of outside investment and externally induced political reforms, and the role of international peacekeeping forces.
Errol A. Henderson, African Realism? International Relations Theory and Africa’s Wars in the Postcolonial Era (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Little-field, 2015), challenges the applicability of Eurocentric international re-lations theories to African cases and explores the rere-lationship between Africa’s domestic and international conflicts.
Several books examine the role of the UN in the post–World War II international order. Mark Mazower, No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013), argues that the UN was created to protect the interests of empire but was reshaped by formerly colonized states and transformed into an instrument for ending the old imperial order. David L. Bosco, Five to Rule Them All: The UN Security Council and the Making of the Modern World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), explores the role of the five permanent members of the UN Secu-rity Council in shaping the post–Cold War world. A number of works investigate UN humanitarian and peacekeeping missions in Africa, elu-cidating the reasons for their success or failure. See Andrzej Sitkowski, UN Peacekeeping: Myth and Reality (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006); Nor-rie MacQueen, Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations (Ed-inburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011); Norrie MacQueen, United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa since 1960 (London: Pearson Education, 2002); Adekeye Adebajo, UN Peacekeeping in Africa: From the Suez Crisis to the Sudan Conflicts (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2011); and Adekeye Adebajo, The Curse of Berlin: Africa after the Cold War (New York: Co-lumbia University Press, 2010).
Other books examine international peacekeeping in Africa. Two wide-ranging studies are particularly useful: Adebajo, UN Peacekeeping in Africa (mentioned previously); and Marco Wyss and Thierry Tardy, eds., Peacekeeping in Africa: The Evolving Security Structure (New York:
Routledge, 2014), which considers UN, AU, EU, and ECOWAS operations, as well as unilateral actions by outside powers. For the role of African
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regional organizations and peacekeeping forces, see David J. Francis, Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems (Burling-ton, VT: Ashgate, 2006); and Abou Jeng, Peacebuilding in the African Union: Law, Philosophy and Practice (New York: Cambridge Univer-sity Press, 2012).
A number of recommended works consider the role of subregional peacekeeping forces. The strengths and weaknesses of ECOWAS peace-keeping missions in West Africa are investigated in Adekeye Abebajo, ed., Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002); Adekeye Adebajo and Ismail Rashid, eds., West Africa’s Security Challenges: Building Peace in a Troubled Region (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004); Adekeye Adebajo, Liberia’s Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG, and Regional Security in West Africa (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002); and Karl Magyar and Earl Conteh-Morgan, eds., Peacekeeping in Africa: ECOMOG in Liberia (New York: St. Martin’s, 1998). SADC’s efforts in Southern Africa are considered in Laurie Na-than, Community of Insecurity: SADC’s Struggle for Peace and Security in Southern Africa (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2012).
Other studies examine the hegemonic influence of particular coun-tries on the African continent. Adebajo, The Curse of Berlin (mentioned previously), considers South Africa, Nigeria, China, France, and the United States. Dane F. Smith Jr., U.S. Peacefare: Organizing American Peace-Building Operations (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010), written by a diplomatic insider, focuses on the role of the United States in postcon-flict peace building. Bruno Charbonneau, France and the New Imperi-alism: Security Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2008), investigates the impact of French security and cooperation poli-cies in postindependence Africa and argues that French intervention de-nied Africans political freedom and sustained their political, economic, and social domination by outsiders. The growing role of China in Africa is considered in Deborah Bräutigam, The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Ian Taylor, China’s New Role in Africa (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2008); David H.
Shinn and Joshua Eisenman, China and Africa: A Century of Engagement (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012); and Howard W.
French, China’s Second Continent: How a Million Migrants Are Building a New Empire in Africa (New York: Knopf, 2014). Ian Taylor, Africa Ris-ing? BRICS—Diversifying Dependency (Martlesham, UK: James Currey,
2014), provides a critical examination of the roles of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa in post–Cold War Africa, arguing that the emerging economies of the Global South, like the Western powers before them, have an interest in perpetuating an unequal system that consigns Africa to the bottom rung.
The emergence of South Africa as both a regional and continental player is considered in several works. Chris Alden and Maxi Schoeman explore South Africa’s growing economic involvement in Africa and its expanding political role on the continent and the global stage. See Chris Alden and Maxi Schoeman, “South Africa in the Company of Giants:
The Search for Leadership in a Transforming Global Order,” Interna-tional Affairs 89, no. 1 (January 2013): 111–29; and Chris Alden and Maxi Schoeman, “South Africa’s Symbolic Hegemony in Africa,” International Politics52, no. 2 (2015): 239–54. William G. Martin, South Africa and the World Economy (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2013), examines the transformation of South African political and economic power from the era of colonialism and white minority rule to the present, marked by its recent alliances with Northern industrialized powers and new challenges from Asia. Chris Alden and Miles Soko, “South Africa’s Economic Relations with Africa: Hegemony and Its Discontents,” Journal of Modern African Studies43, no. 3 (September 2005): 367–92, differen-tiates between the roles played by the regional bodies, SADC and the Southern African Customs Union, on the one hand, and by South Africa’s private and parastatal corporations, on the other. Fred Ahwireng-Obeng and Patrick J. McGowan examine the impact of South African trade,
The Search for Leadership in a Transforming Global Order,” Interna-tional Affairs 89, no. 1 (January 2013): 111–29; and Chris Alden and Maxi Schoeman, “South Africa’s Symbolic Hegemony in Africa,” International Politics52, no. 2 (2015): 239–54. William G. Martin, South Africa and the World Economy (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2013), examines the transformation of South African political and economic power from the era of colonialism and white minority rule to the present, marked by its recent alliances with Northern industrialized powers and new challenges from Asia. Chris Alden and Miles Soko, “South Africa’s Economic Relations with Africa: Hegemony and Its Discontents,” Journal of Modern African Studies43, no. 3 (September 2005): 367–92, differen-tiates between the roles played by the regional bodies, SADC and the Southern African Customs Union, on the one hand, and by South Africa’s private and parastatal corporations, on the other. Fred Ahwireng-Obeng and Patrick J. McGowan examine the impact of South African trade,