While Somalia faltered, the Cold War also took a new turn. In the late 1980s the Soviet Union faced a severe political and economic crisis, and the alliance with Somalia was no longer critical to the United States.
After the 1989 Mogadishu massacre, the George H. W. Bush adminis-tration expressed newfound concern about Siad Barre’s human rights abuses, and Congress suspended military and economic aid. Without US support, the Siad Barre government was an easy target. In January 1991, the United Somali Congress (USC), led by General Mohammed Farah Aidid and dominated by the Hawiye clan family, overthrew the regime, and the USC’s Ali Mahdi Mohamed was elected interim president. After the central government failed, personal, clan, and other rivalries split the opposition.7 A war between the Aidid and Ali Mahdi factions destroyed much of Mogadishu in 1991–92.The formal economy ceased to function, and southern Somalia disintegrated into fiefdoms ruled by rival warlords and their militias. Followers were mobilized and opponents objectified through clan-based hate narratives. Clan cleansing, although instigated by Siad Barre, became a defining instrument of warlord control.8
As the fighting intensified in 1991, war-induced famine, compounded by drought, threatened the lives of 60 percent of the population, primar-ily in the southern and central regions.9 Massive population displace-ment, the theft of food and livestock by marauding soldiers and militia members, and crop failure put 4.5 million people at risk of starvation.
Mogadishu’s port and airport were controlled by warlords who confis-cated food aid and manipulated food supplies to reward their supporters, punish their opponents, and finance the purchase of weapons. By late 1992, some 300,000 Somalis had died from starvation and war-related disease and violence, and 2 million people had fled their homes.
The failure of the UN to respond to the crisis was criticized by many Somalis and international NGOs. Largely absent in 1991, the UN took a more active role in 1992 under the leadership of the new secretary-general,
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Egyptian diplomat Boutros Boutros-Ghali, a onetime supporter of Siad Barre who was deeply hostile to Aidid and determined to undermine his power. The Security Council imposed an arms embargo in January 1992, which prohibited the delivery of any weapons or military equipment to Somalia. In April, the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) was established with a Chapter VI mandate to monitor a ceasefire signed in March and to escort and protect aid convoys. It was authorized to include 50 unarmed observers and 500 armed guards. Boutros-Ghali appointed Algerian diplomat Mohamed Sahnoun both as his special rep-resentative in Somalia and as the head of UNOSOM. Intent on procuring a lasting political solution, Sahnoun mediated a series of negotiations that included warlords, patrilineage leaders, and community elders, as well as intellectuals, merchants, women, and youth. In July, the UN secretary-general brought attention to the humanitarian crisis when he charged that the Security Council was “fighting a rich man’s war in Yu-goslavia while not lifting a finger to save Somalia from disintegration.”10
If the UN was slow to act, divisions within the US government also hindered a rapid American response. In December 1991, Andrew Nat-sios, a high-level official in the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), called Somalia “the worst humanitarian crisis today” and advocated American action.11 In the State Department, Assis-tant Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman Cohen, the East Africa Desk, and the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs also called for a strong US response. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, who was under mounting pressure to demonstrate US leadership in response to humanitarian crises in Bosnia and Somalia, believed that a limited military operation in Somalia, although not desir-able, would be more manageable than one in the Balkans. Those opposed to US military engagement included Assistant Secretary of State for In-ternational Organization Affairs John Bolton, who argued that Somalia was not strategic to US interests and thus did not warrant US help, and National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, who worried about the lack of an exit strategy. Leading officials in the Defense Department and in the US Central Command (CENTCOM), along with experienced am-bassadors in the region, also warned against hasty military involvement without a clear plan or objective.12
These concerns notwithstanding, a major humanitarian disaster so close to the US presidential elections could not be ignored. In July 1992,
the United States agreed to fund and transport 500 Pakistani troops to guard humanitarian shipments as part of the UNOSOM I mission. In August, while awaiting the Somali principals’ acceptance of the UN force, President Bush announced the launch of a unilateral US military airlift.
Operation Provide Relief supplied the equivalent of 12 million meals to Somalia between August and November. By October, the rains had begun and death rates were declining. Although highly effective in the short run, the operation also had drawbacks. Insecurity had not abated, and in some places it had grown more dire than previously. The massive increase in food supplies provided new opportunities for warlords and bandits to weaponize food, and in some ways it contributed to a widen-ing of the conflict. Similarly, the introduction of foreign military forces generated hostility in some quarters and rendered a political solution more difficult.
Among the strongest critics of the use of military force was UN Spe-cial Representative Sahnoun. Although he credited the US airlift with saving lives, he opposed further militarization of the UN operation. Po-litical negotiations were making progress, even if they were slowed by painstaking attention to local sensitivities. Faction leaders and commu-nity elders from all regions had endorsed the idea of a national conference to discuss national reconciliation. Aidid, Ali Mahdi, and other powerful faction leaders had agreed to permit 500 UN peacekeepers to deploy in Mogadishu; the port had been reopened, and food distribution had com-menced. Alternatives to military intervention, including mediation by subregional bodies and the application of sanctions, had not been fully explored, and military intervention would undermine these delicate pro-cesses. Sahnoun publicly criticized the provision of military supplies and money to Ali Mahdi’s forces in a UN plane, which contributed to Aidid’s mounting distrust of the UN; Sahnoun also opposed the increase of the UNOSOM I force to 3,500 troops, authorized in August without warn-ing to Sahnoun or consultation with Somali leaders. Irked by Sahnoun’s public criticisms and his willingness to work with Aidid, Boutros-Ghali dismissed his special representative in late October. Sahnoun’s successors failed to garner the same degree of trust among Somalis, and efforts to thwart the rising tensions between the Ali Mahdi and Aidid factions fell apart, as did agreements that allowed the safe passage of relief shipments.
Although Sahnoun’s removal undermined the prospects for a politi-cal solution, the matter was not yet settled. The Western NGO community
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debated whether enhanced UN military involvement would exacerbate or ameliorate the situation. Some opposed foreign military presence of any kind; others resisted the use of troops beyond those needed to pro-tect relief agencies and their supplies; still others called for a full-blown military intervention. Within the US government, leading officials con-tinued to urge caution. By late November, increased media attention along with urging from bipartisan forces in Congress, president-elect Bill Clinton, and a growing chorus of NGOs tipped the balance toward action. Those who stressed the need to “do something”—with an eye to political and publicity concerns—held sway over those who endorsed prudence. Boutros-Ghali outlined several possible courses of action, in-cluding one that would allow a member state to undertake a military en-forcement operation with UN Security Council authorization. The Bush administration informed the UN secretary-general that the United States was willing to lead such an intervention.
In December 1992, the Security Council authorized the establish-ment of a US-led multinational military task force, officially called Uni-fied Task Force (UNITAF) and unofficially dubbed Operation Restore Hope. The military force would include nearly 26,000 US troops plus 11,000 more from two dozen other countries. UNITAF was granted a Chapter VII mandate to work with UNOSOM I to secure ports, air-ports, warehouses, feeding centers, and roads so that humanitarian re-lief could be delivered. It was not authorized to disarm or demobilize warring parties, confiscate heavy weapons, or intervene to stop fighting between rival groups. Its mandate was solely to ensure the delivery of humanitarian relief to the civilian population. The original charge con-tinued to be the public face of the mission even after the US role had changed substantially.
The authorizations for UNITAF and UNOSOM I expired in May 1993, when UNOSOM II, also led by the United States, took over. Com-posed of 18,000 peacekeepers, including 4,200 Americans, UNOSOM II operated under a broader mandate than its predecessor, and one that was far removed from UNOSOM I’s original peacekeeping role. Arguing that mass starvation could be averted only if local militias were neutralized, the UN Security Council prescribed a Chapter VII mandate and a course of action that included the forcible disarmament of Somali militias, par-ticularly that of Mohammed Farah Aidid, whom the UN leadership was now determined to exclude from power.
Tension between the UN and Aidid broke to the surface on June 5, when Aidid’s militia ambushed and killed two dozen Pakistani peace-keepers who were attempting to inspect his radio station and weapons depots.The Security Council quickly expanded UNOSOM II’s man-date, authorizing UN forces to arrest, detain, try, and punish those re-sponsible for the killings. Having moved from the original mission of protecting aid convoys and relief workers to capturing, disarming, and punishing one faction in the fighting, the UN crossed the line from hu-manitarian intervention to choosing sides in a deadly conflict. As the mission’s chief advocate and leader, the United States was now deeply embroiled in Somalia’s civil war. Because US support had been key to Siad Barre’s survival, many Somalis were already hostile to the United States and distrustful of its motives. In their view, the United States and its UN partner had declared war; their soldiers were now perceived as an occupation force.
On June 11–17, 1993, US military forces in AC-130 Spectre gunships and Cobra and Black Hawk helicopters attacked Aidid’s radio station and a number of Mogadishu compounds believed to hold weapons caches.
UN troops fired on the angry civilians who poured into the streets, kill-ing and maimkill-ing a large number. In July, a similar airborne assault on Photo 4.1. US Marines participate in UNITAF search for General Mohammed Farah Aidid’s weapons, Mogadishu, January 7, 1993. Photo by PHCM Terry C. Mitchell.
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elders, clan and religious leaders, intellectuals, and businessmen, who were meeting to consider a UN peace initiative, killed sixteen prominent members of Aidid’s party and dozens of others. The massacre intensified anti-UN and anti-American sentiment among the civilian population.
Violent retaliation was directed at all foreigners, causing numerous relief organizations to withdraw from Somalia. US troops, in turn, regarded Somali civilians with growing disdain.
Although the delivery of food aid was the priority of the US mili-tary in early 1993, it was not the objective eight months later. From late August to early October, the US armed forces were bent on capturing or killing Aidid and his top lieutenants. The final raid took place on Oc-tober 3, 1993, when 120 elite US Army Rangers and Delta Force troops attempted to capture key leaders of Aidid’s militia in one of Mogadishu’s most dangerous neighborhoods. By this time, al-Itihaad had formed an alliance of convenience with Aidid’s militia. Both groups included mem-bers who had been trained and armed by al-Qaeda operatives who had fought in the Soviet-Afghan War and who were charged with expelling US and UN forces from Somalia. During the October 3 operation, Aid-id’s forces, assisted by al-Itihaad, shot down two Black Hawk helicop-ters, which crashed into children in the streets below.13 Angry crowds attacked the surviving soldiers and those who came to rescue them. In Photo 4.2. Children walk past graffiti criticizing Jonathan Howe, the UN special envoy sent to Somalia to oppose Aidid, Mogadishu, June 30, 1993. Photo by Eric Cabanis/AFP/Getty Images.
the fighting that ensued, eighteen US soldiers and some one thousand Somali men, women, and children were killed. Eighty percent of the dead were civilians.
Within days of the debacle, President Bill Clinton announced that all US troops would be withdrawn from Somalia by the end of March 1994. Without US backing, the UN could not impose a political settlement that excluded Aidid. Although the crisis had not been resolved, the UN pulled out of Somalia in early 1995, declaring that UNOSOM II was over.