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IV. COMPARATIVE OBSERVATIONS – RULES AND STANDARDS IN THE

2. Specific comparisons

2.2. Institutional comparisons

As our comparative data show, the highest regulatory density can be found for the national/EU Central Banks and for Government. Parliaments are the least regulated institutions.

Figure 3: Regulation density of the EU Member States by institutions

76

Whereas the differences between the Central Banks and Governments are not very significant, they are significant between all institutions and the Parliaments. The relative low degree of regulation of Parliaments in Europe reveals the question whether Parliaments are structurally under-regulated. And if so, why that is the case? Most US

58 N. Behncke, Ethik-Maßnahmen für die öffentliche Verwaltung – Modeerscheinung oder Mauerblümchen?, in:

Bogumil, J./Jann, W./Nullmeier, F. (eds.), Politik und Verwaltung, Politische Vierteljahresschrift, No.37/2006, p.269

literature suggests that Parliaments are indeed structurally under-regulated because legislators must regulate themselves. However, in reality most Parliaments are not very eager to regulate themselves.

The under-regulation of Parliaments seems indeed to be problematic. Studies by Transparency International59 show that the political sector is one of the most corrupt sectors of all. If this observation is correct one should also derive from this the conclusion that legislators should be more strongly regulated.

Other observations are equally important:

1. Countries with a high degree of overall regulation density are not necessarily those countries where all five institutions also have a high level of regulation density. For example, the governmental level in Austria is relatively strongly regulated whereas the Parliament and the Supreme Court are not. This makes an interesting contrast with Germany where the Government is less regulated but the Parliament and the Court are more regulated. Another interesting case is the United Kingdom where all conflicts of interest issues are regulated for the governmental level.

These few cases show that it is important to analyse the different institutions separately. In the following we will examine the different institutions from a comparative point of view.

2. Institutions with a relatively low degree of regulation density (e.g. Parliaments) do not necessarily have a low degree of regulation density as regards all CoI issues. For example, Parliaments have a relatively high degree of regulation density as to the regulation of declarations of interests and – to a lesser extent – registers of financial interest. Today in most countries, Parliaments have rules on the obligations regarding financial declarations and registers.

Table 3: Declaration of Financial Interests and Assets by Type of Institution)i (Frequencies in parenthesis)

Declaration of Financial Interests

Government 95% (22)

Parliament 95% (21)

Supreme Court 65% (20) Court of Auditors 63% (19) Type of

Institution

Central Bank 81% (21) EU-27 average 81% (103)

On the other hand Government does not always have a high degree of regulation density.

The analysis of “outside and professional” activities shows that this issue is much stronger regulated for Governments and much less so for Parliaments. In total, the Central Banks, Court of Auditors and the Supreme Courts have a much higher degree of regulation density than Governments.

Table 4: Regulation of Political Activities by Type of Institution (N=27)i (Frequencies in parenthesis)

Political Activities

Government 62% (21)

Parliament 70% (20)

Supreme Court 86% (21) Court of Auditors 89% (18) Type of

Institution

Central Bank 95% (21) EU-27 average 80% (101)

i The number of total cases in each category does not correspond to 27 since missing cases are excluded.

In most Member States, however, disparities of regulation exist among the different types of professional activities. For example, many national Parliaments have at least some regulatory instruments regulating incompatibility of posts and professional activities before or during the term of office, but rules on outside political activities are less frequently in place. Not surprisingly, the Supreme or Constitutional Courts regulate political activities most strictly. Similarly the highest percentage of rules and regulations for Directors of the Courts of Audit and the Directors of the Central Banks can also be found in the field of outside political activities.

At least these few comparisons show that the same conclusion which has been drawn for the comparative country analysis can also be drawn for the comparative analysis of the institutions: whereas it is possible to identify which country or institution is more strongly (or less) regulated than another, this does not mean that as regards the regulation of specific individual CoI issues less regulated institutions (or countries) have more (and stricter) rules in individual cases.

2.2.2. Choice of regulatory instruments

Another interesting level of analysis is to examine the choice of regulatory instruments.

Here our findings show that the dominant regulatory instrument is still the law (especially in the Supreme Courts and in Government). However, one important exception is the Central Banks, which have a relatively high level of regulation by codes of ethics. The Court of Auditors uses codes relatively widely. In contrast, the Supreme Courts and Parliaments do not use codes to a large extent.

Table 5: Form of regulation by type of institution

(Frequencies in parenthesis)

Not

regulated Law Code Both Total

Government 23% (71) 48% (150) 16% (49) 14% (44) 100% (314) Parliament 40% (122) 45% (138) 9% (28) 6% (20) 100% (308) Supreme Court 29% (88) 50% (152) 5% (14) 16% (50) 100% (304) Court of Auditors 28% (77) 40% (113) 11% (30) 21% (60) 100% (280) Central Bank 20% (63) 32% (100) 28% (87) 19% (59) 100% (309) EU-27 average 28% (421) 43% (653) 14% (208) 15% (233) 100% (1519)

Especially in the case of the regulation of gifts, missions and travel it can be seen that the Central Bank use codes of ethics extensively and (much) more than the other institutions.

Table 6: Means of regulating gifts by type of institution (Frequencies in parenthesis)

Not

regulated Law Code Both Total

Government 14% (3) 48% (10) 10% (2) 29% (6) 100% (21) Parliament 29% (6) 48% (10) 10% (2) 14% (3) 100% (21) Supreme Court 19% (4) 48% (10) 5% (1) 29% (6) 100% (21) Court of Auditors 0% (0) 37% (7) 16% (3) 47% (9) 100% (19) Central Bank 5% (1) 24% (5) 43% (9) 29% (6) 100% (21) EU-27 average 14% (14) 41% (42) 17% (17) 29% (30) 100% (103)

Table 7: Means of regulating missions and travels by type of institution

(Frequencies in parenthesis)

Not

regulated Law Code Both Total

Government 11% (2) 39% (7) 22% (4) 28% (5) 100% (18) Parliament 50% (10) 35% (7) 15% (3) 0% (0) 100% (20) Supreme Court 32% (6) 47% (9) 21% (4) 0% (0) 100% (19) Court of Auditors 22% (4) 33% (6) 22% (4) 22% (4) 100% (18) Central Bank 45% (9) 10% (2) 35% (7) 10% (2) 100% (20) EU-27 average 33% (31) 33% (31) 23% (22) 12% (11) 100% (95)