General observations

1. With this study of the various national and institutional CoI rules and CoI systems, much insight and interesting information has been found. In many respects this study has given an insight into an area of fascinating complexity. As could be seen throughout the current international reform process in the field of CoI is leading to reforms and innovations that can be of great interest for other national and the EU institutions eager to reform their policies and instruments.

2. At present, in the field of CoI two conflicting trends can be observed. On the one hand, the current development is towards new transparency requirements¹ and the emergence of new forms of accountability.² On the other hand, another trend is the appearance of new ethic bureaucracies which have an impact (at least in some countries and institutions) on privacy issues. Within this context, the trend towards more disclosure requirements in registers and the setting up of new (independent) ethics committees and other monitoring bodies should also be seen as an ambivalent development. As this study shows, there is still too little knowledge as to the impact of the above mentioned developments on the effectiveness of the different ethic regimes and ethic instruments. However, this is also partly due to the fact that the monitoring of registers and the working procedures of (many internal) ethic committees are highly intransparent and information is not easily accessible. Neglecting the above mentioned trends towards more transparency and accountability requirements would probably send a wrong signal to the public. Therefore, this report recommends that public registers and (independent) ethics committees are important elements of any CoI regime. These instruments may work internally (through self-regulation) or externally (through independent bodies). What is important is that a stronger emphasis should be placed on the credibility and accountability of these monitoring bodies. Consequently, we propose that these bodies should regularly report on the outcome of their activities. Theses reports should be published and be accessible by the public

3. This study on Rules and Standards for Holders of Public Office may imply the existence of an ethical deficit and not enough rules and standards exist for HPO.

sufficient to cast public doubt on the integrity of the whole class of HPO and the whole institution. This is also the case for the EU Institutions. Thus, this study does not suggest that HPO or individual institutions are not sufficiently ethical.

However, it does suggest that HPO have a specific public responsibility.

Therefore, rules and standards are one important instrument in the fight against CoI of HPO.

4. The focus of this study is to analyse the existing “rules and standards” in the field of CoI. Consequently, this study is also emphasising the many different control and monitoring issues. However, this does not imply that the importance of an ethics culture and the need for awareness-building regarding ethical principles etc.

should be neglected.

5. The adoption of more rules and standards require that more concentration should be given to implementation issues. The more rules exist, the more management capacity is required to implement these rules and standards. Here, new paradoxes are about to emerge. Whereas individual requirements in fulfilling new obligations (mainly in the field of disclosure policies) are increasing, in many cases control and monitoring bodies (e.g. ethics committees) are still weak and lack resources. Unfortunately, this study also reflects the difficulties in revealing more evidence on implementation, monitoring and enforcement issues. The real challenges are here: how are registers of interest monitored? How are post-employment rules enforced? How do ethics committees work in practice? These are only some of the questions which merit a deeper examination.

6. Sanctions in relation to HPO´s misbehaviour are rare and – mostly – relatively

“soft” compared to civil servants. One simple solution would be to suggest more vigour in the enforcement phase and to treat HPO´s as other public employees.

However, enforcing CoI of HPO should also consider some specific features of the enforcement of HPO. For example, whereas some HPO enjoy immunity others are confronted with strong media- and public scrutiny. Therefore, the existing judicial- and monitoring bodies should not shy away from enforcing the rules on (mis-) behaviour of HPO. On the other hand, administrative- and legal processes imply the starting of fair, complex and time consuming enforcement procedures. Whereas the enforcement of rules for HPO takes time, the public may ask for a quick response to political scandals. Thus, enforcement requires that specific features of HPO are taken into consideration. Consequently, ethic regimes of civil servants should not be directly used as benchmarks for HPO.

7. Because of the likelihood of more implementation and enforcement challenges in the future as well as growing expectations of the citizens (and the media) as to the integrity of HPO, we believe that weak implementation, monitoring and control mechanisms will be less tolerated in the future. Also growing discrepancies between more rules and standards and weak enforcement practices are likely to create more criticism and public suspicion. Consequently, more people will call for the establishment of independent and effective ethics committees with inquiry

and even sanctioning and enforcement powers. At the same time, systems of self-regulation will be more and more discredited. Also “more rules, at least when they are managed through self-regulation, may not help to build more public trust.”³

8. We recommend that Member States and the European institutions better anticipate these developments and proactively improve the effectiveness of their ethics infrastructure for HPO.

9. Today there is still very little empirical, statistical and scientific evidence on the effectiveness of (independent) ethics committees (or monitoring bodies).

Especially the establishment of independent monitoring committees may also risk to create a new (costly) and maybe even relatively ineffective ethics bureaucracy.

On the other hand, not calling for (more) independent monitoring bodies could be seen as an argument in favour of (the current forms of) self-regulation or in favour of weak monitoring bodies. Moreover, the absence of empirical evidence for the effectiveness of monitoring and enforcement instruments cannot be regarded as a proof of their ineffectiveness. Still, we see these bodies as important instruments in the field of CoI.

10. Therefore, and in order to solve the above mentioned dilemma (between recommendation 7 and 9) we propose that a careful impact-assessment and cost-benefit analysis will be carried out as to the effectiveness and efficiency of different ethic committees (e.g. in the US, Canada, Australia, UK and Ireland).

11. Most national and EU institutions still focus on the introduction of more and new rules and standards. On the other hand, it seems that only few countries and EU institutions review and evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of their conflicts of interest systems⁴. This is particularly regrettable, because the many reform activities that took place in the last few years provide a wealth of interesting material for evaluation and comparison. However, the lack of information on

“implementation and enforcement issues” also makes it difficult to recommend models or certain CoI regimes.

12. Success in implementing new rules and standards is only possible if the different conflicts of interest systems are shaped to the needs of the specific administration, taking the particularities of the administrative culture and political context into account. Therefore one important conclusion of this study is that new ethics

“patent recipe” for a perfect or "correct" code of ethics. Consequently, we remain sceptical as to whether a specific national code should be recommended to the (multicultural) EU institutions at all. Instead, we plead for a careful design and implementation of ethics regime that fits to the proper institutional system, the own structures, processes, resources, culture and tradition. For example, gift giving has a different symbolic importance in many countries, and therefore cannot be eliminated in an attempt to conform to some universal concept of ethical conduct. Also the answer to the question of what should be disclosed in a register of interest is subject to cultural differences. An approach that is too strict may conflict with the rights of the individual in certain countries and prove to be unworkable. There is also the risk that overly strict provisions on professional activities or on post-employment rules of legislators will discourage legislators in some countries from disclosing conflicts of interest. These examples show that offering universal or regional models is extremely difficult.

13. However, while cultural differences may lead to variation in the choice of certain instruments and ethics regime design, little disagreement exists worldwide as to what constitutes unethical behaviour and the need to fight conflicts of interest.

Claims that these contextual factors prevent the possibility of learning from each other should be met with suspicion. In reality, many instruments, strategies, rules and standards take similar directions. Also codes of ethics are more and more seen as one important instrument in the fight against unethical behaviour. Also this study shows that codes are useful and important instruments because their introduction also triggers the introduction of other measures (training) and instruments (ethics committees).