THE IMPACT OF THE ERRORS

The list of second and third order effects resulting from the USG’s failings is large. The not all-inclusive list of problems below represents the most detrimen-tal and shares two characteristics: First, correction of each problem either has or will require a large expen-diture of USG or host nation energy. Second, each problem represents an obvious characteristic of any paramilitary organization that the USG should have considered during the developmental process without fear that they were forcing Western policing-models upon either country.

The first problem involved lack of a vetting process and employee accountability. As Field Manual (FM) 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency, correctly identi-fies, there are four common cultural challenges that often complicate designing a correctly functioning police structure: nepotism, denial of negative results or errors, corruption and influence from competing loyalties (ethnic, religious, tribal or political).¹⁶Given the history and cultural peculiarities of both Afghani-stan and Iraq, the effects of not considering these chal-lenges were significant. The lack of a vetting process meant that large numbers of both IPS and ANP cho-sen to serve were of questionable character. The lack of a personnel accountability system meant that the USG did not track incoming recruits from training to final assignment. Phantom police, or those personnel retained on the payroll after they had left the force or died, significantly contributed to the lack of account-ability in both countries. This resulted in both the ANP and IPS possessing more personnel on the rolls than actually served. Dishonest police commanders often retained the extra pay that the phantom police

accrued. In Iraq alone, an MOI investigation discov-ered that between 15 and 20 percent of names on the police payroll at that time were no longer active-duty officers, which resulted in the purging of more than 11,000 names from the rolls.¹⁷

In Iraq, the USG instituted wildly ambitious and unrealistic hiring programs in the fall of 2003, such as

“30,000 in 30 days” and “60,000 in 60 days.” In these two instances, the USG ordered military commanders to hire 30,000 and 60,000 IPS in 30 and 60 days, respec-tively, which they did with the utmost of zeal. Though this approach resolved the short-term problem of get-ting unemployed Iraqis to work, it was the beginning of the end of any coherent plan to carefully and de-liberately assemble the IPS. The unintended second and third order effects of this hiring technique were numerous, but two stand out from the rest. First, the mass hirings strained relations between the provinces and the central government because no one knew who the new hires were or how they were to receive their pay. Second, it exacerbated the problem of an inad-equate training system, which could barely handle the existing police, much less thousands of new officers.¹⁸ In early 2005, DOS reported they had trained and equipped about 82,000 IPS. However, DOS later quali-fied that statement by adding that the 82,000 was an es-timate because subordinate police leaders around the country had not accurately and consistently reported the personnel strength to the MOI. Additionally, DOS explained that the 82,000 total did not exclude those police officers who the MOI considered absent from duty. Additionally, this process did not reflect the ex-tent to which the 82,000 were equipped with required weapons, vehicles, communications equipment and body armor.¹⁹The immediate impact of the large-scale

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hiring plan, which omitted a fundamental vetting process, came to light in 2006. In the spring, MOI in-vestigators conducted background checks, which ex-posed that more than 5,000 IPS recruits had criminal histories, some of which included attacking American troops. Not surprisingly, a 2006 internal police survey conducted northeast of Baghdad reflected that 75% of respondents did not trust the police enough to tip them off to insurgent activity.²⁰Similarly, DOS and MOI in Afghanistan attempted to validate the status of more than 103,000 applicants for police identification cards by positively identifying all the ANP and develop-ing a computerized police database to validate sala-ries. Because ANP regional commanders would not respond to requests to confirm police officers in their areas, DOS established joint contractor/MOI valida-tion teams to execute the mission.

As of November 2008, nearly 47,000 MOI and ANP personnel received identification cards after valida-tion teams confirmed the applicants had not retired, died or otherwise left the MOI or ANP. The validation teams also determined that another 26,700 applicants had retired, died or otherwise left the MOI or ANP, in-cluding an estimated14,200 to whom the MOI issued identification cards to before they retired, died or left the ANP.²¹

The second problem concerned rank imbalances that affected promotions, chain of command and the budget process in both countries. While the USG has accomplished a large amount of work with the ANP and IPS, they must continue to provide additional re-sources to sustain each institution on a long-term ba-sis.In Iraq, this problem manifested itself as a critical shortage of competent IPS non-commissioned

offi-cers (NCO) and mid-level offioffi-cers. Because the USG’s training effort focused on generating street level po-lice and the time it takes to grow professional NCOs and officers, there were inadequate numbers of junior leaders entering the ranks. The lack of mid-level su-pervisors adversely affected command and control, morale, retention and ethical conduct. Compounding the problem was the fact that the MOI had to compete with the MOD for the same pool of recruits, severely undermining the effectiveness of MOI incentive pro-grams.²²

In Afghanistan, rank equals status, which resulted in early development of a reverse pyramid organiza-tional structure of the ANP. In response, the USG re-duced the ANP officer corps from about 17,800 to ap-proximately 9,000. At the same time, the USG pushed the MOI to reorganize their headquarters by reducing a large number of higher-ranking officers.²³

The third problem was a general lack of sustain-ment capacity developsustain-ment. The inability of the MOI to develop key ministerial functions at the national and local levels directly influenced both logistics sys-tems and command and control. As both forces grew, each became less self-sufficient and more reliant on the USG for support, a less-than desirable effect.²⁴

In Iraq, neither the USG nor the MOI initially de-veloped a national inventory, distribution, or mainte-nance system for vehicles, weapons and communica-tions. As a result, the MOI was incapable of supplying its forces or maintaining its equipment on a consistent basis. The USG eventually developed a logistical con-cept for the IPS, but the MOI will not be able to fully implement it below the regional level for some time.²⁵

In Afghanistan, the USG developed a plan where the ANP would receive their initial issue of

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ment as they arrived to their unit. As an accountability incentive, the USG replaced vehicles and equipment lost by the ANP due to maintenance failures and com-bat damage, but did not replace equipment lost by the ANP due to corruption.²⁶

Despite this rather unsophisticated system, the ANP still suffered from equipment shortages of trucks, radios and body armor, which the leaders at the MOI and regional levels stockpiled. To counter this problem, the Tashkil called for establishment of a central logistics office, national logistics center, five interregional logistics centers and 34 provincial sup-ply points, which the USG has scheduled for future construction. Unfortunately, the new system comes eight years too late and the USG will be unable to fully implement the plan prior to completion of an enor-mous hiring and training campaign for maintenance and supply personnel.²⁷