PROVIDING SECURITY: THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF POLICING
COMPREHENSIVE APPROACHES
Addressing the capability gap and the four inter-woven problem areas must start near the top of the U.S. national security system where a comprehensive interagency review must begin. Due to competing priorities, only a National Security Staff led review of the current multi-department security-assistance engagement-effort can produce the recommendations necessary to create real change from our Iraq and Afghanistan lessons-learned. This comprehensive re-view should focus on recommending either a single existing Department (such as DHS) or a new Depart-ment be created to form a civil-military constabulary police force. This review should address congressional oversight, legislative restrictions, legal authorities and funding for a single Department capable of deploy-ing a civil-military constabulary police force. Until fully fielding a capable constabulary force, the review should examine ways to revise current authorities and create a streamlined funding mechanism to increase the effectiveness of existing engagement programs.
Finally, any review must leverage the vast experience and expertise of U.S. state and local law enforcement agencies to garner their recommendations for imple-menting a single department-led U.S. Government solution. Law enforcement personnel with the proper amount of experience would be the perfect resource to fulfill the initial personnel requirements.
CONCLUSION
Partner-nation security is a necessary component of United States National Security. Such
partner-na-174
tion security forces prevent adversary groups from recruiting members and enjoying sanctuary in areas around the globe where they can plan and launch at-tacks on the United States. Today, the U.S. Govern-ment provides dedicated military trainers to assist a partner-nation develop and mature their military force capabilities and focus their efforts on exter-nal military threats. However, the U.S. Government does not possess a dedicated corps capable of creat-ing or assistcreat-ing partner-nation police forces trycreat-ing to address their internal security concerns. This miss-ing U.S. Government component creates a capability gap that other U.S. Government agencies, such as the DOD must fill temporarily. Temporary gap- fillers create imperfect solutions and inconsistent outcomes.
Thus, the product of the security assistance activities performed by the temporary gap fillers is a partner-nation law enforcement element lacking a solid foun-dation for future growth. To comprehensively address this issue and to further assist partner-nations address their internal security concerns, the U.S. Government must develop a permanent civil-military professional policing component (constabulary) capable of creat-ing, traincreat-ing, and advising existing partner-nations.
Establishing this capability under the management of one Department (such as DHS) rapidly closes this pronounced gap.
A U.S. civil-military constabulary component should be developed in the historical context of the Texas Rangers and have the specific mission and the necessary deployment capabilities to deal with com-plex contingency operations like the French Gendar-merie National and the Italian Carabinieri do. It is imperative for the U.S. Government to leverage state and local law enforcement personnel to provide
ex-perienced policing capabilities to enhance the effec-tiveness of a civil-military constabulary police force.
Furthermore, in an effort to develop this strategy, a National Security Staff led review must assess legal authorities, related policy constraints, Congressional funding, authorities and budgets, necessary to build this capacity. Finally, adopting this paradigm enhanc-es partner-nation security forcenhanc-es and allows the DOD to concentrate on winning the Nation’s war, deterring potential adversaries and defending the homeland.
ENDNOTES
1. Robert M. Gates, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Wash-ington, D.C: The Pentagon, February 2010), 13.
2. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Foreign Aid: Po-lice Training and Assistance (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, March 1992), 1, http://archive.gao.gov/t2p-bat7/145909.pdf (accessed March 4, 2010).
3. Ibid.
4. Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 (P.L. 93-189, sec 2, 87 stat 714, 716, Quoted in U.S. Government Accountability Office, For-eign Aid: Police Training and Assistance (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Accountability Office, March 1992), 2, http://archive.
gao.gov/ t2pbat7/145909.pdf (accessed March 4, 2010).
5. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Foreign Aid: Po-lice Training and Assistance (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, March 1992), 3. http://archive.gao.gov/t2p-bat7/145909.pdf (accessed March 4, 2010).
6. Ibid.
7. 22 U.S.C. 2364, http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/22/2364.
html (accessed March 4, 2010).
176
8. Nina M. Serafino, “The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance: Background, Major Issues, and Options for Congress,” Congressional Research Service RL34639 (December 9, 2008), 86.
9. Ibid.
10. Robert A. Perito, Where is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him? America’s Search for a Postconflict Stability Force (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, 2004), 324
11. “The U.S. military has conducted security operations since the birth of the Republic, from the Whiskey Rebellion in 1794 to today’s insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. Federal forces oc-cupied the defeated South from 1865 until 1877, and military ac-tivities associated with America’s westward expansion included many aimed at enforcing law and order in rough frontier commu-nities lacking effective civil enforcement. More recently, military forces have performed domestic security missions ranging from riot control and counterdrug operations to border control. Since the attacks of 11 September 2001, the military’s role in homeland security only has expanded. Abroad, security operations have been required in nearly every war the Nation has fought, during both hostilities and incident to post-war occupations. The dura-tion of these operadura-tions occasionally has been controversial but, until fairly recently, not the need for them. During the Cold War, however, with U.S. joint forces tasked largely with helping to de-fend allied nations that would be responsible for securing their own populations, security capabilities such as civil affairs person-nel and military police units were curtailed or shifted to the Re-serve Components, and both the doctrine and training associated with security operations tended to lapse.” See U.S. Department of Defense, Capstone Concept for Joint Operations v. 3.0 (Washing-ton, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, January 15, 2009), 16.
12.COL Bryan G. Watson, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Three Pitfalls of Adaptive Planning, USAWC Warfighting Studies Pro-gram Research Paper (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War Col-lege, 2005), 2
13. Ibid., 3
14. Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II, the Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York:
Pantheon Books, 2006), 150.
15. Ibid., 155.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid..
19. Ibid.
20. The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan, national institution established and funded by Con-gress located in Washington, D.C. Robert M. Perito directs the USIPs Initiative on Security Sector Governance under the Centers of Innovation. He is also a senior program officer in the Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations where he directs the Haiti and the Peacekeeping Lessons Learned Projects. Perito came to USIP in 2001 as a senior fellow in the Jennings Randolph Fellowship program. Before joining the Institute, he was a For-eign Service officer with the U.S. Department of State, retiring with the rank of minister-counselor. He served as deputy execu-tive secretary of the National Security Council (1988-1989).” The United States Institute for Peace Home Page, http://www.army.mil (accessed March 4, 2010).
21 Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II, the Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York:
Pantheon Books, 2006), 158.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
178 27. Ibid.
28. Ibid. 157.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Robert A. Perito, Where is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him? America’s Search for a Postconflict Stability Force (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, 2004), 33.
32. Erwin A. Schmidl, “Police Functions in Peace Operations:
A Historical Overview,” in Policing the New World Disorder, ed.
Robert Oakley, Michael Dziedzic, and Eliot Goldberg (Washing-ton, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1998),22, quoted in Robert A. Perito, Where is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him?
America’s Search for a Postconflict Stability Force (Washington, DC:
United States Institute for Peace, 2004), 33.
33. Charles, Moskos, Jr., Peace Soldiers: The Sociology of a Unit-ed Nations Military Force (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1076), 93 and 130, quoted in Robert A. Perito, Where is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him? America’s Search for a Postconflict Sta-bility Force (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, 2004), 34.
34. Don M. Snider, Ph.D., and Maj. Kimberly Field, memo-randum to the Strategic Studies Institute’s Research and Publica-tion Board on “A Constabulary Force: Impacts on Force Structure and Culture” project, U.S. Military Academy, August 11, 2000, quoted in Robert A. Perito, Where is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him? America’s Search for a Postconflict Stability Force (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, 2004), 34.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid., 47.
37. Ibid.
38. William Rosenau, “Peace Operations, Emergency Law Enforcement, and Constabulary Forces, in Peace Operations: De-veloping an American Strategy,” ed. Antonia Chayes and George T. Raach (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995), quoted in Robert A. Perito, Where is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him? America’s Search for a Postconflict Stability Force (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, 2004), 47.
39. The Texas Rangers Home Page, http://www.lsjunction.com/
facts/rangers.htm (accessed January 17, 2010).
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. Robert A. Perito, Where is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him? America’s Search for a Postconflict Stability Force (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, 2004), 37.
43. Ibid.
44. Ministere de la defense “Gendarmerie National,” http://
www.defense.gouv.fr/gendarmerie/ votre_espace/contents_in_english/
introduction.html (accessed October 1, 2009).
45. Ibid. “Special units of the Department Gendarmerie total approximately 4,500 personnel. These units included the Repub-lican Guard, units for the protection of commercial aviation, units that conduct criminal investigations for the judicial police, units that carry out surveillance duties, investigate traffic law viola-tions, and protect mountain regions.”
46. Ibid.,
47. “In Europe, the French Gendarmerie is actively involved in the European Union’s (EU) criminal intelligence agency Eu-ropol, and other regional organizations that are committed to law enforcement cooperation and collaboration. The French Gendar-merie has a special cooperative agreement with other European constabulary forces, specifically, the Spanish Guardia Civil, Ital-ian Carabinieri, and the Portuguese Republic National Guard.”
See Robert A. Perito, Where is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him?
180
America’s Search for a Postconflict Stability Force (Washington, DC:
United States institute for Peace, 2004), 38.
48. Arma dei Carabinieri Home Page, http://www.carabinieri..
it/Internet/Multilingua/EN/.htm (accessed September 16, 2009) 49. Robert A. Perito, Where is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him? America’s Search for a Postconflict Stability Force (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, 2004), 39.
50. Ibid. “Specialized units answer to other government min-istries including Health, Culture, Labor, Agriculture, and Foreign Affairs. The Carabinieri units function both as military police and an internal security force. Duties range from criminal investiga-tion to riot control to border patrol, and they often operate in tan-dem with regular army units.”
51. Ibid.
52. Arma dei Carabinieri Home Page, http://www.carabinieri.
it/Internet/Multilingua/EN/.htm (accessed September 16, 2009) 53. Robert A. Perito, Where is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him? America’s Search for a Postconflict Stability Force (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, 2004), 39.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
56. Ministere de la defense “Gendarmerie National,” http://
www.defense.gouv.fr/gendarmerie/ votre_espace/contents_in_english/
introduction.html (accessed October 1, 2009).
57. Arma dei Carabinieri Home Page, http://www.carabinieri.
it/Internet/Multilingua/EN/.htm (accessed September 16, 2009) 58. Michael Chertoff, One Team, One Mission, Securing Our Homeland, U.S. Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan fiscal Years 2008-2013 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008), 3
59. Ibid., 38-39.
60. Col R. Scott Buran, Creating a National Constabulary – A Strategy to Secure the U.S. Homeland, CMC Fellow Research Paper (Washington, D.C.: the Brookings Institution, June2005), 33.
61. Cresencio Arcos, “The Role of the Department of Home-land Security Overseas,” June 7, 2004, http//www.heritage.org/Re-search/HomelnadSecurity/hl840.cfm accessed December 6,2009), 1.
62. Ibid., 2.
63. Ibid.
64. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Foreign Aid: Po-lice Training and Assistance (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, March 1992), 13, http://archive.gao.gov/t2p-bat7/145909.pdf (accessed March 4, 2010).
65. International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, “ICITAP Strategic Plan,” http://www.justice.gov/criminal/
icitap/ (accessed February 28, 2010).
66. “Created by the Congress in January 2004, the Millenni-um Challenge Corporation (MCC) is an independent U.S. foreign aid agency focused on global poverty. The MCC provides well- performing countries with large-scale grants to fund country-led solutions for reducing poverty through sustainable economic growth. MCC grants complement other U.S. and international development programs.” The Millennium Challenge Corporation Home Page, http://www.mcc.gov/mcc/about/ index.shtml (accessed March 25, 2010).
67. Ibid., 2.
68. Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Legal Attaché Offices,”
http://www.fbi.gov/contact/legat/ legat.htm (accessed October 23, 2009).
69. Federal Bureau of Investigation, “The Iraqi Training Ini-tiative,” http://www.fbi.gov/page2/ nov5/itau110905.htm (accessed October 27, 2009).
182 70. Ibid.
71. U.S. Department of State Bureau of Diplomatic Security,
“2008 Year in Review,” http://www.state.gov/documents/organiza-tion/121616.pdf (accessed October 27, 2009).
72. Ibid.
73. Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Protecting America Against Terrorist Attack, A Closer look at Our Joint Terrorism Task Force,” http://www.fbi.gov/page2/May09/jttfs_052809.html (ac-cessed December 7, 2009).
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid.
76. Robert M. Gates, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, D.C: The Pentagon, February 2010), 73.
77. U.S. Department of Defense. Speech by Secretary of De-fense Robert M. Gates, the “Landon Lecture” delivered at Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas, November 26, 2007. Ac-cessed through http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches; last acAc-cessed July 22, 2008. (accessed January 17, 2010).