Identified factors that impede the establishment of private natural reserves

5.2.4.1. Land tenure situation

The disorganised situation of land tenure is the main legal factor preventing the establishment of the proposed reserves. Since land titles are the main requirement for private land conservation and most proprietors do still not have them, they are not allowed to participate in biodiversity conservation.

The majority of landowners in the region received their land from the government in the last decades under the condition to work and invest in production activities. Because of failures in land policies and the governmental administration, land titling and control of the legal use of the land have not been carried out for a long time; as a consequence, conflicts have emerged, for instance, the overlapping of ownerships, and no recognition of indigenous territories. This situation affects as well the study zone as the majority of rural areas in Bolivia.

Since 1996, the process of land tenure regularisation and land cadastre has been undertaken in order to solve the irregular situation of properties. The main task of this process is the evaluation of social and economic functions (SEF) of rural lands. The SEF is the main precondition to own land; it establishes that the land has to be used for subsistence farming, large-scale production and conservation, in order to avoid land accumulation for illegal traffic. However, this process is being accomplished very slowly due to bureaucratic procedures. Thus, in the study zone, by the end of 2003, not a single landowner has managed to obtain his land title.

The establishment of Natural Heritage Private Reserves (NHPR) is currently the most important legal way to conduct conservation on private land fulfilling the legal requirements (i.e. the SEF). The major constraint is that land titles are required in this process. The majority of proprietors are still undergoing the titling process and cannot establish private reserves.

In conclusion, the legal rules are pushing landowners to reject wildlife protection and to choose exclusively agricultural systems that destroy valuable biological areas. Forestry use in private holdings faces the same legal constrains.

5.2.4.2. Lack of incentives and economic rents

The private land conservation has no effective incentives in Bolivia. Among the benefits of establishing private reserves, the recognition of land property rights and the juridical security are the most frequently expected advantages by the owners, according to the outcomes of the research. However, because of the lack of land titles the owners cannot get the approval of their reserves and consequently they cannot get the juridical protection. The other given benefit: the land tax exoneration is little attractive given the low cost of it and the weak system of tax control.

In this situation, there are no desirable incentives to offer to the majority of proprietors in the study region, since they are looking for alternatives of land-use that could be compatible with the land policies.

Although the necessity to demonstrate legal land rights and adequate land-use has increased the interest in private reserves, in the majority of cases it is a temporal motivation to gain time waiting for future economic alternatives. In this context, if private conservation does not offer economic rents or as a minimum the opportunity cost for land-use, then private reserves may last short periods of time only.

Economic compensation or subsidies for private land conservation seem to be the best way to promote private conservation, but there are only remote possibilities to implement sustainable systems of compensation in Bolivia due to poverty. In addition, the experiences in Latin America show that direct economic incentives have not been perfect to improve conservation (see chapter 2.3.).

5.2.4.3. Bureaucratic technical and legal procedures

The administrative and legal process of establishing a private reserve is based on a long and bureaucratic procedure that disincentives private initiatives of conservation.

The process is characterised by long periods of waiting and significant costs, which include the carrying out of land-use planning and management plans. This is another reason that impede the establishment of private reserves.

The governmental organisations in charge of carrying out these procedures present on the one hand several limitations and on the other hand a lack of coordination. Concerning the limitations, it can be observed that in the Forest and Agrarian Superintendence there is little personnel available to control and revise technical and legal documents. In addition, the centralised structure determines a waste of long periods of time waiting for decision from the central offices located in the capital far from the study zone, even though some technical or administrative resolutions could be taken in the local offices. With regard to the problems of coordination, several institutions (the Forestry Superintendence, the Agrarian Superintendence, the National Office of land (INRA)) are involved in the approval of private reserves, so that proprietors are exposed in some cases to a duplication of requirements and waiting time.

Under these circumstances, a privileged treatment for proprietors who want to set aside areas for biodiversity conservation could be a major incentive, as well as a general decentralisation of the process.

5.2.4.4. Restrictions on land use in private reserves

The establishment of private reserves determines a strong restriction (see 2.3.1.b) on land use.

This is very favourable for biodiversity development. Nevertheless, from an economic point of view, the imposition of strict limitations might be another obstacle considering that a lot of owners have to spend economic resources to maintain the conservation instead of gaining money through it.

Thus the redefinition of restrictions for private reserves and the creation of categories that allow more possible combinations between production and conservation may enhance the participation of owners who want to take part in conservation but reject it because of the strong legal rules and compromises.

5.2.4.5. Weak institutional capacity for the enforcement of private conservation norms

The enforcement of environmental laws in Bolivia represents the main institutional problem for conservation issues. Institutions in charge of regulating and monitoring the fulfilment of legal environmental rules have several weaknesses (for instance, lack of economic resources, lack of knowledge about private conservation, etc.) to achieve their duties.

In the case of private land conservation, landowners who participate in the first attempts have become disappointed because of the lack of governmental support, in particular when their reserves were affected by external agents like hunters, loggers, fire from neighbourhoods.

With the beginning of this century, the invasions of lands by colonists calling for fair free distribution of land have increased. This is probably the main threat that concerns the proprietors of private reserves. In cases of invasion, governmental institutions have had a lot of difficulties to control the invaders and in some cases they could not even intervene due to the social and political pressures. Currently, the first private reserve established in Bolivia in 2001 (property “El Porvenir” located in Santa Cruz) is occupied by colonists.

5.3. Recommended measures and strategies to