Government Control, Public Service Broadcasting and Issues of Censorship

As shown, none of the stations was completely free from government control. The role of broadcasters was not perceived as informing the public or keeping politics in check; rather they were supposed to act as mouthpieces of government, informing the public on government decisions instead of analysing or challenging policies of

go-vernment and opposition. Journalists' role in general was rather seen to help 'building the nation'. Although especially the state broadcasters were nominally independent, they fostered censorship in the interest of the government in many indirect ways. It is, however, difficult to assess the amount of censorship, as it was not executed openly most of the time.

Censorship is a complex mixture of real external control mechanisms in a given media institution (or, for that matter, company) and preconceived ideas of journalists about what they can and cannot (or should and should not) publicise and the conse-quences of trying to do so despite the possibility of conflict. Censorship and selfcen-sorship open a central field of agency for journalists, as they have an impact on jour-nalistic ethos and influence the everyday workings of media institutions.

Censorship is an everyday practice in many media institutions. Academic re-search usually focuses on politically motivated censorship carried out by party or state agencies. Other categories are military censorship, religious censorship and the censoring of "obscenities". That censorship is not a thing of the past, even in demo-cratic Western countries that pride themselves in their free media, is shown by the heated debates on censorship of (child) pornograhy and politically or religiously "ex-tremist" contents on websites. These debates evolve around socially, historically and culturally established norms of decency and acceptability. At the same time, govern-ments refuse to publish sensitive docugovern-ments for reasons of national security.²²² Only recently have media, journalism and communication scholars started to analyse cen-sorship against the background of economic developments by looking at the complex linkages of media conglomerates.²²³ There are many examples where media compa-nies such as publishing houses censor magazines, journals or books for reasons of economic interest to either of the publishing house itself or companies that belong to the group that owns the media institution.²²⁴ In the context of this study, politically mo-tivated and military censorship are of primary interest.

Censorship in most of the stations analysed here was seldom an open procedure.

222 Recent events, for example the scandals involving the Abu Ghraib prison, or the publication of se-cret communication of the US Army in Iraq and US diplomats around the world, show the general interest of political and military institutions to control information.

223 cf. Leidinger, Christiane. 2003. Medien – Herrschaft – Globalisierung. Folgenabschätzung zu Me-dieninhalten im Zuge transnationaler Kommunikationsprozesse, Münster; Phillips, Peter/Project Censored (eds.) 2006. Censored 2006: The Top 25 Censored Stories, New York.

224 cf. Leidinger 2003.

In general, laws that stipulate censorship exhibit only vague definitions, which gives the censors significant leverage vis-à-vis the journalists.

The most outspoken case of censorship was the SWABC's policy code. Addi-tionally, the system of SWABC was structured to ensure that only persons who could be trusted to present the political situation in the correct way were admitted to re-sponsible positions. This went so far that only broadcasters with Afrikaner back-ground were admitted to ideologically important positions in the direction of contribu-tion centres and in the core of the News Desk in Pettenkofer Street. These journalists can now claim there was no censorship in SWABC: "I compiled my news stories throughout the day, and sent them through to Windhoek, but I can't remember one in-stance where they told me 'we are not including that story because of politics'. I was never instructed to keep it back."²²⁵

Censorship and selfcensorship are not necessarily disguised. In a war situation, such as the liberation struggle in Southern Africa, propaganda becomes a necessary weapon in the fight. While the UNIP and SWAPO propaganda stations were openly controlled by the liberation movements, they both relied – as did the SWABC – on politically trustworthy staff. As the stations were broadcasting from exile, there was no possibility to uphold an infrastructure of control; the only way to ensure the propagan-distic effectivity was to employ broadcasters that displayed the necessary "commit-ment."²²⁶ There was however no need to disguise that fact – both had openly been established to support the struggle, and both could draw on significant legitimation as they were supported by organisation such as the OAU and the UN. Consequently ex-Voice of Namibia broadcasters don't hide the fact that they were working as propa-gandists: "That was in exile, it was war. There was no play in anything, it's a serious mission. People need to know what is happening, people are fighting, people are dy-ing. We had to focus on what we're dody-ing."²²⁷ Voice of Namibia broadcasters consid-ered themselves not neutral journalists, but fighters for a common cause: "Although I did not fight with a gun, I'm still fighting by mobilizing people through the radio and in-forming them and educating them as well. So it was almost the same, but another front."²²⁸ The same goes for UNIP staff in Tanzania.²²⁹ Selfcensorship in this case was

225 Ibid.

226 Interview Sackey Namugongo, 11.08.2006.

227 Interview Johanna Mwatara, 17.11.2007.

228 Interview Theofilus Ekandjo, 10.11.2007.

229 cf. Andreya Sylvester Masiye's account of his time at the Voice of UNIP. Masiye Andreya S.:

Sing-an open Sing-and to a certain degree conscious practice, not a "scissors in the head". It was legitimised by the common goal of all involved, the struggle for liberation in Southern Africa.

In the colonial stations, selfcensorship and censorship were enmeshed in complex ways. The FBC, for example, kept a tight control over political news and current af-fairs. The Lusaka station could basically only translate what was sent from Salisbury, or programmes were censored by the Ministry of Information – politically, the former CABS was reduced to a mouthpiece of the Federal government. Politics was thor-oughly kept out of programmes:

"We were reasonably free to produce what we wanted, but censorship was there, if the subject was hinging on political development, then some boss form the Ministry would have to listen before it went on the air. You could not just interview somebody who is going to talk about either political ad-vancement or the lack of it without special permission. [...] The government didn't mind, but you could not go to the studio and talk politics in CABS. It was never allowed, because not even the colonial ma-sters spoke about the manner of colonizing as it were. It didn't arise. The objective was totally differ-ent. 'This is not the media for politics', that's what they'd tell you."²³⁰

In an autobiographical account, ex-broadcaster Andreya Sylvester Masiye de-scribed in detail censorship practices in the FBC:

"In Lusaka, an expatriate with no journalistic training or experience was put in charge of our news nerve-centre. His duty was to monitor the Salisbury newscast. He would record the English bulletin and transcribe or rewrite it in accordance with telegraphed instructions from the federal headquarters.

These instructions invariably led to the blue-pencilling of certain items which the federal authorities deemed unsuitable for the majority of African listeners. In some cases, whole news items were re-placed by new versions. In others, paragraphs were completely rewritten."²³¹

Both the Northern Rhodesian Information Department and the FBC also maintain-ed a monitoring system, employing missionaries to listen in to African language pro-grammes and letting African translators read translated items back to their superiors in English.²³²

As the examples show, censorship practices varied according to the form of go-vernment, ideological tenets and general attitude of politicians towards the media.

Colonial governments used the radio as an instrument of propagating government

ing for Freedom. Zambia's struggle for African government, Nairobi et al. 1977.

230 Interview Cosmo Mlongoti, 10.10.2006.

231 Masiye 1977, 35.

232 Northern Rhodesia Information Department: Annual Report for the Year 1956, 12. NAZ 15/87.

policies and information control. Post-colonial politicians saw the electronic media as instruments of nation-building, but this was, in their mind, connected to the govern-ment of the day. For them, criticising governgovern-ment actions or even individual members of government amounted to compromising the nation-building process. In post-colo-nial Zambia, UNIP in power became more and more authoritarian, connected to the party's attitude towards nation-building and an increasing tendency to see political conflict as a risk to national unity. As shown, this was reflected in the government's policy towards the media in general and the broadcaster in particular. Broadcasters in ZBS were employed as civil servants and as such, had a duty towards the govern-ment of the day: "Once you joined the institution, you were being oriented for three months. During this period, you were told the function of the particular institution you were joining."²³³ Some, who joined broadcasting after this change, joined as civil ser-vants and were trained in that vein. The situation was clear to everybody: "So we were being controlled by the state. And you also knew what to do, because you can't just go on air and say something which'll not please the Government. You'll be in trouble."²³⁴ The attitudes of politicians towards "their" broadcasters could border on the absurd:

"In the TV in Kitwe, the producer and his cameraman were covering a group of politicians. They took a little longer to pack up equipment and travel back to point B, to cover another political group of the ruling party. So when they got there, they explained and apologised, but the guy said 'You should have given me priority, because I am the minister.' And it didn't end there. This chap complained to the Minister of Information [...] Those chaps ended up being suspended from service, they remained on suspension for about two, three years. Ultimately, there was a court case. Meanwhile, the government built up such a big case out of it and they were seen out of service. This was a protracted case. It in-volved one of my best TV cameramen, Moses Phiri. Up to now, I'm not sure even if the Supreme Court ruled in their favor. They should have been reinstated or be paid, but nothing like that has

happened."²³⁵

A similar attitude toward the media was exhibited by the Namibian government. In 1996, an NBC editor had to defend herself and her colleague against a complaint made to the Board of Governors: "our absence [...] had nothing to do with disrespect or disregard for nation building."²³⁶ A subordinate journalist had failed to report from

233 Interview Mwansa Kapeya, 19.12.2007.

234 Interview Emelda Yumbe, 27.12.2007.

235 Interview Cosmo Mlongoti, 10.10.2006.

236 Internal Memorandum, Ass. Editor TV News Input to Cont.: News and Current Affairs, 22.11.1996, ebd. The complaint mentioned that a report had been promised, but the editor explained that such promises were generally not made.

an event in which the Prime Minister personally handed over a donation to a school in the North of Namibia.²³⁷

From 1964 on, the Zambian government exerted more and more control over the broadcaster, as well as on other media.²³⁸ Although theoretically, the constitution gua-ranteed the freedom of the press, it managed to exert more and more influence on editorial decisions through other means – for example, by banning expatriate jour-nalists from the country. The question here is not only what the attitude of the govern-ment was towards the media, but also what possibilities the governgovern-ment had of inter-fering in editorial decisions. In Namibia after 1990, the new Swapo government was under internal as well as external pressure to form a political order in Namibia orien-ted towards democracy and a free market economy. Although the SWAPO movement in exile had, as shown, developed a tendency towards an authoritarian style of

politics, the Swapo party after independence committed itself to democratic rule. This was reflected in the constitution of the NBC, which had considerable editorial free-dom, as well as in the general media legislation. The Swapo government was interna-tionally acclaimed for its commitment to a liberal media environment – the legislation provided for private as well as community broadcasting.²³⁹ Possibilities for govern-ment influence, although still existing, were limited significantly. Nevertheless, go-vernment representatives, as in Zambia, tried to interfere with editorial decisions. At the same time, many ex-VoN journalists and ex-SWAPO cadres felt loyal to the party.

NBC broadcaster Norah Appolus described the balancing act between the different loyalities: "I would always protect Swapo, but I would do it in a way that didn't compromise the work of the NBC."²⁴⁰ In several occasions, broadcasters were com-promised by their proximity to Swapo.²⁴¹ However, in a media environment that

allow-237 Regional Manager: Oshiwambo Service to Controller: News and Current Affairs, 27.11.1996.

238 In the course of the years between 1964 and 1973, conflicts between parts of the Zambian press and the UNIP party and government intensified. The government interfered more and more in editorial decisions, and even banned expatriate editors and journalists from the country. It had taken over the weekly Central African Mail in 1965 out of fear that the major newspapers in the country would all belong to the same expatriate company, Lonrho. Eventually, after the formation of the one-party state, UNIP took control over the major daily newspaper, the Times of Zambia, in 1975. After that, all mass media were in the hand of either the government or the party, up to the end of UNIP rule in 1991. cf. Kasoma 1986; Makungu 2004, 13-20.

239 Namibian Broadcasting Act, 1991. NBC Information Services, no call number.

240 Interview Norah Appolus, 24.11.2007.

241 News editor Sackey Namugongo was attacked in the press in 1990 for addressing a Swapo rally he originally attended as a reporter. The incident led to a policy decision by the Broadcasting Board that although reporters could be members of a party, they should refrain from being actively involved in politics. cf. "Active politics out!", Times of Namibia, 28.06.1990; "NBC reporter in the soup for for addressing Swapo rally", Windhoek Observer 30.06.1990

ed for an oppositional and independent press, the government's position towards the NBC was critically scrutinised by other media. In such an environment, instances of government interference were constantly checked by a free press that had a watchful eye on the NBC. During the term of office of the first Broadcasting Board and the first DG, however, the Ministry of Information increasingly put pressure on the NBC ma-nagement to comply with Swapo's demands. The first DG of the station, Nahum Go-relick, summarises:

"I think it was more a human capacity problem than it was at the beginning a financial problem in really changing this process. A lot of us had gone through education with communication and broad-casting and worked in, not direct, but very close to the political realm and were very aware of how the ideas of the day were developing. But generally, people on the ground, the programme makers and the programme developers were still the old school. [...] But I think as that started moving, there was also a realisation, not only on NBC, [...] a certain political view of maybe partly paranoia, but also partly of control, and I think the stronger that view became, the more they felt that, the way that broadcasting was going, they needed to turn down the screws."²⁴²

Censorship, as becomes clear from these examples, is the result of a complex mixture of political intentions, legislation, infrastructural possibilities and necessities, and a general attitude of politicians as well as managers, editors and broadcasters themselves. While politicians in general tend to try to influence media coverage, le-gislative and infrastructural premises are decisive in guaranteeing autonomous and critical media. The examples cited here offer a wide spectrum of gradations of cen-sorship and selfcencen-sorship; however, in all instances, broadcasters retained possibili-ties of agency. All these conditions determined the attitude of broadcasters in the stations, and were reflected in the programmes.

242 Interview Nahum Gorelick, 29.08.2006.