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I. Introduction

1. Decolonisation, the State and Nationalism in Sub-Saharan Africa

"[…] that was the cornerstone of our radio service in propaganda, in psychological warfare. [...] This message [...] must have all the ingredients: Unifying the people. Inform the people about the importance of unity. [...] Tell them how bad is apartheid."

Sackey Namugongo, Interview 11.08.2006

This quote by the ex-Director of the Voice of Namibia, the external propaganda

–, but also by a change in ways of reading from learning by heart to reflective reading) over debates on whether housewives should listen to radio all day to, post 1945, the alleged dangers of comic books, video games, and internet surfing for children. cf. Bösch, Frank. 2011.

Mediengeschichte (Historische Einführungen 10), Frankfurt, 149-51.

6 cf. Bösch 2011; Briggs, Asa/Peter Burke. 2002. A Social History of the Media: from Gutenberg to the Internet, Cambridge; Chapman, Jane. 2005. Comparative Media History: an Introduction – 1789 to the Present, Cambridge.

7 Vokes, Richard. 2007. Charisma, Creativity, and Cosmopolitanism: a Perspective on the Power of the New Radio Broadcasting in Uganda and Rwanda, in: Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 13, 805-824, 807.

station of the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) during the years of the armed struggle against the South African occupation of Namibia, indicates that movements for national liberation during decolonisation could only effectively mobi-lise significant mass support by conceptualising national unity in an enmity against an oppressive and exploitative alien force. As Eric Hobsbawm writes, national liberation was first and foremost "anti-imperial".8 Additionally, most followed Kwame Nkrumah's advice to first seek the political kingdom, and all else would be added; "a central maxim of which the truth appeared self-evident: once sovereignty was seized by Afri-cans no matter under what conditions, the road to freedom and development would be theirs to follow."9 After the transfer of power, however, it became clear that the pro-cess of decolonisation encompassed structural, social and cultural issues that went far beyond political change. Nationalism as a mobilising ideology gave way to con-cepts of 'nation-building' that sought to integrate the population on the respective ter-ritory into the nation-state.

This process of nation-building was to be achieved first and foremost by means of ideology: constructing a space of experience, shared values and culture that made people identify as Zambians rather than Bemba or Lozi, as Namibians rather than German or Ovambo. This was a problem they shared with many new nations, includ-ing those of nineteenth-century Europe, and that the Italian nationalist Massimo d'Azeglio had expressed in the phrase: "We have made Italy, now we have to make Italians."10 This is in tune with the constructivist line of nationalism theory, which em-phasises the virtuality of the nation, its connection to modern society and technology, and its constructedness. That the idea of 'Italians' or 'Zambians' as a national com-munity was even possible, argues Benedict Anderson, was the result of several con-fluent processes which he ascribes to the development of capitalism and print tech-nology. "Print-capitalism", for Anderson, is the developing of media, specifically newspapers and the novel, under conditions of a capitalist market. Besides playing a major role in the development of language into "national vernaculars", both helped to make imaginable a community that went beyond their immediate social environment.

By separating history from cosmology, these media established new temporalities,

8 Hobsbawm, Eric. 1990. Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality, Cambridge, 137.

9 Davidson, Basil. 1992. The Black Man's Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State, Oxford, 162. The full quote reads: "Seek ye first the political kingdom and all else shall be added onto you."

10 Hobsbawm 1990, 44.

especially a sense of simultaneity that allowed for connections to be made between the protagonists of a novel or between the different events described in the same edi-tion of a newspaper. While the protagonists of a novel, Anderson argues, need not even meet each other, they are connected through a chain of events. The "imagined community", then is one of people one will never know personally, but are neverthe-less connected to oneself. The newspaper, by reporting events under the heading of one specific date, "provides the essential connection – the steady onward clocking of homogeneous, empty time."11

These arguments, and similar ones made by Ernest Gellner, provide an important perspective on the role of media in the development of the nation-state model and its geographical spread over the globe in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries.

Gellner, in "Nations and Nationalism", states quite bluntly that media content "matters precious little", and argues that it is the form of media, "the pervasiveness and impor-tance of abstract, centralised, standardised, one to many communication, which itself automatically engenders the core idea of nationalism, quite irrespective of what in particular is being put into the specific messages transmitted."12 Anderson's work fur-ther elaborates this point. For him, the changes in communication technology and its use in capitalist economies form one of the most important factors in enabling individ-ual members of societies to imagine themselves to be part of a national community.

While Gellner emphasizes aspects of technological and social change towards mo-dern societies, Anderson, although firmly rooted in the argument that nationalism is a modern phenomenon, focuses on the constructedness of the nation and the role of media, particularly print as the mass medium of the 19th Century, in the process. Nev-ertheless, his argument is primarily built on the form of a mass medium, not the con-tent.

The constructivist argument has been challenged, most importantly by Anthony Smith. For the purpose of this thesis, one of his arguments is particularly compelling:

nationalist elites did not construct the nation out of nowhere, or simply "invent" tradi-tions13, but were "archeologists" in that they resurrected older myths and ethnic sym-bols that were then transformed into national symsym-bols. His critique of the modernist

11 all quotes from: Anderson, Benedict. 22006 (1991). Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, London/New York, 33.

12 Gellner, Ernest. 1983. Nations and Nationalism, Ithaca, 127.

13 this is of course in reaction to the earlier argument about the invention of traditions. Hobsbawm, Eric/Terence Ranger. 1992. The Invention of Tradition, Cambridge.

approach is mainly that it fails "to accord any weight to the pre-existing cultures and ethnic ties of the nations that emerged in the modern epoch, thereby precluding any understanding of the popular roots and widespread appeal of nationalism."14 While there are instances in which nationalists used similar strategies in decolonising states

15, another point of Smiths argument is more important in the context of this thesis:

the history of the success of the nation-state in the 19th and 20th Centuries cannot be written without looking at its popular roots, i.e. the way nationalism resonated with 'the masses'. However, Smith argues that "what gives nationalism its power are the myths, memories, traditions, and symbols of ethnic heritages" and their reinterpreta-tion and reappropriareinterpreta-tion by "nareinterpreta-tionalist intelligentsias"16; but most sub-Saharan Afri-can nations17 could not possibly do that as their borders were too obviously artificial, drawn by the very same oppressors they had just liberated themselves from. Smith has himself stated that in most African and Asian states, "the nation cannot be any-thing but an imagined, and very recent, community, one that is being quite deliber-ately engineered in often polyethnic societies."18 Robert Rotberg called the African nations which developed out of colonial territories "nations of intent."19 In many ac-counts, academic or journalistic, the 'failure' of African states has often been attri-buted to this 'artificiality'.20 But, as a closer look at the contemporary history of the continent shows, and as many analysts have since pointed out, the nation state in

14 Smith, Anthony. 1999. Myths and Memories of the Nation, Oxford, 9. emphasis mine.

15 in Zambia, for example, the nationalist UNIP government promoted rituals like the Makishi dance as "national" in propaganda films and radio broadcasts. The Makishi dance probably originated as a ritual connected to boys' intitiation (mukanda) in the Lunda and Luvale regions in north-western Zambia, but was described by David Livingstone (who seems to have been horrified at this "heathen ritual") in the mid-19th century as a part of Lozi festivals in Barotseland, where initiation ceremonies for either boys or girls are unknown. Barotseland, with its special status as a Queens' protectorate, is also the source of the second widely promoted example for "Zambian culture", the Kuomboka festival marking the move of the Litunga and his court from the flood plain of the Zambesi to higher ground at the end of the rainy season. Thus, while these rituals had ex-isted for a long time and had crossed regional, language and ethnic boundaries long before the independence or even the colonial conquest of Zambia, both have been reinterpreted in a nation-al framework. The Kuomboka is still broadcast on nationnation-al television, and both ritunation-als are promo-ted as tourist events in the country. cf. Herbert, Eugenia W. 2002. Twilight on the Zambezi: Late Colonialism in Central Africa, Houndmills, 58f.

16 Ibid.

17 A notable exception is Ethiopia; the case could also be argued for Lesotho and Swaziland, although their complete economic dependence from the Apartheid state denied them real national autonomy.

18 Smith 1999, 166.

19 Rotberg, Robert I. 1966. African Nationalism: Concept or Confusion?, in: JMAS 4:1, 33-46, 37.

20 cf. for current examples Alberto Alesina/William Easterly and Janina Matuszeski. 2006. Artificial States (NBER Working Paper 12328), Cambridge; Englebert, Peter/Stacy Tarango and Matthew Carter. 2002. Dismemberment and Suffocation: A Contribution to the Debate on African

Boundaries, in: Comparative Political Studies 35:10, 1093-1118.

Africa has proven quite stable.21 This is especially true in the cases presented here, where regional or 'ethnic' conflicts have never threatened the integrity of the nation state as a whole.

Other analysts radicalised the constructivist approach in trying to answer the question of the persistence of the nation as reference for social and political practices as well as identity. Rogers Brubaker argues that even the constructivist approach falls into the trap of treating "nations as real entities", adopting "categories of practice as categories of analysis."22 Starting with his research of nationalism in and after the Soviet Union, he opts for an analysis of the nation "not as substance but as institu-tionalised form, not as collectivity but as practical category, not as entity but as con-tingent event."23 All three categories will play a role in the following chapters, but it is the third – the nation as contingent event – that is most important in analysing the role of electronic mass media in "performing the nation."24 In pursuing this task, Mi-chael Billig's notion of "banal nationalism" is helpful. By placing nationalist passion in times of crisis or "exotic" right-wing radicalism in the focus of analysis, he argues, scholars neglect the daily reproduction of nationalist sentiment: "The metonymic im-age of banal nationalism is not a flag which is being consciously waved with fervent passion; it is the flag hanging unnoticed on the public building."25 In that vein, Chapter 4 looks not just at those programmes that celebrated the nation openly (like live re-portage from independence celebrations, or programmes designed for nation-build-ing), but takes into account everyday programming, including music and 'unpolitical' entertainment programmes. Billig's argument that cultural forms such as these play an important role in making nationalism 'common sense' is useful for an analysis of media and the relations between media content and consumption, in that it is the ne-cessary consequence of Anderson's idea of the central role of mass media in

nation-21 Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz have pointed to the fact that ethnic communities in post-colonial Africa are also "imagined" and question the idea that states in Africa have to follow the pattern of the European nation state. Rather, they argue, one should "try to understand the extent to which the Western model inherited at independence has been reconstructed by the Africanisa-tion of the noAfricanisa-tion of political legitimacy." An "ethnic bias" in a politician may well be considered de-sirable by voters and does not necessarily threaten their commitment to the nation state as political arena. Chabal, Patrick/Jean-Pascal Daloz. 1999. Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument, Oxford/Bloomington, 53f. and 57.

22 Brubaker, Rogers. 1996. Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe, Cambridge, 15. emphasis in the original.

23 Ibid., 18.

24 thus the title of a work on the political uses of music in Tanzania: Askew, Kelly. 2002. Performing the Nation: Swahili Music and Cultural Politics in Tanzania, Chicago.

25 Billig, Michael. 1996. Banal Nationalism, London/Thousand Oaks/New Delhi, 8.

alism. Contrary to Billig's broad criticism, Anderson was not interested in the pas-sions, but in the underlying social processes that made the passions possible in the first place.

The question for a history of nationalism and the nation in Africa remains: what was the driving force that ensured nationalist movements mass support, until well af-ter the independence of the respective country? Basil Davidson has suggested that mass support of anticolonial movements in Africa was driven by social struggles ra-ther than genuinely felt nationalism – in this, Davidson argues, they do not differ much from nationalist movements in 19th century Europe.26 Other studies point to the social stratification in play in nationalist movements, arguing that many were driven by a growing urban middle class and an elite that had been educated in European, often missionary, schools.27 As Terence Ranger has shown in his influential study, a social foundation for mass nationalism had also been laid by what he calls "primary resistance" movements, early anticolonial movements that often had a charismatic and/or religious character and managed to mobilise significant parts of the rural po-pulation. The most important connection for him is one of "types of political organisa-tion or inspiraorganisa-tion" that emerged in the "primary" movements and were taken over by the "secondary", nationalist movements. But besides the "direct physical" links Ran-ger also made out "indirect symbolic" connections.28 In the case of Zambia, social un-rest organised by labour unions, spiritual rural movements and organisations of a Western-educated elite all laid the foundation for political nationalist organisations such as the African National Congress (ANC), which evolved out of middle class-backed Welfare Societies, but was supported by the Northern Rhodesian African Mine Workers' Union. Both direct and indirect connections are at play.29 In Namibia, the history of resistance against German colonisation before the First World War and against the South African mandate and Apartheid after 1923 remained an important

26 Davidson 1992, 165f.

27 Iliffe, John 1995. Africans: the History of a Continent (African Studies Series 85), Cambridge, 249.

for a detailed study of the role of churches and missions (European or African-driven) cf. Cruz e Silva, Teresa. 2001. Protestant Churches and the Formation of Political Consciousness in Southern Mozambique, Basel.

28 all quotes from: Ranger, Terence. 1968. Connexions Between 'Primary Resistance' Movements and Modern Mass Nationalism in East and Central Africa: II, in: JAfH 9:4, 631-41, 631-33.

29 Additionally, in the strikes that preceded the merging of unions into the NRAMWU, Watch Tower preachers had supported the strikers and distributed literature of the sect among them. Another spiritual movement, the Lumpa Church, would later develop into such a threat for the nationalist UNIP that it suppressed it brutally. For a history of nationalism in Northern Rhodesia cf. the clas-sic Rotberg, Robert. 1967. The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa: the Case of Malawi and Zambia, 1873-1964, Cambridge.

source of "symbolic" inspiration for nationalist movements, and SWAPO actively worked on incorporating them into a historical myth of nationalist struggle which not only lent the movement its legitimacy, but was also supposed to form the foundation of national identity for Namibians. SWAPO presented itself as the organisation that brought together the different traditions of resistance into the only "nationally organ-ised and politically representative" nationalist movement in Namibia, denying nation-alist parties inside the country their legitimacy.30 In this, the movement brought toge-ther what Frederick Cooper called the "narrative of social mobilization" and the "revo-lutionary narrative."31 While they reflect actual connections, the examples show that nationalist movements also referred to their predecessors and to larger traditions of anticolonial resistance in a conscious effort to place themselves in such traditions and use the mobilising power of these narratives. Mass media were important instruments for establishing such narratives.

Radio was the most important of these media, for several reasons: First, it

reached the majority of the population. Most African states inherited a working broad-casting infrastructure that encompassed most of the geographical area of the new state, and by the time of independence radio sets were affordable for at least the Afri-can middle class. Because it did not need literate consumers, it could reach unedu-cated rural populations more efficiently and directly than newspapers (that needed a few days to reach more remote regions, and then had to be read out to illiterates).

Secondly, it was completely under the control of the state. Where it existed in the form of a parastatal corporation, it was quickly incorporated into the bureaucratic hier-archy. Thirdly, the state held a monopoly over what was, for the larger part of its po-pulation, the most important source for entertainment and information. For a long time, there was no fear of private competition, because either the media laws exclud-ed private enterprise in electronic mexclud-edia, or the initial investment, and therefore the economic risk for private ventures, was too high (as, e.g, in the case of Namibia).

This thesis develops its analysis of the role of radio in decolonisation from two case studies, the decolonisation of Zambia and of Namibia. These are two very dis-tinct cases: the independence of Zambia took place in during the first wave of

decolo-30 Department of Information and Publicity, SWAPO of Namibia. 1981. To Be Born A Nation: the Liberation Struggle for Namibia, London, 176.

31 Cooper, Frederick. 1997. The Dialectics of Decoloization: Nationalism and Labor Movements in Postwar French Africa, in: Cooper, Frederick/Ann Laura Stoler (eds.): Tensions of Empire:

Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London, 406-435, 408.

nisation that swept the African continent between 1958 and 1964, while Namibia (South Africa not being a "colony" in the strict sense) was the last country in the conti-nent to become independent, in a historic context very different from Zambia's. While in Zambia, the nationalist movement, although banned shortly, could accelerate the process of decolonisation by political means, SWAPO took up arms and fought a guerrilla war that would last more than two decades. And while Zambians, being part of the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, had experienced a racially discri-minating settler regime, Apartheid rule in Namibia presents a very specific political and social system. Nevertheless, comparisons can be drawn, and despite all these differences, there are similarities in the way colonial regimes used radio to control in-formation flows and to influence the worldviews of listeners. On the other hand,

nisation that swept the African continent between 1958 and 1964, while Namibia (South Africa not being a "colony" in the strict sense) was the last country in the conti-nent to become independent, in a historic context very different from Zambia's. While in Zambia, the nationalist movement, although banned shortly, could accelerate the process of decolonisation by political means, SWAPO took up arms and fought a guerrilla war that would last more than two decades. And while Zambians, being part of the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, had experienced a racially discri-minating settler regime, Apartheid rule in Namibia presents a very specific political and social system. Nevertheless, comparisons can be drawn, and despite all these differences, there are similarities in the way colonial regimes used radio to control in-formation flows and to influence the worldviews of listeners. On the other hand,